CSA
Summary
Read the report at California State Auditor ↗
Port of Oakland:
Despite Its Overall Financial Success, Recent
Events May Hamper Expansion Plans That
Would Likely Benefit the Port and the Public
October 2001
2001-107
rotiduA
etatS
ainrofilaC
S
T
I
D
U
A
E
T
A
T
S
F
O
U
A
E
R
U
B
The first five copies of each California State Auditor report are free.
Additional copies are $3 each, payable by check or money order.
You can obtain reports by contacting the Bureau of State Audits
at the following address:
California State Auditor
Bureau of State Audits
555 Capitol Mall, Suite 300
Sacramento, California 95814
(916) 445-0255 or TDD (916) 445-0255 x 216
OR
This report may also be available
on the World Wide Web
http://www.bsa.ca.gov/bsa/
The California State Auditor is pleased to announce
the availability of an online subscription service.
For information on how to subscribe,
please visit our Web site at www.bsa.ca.gov/bsa.
If you need additional information, please contact
David Madrigal at (916) 445-0255, ext. 201.
Alternate format reports available upon request.
Permission is granted to reproduce reports.
C S A
ALIFORNIA TATE UDITOR
ELAINE M. HOWLE STEVEN M. HENDRICKSON
STATE AUDITOR CHIEF DEPUTY STATE AUDITOR
October 23, 2001 2001-107
The Governor of California
President pro Tempore of the Senate
Speaker of the Assembly
State Capitol
Sacramento, California 95814
Dear Governor and Legislative Leaders:
As requested by the Joint Legislative Audit Committee, the Bureau of State Audits presents its
audit report concerning the operations of the Port of Oakland (Port). Specifically, we reviewed the
Port’s financial statements to determine the efficiency of its operations and to evaluate the return
on the Port’s capital and real estate investments.
This report concludes that, overall, the Port effectively managed its assets over the last 10 fiscal
years (1990–91 through 1999–2000) and its $1.7 billion capital improvement program should benefit
the public and allow the Port to remain financially competitive in the future. We found that two of
the Port’s three revenue generating divisions—maritime and aviation—performed well during the
past decade, while the third—real estate—has shown consistent losses. The real estate division’s
losses were due to some unsuccessful business undertakings, inaction in controlling its operating
costs, and the Port’s decision to rent to public and nonprofit entities certain real estate division
holdings at below-market rates.
The Port is also in the middle of planning and implementing large capital expansion plans for both its
maritime and aviation divisions. Our review of the Port’s March 2000 feasibility study found that
projections of the maritime and aviation divisions’ future revenues and expenses are reasonable and
that their respective expansion plans should provide a number of public benefits. However, events
have occurred since the March 2000 feasibility study that may significantly affect the aviation
division’s plans for improving the airport. For instance, the aviation division revised its expansion
plan to curb costs when updated construction cost projections proved higher than expected. The
revised plan was only recently approved. In addition, an appellate court decision will require the
Port to develop a supplemental environmental impact report. Finally, the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, could result in costly changes to airport security.
Respectfully submitted,
ELAINE M. HOWLE
State Auditor
BUREAU OF STATE AUDITS
555 Capitol Mall, Suite 300, Sacramento, California 95814 Telephone: (916) 445-0255 Fax: (916) 327-0019 www.bsa.ca.gov/bsa
Port of Oakland:
Despite Its Overall Financial Success, Recent
Events May Hamper Expansion Plans That
Would Likely Benefit the Port and the Public
CONTENTS
Summary 1
Introduction 5
Audit Results
The Port’s Management of Its Major Business
Lines Has Generally Been Effective 11
The Maritime Division Has Managed Its
Growth Efficiently in the Past, and Its Future
Plans Should Increase Its Competitiveness 13
The Aviation Division Has Increased Its
Revenues Over the Past Decade and Is
Implementing Expansion Plans That Should
Significantly Benefit the Public 31
The Real Estate Division Has Operated at a
Considerable Fiscal Loss but Plans to Finance
Future Capital Improvements Without
Incurring Additional Debt 43
Recommendations 52
Appendix 53
Response to the Audit
Port of Oakland 57
SUMMARY
RESULTS IN BRIEF
T
he Port of Oakland (Port) is an independent, self-
supporting department of the city of Oakland charged
Audit Highlights . . . with managing and operating a seaport, a passenger and
cargo airport, and the waterfront real estate in and around the
Our review of the Port of
Oakland Estuary. Over the past decade, its effective administration
Oakland’s (Port) financial
of these properties resulted in an increase of its overall operating
statements for the past
income from $4.4 million in fiscal year 1990–91 to $47 million
10 years and its past and
in fiscal year 1999–2000.1 It is now in the process of planning
future capital
and implementing a $1.7 billion capital improvement program
improvement projects
that includes substantial expansions of both its seaport and
revealed that:
airport. This program should not only enable the Port to remain
(cid:1)
Overall, the Port financially competitive but also benefit the public.
effectively managed its
assets, and its $1.7 billion
Separate revenue divisions are responsible for managing the
capital improvement
program should benefit Port’s maritime, aviation, and commercial real estate activities.
the public and allow it to In recent years the maritime and aviation divisions have con-
remain competitive.
tributed to the Port’s successful performance, but the real estate
(cid:1) Its maritime and aviation division has struggled. The maritime division’s management of
divisions have prospered, its resources has been particularly effective: Over the past 10 years
and their expansion plans
it almost doubled its revenues, while its operating expenses
are based on reasonable
increased by slightly more than half. The maritime division’s
estimates of future
revenues and expenditures. implementation of two important capital improvements—
renovating one of its terminals and deepening the channel
(cid:1)
Certain recent events may
accessing the port—contributed to its ability to remain competitive
hamper the aviation
with comparable seaports. Although significant delays did occur
division’s plans to improve
the airport. in the regulatory approval process of the dredging project, the
maritime division consistently maintained a reasonable amount
(cid:1)
The real estate division
of revenue to cover its debt service during the construction. To
consistently operated at a
deficit due to unsuccessful continue to ensure its competitive position, the maritime division
business ventures, inaction recently implemented its capital improvement program, which
in controlling operating
includes constructing two new ship terminals, new roads, a rail-
costs, and the Port’s
freight transfer terminal, and a waterfront recreational park as
decision to lease certain
properties at below- well as deepening the channel from 42 feet to 50 feet. A feasibility
market rates. study suggests that projected revenues should be adequate to
cover the debt associated with funding these projects.
1 Operating income is the difference between operating revenue and operating expenses,
including depreciation and amortization.
1
Similar to the maritime division, the aviation division has
significantly increased its operating revenues during the past
10 years, and it has nearly doubled the number of passengers
using the Oakland airport. This growth is particularly noteworthy
considering that the number of scheduled flights serving Oakland
has often fluctuated during this period. Although its past capital
improvements have been relatively small projects, the aviation
division is in the process of planning a substantial expansion of
its facilities, including new terminal buildings, roads, and a
parking structure. This expansion should benefit the public by
relieving traffic congestion and enabling the airport to better
serve an increasing number of passengers. Yet, despite the
variety of funding sources identified in the initial feasibility
study, the aviation division has recently met with a number of
setbacks. A new internal review determined that it had signifi-
cantly underestimated the cost of the expansion, a problem that
may be compounded by a recent court decision ordering it to
prepare a new supplemental environmental impact report before
beginning construction on affected capital improvement
projects. Moreover, the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001,
will almost certainly have a significant impact on the airline
industry, the consequences of which are difficult to predict.
As mentioned, the Port’s real estate division has not shown the
same financial growth as the other two. Together, the maritime
and aviation divisions have generated roughly 89 percent of the
Port’s revenues over the past 10 years, while the real estate
division generated the remaining 11 percent. In fact, the real
estate division has consistently operated at a deficit during this
time. Its losses appear to be the result of the real estate division’s
inability to control high maintenance costs for its properties in
Jack London Square, some business decisions that turned out
badly, and the Port’s decision to use the real estate division to
provide benefits to the public that has further exacerbated the
division’s poor financial situation. In effect, the real estate
division has subsidized nine public benefit projects by leasing
eight properties for $1 a year and one property for $490 per year.
The real estate division plans to improve its profitability but has
not yet taken significant action. Although it is currently proposing
several large capital improvement projects, the division does not
intend to move forward with these plans unless the developers
are willing to provide the necessary funding, thus ensuring that
the real estate division will not acquire more debt.
2
RECOMMENDATIONS
To reduce the effect of the commercial real estate division’s
losses on the Port’s operations as a whole, the division should do
the following:
(cid:127) Complete the action plan approved by the board of port
commissioners in 1999.
(cid:127) Examine the effects of management’s decisions to lease land
at below-market rates to determine if changes in the rates
charged could increase revenues without harming the Port’s
relationships with the community and other municipalities.
(cid:127) Continue to look for ways to increase revenues and decrease
costs associated with managing its assets.
AGENCY COMMENTS
The Port feels that our report will provide the State with the
critical information needed to evaluate its value and impact. The
Port also feels that it is taking steps to implement our recom-
mendations. (cid:2)
3
Blank page inserted for reproduction purposes only.
4
INTRODUCTION
BACKGROUND
I
n 1927 the city of Oakland amended its charter to establish
the Port of Oakland (Port), an independent, self-supporting
department responsible for managing and operating 19 miles
of waterfront on the eastern shore of the San Francisco Bay. The
waterfront properties under the Port’s jurisdiction include a
seaport; a passenger, cargo, and general aviation airport; and
waterfront real estate. A seven-member board of port commis-
sioners (board), nominated by the mayor and appointed by the
city council of Oakland, governs the Port. Board members, who
represent diverse backgrounds, serve four-year staggered terms
without compensation.
Because the State granted the waterfront property to the city of
Oakland in a series of Tideland Trust grants, most of the property
is subject to state tideland grant restrictions. These restrictions
require that tideland property and revenues generated by the use
of that property be used for tideland purposes, including com-
merce, navigation, fishing, and public access to the shoreline.
Neither the city nor the Port owns the waterfront property;
rather, the Port holds the property in trust for the people of
California. The Port’s stated mission is to increase the region’s
economic vitality, create jobs, and provide opportunities for
waterfront enjoyment, while also generating earnings to reinvest
in its activities.
Figure 1 on the following page shows how the Port uses its water-
front property: 665 acres are devoted to maritime activities,
3,000 acres to aviation, and 1,040 acres to commercial real estate
holdings. Separate revenue divisions oversee the maritime,
aviation, and commercial real estate activities, while the costs for
several supporting divisions and units are allocated among all
the Port’s enterprises. Figure 2 on page 7 depicts the Port’s
overall organization. In June 2001 the Port’s executive director
announced his retirement, and the board subsequently appointed
his deputy as the next executive director.
5
6
ADELINE ST. MARKET ST. 980 BROADW AY OAK ST. E. 8TH ST. E. 12TH ST. 29TH AVE. AVE. VALE FRUIT-
80 7TH ST. EMBARCADERO M T B e u r R m r d m i . n a al ARITIM E ST. 880 Bou P n o d rt ary
MIDDLE
HARBOR RD.
Port
Boundary
N E
W S
Aviation Division area
Real Estate Division area
Maritime Division area
Property does not belong to the Port of Oakland
HIGH ST. OAKPORT ST. HEGENBERGER 98TH AVE.
EDGEWATER DR. DOOLITTLE DR. PARDEE DR.
ORT
AIRP
.DR
OGRACRIA
Po B r o t undary Lak M e erritt D B O is u t a s r k i i b n la u e n t s i d o s n A P C i a rp e rk o n r t & t er C O o a l k is la e n u d m
B B rid a g y e A B O r a a m s k e y . Oakland 9 Te th r m A i v n e a . l Coast Guard Is. 880 Terminal RD. M.L. King, Jr. Howard Embarcadero Union Point Regional Shoreline Terminal Jack Estuary Cove Basin Park London Park
H O a u rb te o r r
/
Tran
H
C s
a
e p
r
n o
b
t r e
o
ta r
r
tion
In
U
te
n
r
i
m
on
o d
P
a
a
l
c
Y
if
a
ic
rd Oakland
Estuary P
B
or
u
t
i l
O
di
f
n
fi
g
ce Square
Alameda A N ir o p r o th rt
G
C
a
G o
lb
u o
r
r
a
l s f
i
e
th
Bay Farm Island
(Alameda)
Ben E. Nutter
Container Metropolitan Oakland Port
Terminal Interrnational Airport Boundary
Port View (South Airport)
Park
San Francisco Bay
MH elddi
robra
FIGURE 1
Port of Oakland
San Inner Harbor Lea B n a d y ro
M
D
a
e
ri
v
ti
e
m
lo
e
p
/
m
In
e
t
n
e
t
r m
Ar
o
e
d
a
al
HARBOR
BAY
PKW
Y . AIRPORT RD. (under
construction)
6/01
Source: Port of Oakland.
FIGURE 2
Port of Oakland’s Organization Chart
for Fiscal Year 2000–01
Board of Port
Commissioners
Communications Secretary of
Executive the Board
Director
Strategic & Policy Port
Planning Attorney
Deputy Executive
Financial Director Audit Services
Corporate Equal
Maritime Aviation Real Estate Engineering Administrative Opportunity
Services
Source: Port of Oakland.
Denotes a direct reporting relationship
Denotes an advisory relationship
THE MARITIME DIVISION
The maritime division is responsible for administering Oakland’s
seaport. It designs, constructs, and maintains marine transporta-
tion facilities, and acting as a landlord, it negotiates lease and
use agreements for these facilities with private-sector companies.
Under the terms of these agreements, the private-sector companies
are responsible for managing and operating the facilities, and the
maritime division operates the wharf. Currently, the maritime
division has several capital improvement projects planned or
under construction, including building new marine terminals,
improving the rail infrastructure, and increasing the depth of
channels and berths from 42 feet to 50 feet. It is also in the
process of undertaking environmental mitigation measures to
protect and improve air and water quality, developing a wildlife
habitat, and improving public access.
7
THE AVIATION DIVISION
The aviation division operates the Metropolitan Oakland Inter-
national Airport. Its responsibilities include marketing facilities to
tenants, including airlines and air cargo companies. In 2000 the
airport boarded nearly 5 million airline passengers and almost
693,000 metric tons of air cargo. To accommodate an increasing
demand for passenger and cargo services, the airport plans to
add up to 12 passenger gates, build a new multilevel parking and
ground transportation center, create new cargo facilities, and
improve the roadways providing access to the airport complex.
THE REAL ESTATE DIVISION
The real estate division manages, leases, and develops land
located along the Port’s waterfront, including office and retail
facilities in Jack London Square and a commercial waterfront
development along the Oakland Estuary. It is also responsible for
overseeing Oakland Portside Associates (OPA). Originally a non-
Port entity, the OPA was established in June 1987 as a limited
partnership between Portside Properties and its financial partner
to construct and manage most of the buildings currently located
in Jack London Square. After Portside Properties’ financial
partner withdrew from the partnership in December 1987, the
Port became the majority general partner. In August 1990 it
effectively became the sole owner.
SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
The Joint Legislative Audit Committee asked the Bureau of State
Audits to review the financial statements of the Port to determine
the efficiency of its operations and to evaluate the return on the
Port’s capital and real estate investments.
To assess how efficiently the Port manages its operations, we
reviewed revenues and expenses for fiscal years 1990–91 through
1999–2000 as reported in the Port’s annual audited financial
statements. We also reviewed the segmented income statements
covering the same period for each of the three revenue divisions.
8
Because the Port does not maintain complete asset information
by division, we were unable to determine the rate of return for
each revenue division. Instead, we calculated the rate of return
for the entire Port for fiscal years 1990–91 through 1999–2000.
This information is presented in the Appendix. We also calcu-
lated the Port’s debt service coverage ratios from the year-end
financial statements for fiscal years 1992–93 through 1999–2000
for each revenue division to determine whether they met the
criteria of the Port’s bond covenant and its own internal goal.
Due to record retention limitations, we were unable to calculate
the revenue divisions’ debt service coverage ratios for fiscal years
1990–91 and 1991–92.
To determine if the amount of long-term debt proposed to fund
a portion of the Port’s future capital improvement plans is
reasonable, we computed, for each relevant revenue division,
the debt service coverage ratios over the next nine years (the
Port’s planning horizon) using each division’s projected revenues
and expenses. Then we assessed the adequacy of these projected
debt service coverage ratios to support each division’s proposed
issuance of long-term debt. We also examined the Port’s revenue
and expense projections to determine whether they were based
on reasonable assumptions. The Port’s engineering division
produced the cost estimates for its proposed construction
projects and then had an outside consultant review them to
determine if they were reasonable. We therefore relied on the
consultant’s opinion on the reasonableness of the Port’s estimated
construction costs.
To compare the Port’s fiscal performance with those of similar
entities, we researched the characteristics of other ports to
determine which were most comparable. However, since most
ports differ in size and business structure, we compared the
maritime and aviation divisions of the Port to similar business
segments of other entities. We did not include the real estate
division in our comparisons because real estate activities are
generally specific to given geographic areas, and we did not feel
a comparison to entities in other parts of the State and country
would produce meaningful results.
Finally, we determined whether the Port’s projections of the
nonfinancial benefits of its capital improvement projects were
reasonable by reviewing its calculations and methodology. (cid:2)
9
Blank page inserted for reproduction purposes only.
10
AUDIT RESULTS
THE PORT’S MANAGEMENT OF ITS MAJOR BUSINESS
LINES HAS GENERALLY BEEN EFFECTIVE
O
ver the past decade the Port of Oakland (Port) as a
whole performed well financially, producing a 10-fold
increase in operating income, from $4.4 million to
$47 million.2 From fiscal years 1990–91 through 1999–2000, the
Port’s operating revenues increased from $98 million to
$172.7 million, and its total assets grew from $676 million to
just under $1.7 billion. The Port’s operating expenses, including
depreciation and amortization, increased at a slower rate than
its operating revenues, from $93.6 million in fiscal year 1990–91
to $125.7 million in fiscal year 1999–2000. As shown in Figure 3
on the following page, two of the Port’s three core revenue
divisions—the maritime and aviation divisions—contributed to
the Port’s successful performance, producing roughly 89 percent
of the overall revenue for the Port during this time. In contrast,
the real estate division registered consistent losses, in part because
the Port decided to use the division to carry out projects to benefit
the public, a choice that falls within the scope of its mission.
In general, the Port’s past capital improvement projects have
proven financially beneficial, with the Port easily covering the
costs of its investments. A planned $1.7 billion capital improve-
ment program will expand the Port’s seaport by adding new
wharf and container terminals, a new access road, and a more
efficient railroad system, and will add a new passenger terminal,
parking garage, and access road to the Port’s airport. We reviewed
the Port’s initial feasibility study for this program, which was
issued in March 2000, and found that estimates of future rev-
enues and expenses at that time were reasonable. We also found
that the Port’s expansion should offer a number of benefits to the
surrounding community, including more job opportunities, less
traffic congestion around the airport, and a better environment
and improved appearance for the Oakland waterfront.
2 Operating income is the difference between operating revenue and operating
expenses, including depreciation and amortization.
11
12
FIGURE 3
Operating Income for Each Division and the Port as a Whole
for Fiscal Years 1990–91 Through 1999–2000
(In Millions)
$50
Maritime
Aviation
Real Estate
40
Port Overall
30
20
--2200
10
0
-10
-15
1990–91 1991–92 1992–93 1993–94 1994–95 1995–96 1996–97 1997–98 1998–99 1999–2000
Source: Port of Oakland’s audited financial statements.
Unfortunately, certain events that have occurred since the
completion of the March 2000 feasibility study may significantly
affect the Port’s plans for improving the airport. In August 2001
the aviation division increased its construction cost estimate by
$453 million. Also, on September 26, 2001, an appellate court
ruled that the Port’s environmental impact report for the aviation
division’s expansion plans was inadequate and a new supple-
mental report would have to be prepared that will require
additional time and money.
Finally, the terrorist attack launched on the United States on
September 11, 2001, has the potential to negatively affect the
Port’s financial situation in two ways. First, it is likely that the
airport and seaport will require a number of costly security
enhancements. Second, business in general and airline passenger
business in particular could be slowed substantially. These
factors could have a significant impact on the Port’s future
expenses and revenues.
THE MARITIME DIVISION HAS MANAGED ITS GROWTH
EFFICIENTLY IN THE PAST, AND ITS FUTURE PLANS
SHOULD INCREASE ITS COMPETITIVENESS
Over the past 10 years the maritime division’s management of
its resources has been appropriate and effective. During this
time, it almost doubled its revenues, but its operating expenses
increased by a little more than half. Moreover, the maritime
division implemented two important capital improvement
projects: renovating one of its terminals and deepening the
channel accessing the port. Although some delays did occur in
the regulatory approval process for the dredging project, the
maritime division consistently maintained a reasonable amount
of revenue to cover its debt service throughout the periods of
construction. The eventual successes of both the dredging and
renovation projects have contributed to the maritime division’s
ability to remain competitive.
The maritime division currently performs well compared with
similar ports. However, to maintain its place in the market, the
maritime division has begun implementing its capital
improvement program, which will include the construction of
two new ship terminals, new roads, a freight transfer terminal,
and a waterfront recreational park, as well as the deepening of
the channel by an additional 8 feet. According to the
13
division’s feasibility study, its projected revenues should be
adequate to cover the debt associated with funding the capital
improvement program.
Revenues Have Increased Steadily While Operating Costs
Have Risen More Slowly
Overall, the maritime division’s financial records show that,
although its operating revenues and expenses have steadily
increased over the past 10 years, operating ex-
penses grew at a slower rate. As shown in Figure 4,
Typical Seaport Charges the division’s operating revenue almost doubled
between fiscal years 1990–91 and 1999–2000,
(cid:127) Dockage–an assessment for use of a berth
growing from $39 million to $76 million. During
or dock.
the same period, operating expenses increased by
(cid:127) Wharfage–an assessment for passing
cargo over the wharf and through the $13.5 million (55 percent)—from $24.5 million to
marine terminal. $38 million.
(cid:127) Storage and demurrage–an assessment for
cargo remaining in the terminal beyond a According to maritime staff, the changes in
previously agreed upon date.
operating revenues were mainly the result of
(cid:127) Crane fee–an hourly charge for the use of changes in cargo volume. Because the maritime
port-owned container cranes to support
division’s primary sources of revenues are the
cargo operations.
assessments it charges customers for using its
(cid:127) Tariff–published schedule of rates or
facilities and equipment, fluctuations in cargo
charges for a specific unit of equipment,
facility, or type of service. volume affect the level of its operating revenues.
The changes in operating expenses were primarily
caused by increases in the maritime division’s
share of allocated costs. At the end of each fiscal
year, costs are allocated to each division (maritime, aviation,
and real estate) for its respective share of general operating,
maintenance, advertising, administrative, and utility costs.
Increases in the cost of removing hazardous waste and main-
taining facilities are two reasons why the maritime division’s
share of allocated costs have grown.
Past Capital Improvements Provided Financial Benefits and
Fostered a More Efficient Approach to Current Projects
Although the maritime division neither calculates the historical
rates of return on its major capital investments nor maintains
the information we would need to calculate them, our examina-
tion of its debt service coverage ratio suggests that its past capital
improvement projects have benefited it financially. From past
projects, the division has also learned from certain mistakes it
made and has been able to improve the efficiency of the current
capital improvement project.
14
15
FIGURE 4
Maritime Division’s Operating Revenue, Expenses, and Income
for Fiscal Years 1990–91 Through 1999–2000
(In Millions)
$80 Total operating income
Total operating expenses*
70 Total operating revenue
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1990–91 1991–92 1992–93 1993–94 1994–95 1995–96 1996–97 1997–98 1998–99 1999–2000
Source: Port of Oakland’s audited financial statement of segments.
*Operating expenses include depreciation and amortization.
The debt service coverage ratio measures the revenue the Port
has available to pay for obligations, such as bonds, over a set
period. For example, a debt service coverage ratio of 1.0 would
mean the Port had precisely the available revenue needed to
make the principal and interest payment on its outstanding
bonds, and a ratio above 1.0 would indicate that the Port had
more than enough revenue for this purpose. The maritime
division considers debt service coverage when deciding whether
to invest in major capital improvement projects, and credit-
rating agencies use it when determining the creditworthiness of
the Port. Since the Port only computes its debt service coverage
ratios on an entitywide basis, we computed such ratios for each
Since part of its revenues of its three revenue divisions. As Figure 5 shows, for the past
are based on leases that eight years, the maritime division has maintained its debt
reflect the fair market service coverage ratio above both the ratio of 1.25 required by the
value of its facilities and Port’s revenue bond covenant and the Port’s internal minimum
the amount of cargo ratio of 1.6.
moving through the port,
the maritime division must Since part of the maritime division’s revenues are based on
invest in capital leasing agreements that reflect the fair market value of its facili-
improvement projects to ties and the amount of cargo moving through the port, it must
remain competitive. invest in capital improvement projects to remain competitive.
We reviewed two major projects: renovating a terminal and
deepening the channel to 42 feet.
Despite Significant Delays in One Project, Past Capital
Improvement Projects Have Offered Financial Benefits
During the period from fiscal year 1992–93 through fiscal year
1999–2000, the maritime division’s debt service coverage ratio
ranged from a low of 1.84 to a high of 2.48, always remaining
well above the Port’s internal minimum ratio of 1.6. This high
debt service coverage ratio was in part due to the financial benefits
provided by the capital improvement projects undertaken by the
maritime division. These financial benefits resulted from the
division’s ability to competitively price its maritime contracts.
Generally, the maritime contracts are structured to provide a
specified rate of return for the value of the land and berth area
(submerged land), as well as for capital improvement projects
funded by the Port. When berths are renovated, the value of the
land is increased, allowing the maritime division to charge more
for its use.3
3 When formulating a pricing strategy for its maritime contracts, division staff routinely
review other port agreements obtained either through the Federal Maritime
Commission or from other port authorities under the federal Freedom of
Information Act.
16
FIGURE 5
Debt Service Coverage Ratios for the Maritime Division for
Fiscal Years 1992–93 Through 1999–2000
2.5
2.0
1.60*
1.5
o
ti1.25†
a
R
1.0
0.5
0.0
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0
9 9
2–
9 9
3–
9 9
4–
9 9
5–
9 9
6–
9 9
7–
9 9
8–
9– 2
0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9
9
1
Source: Auditor’s calculations based on segmented income statements and bond
payment records.
*The Port’s internal minimum debt service coverage ratio.
†Minimum debt service coverage ratio required by the Port’s revenue bond covenant.
One of the larger renovation projects that benefited the mari-
time division involved an agreement between the Port and one
of its tenants for renovations made at the terminal occupied by
the tenant. Funding for this project came from the 1992 sale of
$53 million in bonded debt. According to the terms of the
agreement, the tenant is responsible for paying all principal and
interest owing on these bonds. In exchange, the tenant is able to
customize the design and construction of the renovated termi-
nal to suit its needs. Thus, the division was able to improve the
maritime facilities without directly affecting its own cash flow.
17
The maritime division’s other major capital improvement
project was the deepening of the channel and berths from 38 feet
to 42 feet. Because it was an improvement to infrastructure, the
project did not provide the maritime division with a direct
return on its investment. However, by enabling the Port to
attract and accommodate larger container vessels, it allowed the
maritime division an opportunity to compete with other ports
and increased its potential for handling more cargo. Although
the dredging project took significantly longer to complete than
originally intended, it ultimately benefited the maritime division.
The 42-foot dredging project was a joint effort by the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers (Corps of Engineers) and the maritime
The maritime division’s division. The Corps of Engineers conducted the original feasibility
previous dredging project study for the project in 1972, and according to division staff, the
enabled it to attract and original plan was to begin construction and dredging around
accommodate larger 1980–82 and to complete the project by 1984–86. However,
container vessels. because the maritime division first had to complete an Environ-
mental Impact Report and Statement (EIR/EIS) for the State and
federal government, construction had not yet started when, in
1986, the federal Water Resources Development Act authorized
the Corps of Engineers to construct various projects to improve
the harbors. According to the manager of the dredging project,
the maritime division originally prepared a separate EIR/EIS for
the outer and inner harbors but had to start again with a new
feasibility study and EIR/EIS because of the new requirements for
cost sharing included in the Water Resources Development Act
of 1986. The manager further stated that between 1986 and 1994,
when the division submitted its final version of the EIR/EIS for
the dredging project, the division had already created four or
five versions in response to changes in environmental laws,
lawsuits, and difficulties in finding appropriate disposal sites for
the dredged material. These changes also required supplements
to the project’s initial EIR/EIS. Although the division filed the
original EIR/EIS in March 1988, it did not complete the final
supplemental EIR/EIS until May 1994.
One reason the EIR/EIS for the dredging project took so long was
that disposal of the dredged material was difficult. The maritime
division’s initial plan was to dispose of the suitable dredged
material at a designated disposal site. However, the division
rejected this plan because regulatory agencies, environmentalists,
and fishing groups voiced concerns. The intervention and
litigation actions by resource and regulatory agencies also halted
18
subsequent disposal plans. The maritime division was eventually
able to negotiate a plan that was acceptable to these agencies
after agreeing to dispose/reuse dredged materials in several ways.
Delays also occurred after the maritime division finally started
the project in January 1996, when the primary contractor fell
behind schedule because needed dredging equipment did not
arrive on time. This was just one of many factors that eventually
caused the contracting company to file for bankruptcy in
January 1997. The Corps of Engineers, with the agreement of
the maritime division, worked with the contractor to complete
the project while the contractor was going through reorganiza-
tion prompted by the bankruptcy filing. Although the project
was scheduled for completion in May 1997, it was not finished
until July 1998.
Past Mistakes Taught the Division to Plan Its Current Dredging
Project More Efficiently
The maritime division applied many lessons learned from its
earlier dredging project to more efficiently plan its current
50-foot dredging project.4 As previously discussed, the Corps of
The maritime division Engineers first began working on the feasibility study for the
took just 3 years to 42-foot dredging project in 1972, but the maritime division did
complete the feasibility not submit a final EIR/EIS until 1994—22 years later. In contrast,
and environmental studies the division initiated the feasibility study (including an EIR/EIS)
for its current dredging for the 50-foot dredging project in 1996 and completed it in
project, compared to 1999. In addition, by including the Corps of Engineers in the
22 years to complete planning process for the current dredging project, the maritime
these studies for its division ensured that the feasibility study was consistent with
previous dredging project. the Corps’ principles and guidelines. Division staff believes that
this fact expedited the review process significantly and allowed
the federal government to authorize the project in the Water
Resources Development Act of 1999, making it eligible to receive
federal appropriations beginning in fiscal year 2000–01.
The Water Resources Development Act of 1996 made the Port
and the federal government responsible for finding an appropriate
disposal site for dredged material from the current project.
According to maritime division staff, the division initiated early
discussions with interest groups to reach consensus on a preferred
plan for reusing dredged materials to mitigate potential lawsuits
and interventions like those that delayed the earlier dredging
4The 50-foot dredging project is part of the maritime division’s latest capital
improvement program. This program is discussed further in the following sections.
19
project. Further, it established an alternative plan in case the
original plan proved to be financially unfeasible. The division
also entered into negotiations with adjacent communities and
businesses potentially affected by the project. These outreach
efforts have led to a series of agreements that should minimize
the ill effects on the community while allowing the project to
move forward.
Finally, the maritime division’s former director told us that to
avoid the problems it faced when one of its main contractors
went bankrupt during the 42-foot dredging project, the division
divided the current dredging project into a number of smaller,
individual contracts. This action should encourage competition
and provide additional control over bids, budgets, schedules,
and nonresponsive contractors.
The Capital Improvement Program Should Attract Seaport
Customers and Benefit Local Communities
The maritime division is in the process of implementing its
latest capital improvement program, which calls for the
construction of two new ship terminals, new roads, a rail freight
In addition to deepening transfer terminal, and a waterfront recreational park. In addition
the channel to 50 feet, the to this program, the maritime division is working with the
maritime division plans to Corps of Engineers on a project to further deepen the channel to
construct two new ship 50 feet. To offset the environmental effects of the construction
terminals, new roads, a projects, the program includes dozens of mitigation projects
rail freight transfer aimed at improving the quality of the air, water, land, and
terminal, and a park. biological life around the port. In addition, the division estimates
that the program should create 3,580 local jobs by 2020. Based
on the maritime division’s projected revenues in the Port’s
March 2000 feasibility study, it appears that the division’s opera-
tions should generate enough revenue to cover the debt service
needed to fund these improvements.
Business for the Seaport Should Increase
According to its strategic plan, the maritime division believes it
must make certain investments in capital improvement projects
to remain economically viable, to continue to grow, and to
provide economic resources for the city of Oakland and the
region. The construction of some of the projects included in the
maritime division’s capital improvement program began as early
as 1999; as these are completed, they should help the port
handle larger volumes of cargo. For example, a shipping terminal,
which occupies two berths, began operations in June 2001, with
20
the first vessel using the terminal on June 18, 2001. It is the first
of two terminals planned under the program to boost the port’s
capacity for handling shipping containers. The construction of
The first of two terminals the second terminal is under way and scheduled to be complete
planned to boost the by July 2002.
port’s capacity for
handling shipping In addition, the maritime division has completed the first phase
containers commenced of construction of a rail freight transfer terminal and is in the
operations in June 2001. process of beginning the second phase, which consists of expand-
ing the terminal by approximately 150 acres to accommodate
more cargo. Market conditions will dictate the time it will take
to complete this phase. The maritime division anticipates complet-
ing the second phase in the next three to eight years. According
to the March 2000 feasibility study, funding for the second
phase is not included in the capital improvement program.
When completed, the transfer terminal should provide centralized
rail operations within the port and enhance the economics and
logistics of the ship-to-rail transfer of containerized cargo, thus
ensuring that the maritime division remains competitive with
other freight carriers. Moreover, during the fall of 2001, the
division should complete a system of new and improved roads
that will provide ocean carriers with greater flexibility in moving
containers between marine terminals, cargo support facilities,
and rail freight transfer terminals.
Finally, the maritime division’s project to dredge the channel to
50 feet is scheduled to begin in October 2001. This project
should allow the maritime division to serve larger vessels,
stimulating additional cargo activity throughout the port.
However, maritime division staff believe that if the current
dredging project encounters delays, the port could be forced to
turn away vessels that require deeper channels than it can now
offer. Because the trend in the design of next-generation container
ships has been toward increasing their size and draft, many now
require a 50-foot water depth to navigate.
The possibility of delays in the current dredging project arises
because of its reliance on federal funds. The cost of deepening
the port’s channel to 50 feet is estimated at $293.2 million.
Currently, $130 million is scheduled to come from federal
matching funds, as authorized in the Water Resources Develop-
ment Act of 1999 and allocated by the Corps of Engineers. In
fiscal year 2000–01, the maritime division received $4 million of
the $130 million of federal funds. The division intends to pay its
$163.2 million share from the sale of bonds and its cash reserves.
However, maritime division staff states that the division will
21
only match its share of the dredging project’s costs when it
Current plans, which receives its annual allocation of federal funds. Under its current
assume no delay in the plans, which assume no delay in the receipt of federal matching
receipt of $130 million in funds, the maritime division has scheduled the 50-foot dredging
federal funds, call for the project to be completed by December 2005. However, if the
50-foot dredging project Corps of Engineers allocates less in future annual budgets to the
to be completed by projects it is helping to fund, the maritime division’s dredging
December 2005. project may not be completed when planned. Such a delay
would inhibit the port’s ability to accommodate the largest
cargo ships and stall its efforts to increase its market share in
this area.
The Local Community Should Benefit From Environmental
Mitigation Projects, Increased Tax Revenue, and New Job
Opportunities
In addition to offering significant financial gain for the maritime
division, its capital improvement program also should benefit
the public in a number of direct and indirect ways. For instance,
as required by the EIR necessary for expanding the port, the
program includes dozens of mitigation projects aimed at improv-
ing the quality of the air, water, land, and biological life around
the tideland properties. For example, the maritime division has
committed to spending nearly $9 million on emission reduction
programs and demonstration projects that promote technological
advances in improving air quality. Some of these funds will be
spent to retrofit diesel trucks, transit buses, cargo-handling
equipment, and a tugboat with new engines designed to reduce
exhaust emissions.
Under the capital improvement program, the division also plans
to create waterfront recreational areas for the public to enjoy. It
has allocated $10 million to construct a 30-acre shoreline park
that will include an education center, shoreline walkways,
fishing piers, picnic areas, and a beach. The park will surround a
190-acre ecological reserve of shallow bay and shoreline habitats.
Located in a retired naval basin, the ecological reserve project
will use the clean sand dredged from the channel. According to
the manager of the dredging program, reusing the dredged
material will not only save the maritime division millions of
dollars in disposal costs but will also create a new area for shallow-
water marine life to flourish.
Because of the expansion planned under the capital improvement
program, the maritime division should also generate increased
state and local tax revenues in future years. Specifically, the
22
maritime division’s tenants paid $96 million in state and local
taxes in 1998, but staff estimate that by 2020 its tenants will
contribute approximately $157 million. This projected increase
of $61 million is based on the projections of the revenues the
maritime division should earn once it completes its
capital improvement projects.
In addition to these benefits, the division’s expansion projects
are expected to create an estimated 3,580 local jobs directly
The maritime division’s related to the seaport by 2020. To estimate the number of new
expansion projects are jobs, the maritime division used a model developed by an
expected to create almost outside consultant and widely employed in the maritime and
3,600 new jobs by 2020. aviation industries. In using the model, Port staff supply a
variety of activity measures, such as the amount of container
cargo moving through the seaport, to estimate the number of
direct and indirect jobs that will result from a new capital improve-
ment project.5 Once they estimate the number of direct and
indirect jobs expected to result from capital improvement
projects, Port staff updates the activity measures each year to
reassess the project’s economic impact. In the past, the model
has proven conservative in predicting new job creation. For
example, staff used the model to estimate that 2,400 new jobs
would be created by calendar year 2000 from the 42-foot dredging
project. According to the Port’s Office of Strategic and Policy
Planning, the economic impact associated with the dredging
project as of calendar year 2000 totaled 4,900 new direct and
indirect jobs.
The maritime division intends to use the Port’s employment
development unit to ensure that local residents fill the majority
of employment opportunities created by the expansion. The
employment development unit acts as a recruiter, finding qualified
job seekers within the local community and matching them
with seaport tenants with job opportunities. The employment
development unit also assists local job seekers facing various
obstacles to employment by directing them to resources that will
help them overcome these barriers. As portions of the port are
expanded and new jobs created, the employment development
unit will work closely with job training and education agencies
to find local community applicants to fill open positions.
The employment development unit is also striving to ensure
that local residents fill a portion of the jobs created by the
construction process. The Port developed an agreement between
5 New direct jobholders spending additional amounts on goods and services creates
indirect jobs.
23
the expansion project contractors and the unions operating
One of the Port’s within the Port that outlines two main employment goals. The
employment goals is that first is to ensure that local residents perform 50 percent of the
local residents perform work that results from the maritime division’s expansion plans.
50 percent of the work The second is to ensure that local apprentices perform 20 percent
resulting from the of the work hours created by the actual construction of the
maritime division’s projects. The employment development unit estimates that
expansion plans. 900 jobs will result from the construction of the maritime
expansion; thus, the construction should create approximately
180 apprenticeships.
Projected Revenues Appear to Be Adequate to Fund the Debt
Service on Capital Improvement Projects
If no major changes occur in its new feasibility study, the mari-
time division’s projected revenues should be substantial enough
to cover the future debt service associated with financing its
capital improvement projects. As shown in Figure 6, the
division’s projections for the next nine fiscal years show that it
will generate enough revenue to meet the debt service coverage
ratio of 1.25 called for in its bond agreements. The division will
also achieve its internal minimum debt service coverage ratio of
1.6 except in fiscal year 2002–03, when we project its debt
service coverage ratio to be 1.56. Should revenues fall slightly
below its projections, the maritime division should still be able
to meet its required debt service coverage ratio of 1.25.
The division based its projected revenues in part on minimum
guarantee agreements or fixed compensation agreements that it
currently has with 19 tenants. Our review of the division’s most
recent feasibility study indicates that these fixed or guaranteed
sources accounted for 68 percent of its projected revenues in
fiscal year 1998–99. These fixed or guaranteed agreements are
generally long term, with some lasting up to 29 years. However,
15 agreements, including 4 in 2001, will expire within the 9 years
for which the maritime division made projections. Of the
4 agreements expiring in 2001, two tenants exercised options to
extend their agreements by 2 and 5 years, respectively; one is
negotiating a 7-year optional extension; and one has converted
to a year-to-year agreement.
According to the division, the other tenants whose agreements
expire on or before December 2008 are all long-time occupants of
the division’s facilities that have always renewed their agreements
in the past. The maritime division further stated that because its
infrastructure was oriented toward handling containerized cargo,
24
FIGURE 6
Projected Debt Service Coverage Ratios for the Maritime Division for
Fiscal Years 2000–01 Through 2008–09
2.5
2.0
1.60*
1.5
o
a
ti 1.25†
R
1.0
0.5
0.0
2 0 0
0– 0 1
2 0 0
1– 0 2
2 0 0
2– 0 3
2 0 0
3– 0 4
2 0 0
4– 0 5
2 0 0
5– 0 6
2 0 0
6– 0 7
2 0 0
7– 0 8
2 0 0
8– 0 9
Source: Auditor’s calculations based on the March 2000 feasibility study projections.
*The Port’s internal minimum debt service coverage ratio.
† Minimum debt service coverage ratio required by the Port’s revenue bond covenant.
it would be hard for most tenants to move to another port in the
area that could accommodate the same cargo volume. Because
the maritime division’s primary means of generating revenues is
through these agreements, it is important that they be renewed
or extended as expiration dates approach.
The remaining 32 percent of the maritime division’s projected
revenues come from variable sources, including cargo activity
beyond the minimums guaranteed in contracts with tenants as
well as miscellaneous port charges. The division projected its
variable revenue sources assuming that its planned capital
improvements—expanded freight transfer connections, two new
cargo terminals (five berths), and renovated terminal facilities—
will spur moderate shipping cargo growth. It also assumed a
moderate recovery of the Asian economy through 2003 and a
robust recovery beyond that. Of the three possible scenarios
described in the Port’s feasibility study, the division considered
25
this most likely. Because it functions as a landlord rather than
an operating entity, the maritime division based its projected
expenses principally on inflation rather than incremental
activity changes. In light of the relatively modest increases in
the division’s expenses in past years—typically less than
$3.3 million per year—this assumption seems reasonable.
Although the maritime division is in the process of revising its
feasibility study, these revisions should not have a major effect
on its projected revenue stream. According to staff at the division,
Although the maritime the revisions proposed mostly involve moving tenants from one
division is revising its terminal to another. For example, certain tenants currently in one
feasibility study, these location plan to move into new berths once they are complete.
revisions should not have Because the relocation of these tenants will create vacancies that
a major effect on the the division can fill with other tenants, the projected revenues
projected revenue stream. and expenses should remain unchanged, according to division
staff. The maritime division is proposing to close the vacated
terminals for a year to complete renovations. However, all the
renovations to the vacated terminals will not occur at the same
time, and once the terminals are renovated, the value of the
leasing agreements should increase because of the improvements
to the facilities.
In addition, staff in the maritime division predict that the
overall revenue projections may be slightly higher in the new
feasibility study, in part because of the inclusion of projected
revenues that should be generated once the Oakland Army Base
(base) is reconfigured into useable maritime facilities. In
April 2001, the Port, the city of Oakland, the Oakland Base
Reuse Authority, and the Oakland Redevelopment Agency
signed a memorandum of intent to identify the issues and
timetable to negotiate a memorandum of agreement conveying
the base property to the Port. The division expects the agree-
ment to be finalized by the middle of 2003 and plans to use the
land to expand its current container terminals. It also plans to
reconfigure the freight transfer terminal to a more efficient
location and layout, which should enable the port to handle
increased volumes of container cargo. By reconfiguring the
transfer terminal, the division will make additional land available
so it can further expand the size of its other terminals.
26
The Division Compares Favorably to Other Ports, but Its
Capital Improvement Program Is Necessary for It to
Remain Competitive
Overall, the maritime division compares favorably both finan-
cially and in terms of cargo volume with the ports located in
Seattle, Tacoma, Los Angeles, and Long Beach. As shown in
Figure 7, the maritime division’s operating income for fiscal
years 1997–98 through 1999–2000 exceeded that of the Port of
Seattle (Seattle) and of the Port of Tacoma (Tacoma). Although
the Port of Los Angeles (Los Angeles) and the Port of Long Beach
(Long Beach) generated more operating income over this same
period, these ports have more land available to handle larger
FIGURE 7
Comparison of Five Ports’ Operating Incomes
for Fiscal Years 1997–98 Through 1999–2000
(In Millions)
$150 Oakland
Seattle
Tacoma
120 Long Beach
Los Angeles
90
60
30
0
-30
1997–98 1998–99 1999–2000
Source: Audited financial statements for each port.
27
volumes of cargo. The maritime division has only 665 acres
devoted to port activities, while Los Angeles and Long Beach
have 7,500 acres and 3,000 acres, respectively.
Of the ports that we compared, we found that the one most
similar in business structure to the maritime division is Seattle.
According to a 1999 ranking of container volume handled by
ports located along the Pacific Coast, Seattle ranks fourth and
the Port of Oakland (Oakland) ranks third. However, the one
major difference between the two ports is that Seattle receives
approximately $35.6 million annually in tax revenues, while all
the revenues of the maritime division come from its business
operations. Seattle uses its tax revenues to fund acquisition and
construction of facilities and to pay environmental expenses.
Another difference between the ports is that the maritime
division acts as a port landlord, meaning that its tenants are
responsible for operating the facilities, while Seattle generally
provides all port services using its own employees except to load
and unload ships. Such services include, but are not limited to,
operating container terminals, grain elevators, and other equip-
ment, as well as loading and unloading rail cars and trucks.
Although we found some similarities between the other ports we
analyzed and the maritime division, significant differences exist.
Tacoma handles a similar volume of cargo, but its business
structure is unlike the maritime division.
Long Beach and Los Angeles have different busi-
ness structures as well, and they are able to handle
Definitions of Vessel Services from the
American Association of Port Authorities substantially larger volumes of containers because of
their greater acreage, as previously discussed. Accord-
(cid:127) Liner cargo–carried in vessels according
to a fixed schedule of routes and ports of ing to the maritime division’s fiscal year 1993–94
call. Most containerized as well as some business plan, the port’s one disadvantage was the
breakbulk cargo falls in this category.
limited amount of land available for expansion.
(Breakbulk is cargo handled in units,
packages, crates, or bags.)
According to the American Association of Port
(cid:127) Tramp cargo–dry cargo carried on
chartered vessels. It includes mainly dry Authorities (AAPA), vessel services are categorized
bulk cargo such as coal, grain, and into three areas: liner, tramp, and tanker. Since the
fertilizers, as well as steel and, in some
maritime division mainly services containerized
cases, automobiles.
cargo, we compared the ports by their rankings in
(cid:127) Tanker cargo–bulk liquid cargo, such as
liner services. In 1999 (the only year data were
crude oil, carried on tanker vessels.
available), the AAPA ranked Oakland in the top
28
10 of 50 ports for liner vessel service for U.S. waterborne foreign
trade. As shown in Table 1, the highest-ranking ports were
Long Beach and Los Angeles. In addition, for 1990 through
1999, the AAPA included Oakland among the top 10 of 164 ports
ranked by the value of their annual cargo. Table 2 on the following
page shows that the lowest ranking for Oakland was eighth, a
ranking it held for 5 of the 10 years, and its annual cargo value
grew from $17.2 billion in 1990 to $25.8 billion in 1999. The
highest-ranked ports were again Los Angeles and Long Beach.
TABLE 1
Five U.S. Ports Ranked by Vessel Service (Liner) for 1999
(In Thousands of Tons)
Port Rank Total Tons
Long Beach 1 18,324,978
Los Angeles 2 17,013,837
Seattle 7 7,613,947
Oakland 8 6,896,643
Tacoma 12 3,845,144
Source: American Association of Port Authorities.
Finally, Table 3 on the following page ranks the ports by their
annual capital expenditures. For five of the eight years considered
(1992 through 1999), Oakland ranked in the top 10. Like other
ports, the maritime division must make capital improvements
in order to remain competitive. The amounts spent by its com-
petitors suggest that if the maritime division does not continue
with its own expansion plans, it may lose its position among
West Coast ports.
29
30
TABLE 2
Five U.S. Ports Ranked by Annual Cargo Value for 1990 Through 1999
(Dollars in Millions)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Cargo Cargo Cargo Cargo Cargo Cargo Cargo Cargo Cargo Cargo
Port Rank Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank Value
Oakland 8 $17,243 8 $18,399 6 $24,132 5 $26,691 5 $29,015 6 $31,095 7 $26,820 8 $25,330 8 $26,170 8 $25,758
Seattle 5 26,737 4 25,882 4 26,891 4 28,357 4 36,135 4 37,113 5 34,079 5 33,625 5 33,982 5 32,227
Tacoma 6 24,303 6 22,017 7 22,967 7 23,086 8 20,851 8 22,786 9 20,557 9 19,519 12 15,018 10 16,985
Los Angeles 1 56,345 1 56,936 1 63,029 1 65,464 1 73,433 2 74,200 2 72,823 2 73,431 2 79,602 2 83,074
Long Beach 3 42,861 3 49,390 3 50,976 2 58,513 2 70,877 1 82,785 1 86,953 1 85,308 1 80,174 1 88,956
Source: American Association of Port Authorities.
TABLE 3
Five U.S. Ports Ranked by Total Capital Expenditures for 1992 Through 1999
(Dollars in Thousands)
Port Rank 1992 Rank 1993 Rank 1994 Rank 1995 Rank 1996 Rank 1997 Rank 1998 Rank 1999
Oakland 10 $24,998 NA NA NA NA 10 $ 29,913 7 $ 45,269 5 $ 53,542 NA NA 2 $125,243
Seattle 8 29,851 3 $62,062 NA NA 4 82,013 3 144,817 3 167,291 2 $135,654 6 62,622
Tacoma NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 5 57,625 NA NA 5 71,178 NA NA
Los Angeles 4 48,400 4 54,991 2 $ 77,524 1 377,513 1 407,099 1 355,074 3 135,228 3 100,820
Long Beach 2 60,800 1 76,000 1 434,100 2 251,100 2 179,690 2 254,561 1 272,992 1 210,872
Source: U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration.
NA: Not applicable because the port did not rank in the top 10 ports for capital expenditures in that year.
THE AVIATION DIVISION HAS INCREASED ITS
REVENUES OVER THE PAST DECADE AND IS
IMPLEMENTING EXPANSION PLANS THAT SHOULD
SIGNIFICANTLY BENEFIT THE PUBLIC
The aviation division has significantly increased its operating
revenues and the number of passengers using the airport in the
past 10 years, although its capital improvements have consisted
of relatively minor projects. This growth is particularly remarkable
considering the fluctuating number of airline flights scheduled
during this period. In response to the increased number of
passengers it serves, the aviation division is in the process of
implementing a substantial expansion of its facilities, including
new terminal buildings, roadways, and a parking structure. This
expansion should benefit the public by relieving traffic conges-
tion and improving access, and it should enable the airport to
remain comparable to other airports of its size that are planning
similar improvements.
The aviation division identified a variety of funding sources for
the expansion in its March 2000 feasibility study, and financial
projections in that study appear reasonable. However, several
significant changes have occurred since the March 2000 study
was completed. First, the aviation division has increased its
estimate of construction costs by almost $500 million. Second,
on September 26, 2001, an appellate court responded to a lawsuit
filed by four petitioners, ordering that the division prepare a new
supplemental EIR before proceeding with the expansion. It is now
unclear when the division will be able to begin construction and
what additional costs it will face. In addition, the acts of terror-
ism against the United States committed on September 11, 2001,
will certainly have an impact on the airline industry, but it is
impossible to predict the precise nature or extent of that impact
on the Metropolitan Oakland International Airport (Oakland
airport) at this time.
Revenues Have Increased and the Number of Passengers
During the last decade,
Using the Airport Has Nearly Doubled
the aviation division’s
operating revenue The aviation division has operated at a profit during each of the
increased during all last 10 years. Despite some volatility in the airlines servicing
10 years, and the number Oakland airport during the last decade, the number of passen-
of passengers boarding gers boarding planes increased during 7 of those years, and the
planes increased during division’s operating revenue increased during all 10. Specifically,
7 of these years. as shown in Figure 8 on the following page, the airport’s operating
31
32
FIGURE 8
Aviation Division’s Operating Revenue, Expenses, and Income
for Fiscal Years 1990–91 Through 1999–2000
(In Millions)
$100
Total operating income
Total operating expenses*
Total operating revenue
80
60
40
20
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0
9 9
0–
9 9
1–
9 9
2–
9 9
3–
9 9
4–
9 9
5–
9 9
6–
9 9
7–
9 9
8–
9– 2
0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9
9
1
Source: Port of Oakland’s audited financial statements.
* Operating expenses include depreciation and amortization.
revenue increased from $50.2 million to $81.5 million (62 percent)
between fiscal years 1990–91 and 1999–2000. Revenue growth
appears to be primarily due to an increase in the number of
passengers boarding Oakland airport flights during the same
period, as depicted in Figure 9 on the following page.
The growth experienced by the aviation division follows a
national trend in the airline industry but is still remarkable
The growth at Oakland considering the lack of stability in the number of airlines servicing
airport over the last the airport and the inconsistency in the number of flights
10 years follows a offered. For example, in fiscal year 1994–95, United Airlines
national trend in the began “Shuttle by United,” offering frequent flights throughout
airline industry. the western United States. A year later, it eliminated the shuttle
services to Seattle, Ontario, and Burbank, and a year after that
further reduced its service by eliminating some of the flights to
Los Angeles. In a similar example, Delta Airlines eliminated its
nonstop flight service from Oakland to Salt Lake City in fiscal
year 1998–99, canceling approximately 33 flights a week.
Capital Improvements in Recent Years Have Been
Relatively Minor
Over the past 10 years the aviation division generated adequate
revenues to cover its expenses and the relatively small capital
improvement projects it undertook during this time. These
capital improvement projects did not, for the most part, generate
revenues that we could use to calculate a rate of return on the
investment. For example, in 1992 the aviation division expanded
the baggage claim area in one of its terminals, and in 1998 it
built a new state-of-the-art fire station. At $2.5 million, the
baggage claim expansion was the least costly project undertaken
during this time, and the fire station was the most expensive at
$13.8 million. Although both improvements benefit airport
customers, neither generates revenues. However, for each year
from fiscal year 1992–93 through fiscal year 1999–2000, the airport
generated at least 100 percent more revenue than it needed to
cover its debt. As shown in Figure 10 on page 35, the aviation
division was able to maintain the debt service coverage ratio
required by its creditors of 1.25 and exceeded the Port’s more
stringent internal goal of a 1.6 ratio.
33
FIGURE 9
Passenger Enplanements From 1991 Through 2000*
(In Thousands)
Oakland enplanements U.S. enplanements
7,000 700,000
6,000 600,000
5,000 500,000
4,000 400,000
3,000 300,000
2,000 200,000
1,000 100,000
0 0
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Source: Port of Oakland and the Federal Aviation Administration.
*The passenger enplanement figure was not available for the United States in 2000.
Although Expansion Plans Promise Significant Public Benefit
and Are Based on Reasonable Estimates, Recent Events May
Necessitate Some Changes
In March 2000 the Port completed and issued its latest feasibility
study concerning the aviation division’s planned capital improve-
ments of the Oakland airport. The major construction projects
proposed in this study included expanding the terminal buildings,
extending roadways, and constructing a parking garage. These
plans offered a number of benefits to the public, including
decreasing traffic congestion around the airport and increasing
the number of jobs open to the local community. Moreover, in
the March 2000 study, the aviation division outlined a variety of
funding sources for the projects that appeared at the time to
adequately meet its projected construction costs.
However, since the Port completed this feasibility study, a
number of events have occurred that significantly alter the
assumptions on which it was based. First, the aviation division
calculated that its costs would be higher than it had previously
34
FIGURE 10
Debt Service Coverage Ratios for the Aviation Division for
Fiscal Years 1992–93 Through 1999–2000
8.0
7.0
6.0
5.0
o
ti 4.0
a
R
3.0
2.0
1.60*
1.25†
1.0
0
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0
9 9
2–
9 9
3–
9 9
4–
9 9
5–
9 9
6–
9 9
7–
9 9
8–
9– 2
0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9
9
1
Source: Auditor’s calculations based on segmented income statements and bond
payment records.
*The Port’s internal minimum debt service coverage ratio.
†Minimum debt service coverage ratio required by the Port’s revenue bond covenant.
predicted, so it started revising its capital improvement plans.
Second, while it was in the process of completing this revision,
an appellate court upheld the complaints of several petitioners
and ordered the division to submit a revised EIR before beginning
construction. Finally, on September 11, 2001, terrorists used
hijacked planes to attack the United States, an act that will
clearly have significant financial consequences for the airline
industry. Because it is impossible to predict how these events
will affect the aviation division’s plans, the conclusions we draw
in this section are based on the estimated costs and fund sources
outlined in the March 2000 study and do not reflect the impact
of recent events.
35
Planned Capital Improvements Should Reduce Traffic Congestion
Around the Airport, Increase Tax Revenues, and Create Jobs
As previously mentioned, the aviation division’s March 2000
feasibility study proposed a number of major capital
improvements, including expanded terminal buildings,
extended roadways, and a new parking garage. These projects
offer a number of significant benefits to the public, including
The aviation division’s less traffic congestion in and around the airport. To accomplish
capital improvement this, the aviation division proposed widening a main roadway
plans include expanding leading into the airport, reconstructing two intersections near
the terminal buildings, the airport, and extending a roadway from one side of the
extending roadways, airport to the other. The planned expansion should help to
and constructing a accommodate the expected increase in passengers and may
parking garage. result in travelers choosing the Oakland airport over more
crowded, alternative airports.
The airport expansion projects should also result in the aviation
division generating additional tax revenues for the city, county,
and State. For example, in fiscal year 1998–99, the aviation
division’s tenants paid $111 million in state and local taxes.
Division staff estimate that if the projects proceed according to
schedule, the division’s tenants will contribute approximately
$125 million in 2010, an increase of $14 million.
The aviation division further estimates that if the expansion
proceeds as planned, its capital improvements should create a
total of 2,700 new jobs by 2010, a projection that the division
reached by using the model employed by the maritime division.
The 2,700 new jobs consist of an estimated 1,900 local jobs
directly related to the airport and another 800 jobs created as a
result of the goods and services purchased by the individuals
filling the direct jobs. In addition to the jobs created as a result
of the expansion, employment opportunities for local residents
should arise during construction of the expansion projects. Like
the maritime division, the aviation division will strive to ensure
that local residents perform 50 percent of the work created by
the expansion and 20 percent of the work created during the
expansion. Port staff projects that 2,200 jobs should be created
during the construction of the aviation expansion and conserva-
tively estimates 400 will be apprenticeships.
36
The March 2000 Plans for Funding Were Based on Conservative
Revenue Projections Involving a Variety of Sources
In its March 2000 feasibility study, the aviation division estimated
that it would need approximately $937 million to finance its
capital improvement program. It anticipated that it would
receive this funding through a variety of sources, including
federal Aviation Improvement Program (AIP) grants, passenger
facility charges, local taxpayer funding, the issuing of commer-
cial paper, and the sale of revenue bonds. Its projections for each
of these funding sources appear to be conservative.
The aviation division estimated that it could receive $18.6 million
in AIP grants that it could apply toward the airport expansion.
AIP grants are allocated by the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) based on annual congressional appropriation levels.
Passenger facility charges According to our understanding of how the federal allocation
collected by airlines and levels are computed, the aviation division’s expectations seem
remitted to the airport reasonable. The aviation division also expected $235.6 million
are expected to fund to come from passenger facility charges, which are fees collected
almost $236 million of by airlines and remitted to the airport. The FAA must authorize
the expansion program. the collection of passenger facility charges, and the division can
only spend the funds on projects that improve safety, reduce
noise, or enhance competition between airlines. Oakland airport
is currently authorized by the FAA to impose a passenger facility
charge of $3 per passenger, but it intends to apply to raise this
charge to $4.50 per passenger in 2003. The aviation division
expects to receive prompt FAA approval. We found that the
division based its estimates of funding from this source on
reasonable assumptions of future passenger growth.
The aviation division has been cautious in projecting future
funding from local voter measures and grants, only including in
the March 2000 study those sources of funding already approved
for its use. The division estimated it would receive approximately
$73.9 million from Measure B, which Alameda County voters
approved in November 1986 to finance the construction of an
airport roadway. It also identified an additional $4.5 million in
local funding that it was likely to receive in the near future from
state and local sources, but because these amounts were not yet
certain, the aviation division did not include them in the feasi-
bility study. For example, it expected $1 million from Alameda
County, subject to the approval of the county’s Congestion
Management Agency board.
37
The aviation division also anticipated issuing bonds and commer-
cial paper to fund its capital improvement projects. To date, the
board of port commissioners (board) has authorized a total of
$150 million in short-term (270-day) notes—called commercial
paper—to fund the airport expansion. It also plans to issue
revenue bonds to raise an additional $321.8 million. The Port is
authorized to issue any amount of revenue bonds as long as its
overall debt service coverage ratio remains above 1.25. Based on
the projections of revenues, expenses, and debt service growth
included in its March 2000 feasibility study, the Port should be
able to issue the necessary amount of revenue bonds to finance
the aviation expansion while maintaining its self-imposed
minimum debt service coverage ratio at 1.6.
Finally, the aviation division estimated that after payment of its
operating expenses and debt service costs, it should have revenue
in the amount of $137.5 million to fund a portion of the expan-
sion plans. The division based its estimates on what we believe
to be reasonable assumptions of revenue growth, operating
expenses, and debt service amounts. For example, the revenue
projections reflect decreases during construction periods and
increases once construction concludes. During fiscal years 2000–01
through 2002–03, the revenue projections take into consideration
that construction of the new airport parking garage will cause a
decrease in parking lot revenues. In fiscal year 2003–04, the new
parking structure is scheduled to be complete; thus, the division
has projected an increase in parking lot revenues. Projections for
operating costs appear to be equally reasonable because they are
based on historical trends and adjusted for expected increases in
future airport activity and staffing requirements.
Preliminary Projections of Costs in the March 2000 Study Prompt
Expansion Plan Revisions
As previously discussed, the funding sources that the aviation
division projected in its March 2000 feasibility study of its
Although the 2000 capital improvement program appear reasonable. However, the
feasibility study estimated division has since discovered that the construction costs it
the airport expansion originally estimated were not accurate; therefore, it is currently
would cost $937 million, revising its expansion plans. The March 2000 feasibility study
the aviation division later estimated that the airport expansion would cost $937 million.
estimated the cost would According to the director of aviation, this estimate was based on
total nearly $1.5 billion. a preliminary study that was not intended to be fully compre-
hensive. The aviation division subsequently performed a more
thorough review and determined that the actual cost was likely
to reach nearly $1.5 billion.
38
The aviation division presented its new projections to the board
in May 2001. On June 1, 2001, the board instructed aviation
division staff to consider two measures to cut projected costs and
report its conclusions. First, the board directed the division to
propose changes in the scope of the expansion project sufficient
to reduce the overall cost to $1.1 billion. Second, it asked the
division to identify up to $200 million in “soft” cost reductions
that would not change the project’s scope. These reductions
might involve items such as development and design costs,
construction and project management costs, consultant costs,
and certain mitigation and oversight costs. In response to the
board’s request, the division submitted a study on June 22, 2001,
containing three alternatives to the scope design and eight ideas
for reducing costs without changing the project’s scope. All the
alternatives outlined in the June study include expanding the
airport terminal buildings, building a parking garage, and con-
structing a two-level roadway for passenger pickup and drop-off,
as planned for in the March 2000 study.
The board reviewed the study and provided feedback to the
aviation staff. On August 3, 2001, the division submitted a
decision document to the board containing the staff’s final
recommendations for the expansion. Although the final expan-
sion plans necessitated a $1.49 billion budget, the aviation
division staff believe there may be methods of reducing costs by
at least $100 million. Therefore, division staff recommended
that the board approve a maximum budget for the expansion of
$1.39 billion. The board approved the staff’s recommendations
for the airport expansion on August 7, 2001. The final revisions
to the airport expansion plans were reviewed by consultants,
who assessed the reasonableness of the estimated construction
costs and underlying assumptions on which those costs were
based and found both feasible.
Recent Developments May Affect the Progress of the
Planned Expansion
After the board’s approval of the aviation division’s revised
On September 26, 2001, plans, two events occurred that are likely to affect the airport
an appellate court ruled expansion. First, on September 26, 2001, an appellate court
that the aviation ruled that the division must submit a new supplemental EIR for
division must submit a its planned projects. The process that resulted in this decision
new supplemental EIR for began in December 1997, when the board certified the division’s
its projects. EIR identifying the significant environmental effects and mitiga-
tion measures of the airport’s expansion plans. Shortly thereafter,
four plaintiffs, including the cities of Alameda and San Leandro
39
and two citizen organizations, filed petitions with the superior
court challenging the board’s decision to certify the EIR and
approve the expansion project. The superior court ordered the
Port to set aside approval and certification of the EIR until the
division prepared a supplement to the EIR in compliance with the
California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). In June 1999 the
board certified and approved the completed supplemental EIR.
Subsequently, three of the four original plaintiffs appealed the
superior court’s ruling.
This led to the appellate court’s modified order filed on
September 26, 2001. The appellate court ordered the division to
prepare a supplemental EIR that included a further discussion of
project alternatives and cumulative impacts. The appellate court
also found that the EIR failed to comply with the CEQA on four
additional points. First, the court found that the EIR did not
adequately analyze the noise impacts from additional nighttime
flights. Second, the division erred in using outdated information
in assessing the emission of toxic air contaminants. Third, the
division failed to support with meaningful analysis its decision
not to evaluate the health risks associated with the emission of
toxic air contaminants. Last, the division improperly deferred
devising a mitigation plan for the western burrowing owl, which
would be affected by the expansion. Because of these deficiencies,
the appellate court also ordered that the aviation division
address these additional points in its new supplemental EIR,
submit it for public review and comment, and certify it in
accordance with the CEQA.
The board is currently assessing the impacts of the court’s ruling.
Although preparing a Although preparing a supplemental EIR will take additional time
supplemental EIR will and money, according to an assistant attorney for the Port, it is
take added time and conceivable that the division will be able to proceed with some
money, an assistant projects while additional environmental review is being done on
attorney for the Port other projects, thus reducing the delay.
stated it may be able to
proceed with some The court’s ruling, combined with the aviation division’s revi-
projects, thus reducing sions of the estimated costs of construction, create a degree of
the delay. uncertainty about the timing and the new sources of funding
needed to pay for the revised costs of the airport expansion.
This uncertainty is heightened by the fact that terrorists
used commercial airplanes to attack the United States on
September 11, 2001. Although difficult to predict in the long
term, some impact on the airline industry is inevitable.
40
The Expansion Plans Should Enable Oakland to Remain
Comparable With Similar Airports
The aviation division is economically comparable with airports
having similar operating capacities, such as San Jose International,
San Diego International, and Palm Beach (Florida) International
airports. As seen in Figure 11, nearly five million passengers
boarded planes at the Oakland airport in fiscal year 1999–2000
compared with about six million passengers at San Jose and
almost eight million at San Diego.
According to Oakland airport’s director of aviation, airlines’ cost
per enplanement is a common indicator used in the industry.
Airports determine the cost per enplanement by dividing the
FIGURE 11
Comparison of Four Airports’ Passenger
Enplanements for 2000
(In Millions)
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Oakland San Jose San Diego Palm Beach
Source: Oakland, San Jose, and San Diego International airports and Palm Beach County
Department of Airports.
Note: Data for Oakland, San Jose, and Palm Beach are for fiscal year 1999–2000, and
data for San Diego are for calendar year 2000.
41
sregnessaP
total that various passenger airlines pay for using airport facilities
by the total number of passengers that board planes.6 Airlines
often use the cost per enplanement to determine whether to fly
in and out of a particular airport. Most airports strive to keep
their cost per enplanement low so more airlines will want to use
their facilities. As shown in Figure 12, Oakland airport’s cost per
enplanement for fiscal year 1999–2000 was slightly more than
$3, the second lowest among the airports we considered. The
cost per enplanement at the comparable airports ranged from
$2.69 at San Jose to $8.16 at Palm Beach.
FIGURE 12
Comparison of Four Airports’ Costs
Per Enplanement for 2000
$10
8
6
4
2
0
Oakland San Jose San Diego Palm Beach
Source: Oakland, San Jose, and San Diego International airports and Palm Beach County
Department of Airports.
Note: Data for Oakland, San Jose, and Palm Beach are for fiscal year 1999–2000, and
data for San Diego are for calendar year 2000.
6 Enplaned passengers are those who board the aircraft at a particular airport. In general,
airport use is measured by the number of passengers who board aircraft as opposed to
those who disembark.
42
Although the Oakland airport can be compared with other
airports in terms of number of passengers and cost per
enplanement, we found it difficult to meaningfully compare
Oakland airport’s cargo function with other cargo airports.
Unlike other airports of its size, Oakland airport has two airfields—
one used for passengers and a second devoted mainly to general
aviation activities involving small private aircraft. Oakland serves
as a hub for Federal Express and a mini-hub for the United Parcel
Service, two major freight and mail carriers. Consequently, the
amount of cargo activity at Oakland airport is much greater
than the activity at the comparable passenger airports.
Like Oakland, most of the airports in our review are currently
planning expansions. San Jose and Palm Beach International
airports both intend to expand their cargo areas, parking facili-
ties, and passenger terminals, as well as improve their roads and
runways. San Diego International airport is implementing
construction projects designed to expand and improve its
terminal facilities. If Oakland airport does not continue its
expansion plans, it risks being left behind by comparable airports
and losing the position in the industry that it has earned over
the past decade.
THE REAL ESTATE DIVISION HAS OPERATED AT A
CONSIDERABLE FISCAL LOSS BUT PLANS TO FINANCE
FUTURE CAPITAL IMPROVEMENTS WITHOUT
INCURRING ADDITIONAL DEBT
Of the Port’s three revenue divisions, only the real estate division
The real estate division has has failed to significantly increase its revenues over the past
consistently operated at a 10 years. In fact, the real estate division has consistently operated
deficit, relying on the at a deficit during this time, relying on the other divisions to
other divisions to fund fund its capital improvement projects. The division’s losses were
its past capital due in part to its unsuccessful business undertakings and the
improvement projects. Port’s decision to use the real estate division as a means to supply
public benefits. To accomplish the Port’s overall mission, the real
estate division has in effect subsidized a number of public benefit
projects, including several parks and an Amtrak station.
Despite plans to improve its profitability, the real estate division
has yet to take significant actions toward this end. It is currently
proposing several large capital improvement projects, including
expanding Jack London Square and developing a large section in
43
the waterfront area in cooperation with the city of Oakland.
However, rather than increasing its debt, it plans to move
forward with these projects only if it can find developers who
will agree to be responsible for the capital development funding.
Consistent Losses Have Been Due to Costly Public Services,
High Operational Expenses, and Ill-Fated Business Decisions
Despite two studies and an action plan adopted by the board,
the real estate division has taken few steps to alleviate the
financial drain it has had on the Port’s overall operations.
Despite two studies and Although real estate is the smallest of the three divisions in
an action plan, the real terms of revenue production, averaging approximately 11 percent
estate division has of the Port’s total annual revenue, its costs make up about
taken few steps to 21 percent of the Port’s annual expenditures. As shown in
alleviate the financial Figure 13 on the following page, between fiscal years 1990–91 and
drain it has had on the 1999–2000, the real estate division lost between $4.3 million and
Port’s overall operations. $12.4 million a year, for an average annual loss of $7.5 million.
These losses appear to result from at least three different factors.
The first is a conscious decision by the Port to have the real
estate division enter a number of lease agreements at rates
significantly below fair market values. The second relates to the
high operational costs associated with the properties located in
and around Jack London Square, costs that the real estate division
failed to reduce. The third cause seems to be some ill-fated
decisions the division made in pursuing certain business deals.
The first of these factors stems from the nature of the Port’s
mission. The Port has chosen to lease a total of nine different
properties, some situated in prime locations, at nominal rates—
eight for $1 per year each and one for $490 per year—to the city
of Oakland, the Bay Area Rapid Transit, the East Bay Regional
Parks District, Amtrak, and the Oakland Fire Department Historical
Society. When we asked the Port why it offered these lease terms,
its assistant attorney stated that unless required by federal, state,
or other legal mandate, the Port will generally direct the real
estate division to grant $1-per-year leases only if the board
determines it is in the Port’s best interests. In making such
decisions, the board uses the following criteria:
(cid:127) The property generates a minimal amount of overall Port
revenue, and the acreage is small enough so as not to affect
Port revenue.
44
45
FIGURE 13
The Real Estate Division’s Operating Revenue, Expenses, and Losses for
Fiscal Years 1990–91 Through 1999–2000
(In Millions)
$30
Total operating loss
Total operating expenses*
25
Total operating revenue
20
15
10
5
0
-5
-10
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
-15
9 9
0– 9
9 9
1– 9
9 9
2– 9
9 9
3– 9
9 9
4– 9
9 9
5– 9
9 9
6– 9
9 9
7– 9
9 9
8– 9
9– 2
0 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9
9
1
Source: Port of Oakland’s audited financial statements.
*Operating expenses include depreciation and amortization.
(cid:127) The tenant is a public agency or nonprofit private entity that
will use the property for Tideland Trust uses. According to the
Tideland Trust, these uses include commerce, navigation,
fishing, and recreation.
(cid:127) The use provides special and important benefits in developing,
operating, or protecting public trust lands and facilities that
justify the minimal lease payments.
(cid:127) The transaction does not result in the Port losing the opportu-
nity to earn substantial net revenues.
(cid:127) For leases executed after January 1, 1989, the lease will not
have a substantial adverse effect on the revenues pledged to
service the Port’s bond debt.
Although the board considers all these criteria when deciding
whether to direct the division to grant a nominal lease, it does
not require that all be met before it can make such a decision.
The Port’s assistant attorney stated that seven of the $1-per-year
leases currently in place clearly satisfy the Port’s general criteria.
According to the assistant attorney, two of the leased properties
do not meet these criteria: One is used as a service center for
municipal maintenance and supplies and the other for a munici-
pal sewer pipeline. However, because of its minimal value and
the fact that it does not interfere with trust uses, the assistant
attorney also stated that the failure of the leased property used
for the pipeline to meet the criteria was not significant.
While the decision to lease land at below-market values may
help the Port accomplish its mission to generate economic
vitality, jobs, and waterfront activities, it has come at a high
Although the Port’s price to the real estate division. The real estate division could
decision to lease land at receive an additional $33.1 million annually in revenue if it
below-market values may leased these properties for their estimated fair market value. To
accomplish its mission to quantify this lost revenue, we asked division staff to provide
generate economic growth estimates of what these properties could lease for annually
and waterfront activity, it without any further upgrades or development. As shown in
has been detrimental to Table 4, we used the division’s estimates to calculate the annual
the real estate division’s amount of additional revenue it would earn if it leased the
financial success. properties at full value, as well as what it would earn leasing the
properties at 75 percent, 50 percent, and 25 percent of their
value. The total added annual lease revenue would range from a
low of $8.3 million a year (at 25 percent of fair market value) to
a high of $33.1 million a year (at 100 percent of fair market value).
In other words, leasing these nine properties for just 25 percent
46
TABLE 4
Estimated Fair Market Value of the Real Estate Division’s Below-Market Lease Properties
Property Fair Market Percent of Fair Market Value
Tenant Description Value of Annual Lease
Name and Use Annual Lease 75 50 25 Lease Rate Expiration
Bay Area Rapid 80 square feet Nominal NA NA NA $ 1 2004
Transit District of vacant land amount
for emergency
command post
City of Oakland 21 acres for $ 1,116,000 $ 837,000 $ 558,000 $ 279,000 1 Pending
a municipal renegotiation
maintenance yard
City of Oakland 0.5 acre for a 26,568 19,926 13,284 6,642 1 Pending
fire station renegotiation
City of Oakland 12.7 acres of 674,916 506,187 337,458 168,729 1 2029
land and water
for a park
City of Oakland 15,543 square feet 29,832 22,374 14,916 7,458 1 2007
of land and
7,406 square feet
of water for a
fire station
City of Oakland 4,474 square-foot 5,448 4,086 2,724 1,362 1 2060
easement for a
sewer line
East Bay Regional 565 acres of 30,025,908 22,519,431 15,012,954 7,506,477 1 2002
Park District land and water
for a park
Amtrak 15,000 square feet 1,160,000 870,000 580,000 290,000 1 2061
of building plus land
for public rail
transportation
Oakland Fire 7,000 square feet 21,000 15,750 10,500 5,250 490 Pending
Department of warehouse space renegotiation
Historical Society
Totals $33,059,672 $24,794,754 $16,529,836 $8,264,918 $498
Source: Port of Oakland real estate division.
NA: Not applicable.
of their value would have generated enough revenue to cover
the annual loss of $7.5 million that the real estate division has
averaged over the last 10 fiscal years.
The Port has commissioned two studies of the real estate division
in an effort to improve its profitability—one in 1995 and one in
1998. The 1998 study examined the division’s operational
problems and made recommendations for improvement. These
recommendations included ways to increase revenues while
reducing expenses and capital outlays. From this study, the Port
47
created an action plan in February 1999, which included 10 items
and a timetable for completing them. However, it appears that
this timetable was unrealistic. As shown in Table 5, as of
September 12, 2001, the real estate division had only completed
1 item, had partially completed 7, and the remaining 2 were on
hold pending the completion of one of the other items. According
to the established timetable, 9 of the 10 action items should
have been completed. The director of the real estate division
feels that he may have been too aggressive in his timetable
because he did not adequately anticipate the time a public entity
with multiple stakeholders needs to reach decisions. However,
he also feels that the division has made progress in implementing
its plan over the past two and a half years. As Figure 13 on
page 45 shows, the real estate division did reduce its losses by
almost $4 million between fiscal years 1998–99 and 1999–2000.
TABLE 5
1999 Action Plan for the Real Estate Division
Scheduled Status as of
Action Item Completion Date September 12, 2001
1. Port review and approval of plan 2/16/99 Completed
2. Market or sell Hegenberger Road 8/31/99 In process
development parcels
3. Market or secure Jack London Square 8/31/99 In process
strategic developer and leases
4. Market or secure marina lease 8/31/99 In process
5. Prepare and certify an environmental 3/31/00 On hold pending
impact report for Jack London Square completion of
item 3
6. Further develop Jack London Square 3/30/01 In process
7. Implement the Estuary Plan 7/31/09 In process
8. Restructure the division 2/29/00 In process
9. Implement new operations systems 4/28/00 On hold pending
and policies completion of
item 3
10. Restructure and pay down debt 3/31/00 In process
Source: Real estate division’s restructure and development plan and recommendations.
One item discussed in the 1998 study was the high cost of
running and maintaining the land and buildings the real estate
division manages. Over a period of three years, from fiscal years
48
1996–97 through 1998–99, the real estate division’s maintenance
cost averaged roughly $4 million, approximately 32 percent of
its total operating expenses during each of those three fiscal
years. To combat these high costs, the consultant performing the
study recommended restructuring the real estate division and
finding a lessee for the marina, noting that the operating ex-
penses for private marinas tended to be about half what public
marinas expend. According to the consultant, workforce improve-
ments, such as personnel training and specialization, contribute
to the greater profitability of private marinas. The consultant
also recommended that the real estate division find a lessee to
operate the facilities in Jack London Square.
In response to the first recommendation, the division received
approval on August 7, 2001, from the board to send out a Request
for Proposal for a management company to take over the marina.
However, the division does not expect to complete this process
until early next year. In fiscal year 1999–2000, the real estate
division transferred its maintenance function to the engineering
division’s maintenance unit, thus redirecting some of its labor
costs. While this action did not reduce the Port’s overall operat-
ing expenses, it did have a positive effect on the real estate
division’s maintenance costs, which dropped from an average of
32 percent of its total operating costs to about 10 percent in
fiscal year 1999–2000.
Finally, some of the real estate division’s losses have been the
result of business decisions that turned out badly. One of the key
decisions involved Oakland Portside Associates (OPA), a limited
partnership formed in 1987 to develop Jack London Square.
Unfortunately, OPA lost its partner, which was supplying the
necessary capital, shortly after the start of the development. At
the time the OPA’s partner withdrew, the Port had already
The Jack London Square started construction on various infrastructure improvements
project has been operating including parking facilities, roads, and utilities with an estimated
at an average annual loss cost of more than $30 million. Rather than walk away from its
of $2.4 million since the investment, the Port became a general and limited partner, and
Port became the sole in August 1990, it in effect became the sole owner of the OPA.
owner in 1990. The OPA finished the project but has been operating at an
annual loss averaging $2.4 million since fiscal year 1990–91.
These losses, which are reflected in the operations of the real
estate division, are included in the amounts shown in Figure 13 on
page 45. Further, when it acquired the OPA, the Port wrote down
the value of the OPA assets by almost $7 million in fiscal year
1990–91 to accurately reflect their value.
49
Another example of a business decision that turned out badly
involved one of the real estate division’s tenants that operated a
hotel adjacent to the airport until August 1994. The real estate
division took possession of the building as part of the tenant’s
bankruptcy settlement and attempted to run the hotel until it
could locate a potential buyer. However, when it was unable to
find a suitable prospect, it eventually demolished the building
and cleared the land. During the period between fiscal years
1994–95 and 1996–97, the real estate division spent approximately
$2.7 million more to operate the hotel than it received in rev-
enues. It spent another $1.8 million to raze the site.
The Other Divisions Have Subsidized the Real Estate
Division’s Past Capital Improvement Projects
The real estate division has only been able to minimally contribute
revenue to pay for its past capital improvement projects because
The real estate division has its expenses have generally exceeded its revenues. Specifically, the
not generated enough real estate division’s debt service coverage ratio was negative for
revenue to cover its debt six of the eight fiscal years spanning 1992–93 through 1999–2000.
service costs for six of the A negative debt service coverage ratio means that the division’s
last eight fiscal years. operations did not generate enough revenues to pay for both its
operating costs and its long-term debt.7 Thus, one or more of
the other divisions has had to subsidize the real estate division’s
past capital improvement projects that, from January 1991 to
May 2001, amounted to approximately $74 million.
The real estate division’s two largest projects were a large parking
garage that cost approximately $12.3 million and a new Amtrak
station that cost about $10.5 million. Our attempt to determine
the rate of return on the parking garage as an individual project
was unsuccessful. The real estate division does not keep detailed
accounting records, instead depending on the finance division
of the Port for its accounting needs. As a result, the information
that the real estate division provided us regarding the financial
health of the parking garage did not contain the maintenance,
utilities, and finance costs associated with the project. The
finance division was also unable to provide us with the mainte-
nance and utility costs because it does not record them on an
individual project basis. Although the revenues and expenses
reflected in the accounting records indicate that the parking
7 It should be noted that the debt service coverage ratio presented to investors is based
on the Port’s activities taken as a whole. Therefore, as long as the Port’s other two
revenue divisions maintain debt service coverage ratios high enough to cover the real
estate division’s deficit, it should not preclude the Port from obtaining financing.
50
project is making a profit, any evaluation made of that data
would be incomplete without inclusion of the maintenance and
other operating expenses.
The cost to construct the Amtrak station was around
$10.5 million, but the real estate division was only responsible
for a part of this total. State and federal grants paid for approxi-
mately $8 million of the construction, while the real estate
division paid the remaining $2.5 million. As mentioned earlier,
the real estate division provides the land the station sits on for a
lease of $1 a year. It does not receive any other revenues from
this project.
The Division’s Plans Should Not Increase the Port’s Debt
The real estate division’s projected debt service coverage ratios
for the next nine fiscal years, from 2000–01 through 2008–09,
appear to be well below the 1.25 required of the Port as a whole.
However, these projections do not take into account a number
of the division’s current plans to reduce its losses. According to
the division, these plans were not included when it projected its
future revenues and expenses because it did not want to assume
it could accomplish these tasks in the near future. According to
the Port’s chief financial officer, the real estate division’s plans
are not yet finalized and thus could not be considered in the
capital improvement program contained in the feasibility study.
This decision partially explains why the division’s projections
continue to show losses. Because the real estate division has
struggled in the past to improve its operations, this appears to be
a conservative and appropriate approach.
Some large developments that the real estate division is in the
process of planning should not require the issuance of any
additional debt. These projects, which include expanding Jack
For its future capital London Square and developing a large section in the waterfront
projects, the division will area, are part of a bigger overall plan the Port and the city of
act primarily as a Oakland have for the waterfront called the Estuary Plan. To
landlord while developers finance its Estuary Plan projects, the division intends to have the
bear the burden of developers bear the responsibility for the capital development
financing capital costs while it acts primarily as a landlord. The division is also
development costs. attempting to sell some properties around the airport and
intends to use the proceeds from those sales to finance its portion
of the developments. Currently, the division is in negotiations
with developers for the second phase of the Jack London Square
project and has issued a Request for Qualifications for the water-
front development.
51
RECOMMENDATIONS
To reduce the effect of its losses on the Port’s overall operations,
the real estate division should take the following actions:
(cid:127) Complete the action plan approved by the board in 1999.
(cid:127) Examine the feasibility of increasing below-market lease rates
to cover its operational costs. It should also consider the
impact of such an action on the Port’s relationships with the
community and the other municipalities.
(cid:127) Continue to look for ways to increase revenues and decrease
costs associated with managing its assets.
We conducted this review under the authority vested in the California State Auditor by
Section 8543 et seq. of the California Government Code and according to generally accepted
government auditing standards. We limited our review to those areas specified in the audit
scope section of this report.
Respectfully submitted,
ELAINE M. HOWLE
State Auditor
Date: October 23, 2001
Staff: Doug Cordiner, Audit Principal
Phillip Burkholder, CPA
Dawn Tomita
Nicki Ruszczycky
Wesley Opp
Patrick Browning
52
APPENDIX
A
s discussed in the Scope and Methodology section of the
Introduction, the Port of Oakland (Port) does not inter-
nally calculate the rate of return on its major capital and
real estate investments but instead relies on the debt service
coverage ratio as the key measure in determining the viability of
its capital projects. We attempted to calculate the rate of return
for each of the revenue divisions of the Port but were unable to
do so because the Port does not maintain asset information
segmented by division. Therefore, we calculated the rate of return
for the Port as a whole by using information from the Port’s
annual audited financial statements for fiscal years 1990–91
through 1999–2000.
The rate-of-return-on-investment ratio measures an entity’s
income in relation to its total asset value. The Port’s rate of
return on investment ranged from -2.67 percent in fiscal year
1990–91 to a peak of 1.63 percent in fiscal year 1997–98. We
were not able to compare the rate of return on investment to
other ports because it is not a ratio that other ports use. Table 6
on the following pages show selected financial information,
including the rate of return, for the Port covering the 10 fiscal
year period 1990–91 through 1999–2000.
53
54
TABLE 6
Selected Information From the Port of Oakland’s Annual Audited Financial Statements for
Fiscal Years 1990–91 Through 1999–2000
(In Thousands)
Balance Sheet 1990–91 1991–92 1992–93 1993–94 1994–95 1995–96 1996–97 1997–98 1998–99 1999–2000
Assets
Current assets $ 47,598 $ 67,980 $ 60,689 $ 83,999 $106,642 $106,810 $ 108,012 $ 126,322 $ 136,583 $ 113,263
Restricted cash and investments 30,360 82,912 156,389 119,085 109,813 95,487 132,985 130,672 81,339 456,249
Property, plant, and equipment 622,409 672,534 706,802 782,248 827,063 879,949 914,707 943,954 951,134 994,946
Less accumulated depreciation (158,229) (177,465) (198,616) (217,754) (241,348) (269,671) (298,906) (327,450) (343,653) (374,620)
Land 108,262 98,693 132,725 115,928 123,269 138,158 165,746 198,653 340,713 475,266
Deferred charges and other assets 25,873 20,630 21,048 18,803 16,243 15,330 36,424 17,488 17,266 22,326
Total Assets $676,273 $765,284 $879,037 $902,309 $941,682 $966,063 $1,058,968 $1,089,639 $1,183,382 $1,687,430
Liabilities and Equity
Current liabilities $ 32,615 $ 31,047 $ 35,017 $ 40,376 $ 47,034 $ 43,121 $ 39,599 $ 46,179 $ 77,848 $ 51,151
Current liabilities paid 42,272 46,652 9,405 17,295 18,776 22,752 21,951 20,654 23,900 69,971
from restricted assets
Long-term liabilities 381,589 445,761 566,304 543,448 539,622 534,329 589,910 576,832 597,950 1,041,523
Equity 219,797 241,824 268,311 301,190 336,250 365,861 407,508 445,974 483,684 524,785
Total Liabilities and Equity $676,273 $765,284 $879,037 $902,309 $941,682 $966,063 $1,058,968 $1,089,639 $1,183,382 $1,687,430
Source: Port of Oakland, consolidated audited financial statements for fiscal years 1990–91 through 1999–2000.
55
Operating Statement 1990–91 1991–92 1992–93 1993–94 1994–95 1995–96 1996–97 1997–98 1998–99 1999–2000
Operating revenue $98,038 $107,389 $118,715 $120,805 $133,474 $143,860 $149,918 $157,838 $162,903 $172,725
Operating expenses (72,499) (55,920) (58,310) (67,693) (71,486) (76,476) (79,121) (84,094) (93,109) (90,830)
Depreciation and amortization (21,172) (21,700) (23,211) (23,892) (30,242) (31,046) (32,199) (33,225) (34,227) (34,900)
Operating Income $4,367 $29,769 $37,194 $29,220 $31,746 $36,338 $38,598 $40,519 $35,567 $46,995
Nonoperating income (expenses) (21,701) (19,720) (18,533) (15,917) (21,171) (27,864) (27,432) (23,028) (18,551) (23,970)
Net Income Before Extraordinary Items (17,334) 10,049 18,661 13,303 10,575 8,474 11,166 17,491 17,016 23,025
Extraordinary items (839) 573 (5,552) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Net Income (Loss) $(18,173) $10,622 $13,109 $13,303 $10,575 $8,474 $11,166 $17,491 $17,016 $23,025
Rate of Return* -2.67% 1.47% 1.59% 1.49% 1.15% 0.89% 1.10% 1.63% 1.50% 1.60%
Source: Port of Oakland, consolidated audited financial statements for fiscal years 1990–91 through 1999–2000.
* Auditor calculated rate of return by dividing net income by average total assets.
Blank page inserted for reproduction purposes only.
56
Agency’s comments provided as text only.
Port of Oakland
530 Water Street
Oakland, CA 94604-2064
October 10, 2001
Elaine Howle
California State Auditor
Bureau of State Audits
555 Capitol Mall, Suite 300
Sacramento, CA 95814
SUBJECT: PORT OF OAKLAND RESPONSE AND COMMENTS
Dear Ms. Howle:
The Port of Oakland is pleased to have an opportunity to respond to the findings of the audit
conducted by the Bureau of State Audits. As the Port of Oakland experiences unprecedented
growth and embarks on an aggressive expansion plan to meet those demands, it is critical that the
State have an understanding of the Port, its operations, and economic impact. We trust that the
audit provided the critical information needed by the State in its evaluation of the Port’s significant
value and impact. With respect to the State’s findings and recommendations regarding the Com-
mercial Real Estate Division, we offer the following comments:
1. Execution and implementation of the Restructure & Development Plan is well under way.
All elements of the Plan are being aggressively executed.
2. Any perceived delays in execution and implementation of the Plan have been either a
result of the challenges associated with managing a large and visible public agency with a
diverse group of stakeholders and/or decisions made by the Port to address the goals and
objectives of our Port-wide Mission and Strategic Plan. Examples of these decisions
include the policy to lease real estate at below-market rates for public use and benefit as
shown in the audit report Table 4 — Estimated Fair Market Value of the Real Estate
Division’s Below-Market Lease Properties.
We trust that these comments are responsive to your findings and hope that your audit of the Port
of Oakland provides the State of California with the information necessary to evaluate and concur
with our belief that the Port of Oakland plays a critical role in not just the San Francisco Bay Area
economy, but also that of our entire State.
Sincerely,
(Signed by: Tay Yoshitani )
Tay Yoshitani
Executive Director
57
cc: Members of the Legislature
Office of the Lieutenant Governor
Milton Marks Commission on California State
Government Organization and Economy
Department of Finance
Attorney General
State Controller
State Treasurer
Legislative Analyst
Senate Office of Research
California Research Bureau
Capitol Press
58