CSA
Summary
Read the report at California State Auditor ↗
Terrorism
Readiness:
The Office of Homeland Security, Governor’s
Office of Emergency Services, and California
National Guard Need to Improve Their
Readiness to Address Terrorism
July 2003
2002-117
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July 31, 2003 2002-117
The Governor of California
President pro Tempore of the Senate
Speaker of the Assembly
State Capitol
Sacramento, California 95814
Dear Governor and Legislative Leaders:
As requested by the Joint Legislative Audit Committee, the Bureau of State Audits presents its audit report
concerning the readiness of the Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (OES) and the California National
Guard (National Guard) to respond to terrorist events in the State. This report concludes that although both
agencies have developed plans that adequately guide their response to terrorist events, OES has not
included a prevention element in the State’s terrorism response plan. Additionally, OES does not always
identify the critical training that staff in the operations centers need to effectively complete their duties,
nor does it regularly develop and administer state-level terrorism readiness exercises with other state
and local agencies as required by the terrorism response plan. Furthermore, clarification of the roles
and responsibilities of the State’s Office of Homeland Security and OES would be beneficial to ensure
that clear lines of authority exist.
This report also concludes that although the National Guard generally relies on its members’ military
training to respond to terrorism missions, it has not provided all of the training its staff in its Joint
Operations Center needs to adequately respond to these missions. The National Guard also has not
fully implemented a required terrorism readiness force protection program in its Army Guard Division.
Additionally, although it conducts internal terrorism readiness exercises, the National Guard believes
it has not had sufficient funding to participate in exercises involving other state and local emergency
response agencies. Finally, despite ranking behind many of its counterparts in other states based on
a key measure of recruiting and retention success, the National Guard has managed to finish near its
end-strength goal—the number of members for which the National Guard is funded—for each of the
last four years.
Respectfully submitted,
ELAINE M. HOWLE
State Auditor
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CONTENTS
Summary 1
Introduction 7
Chapter 1
A More Comprehensive Plan and Improved
Training Could Enhance the State’s Ability to
Prevent and Respond to Terrorism 17
Recommendations 36
Chapter 2
Although the California National Guard Has
Begun to Define Its Role in State Terrorism
Prevention and Response, Several Constraints
May Limit Its Effectiveness 39
Recommendations 54
Appendix A
The State Emergency Plan and the Terrorism
Response Plan Appear to Provide Adequate
Guidance for Agencies to Respond to
Terrorist Events 57
Appendix B
The California National Guard’s Homeland
Security Strategy Defines Its Role and Objectives
in Responding to Terrorism 65
Responses to the Audit
Office of Homeland Security and
Governor’s Office of Emergency Services 73
Military Department 77
SUMMARY
RESULTS IN BRIEF
The Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (OES) has
developed a State Emergency Plan (emergency plan)
Audit Highlights . . .
that establishes a system for all phases of emergency
Our review of the Governor’s management within the State and covers all emergencies that
Office of Emergency Services’ the State may encounter, including terrorist events. An annex
(OES) and the California
to the emergency plan, called the terrorism response plan,
National Guard’s (National
describes how the State will respond to terrorist events and
Guard) terrorism readiness
activities revealed: identifies the roles and responsibilities of 25 state agencies
participating in the State’s responses.
þ Both agencies have
developed plans that
adequately guide their Not included in either the emergency plan or the terrorism
response to terrorist response plan are ways the State might help prevent terrorist
events, but OES has not
events. Rather, the plans focus on how the State will respond
included a prevention
when a terrorist event occurs. Although this focus is consistent
element in the State’s
terrorism response plan. with the role established for OES in the California Emergency
Services Act (act), the recently developed National Strategy for
þ OES has not always
Homeland Security calls for states to develop their abilities to
identified the critical
training that staff in the help prevent terrorist events from occurring. The director of the
operations centers need State’s new Office of Homeland Security (OHS) advised us that
to effectively complete
his office recognizes the need for a prevention element in the
their duties.
terrorism response plan and intends to develop a state plan on
þ OES does not regularly terrorism that incorporates such an element.
develop and administer
state-level terrorism
As part of the emergency plan, OES is responsible for coordinating
readiness exercises with
other state and local the State’s response to terrorism, which it does through its state
agencies, as its terrorism operations center (state center) and its regional emergency
response plan requires.
operations centers (regional centers). However, OES has not
þ Clarification of the roles always identified the critical training that staff in the state
and responsibilities of the and regional centers need to effectively complete their duties.
State’s Office of Homeland
Without an assessment of the training needs of its staff, OES is
Security and OES would
not in a position to ensure that all state and regional centers’
be beneficial.
staff are properly trained. According to OES, it lacks the funding
þ Although the National to develop and implement training requirements for its staff.
Guard generally relies
Additionally, although OES staff receive on-the-job experience,
on its members’ military
training to respond to OES does not regularly develop and administer state-level
terrorism missions, it has terrorism readiness exercises with other state and local agencies,
not provided all of the
as the terrorism response plan requires. OES again cites a lack
training its staff in its Joint
of funding as the reason it has not conducted these exercises.
Operations Center needs
to adequately respond to However, since February 2003, OES reports to the Governor’s
these missions. Office through the OHS director, who told us that he believes
continued on next page
California State Auditor Report 2002-117 11
OES is adequately funded. He stated further that his office
plans to perform a thorough assessment of the organization of
þ The National Guard believes
OES to identify ways it can fulfill its statutory responsibilities
it has not had sufficient
funding to participate in more efficiently. In June 2003, OHS decided that the California
exercises involving other National Guard (National Guard) should be responsible for
state and local emergency
coordinating state-level exercises and allocated federal funding
response agencies.
for that purpose. Because of the unique role OES plays in
coordinating emergencies, it will be important for OES to
work with the National Guard to establish an effective exercise
program. Without periodic training exercises, OES cannot ensure
that state and local agencies are adequately prepared to respond
to terrorism activities that occur within the State.
Clarification of the roles and responsibilities of OHS and OES
would be beneficial. The authority provided to OES under the act
and the authority provided to OHS by the governor’s February 2003
executive order appear to have the potential to overlap. Moreover,
the directors of the two offices appear to have differing views on
their roles and responsibilities. A lack of clarity in their respective
roles and responsibilities could adversely affect the State’s ability to
respond to emergencies, such as a terrorist event.
As one of the state agencies OES can call on in an emergency, the
National Guard has developed an overall strategy as well as specific
plans and procedures to outline its role in the State’s response
to terrorist events and identify the actions essential to its being
prepared for its likely missions. Although the National Guard has
begun working toward completing several of the objectives of
its overall strategy, it has many left to accomplish. The National
Guard told us that the primary reason for it not yet attaining all the
objectives of its overall strategy is that many of the actions require
the participation of bodies outside the National Guard, such as the
state Legislature and the U.S. Congress. Therefore, it has not yet
fully accomplished many of the key actions.
Additionally, most of the training performed by the National
Guard is federally funded and designed to prepare the
organization to meet its federal military missions. Although
these federal missions are not specifically terrorism readiness,
the skills possessed by the National Guard forces can be used
by the State to respond to terrorist events occurring within
the State. The National Guard’s Joint Operations Center is
responsible for receiving requests for state missions from OES
and developing and overseeing the National Guard’s response
to the requests. The Joint Operations Center has identified
key training its staff need to effectively coordinate missions
22 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 33
and perform the functions of the Joint Operations Center;
however, many of the 38 staff have not received even half of
this training. According to the deputy director of the Joint
Operations Center, lack of funding and limited availability of
classes have hindered its ability to train its Joint Operations
Center staff in the areas identified. Without proper training,
the ability of the National Guard to respond promptly and
effectively to state missions may deteriorate.
Training is also lacking in the National Guard’s Army Guard
Division—specifically, training in its terrorism readiness force
protection program, designed to protect National Guard units
against terrorist threats. According to the commanders of the
Army Guard units we visited, training is not being provided
because they have not received the guidance from National
Guard management on implementing the terrorism readiness
force protection training. Without the required terrorism
readiness training, National Guard troops are less prepared for
terrorist threats. Furthermore, although the National Guard
performs regular exercises to prepare its response to state
missions, including terrorism, the National Guard believes it has
not had sufficient funding to participate in exercises involving
other state and local emergency response agencies. As discussed
previously, OHS has now allocated federal funds to the National
Guard to coordinate state-level exercises.
Finally, although an analysis focusing on a key measure of
recruiting and retention success indicates that the efforts
of California’s National Guard have not been as successful
as National Guard forces in many other states and territories, it
has managed to finish near its end-strength goal—that is, the
number of members for which the National Guard is funded—for
each of the last four years. Further, its ranking among states and
territories in recruiting and retention does not have a direct
correlation to its readiness to respond to its missions, including
responding to terrorist events. However, federal deployments
of National Guard units do affect the availability of the units to
respond to state missions. Because the military missions assigned
to the National Guard by the Department of Defense are its
primary missions, National Guard units activated by the federal
government are not available to respond to state missions. OES
advised us that if National Guard forces are deployed, OES can
access resources through other agencies as needed. Nonetheless,
OES stated that although some capabilities of the National Guard
can be replaced by other agencies, the National Guard plays a
critical role in supporting requests for specialized equipment.
22 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 33
RECOMMENDATIONS
To ensure that the State is adequately prepared to address
terrorist threats, OHS should do the following:
• Continue its plans to develop a state plan on terrorism that
includes a prevention element.
• Continue its plans to thoroughly assess OES functions to
determine how it can optimize its efficiency.
• Work with the governor on how best to clarify the roles and
responsibilities of OHS and OES.
To ensure that state agencies, including OES, are adequately
prepared to respond to terrorist events occurring within the State,
OES should do the following:
• Identify the most critical training required by staff at the state
and regional centers and then allocate existing funding or seek
additional funding it needs to deliver the training.
• Assist the National Guard in providing state-level terrorism
readiness exercises.
To ensure that its members are adequately trained to respond to
terrorism, the National Guard should do the following:
• Determine the most critical training its Joint Operations Center
staff need to fulfill their duties and then allocate existing funding
or seek the needed funding to provide the training, document-
ing why it is needed.
• Develop guidance for its Army Guard Division to implement
its terrorism readiness force protection program.
• Use the recently awarded funds from OHS to identify the type and
frequency of state-level exercises responding to terrorist events
that the State needs to be adequately prepared. The National
Guard should then provide the exercises it has identified.
AGENCY COMMENTS
OHS and OES agree with the recommendations directed to each
of them. The Military Department, which is composed mainly
of the National Guard, acknowledges that our report identifies
44 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 55
areas where it can improve its support to the State, and its
response describes actions it is taking for each recommendation
directed to it. n
44 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 55
Blank page inserted for reproduction purposes only.
66 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 77
INTRODUCTION
VARIOUS STATE AGENCIES HAVE ROLES IN
TERRORISM READINESS
The Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (OES) is
responsible for coordinating the State’s response to all
emergencies, including terrorist events. Additionally, OES
has identified 25 state agencies that play lead or supporting roles
in responding to terrorism. One of these state agencies is the
Military Department, which provides support in a variety of areas
and consists primarily of the California National Guard (National
Guard). In February 2003, the governor created the State’s Office
of Homeland Security (OHS) to coordinate and approve all
terrorism-related activities in the State. Additionally, OES is to
report to the Governor’s Office through the OHS director.
Office of Emergency Services
The California Emergency Services Act (act) established OES and
gave its director the responsibility of coordinating the activities
of all state agencies in responding to emergencies within the
State. In fulfilling the requirements of the act, OES is responsible
for ensuring the State’s readiness to respond to and recover from
natural, man-made, and war-caused emergencies. OES is also
responsible for assisting local governments in their emergency
preparedness, response, and recovery efforts. Accordingly, OES
developed a State Emergency Plan (emergency plan), which
establishes a system for coordinating all phases of emergency
management in California. Additionally, OES developed
an annex to the emergency plan that specifically addresses
terrorism (terrorism response plan). The terrorism response
plan provides direction to state agencies and local governments
within California involved in protecting public safety and
preparing for and responding to terrorist events.
OES operates a warning center staffed 24 hours a day, 365 days
a year. County emergency services offices contact this center
when an emergency arises. The act provides that during a state
of war emergency, a state of emergency, or a local emergency,
the director of OES will coordinate the emergency activities of
all state agencies connected with the emergency, and every state
agency and officer will cooperate with the director in rendering
66 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 77
all possible assistance in carrying out the provisions
of the act. During an emergency, OES activates its
Conditions or Degrees of
Emergency Defi ned by the state operations center (state center) in Sacramento
California Emergency Services Act and its three regional emergency operations centers
(regional centers) in affected areas to receive and
State of war emergency means the
process local requests for assistance.
condition that exists immediately, even
without being formally proclaimed by the
governor, whenever the State or nation is Although OES does maintain some emergency
attacked by an enemy of the United States, or
response resources—communications vans and
upon receipt by the State of a warning from
the federal government indicating that such portable satellite units to establish voice and data
an enemy attack is probable or imminent.
transmissions from remote locations, for instance—
State of emergency means the duly its main role is to plan for and coordinate responses
appointed authority has proclaimed the
to disasters that occur within the State, including
existence of conditions of disaster or extreme
peril to the safety of persons and property directing the resources of other state agencies that
within the State that, by reason of their may be needed in times of emergency.
magnitude, are or are likely to be beyond the
control of the services, personnel, equipment,
and facilities of any single county, city and The act gives the governor broad powers in carrying
county, or city and require the combined
out emergency response responsibilities. The
forces of a mutual aid region or regions to
combat. Includes conditions such as fi re, governor has subsequently delegated much of the
fl ood, storm, riot, sudden and severe energy authority to OES. The act allows the governor to
shortage, and earthquake.
spend any appropriation needed to support executing
Local emergency means the duly appointed the responsibilities of the act. Further, the act allows
authority has proclaimed the existence of
that during a state of emergency, the governor may
conditions of disaster or of extreme peril to
the safety of persons and property within the direct all agencies of the state government to utilize
territorial limits of a county, city and county, and employ state personnel, equipment, and facilities
or city that are likely to be beyond the control
for the performance of any and all activities designed
of the services, personnel, equipment, and
facilities of that political subdivision and to help prevent or alleviate actual and threatened
require the combined forces of other political
damage due to the emergency.
subdivisions to combat. Includes conditions
similar to those in a state of emergency.
In 1999, the governor created the State Strategic
Committee on Terrorism (committee on terrorism),
chaired by the OES director, to guide the State in
its preparedness for and response to terrorism. After the events of
September 11, 2001, the committee on terrorism was specifi cally
charged with evaluating the potential threat of terrorist attacks
in the State, reviewing California’s current state of readiness to
help prevent and respond to a potential attack, and establishing
and prioritizing recommendations for prevention and response.
In performing these tasks, the committee on terrorism was to
consider how the resources of both the public and private sectors
could be used in combating terrorism.
To carry out this work, the committee on terrorism established
numerous subject matter and support subcommittees, including
one that addressed the training needs of emergency responders
and another that identifi ed potential sources of funding.
88 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 99
Additionally, within the committee on terrorism
is the State Threat Advisory Committee, which
Resources the State Strategic Committee
on Terrorism Was to Consider in was established to provide an ongoing capability
Developing the State’s Preparedness for rapid assessment of information regarding
for and Response to Terrorism the potential effects of specifi c terrorists’ threats
or events in California. In February 2003, the
• Public and private infrastructures that support
governor established the director of OHS as the
the people and economy of California.
chair of the committee on terrorism, replacing the
• Facilities and systems for manufacturing,
director of OES in that role.
processing, transporting, disposing of, and
storing potentially dangerous substances.
• Farms, ranches, feeding, processing, California National Guard
storage, delivery, and other systems that
are part of the agricultural industry. OES has identifi ed 25 state agencies that have
• Railways, bridges, roadways, terminals, roles in responding to terrorism. One state agency
ports, and other transportation arteries. that provides support in a variety of areas is the
Military Department, which is composed mainly
• Hospitals, emergency medical systems, and
other health facilities and systems critical to of the National Guard. The mission of the National
the State’s ability to rescue and administer to
Guard is threefold: to provide mission-ready forces
those who may be affected by terrorist acts.
to the federal government as directed by the
• Computers, computer networks, and other
president, to provide emergency military support
computing systems that provide essential
data processing, system control, and to civil authorities as directed by the governor, and
information channels. to provide support to the community as approved
by the proper authority. The state adjutant general,
• Procedures of agencies and departments
responsible for issuing licenses and/or who is appointed by the governor and confi rmed
regulating materials or processes that pose
by the state Senate, commands the National Guard.
a potential terrorist threat.
Although its federal mission is its fi rst priority,
• Public employees, facilities, and systems
when the federal government is not using the
that provide the services necessary for
protection of the State. National Guard’s resources, they are available for
the State to use.
As shown in Figure 1 on the following page, the
National Guard comprises three divisions: Joint Staff, Army Guard,
and Air Guard.
The Joint Staff Division is organized into four teams: operations,
resource management, special staff, and services and support.
The twofold mission of the Joint Staff Division is to provide
direct service and support to a wide base of public agencies and
to develop, implement, and provide timely policies, procedures,
and support to the Army Guard and Air Guard divisions. Included
in the Joint Staff Division is the Joint Operations Center, which
coordinates the National Guard’s response to state missions.
The Army Guard Division comprises a headquarters command
and two senior commands: the 40th Mechanized Infantry
Division and the 49th Combat Support Command. The senior
88 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 99
FIGURE 1
California National Guard Organization
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Source: California National Guard quadrennial report for fi scal years 1996–97 through
1999–2000.
commands include capabilities such as engineering, military
intelligence, fi eld artillery, and infantry. As of September 2002,
the Army Guard Division had approximately 16,100 soldiers
assigned. The Army Guard Division also oversees the California
State Military Reserve, which is composed of unpaid volunteers.
The Air Guard Division consists of a combat communications
group and four fl ying wings: a rescue wing, a fi ghter wing,
an airlift wing, and an air refueling wing. These units include
capabilities such as fi ghter interceptor forces, air rescue and
recovery, aerial refueling, communications, civil engineering,
and medical care. As of September 2002, the Air Guard Division
had almost 4,900 personnel assigned.
When OES calls on the National Guard to respond to a state
mission—which the National Guard refers to as Military Support
to Civil Authorities—the National Guard develops a task force
to respond to the mission. To form the task force, the National
Guard’s Joint Operations Center assigns needed personnel and
assets from the various units within the Army Guard and Air Guard
divisions. Therefore, when the National Guard responds to
a state mission, it normally does not need to activate all the
resources of one unit.
1100 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 1111
Office of Homeland Security
In February 2003, the governor through an executive order
established OHS within the Governor’s Office. Under the
executive order, the director of OHS, along with any staff,
is appointed by the governor. The mission of OHS includes
developing and implementing a comprehensive strategy to
coordinate security activities throughout the State. Further,
the director of OHS is responsible for coordinating the security
efforts of all departments and agencies in the State. The director
is also the chair of both the committee on terrorism and
the Emergency Response Training Advisory Committee. The
executive order directs OES and the Office of Criminal Justice
Planning to report to the Governor’s Office through the OHS
director and assigns the following responsibilities to OHS:
• Coordinating and approving all activities between state and
federal agencies on topics related to terrorism, including
coordinating and approving all state requests for federal funds
designated for activities related to addressing terrorism, devel-
oping guidelines for all such state requests, and approving the
distribution of any federal funds allocated to the State.
• Serving as the principal point of contact for and to the
governor with respect to the federal Department of Homeland
Security and all other federal and state agencies and legislators
on matters relating to terrorism and state security.
• Coordinating the review and assessment of the emergency
plan and the terrorism response plan, and coordinating the
amendment and the submission of those plans, through the
California Emergency Council, to the governor for approval.
• Assigning specific state security functions to state agencies
consistent with the duties and responsibilities identified in
the emergency plan and the terrorism response plan.
• Coordinating efforts to ensure that all state departments and
agencies that have intelligence collection responsibilities have
sufficient technological capabilities and resources to collect
intelligence and data relating to terrorist activities or possible
terrorist events within California.
1100 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 1111
THE EMERGENCY PLAN ESTABLISHES A SYSTEM
FOR COORDINATING ALL PHASES OF EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT IN CALIFORNIA
The act calls for the development of emergency plans to
describe the principles and methods to be applied in
carrying out emergency operations during
emergencies. Accordingly, OES has prepared
the emergency plan, which establishes a system
Components of the
State Emergency Plan for coordinating all phases of emergency
management in California. The act requires
• A description of the California OES to create a standardized system for
Emergency Organization.
all emergency response agencies to use in
• A description of mutual aid use during managing emergencies. Thus, OES developed
nondeclared and declared emergencies
the Standardized Emergency Management
to ensure effective coordination of
needed resources. System (SEMS) to provide a framework for
managing multiagency and multijurisdictional
• General policies to guide emergency
management activities. emergencies in California.
• Guidance on interagency coordination to
deliver assistance. As shown in Figure 2, the SEMS provides for
fi ve organizational levels, which are activated
• Specifi c responsibilities of state agencies
as needed in response to an emergency. The
and various levels of the California
Emergency Organization. fi ve SEMS organizational levels combined with
private sector resources are collectively referred
• Potential assignments for state agencies.
to as the California Emergency Organization,
• Interagency and intergovernmental
which we discuss further in Appendix A.
shared responsibilities.
According to the emergency plan, the SEMS
• Supporting plans and procedures.
helps bring all elements of the California
Emergency Organization together into a single
integrated system. The act requires all state
response agencies to use the SEMS, and local government
agencies are required to use the SEMS to be eligible for state
emergency response funding.
The SEMS incorporates the use of the incident command system,
which provides a means to coordinate the efforts of individual
agencies as they work toward the common goal of stabilizing
an incident and protecting life, property, and the environment.
As a means of coordinating the effective use of all available
resources, the incident command system is built around fi ve
major functions: management, planning, operations, logistics,
and fi nance and administration. These functions are the
foundation on which the response organization develops.
Accordingly, emergency response agencies at each level of the
SEMS are organized into the fi ve functional areas, which apply
during a routine emergency, when preparing for a major event,
or when managing a response to a major disaster.
1122 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 1133
FIGURE 2
Standardized Emergency Management System
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Source: State Emergency Plan.
Resource requests for response and recovery operations originate at
the lowest level of the SEMS and are progressively forwarded to the
next level until fi lled. For example, if an operational area is unable
to provide the necessary requested assistance, it may contact the
appropriate OES regional center and forward the request. California
has established essential communication support procedures among
the operational areas, the OES state and regional centers, and other
state agencies to provide the information links for the elements of
the California Emergency Organization.
The terrorism response plan incorporates the use of the SEMS in
responding to terrorist events, consistent with the emergency plan.
Accordingly, it describes how local and state agencies will interact
during an emergency. It also describes how OES will respond to
terrorist threats. Finally, it identifi es the roles and responsibilities
of state agencies that are likely to be called on in responding to
terrorist events. Table A.2 in Appendix A summarizes the roles
and responsibilities of state agencies as presented in the terrorism
response plan.
1122 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 1133
SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
The Joint Legislative Audit Committee (audit committee)
requested that the Bureau of State Audits conduct an audit of
the terrorism readiness efforts of OES and the National Guard.
Specifically, the audit committee asked that we review and
evaluate the terrorism prevention and response plans, policies,
and procedures of these agencies and determine whether
the plans are periodically updated and contain sufficient
guidance. It also asked that we determine whether OES and
the National Guard have provided sufficient training to their
staff to effectively respond to terrorism activities and assess
how the training compares to best practices or other reasonable
approaches. The audit committee further requested that we
determine whether both agencies take advantage of all state
and federal funding for terrorism readiness. Finally, the audit
committee asked that we determine whether the National Guard’s
recruitment and retention practices and staffing levels impact its
readiness to respond to terrorism activities or its ability to attract
qualified personnel for terrorism readiness positions.
Subsequent to the audit committee’s approval of this audit,
the governor established OHS in February 2003. The governor
charged OHS with leading the State’s efforts regarding terrorism
and directed OES to report to the Governor’s Office through
the OHS director. Accordingly, we interviewed the OHS director
to gain an understanding of his plans for guiding the State’s
terrorism readiness efforts and how the role of OES and other
state agencies may be affected by those plans.
To evaluate the terrorism readiness plans, policies, and procedures,
we reviewed and analyzed the relevant laws, rules, and
regulations. Additionally, we reviewed the documents that
OES and the National Guard had prepared related to terrorism
prevention and response. We determined whether the documents
appeared reasonable, providing appropriate detail and instruction
to enable a sufficient response. We interviewed staff at both
OES and the National Guard to determine whether they had
established a process to periodically review the plans and update
them as necessary.
To evaluate the training OES and the National Guard provided,
we identified the key individuals within each organization that
would be involved in responding to a terrorist event. At OES,
we determined that these individuals worked in its state and
regional centers. At the National Guard, the key individuals
1144 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 1155
were in the Joint Operations Center. We ascertained whether
both agencies had identified the training these key employees
need to effectively complete their responsibilities. For the
training needs we identified, we determined whether the
relevant individuals had received the training.
The federal government requires the National Guard to provide
certain training to its members. To determine whether the
National Guard had provided this training to its members, we
visited four units—two from the Army Guard Division and two
from the Air Guard Division—and obtained information from
a third Army Guard unit. When records existed, we reviewed
the training records of 15 members at each unit. We also visited
the National Guard’s two civil support teams to determine if
their members had received required training. To determine the
training that OES provides through its California Specialized
Training Institute, we reviewed its catalog of courses and
interviewed the director of the institute.
To understand the extent to which the committee on terrorism
had identified training needs and opportunities for state-level
terrorism readiness personnel, we reviewed documents prepared
by the committee on terrorism.
To determine whether OES and the National Guard take advantage
of all state and federal terrorism readiness funds, we identified the
amount each agency received in funds specifically earmarked for
terrorism readiness activities and then determined if the agencies
used the funds. We also inquired about the methods the agencies
use to identify potential sources of funding to determine if the
methods were reasonable and whether the agencies saw gaps in
existing funding for terrorism readiness programs.
To identify best practices for planning, training, and funding,
we reviewed the National Strategy for Homeland Security
created by the federal government and obtained information
from other states. Although we contacted some of the same
states to identify best practices for OES and the National
Guard, we performed independent analyses to determine
which states should be included in the respective reviews. To
compare other states’ practices with those of OES, we selected
its counterparts in Florida, Georgia, New York, Pennsylvania,
and Texas. New York declined to provide any information, and
Pennsylvania declined to provide its terrorism response plan.
For our comparison to the National Guard, we selected Florida,
Michigan, New York, Texas, and Washington. The Washington
1144 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 1155
National Guard declined to provide its terrorism readiness plan
for our review, although it did provide information related to its
terrorism readiness activities.
To determine whether the National Guard’s recruitment and
retention practices and staffing levels affect its readiness
to respond to terrorism activities, we interviewed key staff
in the Air Guard and Army Guard divisions to understand
how the National Guard measures its mission readiness. To
determine the National Guard’s recruiting and retention
effectiveness, we analyzed recruiting and retention data as
of September 2002 provided by the federal National Guard
Bureau for the 54 state and territorial National Guards and
determined how California compared. n
1166 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 1177
CHAPTER 1
A More Comprehensive Plan and
Improved Training Could Enhance
the State’s Ability to Prevent and
Respond to Terrorism
CHAPTER SUMMARY
The Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (OES) has
developed a State Emergency Plan (emergency plan)
that establishes a system for all phases of emergency
management within the State and covers all emergencies that
the State may encounter, including terrorist events. Terrorism is
specifically addressed in the terrorism response plan—an annex to
the emergency plan. However, the terrorism response plan focuses
solely on how the State will respond when a terrorist event
occurs, not on how the State could help prevent terrorist events.
Although this focus is consistent with the role established for OES
in the California Emergency Services Act (act), recent events have
established the need for prevention as well as response efforts to
protect California citizens from terrorism. Recognizing this need,
the director of the State’s new Office of Homeland Security (OHS)
informed us that OHS intends to develop a state plan that will
include a prevention component. Additionally, OES lacks a formal
process to periodically review its terrorism response plan based on
specified criteria and update the plan accordingly to ensure that
the plan remains current.
As part of the emergency plan, OES is responsible for coordinating
the State’s response to terrorism, which it does through its
state operations center (state center) and regional emergency
operations centers (regional centers). However, OES has
not identified the critical training that staff at the state and
regional centers need to effectively complete their duties.
Without an assessment of the training needs of its staff, OES
is not in a position to ensure that all its staff are properly
trained. According to OES, it lacks the funding to develop and
implement training requirements for its staff. Additionally,
although OES staff receive on-the-job experience, OES does not
regularly coordinate state-level terrorism readiness exercises
with other state and local agencies as called for in the terrorism
response plan. OES again cites inadequate funding as the
primary factor hindering it from conducting these exercises.
1166 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 1177
Recognizing the importance of periodic training exercises,
OHS decided in June 2003 that the California National Guard
(National Guard) should be responsible for coordinating
state-level exercises and allocated federal funding for that
purpose. However, because of the unique role that OES plays
in coordinating emergencies and ensuring that state and local
agencies are adequately prepared to respond to terrorism
activities that occur within the State, OES should work with the
National Guard to establish an effective exercise program.
Finally, clarification of the roles and responsibilities of OHS and
OES would be beneficial. The authority provided to OES under
the act and the authority provided to OHS by the governor’s
February 2003 executive order appear to have the potential
to overlap. Further, the directors of the two offices appear to
have differing views on their roles and responsibilities. A lack
of clarity in their respective roles and responsibilities could
adversely affect the State’s ability to respond to emergencies,
such as a terrorist event.
THE TERRORISM RESPONSE PLAN GUIDES THE STATE’S
RESPONSE BUT DOES NOT INCLUDE WAYS TO HELP
PREVENT TERRORISM
Although the emergency plan and terrorism response plan
adequately define the roles and responsibilities of numerous
state and local agencies in responding to various emergencies,
including terrorism, they do not address how the State could
help prevent terrorist attacks from occurring. In accordance
with the act, OES focuses on coordinating the State’s response
to emergencies and has integrated the use of the Standardized
Prevention is the number Emergency Management System (SEMS) into the emergency
one priority identified plan as required by state law. However, prevention is the
in the national strategy number one priority identified in the National Strategy for
for homeland security Homeland Security (national strategy) developed by the federal
developed by the government. The director of California’s newly established
federal government. OHS advised us that his office is aware of the need for the State
to include the prevention of terrorist events in a state plan.
Accordingly, OHS will soon be developing a state plan that
will include this element. Another aspect of planning that
needs improvement is plan review and revision. OES has not
established a formal process to regularly review and update its
terrorism response plan and thus cannot ensure that the plan
remains current and adequately protects the State.
1188 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 1199
The act establishes the requirement for an emergency plan and
declares that it must be in effect in each political subdivision
of the State. The act also requires the governing body of each
political subdivision of the State to carry out the provisions
of the emergency plan. OES is responsible for maintaining
the emergency plan and for assisting local governments and
other state agencies in developing their own emergency plans.
OES’s emergency plan and its annexes, including the terrorism
response plan, provide the framework for the State’s response to
all types of emergencies and establish the systems and functions
that state agencies must use in responding to emergencies.
Taken together, these plans appear to provide adequate guidance
for responding to an act of terrorism. OES’s terrorism response
plan is also comparable to the terrorism plans of three other
states we reviewed. In fact, one state told us that it had modeled
its plan, which is still being finalized, after California’s because
it viewed California as a leader in emergency response planning.
Additional details on OES’s plans appear in Appendix A.
The Terrorism Response Plan Does Not Address Prevention
Lacking in the terrorism response plan is guidance for terrorism
prevention. One reason for this deficiency may be that
One reason the State’s the Legislature did not envision a prevention role when it
terrorism response plan established OES in the act. Rather, the act sets the focus of OES
does not include a as coordinating the State’s response activities. However, the
prevention component State needs to plan how it can help prevent terrorist events from
may be because the act occurring to best protect the citizens of the State against the
establishing OES did not consequences of such events. The State does have some activities
envision a prevention role designed to help prevent terrorist activities: The California
for the office. Anti-Terrorism Information Center provides intelligence support
to statewide law enforcement to combat terrorism, and law
enforcement has historically worked to help prevent acts such as
terrorism. Nonetheless, including these activities and any other
relevant activities in a state plan would help ensure that state
and local resources are used most effectively.
Acknowledging this void in the current terrorism response plan,
the director of the newly created OHS stated that his office
plans to revise the current state plan to make it more concise
and include a prevention component. The director explained
that although the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has the
overall responsibility for terrorism prevention, the duties of
analyzing and disseminating intelligence information to local
law enforcement and the FBI belong to the State. Including a
prevention element in the state plan is important to ensure that
1188 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 1199
a process is in place to analyze and disseminate intelligence
information. The OHS director added that the efficient and
effective use of state resources requires coordination and
cooperation at all levels, and the gathering of intelligence and
its lawful dissemination to all concerned parties is a pivotal and
important state role.
The OHS director said that he expects a new state plan that
includes a prevention element will be released in fiscal
OHS expects that a new year 2003–04. The plan that OHS intends to develop will
state plan that includes define the roles of state agencies involved in terrorism
a prevention element prevention. The OHS director stated that OES likely would
will be released in fiscal play a role in the prevention element. However, he also said
year 2003–04. that other agencies would have significant responsibilities in
helping to prevent future terrorist attacks, and OHS would
coordinate these resources. For example, he told us that he
envisions the role of the National Guard evolving from assisting
in managing the consequences of a terrorist attack to using its
expertise in intelligence analysis, planning, and training.
Including a terrorism prevention element in the state plan
is consistent with the direction from the national strategy
developed by the federal government. The national strategy
puts the highest priority on the objective of preventing
terrorist attacks within the United States. Another primary
mission identified by the national strategy is protecting
critical infrastructures and key assets by preventing, to the
extent possible, the possibility of terrorist attacks. As part
of a national vision, the national strategy specifies that the
collection and analysis of homeland security intelligence and
information is a priority of the highest measure. This national
vision further states that efforts must be structured to provide all
pertinent homeland security intelligence and law enforcement
information—from all relevant sectors, including state and local
law enforcement as well as federal agencies—to those able to
take preventive or protective action.
OES Has No Formal Process to Periodically Review and
Update the Terrorism Response Plan
OES lacks a formal process to regularly review the terrorism
response plan and update it as determined necessary.1 Without
an established process to regularly review the plan, OES cannot
1 For information regarding OES’s process for updating the State Emergency Plan, refer to
audit report 2002-113, issued in July 2003.
2200 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 2211
ensure that it remains current and adequately protects the State.
The terrorism response plan was last updated in February 2001.
When we asked whether OES has a formal process to regularly
review the terrorism response plan to determine if changes
are needed, the director of the Planning and Technological
Assistance Branch explained that although no formal process
exists, the terrorism response plan is updated when changes in
statute affecting emergency management or changes occur in
regulations, policies, or significant procedures.
OES did review the terrorism response plan in March 2003 as
part of a federal effort to ensure that state emergency plans
were adequate. During this review, OES assessed the terrorism
response plan and determined that no updates were necessary.
To receive federal funding, OES needed to determine that
existing plans were adequate and capable of guiding appropriate
emergency response and recovery operations in the State. In
fulfilling this obligation, OES used a checklist provided by
the federal government that guided OES in reviewing key
elements expected in a plan, including planning and functional
responsibilities and capabilities such as communications,
warnings, public education, protective actions, public health
planning, health and medical coordination, and evaluating
preparedness for radiological terrorist incidents.
Although OES has not established a formal process to regularly
review the terrorism response plan, other organizations and
Each of the four states states do regularly update and incorporate lessons learned
we talked to requires into their plans. For example, the National Guard Bureau, the
its emergency services federal agency that oversees the National Guard in each state,
agency to regularly review requires all National Guard forces to evaluate their emergency
its emergency plan and plans annually and update them as determined necessary.
update it when the agency Additionally, each of the four states we talked to requires its
thinks it is needed. emergency services agency to regularly review its emergency
plan and update it when the agency thinks it is needed. For
example, Florida reviews its plan annually and updates it at least
every two years.
OES would benefit from a process to regularly review its terrorism
response plan to assess whether it is still meeting the needs of
the State. Furthermore, OES would make its assessment more
consistent and effective if it developed a checklist to guide its
efforts in evaluating the terrorism response plan. OES could use
the checklist provided by the federal government as part of its
recent effort to review plans, modifying the checklist as it feels
necessary to best meet the needs and special circumstances of
2200 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 2211
California as they relate to terrorism readiness. Although
OES does have a checklist that its Planning and Technological
Assistance Branch uses to review plans, the checklist is only one
page and is not specific to terrorism, addressing issues such as the
legal basis of the plan and whether it is consistent with the SEMS.
OES HAS NOT IDENTIFIED THE TRAINING NEEDS FOR
ALL OF ITS STAFF
OES has not conducted a needs assessment to determine the
training requirements for all personnel at its state and regional
centers and to ensure that it spends its training funds most
effectively. To determine whether OES adequately trains its staff
in responding to terrorist events, we asked OES to show us the
training courses that it considers essential for its staff to fulfill
their responsibilities. We focused our assessment on the state
OES states that it center staff because the state center is the entity that coordinates
would like to have a the State’s response to emergencies such as a terrorist event. We
training program for also evaluated whether OES has developed training requirements
all its staff but has not for staff in the regional centers, because they are the OES
developed formal training employees who coordinate the response at the regional level.
requirements for personnel
in its state and regional According to a representative for the director’s office, OES
centers because it does not acknowledges its need to identify critical training for its staff.
have the funding to pay For example, OES believes that its staff would probably benefit
for the training. from additional terrorism awareness training. The representative
states that OES would like to have a training program for all
its staff but has not developed formal training requirements
for personnel in its state and regional centers because it
does not have the funding to pay for the training. The State
Strategic Committee on Terrorism (committee on terrorism)
also identified the need for additional training for OES staff.
Specifically, it found that state emergency response personnel,
including OES, needed more training in areas such as terrorism
response operations, terrorism emergency management, and
crisis and risk communications.
OES does not appear to be unique in not identifying the training
needs of its emergency response staff. None of the four states we
contacted had developed a formal training plan that identifies
the training needed by staff responsible for coordinating state
emergency response efforts. However, two of the four states we
talked to said they were in the process of developing a plan that
would identify training needs.
2222 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 2233
In fiscal year 1998–99, OES did create training guidelines for its
emergency service coordinators (service coordinators); however,
it never implemented these guidelines because it determined
that service coordinators working in different functions within
OES needed different training to fulfill their responsibilities.
Additionally, OES has developed an individual training
plan (training plan) program, which identifies an individual
employee’s career goals and objectives, the knowledge required
to meet those goals and objectives, and the training required
to obtain the knowledge. However, OES had only developed
training plans for seven of the 14 state center staff we reviewed.
Further, OES has not developed guidance for all of its supervisors
preparing training plans to ensure that they include training
related to core competencies. Core competencies are the key
skills employees need to possess to perform their assigned duties.
Although the training plan could be a useful tool, because OES
does not use it for all state center staff and does not provide
guidance to all supervisors preparing training plans, OES cannot
ensure that all state center staff receive the training they need to
effectively respond to emergencies.
According to the director of the California Specialized Training
Institute (CSTI)—the training arm of OES—OES is reviewing
According to OES, it is in its training policy and is in the process of developing a formal
the process of developing training program that will include core competencies for all
a formal training employees; however, there is no target date for this program
program that will include to take effect. By not identifying the essential training its
core competencies for employees need, OES runs the risk of having staff members
all employees. who are insufficiently trained to fulfill their responsibilities
and perform their functions in the state and regional centers.
If personnel are not well trained, their ability to effectively
coordinate activities in response to emergencies could be
hampered, which could lead to delayed response times to
emergencies, including terrorist events. Additionally, OES
cannot ensure that it spends its training funds most effectively.
Although OES has not identified what training is most important
to personnel at its state and regional centers in fulfilling their
responsibilities, it does provide a broad range of emergency
management classes—including several related to terrorism—at
its CSTI. Specifically, the CSTI offers 14 courses that specifically
address terrorism, including the following:
• Terrorism I: Understanding the Threat
• Terrorism II: Meeting the Threat
2222 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 2233
• Terrorism: Weapons of Mass Destruction
• Terrorism Update
• Terrorism Liaison Officer
• Terrorism: Special Seminars
• Weapons of Mass Destruction Technician/Specialist—Terrorism
The CSTI recommends some of these courses, such as Terrorism I,
to all government agencies, including law enforcement, fire
service, emergency medical services and health providers,
emergency management agencies, and concerned entities from
the private sector. Other courses, such as Weapons of Mass
Destruction Technician/Specialist—Terrorism, are directed to a
specialized group.
In June 2003, OHS allocated $2.4 million in federal funds to
the National Guard to coordinate the design of a new terrorism
readiness training curriculum for state and local emergency
response agencies. According to a deputy director at OHS,
the National Guard will develop and implement a terrorism
readiness training program based on the recommendations of
the Emergency Response Training Advisory Committee (training
committee) for all appropriate agencies, including OES. The
training committee was established by statute in September 2002
and is charged with developing specific training criteria related
to terrorism. The training committee comprises representatives
from state and local law enforcement, fire services, emergency
medical services, and port security.
OES HAS NOT CONDUCTED STATE-LEVEL TERRORISM
READINESS EXERCISES AS CALLED FOR IN ITS TERRORISM
RESPONSE PLAN
With the exception of federally or state mandated exercises
associated with nuclear power plants and hospitals, the State
OES states that it has does not presently have an established program to provide
not developed and exercises to ensure that state agencies are prepared to respond to
administered exercises terrorist events. Even though the terrorism response plan states
because it is not funded to that OES must develop and administer exercises to test and
do so. However, OES has enhance the capabilities of state agencies, local governments,
not requested state funding and related entities to prepare for, respond to, and recover from
to conduct these exercises. terrorist events, OES has not developed and administered these
exercises. According to a representative for the director’s office,
2244 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 2255
OES has not regularly developed and administered terrorism
readiness exercises because it is not funded to do so. However,
OES has not requested state funding to conduct the exercises.
Further, OES has not identified the types and frequency of
exercises needed to adequately prepare state and local agencies
for terrorist events. If it were to have done so, and made a
compelling argument as to why the exercises were needed, OES
might have been more successful in obtaining the funding.
OES has participated in terrorism readiness exercises when
other agencies have held them, and staff have received training
through activation experiences. For example, the federal
government contracted with the RAND Corporation to design
and implement a terrorism readiness exercise in California in
April 2003. OES hosted the exercise and assisted by inviting the
appropriate state agencies to participate and by providing input
on the exercise design. OES also was invited to participate in
exercises held by various entities, such as Los Angeles County;
the U.S. Coast Guard; and the National Guard’s civil support
teams, which are responsible for responding to incidents
involving weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear agents. In addition, as of
OES has participated March 2003, the state center has been activated 48 times in the
in exercises when other past three fiscal years, including seven times for monitoring
agencies have held them; possible terrorist activities during times of heightened alert. For
however, these activities example, the state center was activated to monitor emergency
would not necessarily test situations during the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the
the capabilities of state San Diego Super Bowl, and the Iraq war. Since the state center
agencies to prepare for, operates similarly when responding to all types of emergencies,
respond to, and recover these activations provide state center staff with the opportunity
from terrorist events. to use their skills. Therefore, while the state center has not
regularly developed and administered terrorism readiness
exercises, through the activations for other emergencies, state
center staff are able to use and hone their skills in coordinating
the response to emergencies.
However, these activities would not necessarily test and enhance
the capabilities of state agencies, local governments, and related
entities to prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist
events as called for in the terrorism response plan. For this kind
of training to be effective, all state agencies assigned a role in the
terrorism response plan should be included, and the exercises
should include scenarios needed to adequately train state agency
staff in their designated roles. Providing terrorism readiness
exercise opportunities to state agencies appears to be an area
where California can learn from other states. Three of the four
2244 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 2255
states we talked to reported that they regularly provide terrorism
readiness exercises to state emergency response agencies.
Without periodic training exercises, OES cannot ensure that the
state and local agencies are adequately prepared to respond to
terrorism activities within the State.
Although its terrorism response plan calls for OES to develop and
administer exercises to ensure that state agencies are prepared
to respond to terrorist events, OHS has recently decided that
another agency should be responsible for coordinating state-level
exercises. As discussed later in the chapter, the State recently
received federal funds it could use for exercises. OHS informed us
that it was awarded $1.6 million in federal funds in May 2003,
which it subsequently allocated to the National Guard to
coordinate terrorism readiness exercises for the benefit of state
agencies and rural jurisdictions. The $1.6 million represents the
entire state agency portion of the exercise appropriation given
OHS recently placed to California. The State was awarded additional federal funds
the responsibility for in June 2003, but OHS has not yet decided how much will be
coordinating state-level allocated to exercises. Nevertheless, the OHS director believes that
terrorism readiness federal funds will be sufficient at this time to provide the needed
exercises with the exercises and that no additional state funding will be required. No
National Guard. matter how much funding is allocated, because of the unique role
that OES plays in coordinating emergencies, it will be important
for OES to work with the National Guard to establish an effective
exercise program.
OES RECEIVES BOTH FEDERAL AND STATE FUNDING
FOR TERRORISM READINESS EQUIPMENT AND ACTIVITIES
For federal fiscal years 2000 through 2003, the State was awarded
approximately $216 million in federal terrorism readiness funds,
much of which was just received in May and June 2003. Although
most of the federal funds are passed to local governments to
operate their terrorism readiness programs, approximately
$39 million is available for state-level terrorism readiness efforts.
Before the establishment of OHS, OES coordinated, approved,
and managed federal grants for terrorism readiness. However, in
February 2003, the governor established OHS as the state agency
to coordinate and approve all activities between state and federal
agencies on topics related to terrorism, including all state requests
for federal funds designated for terrorism-related activities. OHS
is also responsible for developing guidelines for all such state
requests and approving the distribution of any federal funds
allocated to the State. OHS has designated OES to continue
2266 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 2277
to manage terrorism readiness grants, although OHS maintains
final approval. Therefore, the federal grants that we discuss in this
section are managed by OES, subject to OHS’s approval. OES also
occasionally receives state funds for terrorism readiness activities.
For example, OES received $562,000 for three staff to coordinate
the activities of the committee on terrorism.
The State Receives Funding From Two Federal Terrorism
Readiness Grants
Two federal grants fund the State’s terrorism readiness efforts:
the State Homeland Security Grant Program and the Federal
Emergency Management Agency Supplemental Grant for
Emergency Operations Planning (FEMA Grant). OES administers
other federal grants that it can use to respond to terrorist events;
however, these grants are not specifically earmarked for terrorism.
The State Homeland Security Grant Program
The State Homeland Security Grant Program, formerly known
as the State Domestic Preparedness Equipment Program, funds
federally approved equipment and services that will enhance
For federal fiscal year the capabilities of state and local jurisdictions to plan and
2003, the State received respond to terrorism. The grant includes funding for purchasing
$164.3 million in federal equipment and planning, conducting, and evaluating exercises.
homeland security funds For federal fiscal year 2003, the federal government awarded
to allocate to local California $164.3 million under this grant program. The award
governments and to use occurred in two phases. The first phase amount, which was
for state-level activities. awarded to the State in May 2003, was $45 million, allocated to
the following categories:
• $31.6 million for equipment
• $7.9 million for exercises
• $2.4 million for training
• $3.1 million for planning, assessment, strategy,
and administration
OHS awarded 80 percent of the equipment, exercise, and
planning funding to local governments and retained the
remaining 20 percent for state-level activities. Additionally, as
discussed previously, OHS provided the $2.4 million training
allocation to the National Guard to coordinate the design of a
new terrorism readiness training curriculum for state and local
emergency response agencies. The State received the second
2266 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 2277
phase of the grant in June 2003. Of the $119.3 million awarded,
$15.9 million was earmarked by the federal government to cover
the costs state and local fi rst responders have incurred during the
war with Iraq for increased security at critical infrastructure sites
and to cover costs incurred during future periods of heightened
threat, contingent on guidance from the federal government.
The remaining $103.4 million is for state and local activities for
equipment, exercises, training, planning, and administration. As of
June 2003, OHS expects to award 80 percent of the $103.4 million
to local governments and retain 20 percent for state activities.
Unlike the allocations specifi ed in the fi rst phase, how much
funding will be spent on each category is at the discretion of the
State and local governments.
FEMA Grant
In addition to the State Homeland Security Grant Program, the
federal government provides terrorism readiness funding through
the FEMA Grant. OES uses these funds to focus on comprehensive
emergency planning, with emphasis given to
updating the emergency plan and supporting
planning documents to address all emergencies,
Where the State Must Use
including weapons of mass destruction and
FEMA Grant Funds
terrorism, and providing support to the committee
• Interstate and intrastate mutual on terrorism. Additionally, OES provides grants
aid agreements.
to local governments to update their plans
• Facilitating communication and for emergency operations, especially terrorism
interoperability protocols so that networks
preparedness.
and communications lines are established
prior to an event, thereby minimizing the
interoperability problem. For the grant period from December 2002 to
December 2003, the State was awarded $11.9 million
• Establishing a common incident
command system. for planning. Of this amount, OES distributed
$8.9 million to local governments, retaining
• Identifi cation of and plans to protect
critical infrastructure. the remaining $3 million for state planning for
emergency operations. The State was awarded
• Addressing state and local continuity of
operations and continuity of government. another $50,000 to assess the emergency operation
centers at counties2 and $100,000 more to modify
• State and local hazard and risk assessments
to determine emergency management the state center to house secure equipment.
planning priorities.
• Coordinating citizen and family preparedness
OES Has Established Methods for Identifying
plans and programs, including Citizen Corps,
donations programs, and other volunteer Potential Sources of Funding
initiatives to ensure an effective response to
all types of emergencies. OES currently administers numerous state and
federal grants that are provided either on an
annual basis or when a disaster occurs. OES
2 For additional information on county emergency preparedness, refer to audit report 2002-113, issued in July 2003.
2288 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 2299
coordinates with the respective federal agencies to maintain
its awareness of any additional funds available through these
programs. In addition, OES has a grant management section
and a legislative affairs unit that identify funding sources by
reviewing new state and federal legislation and Web sites, by
establishing contacts with state and federal partner agencies,
and through subscriptions to services such as the federal register
notifications. Through its coordination with federal agencies,
coordination with the governor’s offices in Sacramento and
Washington, D.C., and membership in the National Emergency
Management Association, OES is also made aware of any federal
legislation that may potentially affect its funding opportunities.
The committee on terrorism has established a subcommittee
that identifies funding for state and local agencies. The funding
subcommittee began an effort to identify funding sources,
such as federal grants, that state and local agencies could use
to fund terrorism readiness activities; however, it has not
yet completed this effort. Further, the subcommittee has not
met since December 2002 and is not expected to meet again
until July 2003. The director of OHS, who is the chair of the
committee on terrorism, stated that he delayed the work of all
the various subcommittees until OHS could review the structure
of the committee on terrorism. He said this was necessary
because he believed the committee on terrorism currently had
too many subcommittees, rendering it inefficient. In July 2003,
OHS plans to convene the committee on terrorism and begin
to determine the subcommittees that will remain. The efforts
of the funding subcommittee in identifying funding sources
for the terrorism readiness activities of state and local agencies
could lead to additional funds. If OHS does not use the funding
subcommittee to identify potential funding sources, it should
ensure that it has an effective mechanism to do so.
According to the director of OHS, a funding working group,
comprising various state and local entities, assisted OHS in
OHS may find benefits creating a funding plan. Submitted to the federal government
in combining the work in October 2002, the funding plan outlined the proposed
of the commission on distribution of federal homeland security funds in California.
terrorism’s funding The working group is also to review the State’s system for
subcommittee with that allocating federal homeland security funds to determine if any
of an existing funding adjustments are needed in the future. The efforts of the working
working group. group and the funding subcommittee both focus on funding.
As discussed previously, OHS is reviewing the structure of the
committee on terrorism and its subcommittees. OHS may find
benefits in combining the work of the funding subcommittee
and the working group.
2288 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 2299
OHS Has Recently Begun to Disburse State-Level Terrorism
Readiness Funds
Although there are approximately $39 million in federal terrorism
readiness funds from federal fiscal years 2000 through 2003
that could be used at the state level, the State has only recently
received most of these funds and is now beginning to allocate
them. Approximately $32 million of the $39 million was just
awarded in May and June 2003. Of the remaining $7 million,
$2.6 million had been available since August 2002, but OES
had not yet allocated or expended these funds because it was
directed to hold the funds by the director of OHS until his
office developed a plan to allocate available terrorism readiness
funds. Between August 2002 and February 2003, when the
governor created OHS, OES held the funds in anticipation of
OHS being established. The federal government allows the State
to spend these funds on various terrorism readiness activities.
For the federal fiscal year 2000 through the first phase of the 2003
award, the federal government awarded California more than
$18 million for state-level terrorism readiness activities. The
State can spend $8.9 million for equipment, $1.6 million for
exercises, $4.7 million for exercises or equipment, $2.4 million
for training, and $600,000 for planning. Additionally, in
June 2003, in the second phase of the grant, the State was
awarded approximately $21 million by the federal government,
which allowed the State the discretion to determine how much
to spend on equipment, exercises, training, and planning.
According to the director of OHS, before deciding how to
allocate the state-level terrorism readiness funds, and soon
OHS assessed the needs after the governor’s executive order created OHS, he assessed
of state agencies claiming each state agency that claimed to have a first-responder role
a first-responder role in terrorism readiness activities so that OHS could identify
in terrorism readiness how much money the agency believed it needed to fulfill its
activities to determine responsibilities. OHS then determined whether the activities
how best to distribute the fit the mission of the agency and did not duplicate the services
federal funds designated of another agency and if the amounts requested seemed
for state-level activities. reasonable. For example, according to the director of OHS, the
California Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of
Health Services, and the Emergency Medical Services Authority
submitted plans that showed they would conduct some of the
same activities. Rather than fund all the activities and have
redundancies, OHS is meeting with each agency to identify their
respective missions. OHS will then determine which agency
should perform a particular activity and fund each activity
accordingly. The director of OHS stated that he believes that
3300 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 3311
funding only those activities that are clearly part of an agency’s
mission is the most fair and efficient way of allocating funds.
He further stated that agencies with first-responder roles, such
as the California Highway Patrol, the National Guard, the
Department of Forestry and Fire Protection, and the Department
of Health Services, were placed higher on the funding list.
From the more than $18 million that was available for federal
fiscal years 2000 through the first phase of the 2003 award, OHS
in June 2003 allocated the $1.6 million for exercises and the
$2.4 million for training to the National Guard, and allocated
the $600,000 for planning to OES. Additionally, OHS allocated the
remaining $13.7 million of equipment funds as displayed in the
Table. OHS expects to allocate the $21 million the State was
awarded in June 2003 later in the summer of 2003.
TABLE
Allocation of State-Level Equipment Funds for
Federal Fiscal Years 2000 Through 2003
( in Thousands)
Agency Amount Requested Amount Allocated
Anti-Terrorism Information Center $ 1,100 $ 0
California Exposition and State Fair
police department 2,013 85
California State University police 1,900 1,100
Emergency Medical Services Authority 1,500 0
Environmental Protection Agency 2,350 950
Food and Agriculture 800 730
Forestry and Fire Protection 15,000 1,575
General Services 900 492
Health Services 450 450
Highway Patrol 7,926 6,178
National Guard 1,650 1,640
University of California
police department 8,000 450
University of California, Davis,
fire department 226 23
Totals $43,815 $13,673
Source: Office of Homeland Security.
3300 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 3311
OES Received Some State Funding for Terrorism Readiness
During the past three fiscal years, OES submitted two budget
requests for additional state general funds for personnel
and equipment related to terrorism readiness activities. OES
requested in September 2000 and subsequently received
$425,000 to purchase and maintain secure radio equipment.
This equipment will allow OES personnel to communicate with
two-way radios that cannot be monitored by the news media
or public when responding to incidents involving sensitive
communications such as criminal incidents or terrorist attacks.
Also, OES requested in September 2001 and subsequently
received $562,000 for three staff members to provide dedicated
support and coordination to the committee on terrorism. OES
believes that the increased staff and additional funding will
enhance interagency coordination with state agencies.
Other states have various ways to fund terrorism readiness
activities. For example, Florida allocated $2 million in state
general funds for fiscal year 2002–03 to perform state-level
Some states, such as exercises and to purchase personal protective equipment
Florida, have created for first responders. Georgia began to devote state funds
a dedicated revenue specifically toward terrorism readiness activities after the events
stream to help pay for of September 11, 2001. For example, it has added seven state-
preparedness efforts. funded positions that are specifically focused on terrorism
readiness activities. In addition, the Little Hoover Commission
reported in January 2002 that some states, such as Florida, have
created a dedicated revenue stream to help pay for preparedness
efforts. Florida created a trust fund, financed by a surcharge
on commercial and domestic property insurance, to finance
emergency management efforts such as acquiring a geographic
information system and a satellite communications system.
On the other hand, one state—Pennsylvania—told us that
its terrorism readiness activities are financed exclusively with
federal funds.
THE EFFECT OF OES BUDGET CUTS ARE UNCERTAIN
An OES analysis stated that budget cuts it is required to sustain
due to the current state budget crisis will severely hinder its
ability to fulfill its overall mission, including terrorism readiness.
However, since February 2003, OES is to report to the Governor’s
Office through the OHS director, and the OHS director told us
he believes that OES can meet its statutory mission despite
budget cuts. Due to the current budget crisis, as of June 2003,
3322 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 3333
OES sustained a budget cut of $2.9 million for
fi scal year 2002–03 and $8.2 million for fi scal
How OES Plans to Sustain
Budget Reductions year 2003–04. OES’s total General Fund budget
for fi scal year 2002–03 after the cuts was $56 million.
• Cut positions, including instructors at the
California Specialized Training Institute.
In a January 2003 analysis, OES stated that these
• Reduce staffi ng and operating expenses at reductions in funding would severely hinder its
the Disaster Assistance Pasadena Offi ce.
ability to fulfi ll its public safety mission and would
• Reduce staffi ng and operating expenses have a noticeable impact on the resources available
at the Coastal Regional Emergency
to prepare for, mitigate, respond to, and recover
Operations Center.
from emergencies, disasters, and acts of terrorism.
• Eliminate the annual earthquake campaign
For example, in relation to the CSTI, OES said that
and funding for the dam safety programs.
10 positions, or 25 percent of CSTI’s staff, would
• Reduce maintenance of the California be cut as part of the fi scal year 2002–03 budget
Integrated Seismic Network.
cuts. The CSTI provides training to emergency
• Reduce administration and executive support. response personnel in various areas, including
terrorism. This training equips city, county, and
• Reduce local assistance.
state emergency services personnel with the
knowledge and skills they need to effectively plan,
respond, manage, and recover from emergency
situations. Positions lost included four instructors and six support
staff positions, including two registrars. According to the
director of the CSTI, as of May 2003, it has not yet determined
which of the courses will be cut from the schedule for next year
because it is still in the process of identifying which instructors
will be let go based on seniority. She is particularly concerned
that one of the instructors with the least state seniority is a
nationally recognized terrorism expert.
Additionally, the director of the CSTI believes that the loss
of registrar positions is especially problematic, as this is the
primary contact person for students and is critical to getting
students registered in the classes, including making sure that
payments are received. The director of the CSTI points out
that as OES reduces the number of courses it is able to offer,
the amount of tuition brought in will decrease, which affects
the amount of reimbursements in OES’s budget. In addition,
OES has seen a decline in student enrollment as a result of cuts
in local government spending on emergency management
training. Although other state agencies such as the National
Guard, the Department of Health Services, and the California
Environmental Protection Agency have expressed interest in
receiving training from the CSTI in the Standardized Emergency
Management System as well as other areas, OES is not sure it
can meet this need because of the staff cuts at the CSTI. OES
is also uncertain about meeting its internal training needs,
3322 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 3333
because the cuts not only affect instructors but also support staff
who are members of OES’s training committee and oversee the
training database.
However, the director of OHS stated that he believes OES can
fulfill its responsibilities even with the budget cuts that have been
The director of OHS sustained as of June 2003. In fact, he believes neither OHS nor OES
believes OES can fulfill need additional funding from the State. Moreover, the director of
its responsibilities even OHS wants to optimize the efficiency of OES resources. In pursuit
with the budget cuts that of this goal, he intends to assess the OES organization as early as
have been sustained as the summer of 2003 and expects to identify more efficient ways for
of June 2003. OES to fulfill its statutory responsibilities, focusing its resources on
mission-related activities.
According to the director of OHS, the funding that OHS receives
from the federal government should be sufficient for the State
to implement its terrorism response plan activities, provided
that the federal government allows the State flexibility in how
the money is spent. For example, in the past, some grants
specified that the money could only be spent on equipment,
even though there might have been a greater need for training.
Current grants are more flexible, and the State can use them
for training, exercises, planning, and administration as well.
Additionally, the director stated that OHS is working with the
federal government to clarify whether overtime costs incurred
by local emergency staff are eligible for reimbursement from
federal terrorism readiness funds and to determine if the State
can fund positions—specifically intelligence analyst positions—
with federal money.
CLARIFICATION OF THE ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
OF OHS AND OES WOULD BE BENEFICIAL
As discussed in the Introduction, in February 2003, the governor
established OHS within the Governor’s Office. Some of the
responsibilities assigned to OHS by the executive order and to
the director of OES appear to have the potential to overlap.
For example, under the act, the director of OES is assigned the
responsibility of coordinating the emergency activities of all
state agencies during a state of war emergency or other state
emergency, and every state agency and officer is required to
cooperate with the director in rendering assistance. Further,
under the act, the extraordinary powers granted to the governor
to mitigate emergency situations may be delegated by the
governor to the director of OES. However, the executive order
3344 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 3355
assigns OHS the responsibility of coordinating the security
efforts of all departments and agencies of the State and the
activities of all state agencies pertaining to terrorism-related
issues, and it designates OHS as the principal point of contact
for the governor. Moreover, the director of OES is required to
report to the governor through OHS, but that reporting function
is not limited to issues relating to state security or terrorism and
thus appears to require OES to make all reports to the governor
through OHS. Finally, an organizational chart located on the
State’s Web site suggests that OHS has oversight responsibility
over OES. Therefore, it appears that the responsibilities of OHS
and OES may overlap.
We asked OES and OHS to clarify their respective roles and
responsibilities, and both indicated that they believe the
executive order is clear. The director of OES further commented
that although state agency administrators typically report to the
governor through his various policy assistants, the executive
order formalizes the day-to-day reporting relationship that OES
and the Office of Criminal Justice Planning have with OHS
with respect to matters assigned to OHS. He acknowledged that
he reports to the director of OHS for terrorism-related issues.
However, he also stated that the press release accompanying
the executive order made it clear that OHS would provide
coordination of all state agencies for terrorism-related issues
but that it did not address OES specifically or any shifts in
the organization of state government. The director of OES
further added that California, like many other states, is going
through a process to review and build on its existing systems
and organizations to ensure that it has the best system
possible to address terrorism. He continued by saying that
In contrast to the during this process, there will undoubtedly be times when the
perspective of the director organizational relationships are both complex and evolving.
of OES, the director of OHS
believes he has “across the In his statements to us, the director of OHS concurred that
board” authority for all reorganization and change are difficult. Further, because his
areas of OES’s operations. focus is homeland security, he acknowledges that he would be
more involved with terrorism-related issues than other aspects
of OES’s operations. However, in contrast to the perspective
of the director of OES, the director of OHS believes he has
“across the board” authority for all areas of OES’s operations.
This apparent lack of clarity in OHS’s and OES’s respective roles
and responsibilities could adversely affect the State’s ability to
respond to emergencies, such as a terrorist event.
3344 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 3355
Given that OES is established by statute and that OHS is
established by executive order, further clarification of the
respective roles and responsibilities of OES and OHS could help
avoid misunderstandings, particularly if OHS is envisioned as
a permanent part of state government. For example, under the
California Constitution, the governor may assign and reorganize
functions among executive officers and agencies in the manner
provided by state law. Under state law, when the governor
determines that reorganization of state agencies is in the public
interest, he has authority to prepare a reorganization plan to
the Legislature for review, which may become effective as early
as 60 days following submission. Alternatively, legislation could
clarify the roles of OES and OHS, particularly with respect to the
coordination of state agencies during an emergency.
RECOMMENDATIONS
To ensure that the State is adequately prepared to address terrorist
threats, OHS should do the following:
• Continue its plans to develop a state plan on terrorism that
includes a prevention element.
• Continue its plans to thoroughly assess OES functions to
determine how it can optimize its efficiency.
• Consider the benefits of combining the funding subcommittee
of the committee on terrorism with the homeland security
funding working group.
• Work with the governor on how best to clarify the roles and
responsibilities of OHS and OES.
To ensure that state agencies, including OES, are adequately
prepared to respond to terrorist events occurring within the
State, OES should do the following:
• Identify the most critical training required by staff at the state
and regional centers and then allocate existing funding or
seek additional funding it needs to deliver the training.
• Assist the National Guard in providing state-level terrorism
readiness exercises.
3366 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 3377
Given the events of September 11, 2001, and the evolving nature
of the terrorist threat, OHS and OES should do the following:
• Ensure that the state plan addressing terrorism is reviewed on
a regular basis and updated as determined necessary to ensure
that it adequately addresses current threats and benefits from
the lessons learned in actual terrorist readiness events occurring
both in California and nationwide.
• Develop a checklist to guide periodic evaluations of the state
plan addressing terrorism to ensure that such assessments are
consistent and effective. n
3366 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 3377
Blank page inserted for reproduction purposes only.
3388 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 3399
CHAPTER 2
Although the California National
Guard Has Begun to Define Its Role
in State Terrorism Prevention and
Response, Several Constraints May
Limit Its Effectiveness
CHAPTER SUMMARY
The California National Guard (National Guard) responds
to state emergencies as directed by the Governor’s Office
of Emergency Services (OES). To outline its role in the
State’s response to terrorist events and identify key actions
it must take in readiness for its likely missions, the National
Guard has developed an overall strategy as well as specific plans
and procedures. Despite working toward completing several
of the critical objectives of its overall strategy, the National
Guard advised us that many require actions from bodies outside
the National Guard, such as the U.S. Congress and the state
Legislature; therefore, the National Guard has not yet fully
accomplished its overall strategy.
Most of the training performed by the National Guard is federally
funded and designed to prepare the organization to meet its
federal military missions. Although these federal missions do
not specifically involve terrorism readiness, the State can take
advantage of the skills possessed by National Guard forces when
responding to terrorist events occurring within California. The
National Guard’s Joint Operations Center is responsible for
receiving requests for state missions from OES and developing
and overseeing the National Guard’s response to requests.
In two important areas, the National Guard’s training is lacking
and could hinder its ability to respond promptly and effectively
to state missions. First, although the Joint Operations Center
has identified the training its staff need to effectively coordinate
missions and perform the functions of the Joint Operations
Center, many of the 38 staff have not received even half of the
necessary training. The deputy director of the Joint Operations
Center told us that lack of funding and limited availability of
classes have hindered its ability to train its Joint Operations
Center staff in the areas identified. Second, the National Guard’s
3388 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 3399
Army Guard Division does not provide terrorism readiness
training, which is federally required and designed to protect
National Guard units against terrorist threats. According to the
commanders of the Army Guard units we visited, they do not
provide the training because National Guard management has
not given them the guidance they need to implement terrorism
readiness training.
Finally, although an analysis focusing on a key measure of
recruiting and retention success indicates that the efforts of
California’s National Guard have not been as successful as those
of National Guard forces in many other states and territories,
it has managed to finish near its end-strength goals for each
of the last four years. Further, its ranking among states and
territories does not have a direct correlation to its readiness for
its missions, including responding to terrorist events. However,
federal deployments of National Guard units do affect the
availability of National Guard units to respond to state missions.
Since the military missions assigned to the National Guard by
the Department of Defense are its primary missions, National
Guard units that are activated by the federal government are not
available to respond to state missions.
THE CALIFORNIA NATIONAL GUARD HAS DEVELOPED A
STRATEGY AND PROCEDURES TO GUIDE ITS RESPONSE
TO TERRORIST EVENTS
The events of September 11, 2001, demonstrated a new level
of threat to the United States and demanded that government
The National Guard’s take the necessary steps to ensure the safety of U.S. citizens.
December 2002 Homeland In response to this demand, in December 2002, the National
Strategy defines key Guard developed the Homeland Security Strategy (Homeland
objectives the National Strategy), which identifies objectives it must achieve to prepare
Guard must meet to be for, help prevent, and respond to terrorist events within the
prepared for missions it State. The National Guard has also developed a plan that guides
likely will receive. its response to terrorist events, as well as other emergencies
to which it is asked to respond within the State. When the
National Guard does respond to an emergency, such as a
terrorist event, its response is coordinated through the Joint
Operations Center. The National Guard has developed standard
operating procedures for the Joint Operations Center to describe
relationships and delineate responsibilities for those working
in the Joint Operations Center. Finally, the National Guard has
developed a process to annually review and assess its operational
plan to ensure that it is up-to-date.
4400 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 4411
The National Strategy for Homeland Security—a comprehensive
plan for terrorism response prepared by the federal Office
The National Guard of Homeland Security—states that the nation’s approach
acknowledges that to homeland security is based on the principles of shared
because many of the responsibility and partnership with Congress, state and local
objectives of its Homeland governments, the private sector, and the American people. As
Strategy require actions a critical element in the State’s response to emergencies that
from others, it has not occur in California, the National Guard developed its Homeland
yet fully accomplished its Strategy in December 2002, describing its role in the State’s
overall strategy. response to a terrorist event and defining key objectives it
must meet to be prepared for missions it likely will receive. The
National Guard has taken steps to accomplish several of the
objectives identified in the Homeland Strategy. However, the
executive officer of the National Guard’s homeland security
office stated that because many of the objectives require actions
from entities outside the National Guard—including the state
Legislature and the U.S. Congress—the National Guard has
not yet fully accomplished its overall strategy. Nonetheless,
the California National Guard’s terrorism readiness planning
appears to be more advanced than those of its counterparts in
the four states we reviewed. None of the four state National
Guard forces that gave us information on their plans had an
established terrorism readiness plan that outlined their roles in
responding to terrorism in their states. A fifth state told us it
had a terrorism readiness plan but declined to provide it to us
for review. Appendix B discusses the Homeland Strategy in more
detail and describes the National Guard’s progress in completing
its objectives.
The National Guard responds to emergencies that occur within
the State as directed by OES. To guide its response to these
missions, the National Guard has developed a plan of operations
that not only identifies the basic concepts underlying a response
to all missions but also includes annexes that provide more
specific guidance for particular types of emergencies, including
terrorism. The plan appears to give an adequate level of guidance
to allow for an organized and efficient response to state missions
the National Guard will likely receive. This plan also establishes
the National Guard’s Ready Reaction Force, which is designed
to respond quickly to certain emergencies. Appendix B discusses
the plan of operations in greater detail.
In addition to the operational plan, the National Guard has
developed procedures for its Joint Operations Center to follow
in coordinating the National Guard’s response to state missions.
These procedures describe the various areas of responsibility
4400 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 4411
within the Joint Operations Center and define what each area
needs to accomplish during a response to a state mission. These
procedures appear to provide sufficient guidance to allow for a
coordinated response to any state mission.
In response to a concern we raised in an audit released in
February 2002, the National Guard has developed a process to
annually review its operational plan, identify needed changes,
and update the plan as needed. As part of this process, the
National Guard is implementing a software program to better
track its progress in updating the operational plan. We further
discuss the National Guard’s efforts in this area in Appendix B.
ALTHOUGH FEDERAL MILITARY TRAINING GENERALLY
PROVIDES THE CAPABILITIES THAT THE NATIONAL GUARD
USES FOR STATE MISSIONS, ADDITIONAL TRAINING IS
NEEDED TO ADEQUATELY RESPOND TO TERRORISM
Training provided by the federal government generally provides
National Guard units with the skills needed to respond to state
missions, but additional training is needed to respond adequately
to terrorist events. Each member of the National Guard is
assigned one or more specialties—such as infantry soldier,
pilot, or military police officer––for which they receive military
training that qualifies the member to perform the associated
duties. In responding to state missions, the National Guard
draws on the skills its members obtained through their specialty
training. Therefore, the National Guard generally does not have
to provide additional skills training to its members to respond to
state missions. Any supplemental training a commander deems
necessary to effectively carry out the state mission is given
to members as part of the response to the mission. However,
the National Guard has not provided its Joint Operations
Center staff with much of the training they need to properly
The National Guard coordinate an effective response to state missions. Additionally,
draws on the skills its the Army Guard Division does not provide terrorism awareness
members obtained training—designed to protect its members, their families,
through their specialty and its resources—to its members as required by U.S. Army
training provided by the regulations. Further, although the National Guard’s civil support
federal government. teams are required to receive a significant amount of training
in responding to incidents of weapons of mass destruction—
including chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
agents—we found that many of the members of these teams
have not received all the required training. Finally, although the
National Guard performs periodic internal exercises to evaluate
4422 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 4433
its ability to respond to terrorist events and other emergencies, it
does not periodically exercise with other state and local agencies
to practice coordinating an effective response.
Wartime Specialty Training Gives National Guard Units the
Skills They Need to Respond to State Missions
Most of the training performed by the National
Guard is federally funded and designed to
Some of the Military Skills the National
Guard Monitors for State Missions prepare the organization to accomplish its federal
missions. Although the federal missions are
• Command and control not specifi cally related to terrorism readiness,
• Communications support National Guard members use the skills they
obtain in training for and performing their
• Air/ground transport and evacuation
military specialties to respond to state terrorism
• Aerial/ground medical evacuation readiness missions. Commanders may identify
additional training that members need to achieve
• Emergency shelter
a particular mission. The fi ve other state National
• Restoring law and order
Guard forces from which we obtained information
• Crowd/traffi c control/security reported similar reliance on the military specialty
skills of their members to respond to terrorism
• Explosive ordinance disposal
readiness missions in their states.
• Limited decontamination
• Civil support teams In June 2002, the National Guard developed a
skills matrix that identifi es the federal military
capabilities that National Guard units possess and
are most likely to use during state emergencies.
Additionally, the matrix identifi es, through a color-coding
system, the current capability of the National Guard to
provide the identifi ed skills based on factors such as federal
deployments, training, and equipment repairs. This matrix
is maintained by the Joint Operations Center and is updated
weekly to refl ect the current status of National Guard units.
To identify additional training that guard members need to
complete a particular mission, the commander develops a
Mission Essential Task List (METL) to specify the required
training. For example, as of June 2003, the National Guard has
a task force made up of four teams guarding the Golden Gate
Bridge in San Francisco 24 hours a day, seven days a week. The
task force commander identifi ed four specifi c areas in the METL
outlining the training he believes is necessary for task force
members to have to be prepared to achieve the mission. The
training identifi ed in the METL included weapons qualifi cation;
understanding the various law enforcement jurisdictions
surrounding the bridge area; nuclear, biological, and chemical
4422 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 4433
training; and an abbreviated version of the training that law
enforcement officers receive. Various types of training related
to this METL are included in the task force’s scheduled training,
and the training is provided to the members accordingly.
To determine if task force members were actually receiving the
training identified in the METLs, we judgmentally selected a
sample of 15 of the 44 members from the Golden Gate Bridge
Task Force and reviewed the task force training records. We used
a judgmental sample to ensure that each of the four task force
teams was represented. We found that 14 of the 15 members
received all the training. One member did not receive all the
training because he was serving on active military duty during
the time the training classes were given. According to a leader
of the task force, the task force member was briefed on the
training that was missed. Therefore, it appears that generally the
task force members are receiving training related to the METLs
established by task force commanders.
Because the National Guard largely relies on military training
to ensure that its members are prepared for state missions, we
reviewed the unit status reports of three of the 23 Army Guard
units and two of the five Air Guard units that had been assigned
a role in the Ready Reaction Force. Army Guard units prepare
unit status reports each quarter, stating the unit’s readiness level
to fulfill its assigned mission and the number of members who
are qualified in their assigned military specialty. For the quarter
ending March 2003, we found that two of the three units did
not meet their army training readiness goals. Air Guard units
prepare similar reports each month to state their readiness to
fulfill their assigned missions, including training. Both the Air
Guard units we reviewed reported in March 2003 that they
had met their readiness goals. Readiness goals are the levels,
Although two of the three established by the respective military services, that each unit
Army Guard units we must meet to be ready to respond to a mission.
reviewed are not meeting
their readiness goals, the Although two of the three Army Guard units we reviewed are
National Guard believes it not meeting their readiness goals, the National Guard believes
does not adversely affect this does not adversely affect its ability to respond to state
its ability to respond to missions because it uses the task force concept to respond to
state missions because it state emergencies. The task force concept refers to the practice of
uses the task force concept. forming an ad hoc force from any of the National Guard units
that are available—including Army Guard and Air Guard—based
on the skills that the National Guard identifies as necessary
to fulfill the mission it has been given. Therefore, under this
concept, members and equipment from an Air Guard wing could
4444 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 4455
join members and equipment from an Army Guard company to
form a task force that would respond to a state mission. Accordingly,
the National Guard will not likely need entire units to respond to
state missions. Indeed, the director of the Joint Operations Center
told us it is not abnormal for units to not meet their readiness goals
due to normal turnover, the length of time needed to sufficiently
train members in new specialties, limited availability of training,
federal budget shortfalls, and limited equipment. Therefore, to the
extent that the National Guard has a sufficient number of trained
members to meet the requirements of state missions under the task
force concept of operations, it should be able to respond to any
likely mission.
Joint Operations Center Staff Have Not Yet Completed All the
Training They Need to Effectively Coordinate Missions
The Joint Operations Center is responsible for receiving
state missions from OES and developing and overseeing the
National Guard’s response to requests for its services. In June 2002,
the Joint Operations Center identified training it believes its staff
need to adequately respond to state emergencies. However, many
of the staff have not had all the identified training. Without
proper training, the ability of the National Guard to respond
promptly and effectively to state missions may deteriorate.
The Joint Operations Center uses a matrix to track the progress
each staff member has made in taking the training courses
identified as necessary to effectively fulfill his or her responsibilities.
However, 32 of the 38 members required to take specific courses
Of the 38 members of the had received less than half the designated training. According to
Joint Operations Center, the deputy director of the Joint Operations Center, lack of funding
32 had received less than and limited availability of classes have hindered its ability to train
half of the required training its Joint Operations Center staff in the identified areas. Therefore,
the National Guard the Joint Operations Center would benefit from continuing to
identified as necessary pursue the training identified as necessary for its staff and to seek
to effectively fulfill the funding it needs to ensure that they are adequately trained.
their responsibilities.
Some classes the Joint Operations Center identified are free
on-line courses, and the Joint Operations Center’s training
officer advised us that these will be incorporated into its training
plans. According to its deputy director, the Joint Operations
Center requested additional funding for the other classes but,
due to higher organizational priorities, the National Guard did
not approve the training. He added that the Joint Operations
Center is currently working with one of the training providers to
see if the tuition can be waived if National Guard staff assist the
4444 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 4455
training provider in delivering other training. In April 2003, the
Joint Operations Center established a new list of training courses
its staff need to adequately respond to state emergencies. This
list includes even more classes than the previous one, thereby
compounding the problem.
The Army Guard Division Does Not Provide Required
Terrorism Awareness Training to Its Members
U.S. Army regulations issued in January 2002 require the
adjutant general—the head of the National Guard—to
implement a terrorism readiness force protection program
(force protection program) in the Army Guard Division. In
addition, the adjutant general is required to publish guidelines
for the division to follow in implementing the force protection
program, which is designed to protect National Guard members,
Without the required their families, and its resources from terrorist threats. The
terrorism awareness director of the Joint Operations Center has been assigned the
training, Army Guard responsibility to implement the force protection program for
members are less prepared the National Guard. Although the National Guard has fully
for terrorist threats. implemented a similar program in the Air Guard Division and
has implemented some parts of the force protection program
in the Army Guard Division, it has not annually provided
the required terrorism awareness training to its Army Guard
members. Without this necessary training, Army Guard
members are less prepared for terrorist threats.
To determine whether the National Guard has implemented the
force protection program in the Army Guard and Air Guard as
required by federal regulations, we selected three Army Guard
units and two Air Guard units and determined whether they
had provided the required terrorism awareness training.
Although separate regulations apply to the Army Guard and
Air Guard divisions, both regulations require, among other
things, that units provide annual terrorism awareness training
to all their members. We found that the National Guard has
implemented several parts of the Army force protection program
at the headquarters level, such as appointing a terrorism
readiness officer and establishing a terrorism readiness steering
committee. Additionally, the Air Guard units have fully
implemented the terrorism awareness training requirements
of the force protection program. However, we found that none
of the three Army Guard units we reviewed has provided the
annual terrorism awareness training as required by U.S. Army
regulations. Indeed, one of the unit commanders was not aware
of the regulation at all.
4466 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 4477
According to the commanders of the Army Guard units we
visited, the reason they have not fully implemented the
terrorism awareness training is that they have not received the
guidance to implement it. The regulation provides that the units
can offer their members the required training either through
Although the director an approved Web-based course or from a specially trained
of the Joint Operations instructor using an approved lesson plan. The director of the
Center told us that his Joint Operations Center, who is responsible for implementing
office was unaware of the National Guard’s force protection program, acknowledges
an approved Web-based that it has not issued guidance to the Army Guard units. Further,
course on terrorism according to the director of the Joint Operations Center, the
awareness until recently, U.S. Army simply does not have enough qualified trainers to
an Air Guard unit we provide the training. The director added that his office had been
visited had been using unaware of an approved Web-based course until recently.
such a course since
June 2002. However, while visiting an Air Guard unit in April 2003, we
discovered that it had been using a Web-based course to fulfill
the requirement for terrorism awareness training since June 2002.
Therefore, despite its responsibility for implementing the force
protection program in both the Air Guard and Army Guard
divisions, the Joint Operations Center was unaware of the
practices of the Air Guard Division that could have benefited
the Army Guard Division. Had the Joint Operations Center
been more aware of the training being utilized in the Air Guard
Division, it could have identified this best practice and shared
it with the Army Guard Division. Without terrorism awareness
training, members of the Army Guard are less prepared to protect
themselves, their families, and National Guard assets from
terrorist threats.
Some Members of the Civil Support Teams Have Not Received
All Their Required Training, but the U.S. Army Considers Them
Fully Able to Respond to Potential Terrorist Activities
Although not all members of the State’s two civil support teams
have taken all federal and state required training courses, the
U.S. Army has recently assessed the units and found them
fully ready to perform their mission. A civil support team is
divided into six areas of expertise: command, operations, survey,
medical, communications, and logistics/administration. To
attain the high level of competency expected of these units,
the National Guard Bureau has listed more than 1,400 hours of
training that various members of the civil support team must
take, depending on their areas of expertise.
4466 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 4477
The federal government created civil support teams to provide
states with a resource in responding to potential terrorist activities
involving weapons of mass destruction, which can include
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear agents. Although
the units are federally funded, they are under the direction of
the governor. At present, 32 civil support teams are scattered
throughout the country with two teams currently in place within
California: the 9th civil support team in Los Alamitos and the
95th in Hayward. Although the civil support teams are under the
operational control of the governor, the National Guard Bureau
mandates a minimum level of competency, and the U.S. Army
evaluates the teams every 18 months.
Federal requirements direct civil support team members to
obtain certain competencies. The National Guard Bureau
identifies the courses that team members must complete to
obtain these competencies. Additionally, state regulations
require that civil support team members receive training in
The National Guard handling hazardous materials. The National Guard Bureau has
Bureau has designated designated more than 1,400 hours of training in a variety of
more than 1,400 hours topics that members of the civil support teams must complete,
of training in a variety depending on their positions. However, many team members
of topics that members have not completed all the required training. Specifically, 20
of the civil support team of the 21 members of the 9th civil support team were not fully
must complete, depending trained, although only one of the 20 members had 50 percent
on their positions. or less of the training required for the member’s position. For
the 95th civil support team, we found that 15 of the 23 members
were not fully trained, with only four of the 15 receiving
50 percent or less of the required training.
According to the commander of the 9th civil support team,
several factors have prevented its members from receiving all
their required training. He said that the team’s training and
deployment requirements, as well as other scheduling issues,
result in team members taking between one and two years to
complete all the necessary training. He also said that training
priorities for courses at the national level are often set aside for
newly established civil support teams; therefore, the 9th civil
support team has experienced the burden of pursuing classes
that have been set aside for others. Finally, the commander of
the 9th civil support team told us that as part of their normal
career progression, members leave the civil support teams to
begin jobs of increasing rank and responsibility; therefore,
new team members must be trained to fill the open positions.
He concluded by saying that the goal of the 9th civil support
team is to have all members 100 percent trained on identified
4488 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 4499
courses, that their turnover is stabilizing, and that the training
completion rate continues to increase. According to the senior
operations officer of the 95th civil support team, three of the
four individuals that lacked most of their required training were
newly assigned to the team and are in the process of receiving
training. The fourth individual was delayed in receiving training
while recovering from a medical condition.
Although not all members of the 9th and 95th civil support teams
have taken all their required classes, both teams have passed the
necessary certification required by the Department of Defense and,
according to a U.S. Army representative, both teams did “extremely
well” on recent army evaluations. Specifically, the army recently
assessed both civil support teams—the 9th in November 2002 and
the 95th in March 2003—regarding their readiness to fulfill their
missions and found that both are sufficiently prepared. Therefore,
despite the difficulties the civil support teams have encountered in
providing its members with all the required training, it does not
appear as though the U.S. Army believes it has affected their ability
to achieve their missions.
The National Guard Would Benefit From Increased State-
Level Terrorism Exercises
In analyzing its ability to respond to homeland security
missions, the director of the National Guard’s Joint Operations
Although the National Center states that much of its success is achieved through
Guard performs internal the building of relationships with state and local emergency
exercises for its operational response agencies. The director states that as the need for
plan at least quarterly, National Guard support increases with the risk of terrorism,
opportunities to exercise so does its need to participate in exercises with state and
with state and local local authorities. However, these opportunities have been few
authorities have been few. because, as discussed in Chapter 1, OES has not developed and
administered terrorism readiness exercises involving state and
local emergency response agencies. These agencies need to
participate in terrorism readiness exercises to ensure that they
are adequately prepared to respond to actual terrorism events.
According to the director of the Joint Operations Center, the
National Guard performs internal exercises for its operational
plan at least quarterly. We were able to observe portions of
one of these exercises during our audit. In a typical exercise,
the Joint Operations Center assembles staff and provides a
scenario relating to one of the emergencies covered by the
National Guard’s operational plan (one of which is terrorism).
The Joint Operations Center staff then assess the participants
4488 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 4499
as they develop and implement a plan to respond to the
scenario. This experience enables participants to work through
the decision-making processes involved in responding to a
state mission and helps prepare them for actual missions. In
performing these exercises, the National Guard is ahead of most
of its counterparts in the other states from which we obtained
information. Specifically, all five state National Guard forces
that gave us information said they do not have regular terrorism
readiness exercises related to their potential state missions.
However, some mentioned they conducted exercises to ensure
that they are ready to protect their own forces when carrying
out their duties.
Although these internal exercises are valuable, the director of
the Joint Operations Center told us that the National Guard has
not had sufficient funding to participate in exercises with other
state and local emergency response agencies. In fact, in fiscal
year 2002–03, the limited state funding it did receive to perform
exercises was eliminated. The director of the Joint Operations
Center told us that the lack of funding limits the ability of all
state and local emergency response agencies, including the
National Guard, to practice their emergency plans and become
better prepared if an actual emergency occurs. As discussed in
In June 2003, OHS Chapter 1, the State’s Office of Homeland Security (OHS) has
allocated $1.6 million assumed control of state and federal terrorism readiness funds
in federal funds to the and is responsible for determining how state-level funds should
National Guard to be allocated. In June 2003, OHS advised us that it has now
coordinate terrorism allocated $1.6 million in federal funding to the National Guard
readiness exercises that to coordinate terrorism readiness exercises that include both state
include both state agencies agencies and rural jurisdictions. Therefore, the National Guard
and rural jurisdictions. should soon be able to participate in terrorism readiness exercises
with other state and local emergency response agencies.
THE NATIONAL GUARD HAS FEW FUNDS EARMARKED
FOR TERRORISM READINESS, AND ITS REQUESTS FOR
ADDITIONAL FUNDING HAVE BEEN DENIED
During fiscal year 2002–03, about 93 percent of the
National Guard’s funding came from the federal government. Out
of the $635 million in federal funds the National Guard reported
receiving, only $70,000 was specifically earmarked for terrorism
readiness activities. It used these funds to pay the expenses of staff
that attended terrorism readiness courses. Another $1.7 million
was used to help fund the civil support teams. The National Guard
also receives approximately $5 million annually from the federal
5500 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 5511
government to fund its force protection program, which serves
to protect the security of National Guard personnel and assets.
None of the $42 million the National Guard received in state
funds was earmarked for activities related to terrorism readiness.
The California National Guard is not alone in this regard; none
of the five state National Guard forces from which we obtained
information reported receiving state funds specifically for terrorism
readiness training activities.
The National Guard has requested additional funding related
to terrorism readiness from both the State and the federal
government. In fiscal years 2001–02 through 2003–04, the
National Guard submitted requests to the State for more
Since fiscal year 2001–02, than $10 million in additional state funding for activities
the National Guard has that were at least in part related to terrorism readiness. These
requested more than requests included funding for additional staff to maintain the
$10 million in additional Joint Operations Center, exercises involving state missions, and
state funding for activities the establishment of a homeland security office. However, the
that were at least in deputy director of the Joint Operations Center advised us that
part related to terrorism all these requests were denied and that the National Guard is
readiness; however, all pursuing other sources for this funding.
these requests were denied.
Although all the requests for additional state funding were
denied, OHS allocated $5.6 million in federal funds to the
National Guard in June 2003. The $5.6 million is to be used to
develop training and coordinate exercises to prepare state and
local emergency responders for terrorist events, as well as to pay
for equipment for the National Guard’s own needs. Additionally,
as we discuss further in Appendix B, the National Guard recently
completed an assessment of its homeland security mission and
submitted a request for more than $156 million to the federal
government. This assessment identified additional training,
materials, and personnel that the National Guard believes it
needs to fulfill its homeland security mission. Specific items on
this list included funding for exercises, weapons qualification,
law enforcement training, and equipment for operating in
contaminated environments. However, as of June 2003, the
National Guard had not yet been informed whether the federal
National Guard Bureau would fund these items. According to
the executive officer of the National Guard’s homeland security
office, his office plans to have two individuals that will be
responsible for identifying and applying for additional funds for
terrorism readiness activities.
5500 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 5511
ALTHOUGH THE NATIONAL GUARD’S RECRUITING
AND RETENTION HAS NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED
ITS READINESS, FEDERAL DEPLOYMENTS LIMIT THE
AVAILABILITY OF KEY ASSETS TO THE STATE
An analysis focusing on a key measure of recruiting and
retention success indicates that California’s National Guard
ranks below many state and territorial National Guard forces.
Nonetheless, the National Guard has been able to recruit and
retain enough members to reach about 97 percent or more of its
end-strength goal—that is, the number of members for which
the National Guard is funded—in each of the past four federal
fiscal years. Therefore, although it may not be as successful,
on a percentage basis, as other state and territorial National
Guard forces, its recruitment and retention does not appear
to have affected the National Guard’s ability to meet its overall
needs. However, key units within the National Guard have
been deployed into federal service, rendering their special skills
unavailable to the State. The Army Guard units significantly
affected by deployments include the military police, engineering,
and transportation units. These units are also the ones most often
required by the State. Therefore, when these units are federally
deployed, the State must look elsewhere to meet its needs. OES
told us that the State can replace some of the capabilities offered
by the National Guard through other agencies, but the National
Guard’s specialized equipment is critical.
The National Guard Is Generally Meeting Its End-Strength Goals
Recruiting and retention requirements do not necessarily equate
with readiness capabilities. The National Guard Bureau issues
Recruiting and retention a monthly assessment of the state and territorial National Guard
requirements do not forces’ recruiting and retention efforts. Until recently, the
necessarily equate with National Guard Bureau called its assessment report the Readiness
readiness capabilities. Planning Guide. However, the title of this report resulted
in some confusion because recruiting and retention do not
necessarily correlate with readiness. As mentioned earlier in
this chapter, determining the readiness of National Guard units
requires reviewing the Army Guard unit status reports—or the
equivalent Air Guard reports—that identify the units’ readiness
levels to fulfill their missions. Additionally, as we also have
previously discussed, to the extent that the National Guard has a
sufficient number of trained members to meet the requirements
of state missions under the task force concept of operations, it
should be able to respond to the missions.
5522 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 5533
The number of positions funded by the National Guard Bureau
determines the National Guard’s end-strength goals. Although
the Air Guard has been generally more successful than the
Army Guard has in reaching end-strength goals, the Army Guard
has nevertheless reached about 97 percent or more of its end-
strength goals over the past four federal fiscal years. Nonetheless, in
February 2002, the National Guard Bureau ranked the Army Guard
51st among the 54 state and territorial National Guard forces
in recruiting and retention. In determining this ranking, the
National Guard Bureau considered the Army Guard’s overall
recruiting and retention efforts, as well as its recruiting and
retention efforts related specifically to certain officers.
The National Guard Bureau no longer provides this ranking
in its monthly assessments. Therefore, we computed our own
ranking that focused on a key measure of recruiting and retention
success—the extent to which end-strength goals were attained. We
analyzed data we obtained from the National Guard Bureau as of
September 2002, the end of the most recent federal fiscal year. For
each of the 54 state and territorial Army Guard forces, we compared
Despite ranking behind the end strength attained by the Army Guard to its end-strength
many of their counterparts goals and computed the percentage of end-strength goal attained.
in other states, California’s We found that the California Army Guard ranked 33rd among
Army Guard and the 54 state and territorial Army Guard forces using this measure.
Air Guard were still able Nonetheless, the California Army Guard was able to end this period
to attain 99.7 percent at 99.7 percent of its end-strength goal. Therefore, it appears that
and 99.3 percent of their the Army Guard’s recruiting and retention practices have been
respective end-strength reasonably successful.
goals as of September 2002.
We performed a similar analysis for the Air Guard and found that the
California Air Guard ranked 25th among the 54 state and territorial
Air Guard forces in its ability to recruit and retain members. Despite
this, the Air Guard attained an end strength of 99.3 percent of
its goal. Therefore, it appears that the Air Guard has also been
reasonably successful in its recruiting and retention practices.
Nevertheless, the National Guard recruiters advised us that
recruiting in the current year has been adversely affected by
recent federal and state deployments. In fact, the superintendent
for recruiting for the Air Guard told us that it will likely not
meet its end-strength goals for federal fiscal year 2003, which
ends in September 2003. Thus, the National Guard should
continue to monitor the results of its recruiting and retention
efforts, and if it finds that the results of these efforts adversely
impact its ability to respond to missions, the National Guard
should seek legislative or other remedies to address its problems.
5522 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 5533
Federal Deployments Limit the Availability of California
National Guard Units to Respond to State Missions
The National Guard stated in its Homeland Strategy issued in
December 2002 that it does not have the capability to respond
to the requirements of both the federal and state missions it
anticipates receiving. Therefore, since its federal mission is its
priority, when National Guard assets are deployed for federal
missions, it may not be able to meet the needs of the State. The
Air Guard and Army Guard have deployed numerous units in
response to recent military actions. The deployment has resulted
in a depletion of specific manpower and equipment that might
be detrimental to the National Guard’s ability to respond to
state missions. For example, most of the military police in the
Army Guard have been deployed as well as more than one-
Because its federal mission third of the engineers and truck drivers, and the majority of
is its priority, when these Army Guard members are still deployed. In the Air Guard
National Guard assets Division, half the C-130 E cargo planes it uses were deployed in
are deployed for federal May 2003, but these aircraft have since returned. Currently, the
missions, the National primary effect of deployments is the lack of military police, with
Guard may not be able to more than 90 percent of the National Guard’s military police
meet the needs of the State. mobilized and deployed. However, the State can draw from
the resources of various state and local agencies to fill that void
in an emergency. For example, the California Highway Patrol
could step in to fill the role of the military police. Nonetheless,
a representative from the OES executive office advised us that
although some capabilities offered by the National Guard can be
replaced by other agencies, the National Guard plays a critical
role in support of requests for specialized equipment. Many of the
Army Guard units are still deployed, and other units may need to
be deployed as the needs of the military continue to shift.
RECOMMENDATIONS
To ensure that its members are adequately trained to respond to
terrorism missions, the National Guard should do the following:
• Determine the most critical training its Joint Operations Center
staff need to fulfill their duties and then allocate existing funding
or seek the needed funding to provide the training, document-
ing why it is needed.
• Develop guidance for its Army Guard Division to implement
its terrorism readiness force protection program.
5544 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 5555
• Ensure that its Joint Staff Division, including the Joint
Operations Center, share best practices between its Air Guard
and Army Guard divisions.
• Use the recently awarded funds from OHS to identify the type and
frequency of state-level exercises responding to terrorist events
that the State needs to be adequately prepared. The National
Guard should then provide the exercises it has identified.
The National Guard should continue to monitor the results
of its recruiting and retention efforts. If those efforts begin to
adversely affect its ability to respond to state missions, it should
seek legislative or other remedies to address its problems.
We conducted this review under the authority vested in the California State Auditor by
Section 8543 et seq. of the California Government Code and according to generally accepted
government auditing standards. We limited our review to those areas specified in the audit
scope section of this report.
Respectfully submitted,
ELAINE M. HOWLE
State Auditor
Date: July 31, 2003
Staff: Karen L. McKenna, CPA, Audit Principal
David E. Biggs, CPA
Theresa M. Carey, CPA, CFE
Tameka V. Hutcherson
Roberta A. Kennedy
5544 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 5555
Blank page inserted for reproduction purposes only.
5566 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 5577
APPENDIX A
The State Emergency Plan and the
Terrorism Response Plan Appear
to Provide Adequate Guidance for
Agencies to Respond to Terrorist Events
The California Emergency Services Act (act) establishes the
requirement for a State Emergency Plan (emergency plan)
and requires that it be in effect in each political subdivision
of the State. The act also requires the governing body of each
political subdivision of the State to carry out the provisions
of the emergency plan. The Governor’s Offi ce of Emergency
Services (OES) is responsible for maintaining the emergency plan
and for assisting local governments and other state agencies in
developing their own emergency plans. The emergency plan,
which includes an annex called the terrorism response plan,
provides the framework for the State’s response to all types of
emergencies, including terrorism, and establishes the systems and
functions that agencies will use in responding to emergencies.
Together, the emergency and terrorism response plans appear to
provide adequate guidance for responding to an act of terrorism.
The emergency plan primarily consists of the
basic plan and a section on the organization
Priorities When Conducting
Emergency Operations for response and recovery operations. The basic
plan is intended to be general in its application
• Protecting life (highest priority), property, and provide for fl exibility during response and
and the environment.
recovery. It describes the Standardized Emergency
• Meeting the immediate emergency needs Management System (SEMS), the California
of people, including rescue, medical care,
Emergency Organization, and the phases of
food, shelter, and clothing.
emergency management, and it establishes the
• Temporarily restoring facilities that are
priorities of emergency operations.
essential to the health, safety, and welfare
of people.
The act requires the State to use the SEMS
• Meeting the rehabilitation needs of people,
including provisions of temporary housing, for managing its response to multiagency
food stamps, and employment. and multijurisdictional emergencies. Local
governments must use the SEMS to be eligible for
• Mitigating hazards that pose a threat to
life, property, and the environment. funding for their personnel-related costs under
state disaster assistance programs. The SEMS
consists of fi ve organizational levels, which are
5566 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 5577
activated as necessary to respond to emergencies: field response
(the emergency site); local government (city, county, or other
local jurisdiction); operational area (the county and all political
subdivisions within the county, which coordinates between
local and regional); regional (which coordinates between the
State and the operational area); and the State (OES coordinates
the state response at its state operations center and regional
emergency operations centers). The SEMS incorporates the
use of the incident command system and the Master Mutual
Aid Agreement, which requires agencies to provide available
emergency response services at no cost to any jurisdiction that
requests them.
The emergency plan also describes the California Emergency
Organization, which comprises the five SEMS organizational
levels and the private sector as displayed in Figure A.1, and
represents all resources available within the State that can
FIGURE A.1
California Emergency Organization
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Source: State Emergency Plan.
5588 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 5599
respond to and recover from an emergency. The California
Emergency Organization operates from emergency operations
centers established at all levels of government, as well as in
many businesses and industries. Resource requests for response
and recovery originate at the lowest level and are progressively
forwarded to the next level until filled. Additionally, when
support requirements cannot be met with state resources, the
State may request assistance from federal agencies.
The emergency plan also describes communications support
procedures among the SEMS levels of the California Emergency
Organization to provide information links during emergencies.
This communications infrastructure includes the use of the
Response Information Management System—a computerized
information and resource tracking system—and the California
portion of the National Warning System.
Emergency management, as described in the emergency plan, is
performed in four phases. As Figure A.2 on the following page
illustrates, the four phases comprise what the emergency plan
refers to as the disaster cycle. The preparedness phase involves
activities undertaken in advance of an emergency, developing
operational capabilities and improving effective responses
to a disaster. These preparatory activities include developing
and revising disaster plans, training response personnel, and
improving public information and communications systems.
In the response phase, actions are taken to save lives, protect
property, and minimize the effects of the disaster. Warning
systems may be activated; resources may be mobilized,
including mutual aid; and emergency operations centers
may be activated. The recovery phase consists of both short-
term activity intended to return vital life support systems
to operation and long-term activity designed to return
infrastructure systems to predisaster conditions. Finally, the
mitigation phase includes a review of ways to eliminate or
reduce the impact of future disasters, including the lessons
learned from disasters the State encounters.
5588 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 5599
FIGURE A.2
The Disaster Cycle
��������
������� �������
�������
Source: State Emergency Plan.
The second part of the emergency plan identifies the activities
included in the response and recovery phases and identifies the
roles of state agencies in fulfilling these activities. The activities
are broken out into functional areas, including management,
planning, operations, logistics, and finance/administration.
These functions are integrated into the SEMS. The plan specifies
the response and recovery activities required within each
functional area and identifies each state agency that has either a
leading or supporting role in fulfilling the activity. Table A.1 lists
the functional areas and the related key activities.
6600 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 6611
TABLE A.1
Key State Response and Recovery Activities
Response Activities Recovery Activities
Management Management
• Liaison • Legislative liaison
• Public information • Public information
• Safety • Safety
Planning/Intelligence Planning
• Situation status and analysis • Situation status and analysis
• Mobilization/demobilization • Mobilization/demobilization
• Advance planning • Advance planning
• Technical specialists • Action planning
Operations Operations
• Fire, rescue, and law enforcement • Individual assistance
• Medical and health services • Public assistance
• Care and shelter • Hazard mitigation
• Utilities and hazardous materials
Logistics Logistics
• Information systems and • Information systems and
communications communications
• Transportation • Transportation
• Facilities coordination • Facilities coordination
• Resource tracking • Resource tracking
Finance/Administration Finance/Administration
• Compensation and claims • Compensation and claims
• Cost accounting • Cost accounting
• Damage survey report record keeping • Damage survey report record keeping
Source: State Emergency Plan.
OES developed the terrorism response plan as an annex to the
emergency plan in March 1999 (and updated it in February 2001).
Similar to the emergency plan, the terrorism response plan
provides direction to state agencies and local governments
within California involved in protecting public safety and
preparing for and responding to terrorist events. Following are
the stated objectives of the terrorism response plan:
6600 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 6611
• Provide a vehicle for establishing and maintaining a current
and realistic assessment of the potential threat of terrorism
in California.
• Outline the roles, responsibilities, and capabilities of state
and federal agencies in preparing for and responding to
terrorist events.
• Provide planning, response, and recovery guidance that is
consistent with the SEMS and national policy.
• Provide a basis for identifying needed training of person-
nel and exercising of local, state, and federal capabilities for
responding to terrorist events.
The terrorism response plan incorporates the use of the SEMS in
responding to terrorist events, consistent with the emergency
plan. Accordingly, it describes how local and state agencies
will interact during an emergency. It also describes how OES
will respond to terrorist threats. Finally, it identifies the roles
and responsibilities of state agencies that are likely to be called
on in response to terrorist events. Table A.2 lists the roles and
responsibilities of various state agencies.
The emergency plan and terrorism response plan provide the
framework for the State’s response to emergencies, including
terrorist events. Taken together, these plans appear to provide
adequate guidance for responding to an act of terrorism.
6622 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 6633
6622
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TABLE A.2
State Agency Roles and Responsibilities in Responding to Terrorist Events
Role/Responsibility
draoB
secruoseR
riA
sproC
noitavresnoC snoitcerroC
lacideM
ycnegremE ytirohtuA
secivreS
secivreS
ycnegremE
noissimmoC
ygrenE
htlaeH
latnemnorivnE
tnemssessA
drazaH ecnaniF
emaG
dna
hsiF
erutlucirgA
dna dooF
eriF dna
yrtseroF
noitcetorP secivreS
lareneG
secivreS
htlaeH
lortaP
yawhgiH
snoitaleR
lairtsudnI
etsaW detargetnI
draoB
tnemeganaM
ecitsuJ
drauG
lanoitaN
seitilitU
cilbuP
noissimmoC secivreS
laicoS
secnatsbuS
cixoT lortnoC
noitatropsnarT secruoseR
retaW
secruoseR
retaW
draoB
lortnoC
ytirohtuA
htuoY
Management
Emergency management L
Liaison L S S
Safety L
Public information L
Planning/Intelligence
Mobilization/demobilization L S S
Plans L
Reports L
Situation status L S S S S S S S
Technical specialist S L
Operations
Care and shelter S S S S S L S
Construction and engineering S L S S S S S S
Coroners L S
Fire S L S S S
Hazardous materials/radiological S S L S L* S S S S S S S S S
Law enforcement S L S S S S S S S
Medical S S L S S S S S S S
Public health S S S S L S S S S
Utilities L S S S S S
L = Lead role continued on next page
S = Support role
6644
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Role/Responsibility
Logistics
Communications/information systems L S S S S
Facilities S S L S
Personnel L
Purchasing L S S
Resources L S S S
Transportation S S S S L
Finance/administration L S S
Source: Governor’s Office of Emergency Services’ terrorism response plan.
* The Department of Fish and Game is the State’s lead agency for oil spills.
draoB
secruoseR
riA
sproC
noitavresnoC snoitcerroC
lacideM
ycnegremE ytirohtuA
secivreS
secivreS
ycnegremE
noissimmoC
ygrenE
htlaeH
latnemnorivnE
tnemssessA
drazaH ecnaniF
emaG
dna
hsiF
erutlucirgA
dna dooF
eriF dna
yrtseroF
noitcetorP secivreS
lareneG
secivreS
htlaeH
lortaP
yawhgiH
snoitaleR
lairtsudnI
etsaW detargetnI
draoB
tnemeganaM
ecitsuJ
drauG
lanoitaN
seitilitU
cilbuP
noissimmoC secivreS
laicoS
secnatsbuS
cixoT lortnoC
noitatropsnarT secruoseR
retaW
secruoseR
retaW
draoB
lortnoC
ytirohtuA
htuoY
APPENDIX B
The California National Guard’s
Homeland Security Strategy Defi nes
Its Role and Objectives in Responding
to Terrorism
In December 2002, the California National Guard
(National Guard) developed the Homeland Security Strategy
(Homeland Strategy), defi ning and planning for three
functional areas in its response to terrorism. First,
the National Guard must prepare for an event,
establishing proper organization, direction,
Components of the National
equipment, coordination, training, and resources.
Guard’s Homeland Security Strategy
Second, the National Guard expects to be called
Functional areas: on to help prevent the effects of terrorist events.
• Preparing Prevention involves supporting civil authorities
• Preventing through proactive efforts that may include
education, protecting critical assets, helping to
• Responding
secure ports of entry, and reducing the impact on
Imperatives: citizens of a terrorist event or attack. For example,
• Identify organizational capabilities the National Guard protected a fuel storage
• Secure adequate funding facility during the Super Bowl held in San Diego
in January 2003. Finally, the National Guard will
• Clear legislative, policy, and regulatory hurdles
be called on to respond if a terrorist event occurs
within the State.
The National Guard Is Making Progress on the Objectives It
Has Identifi ed
The Homeland Strategy describes three imperatives that the
National Guard believes it must accomplish to be ready to respond
to terrorism. The fi rst imperative calls for the National Guard
to identify and develop organizational capabilities to complete
the planning and coordination needed to integrate with other
responding agencies before, during, and after an event. The
Homeland Strategy states that this may require adjustments
in the current organization and training priorities of the
National Guard units as well as a reallocation of resources
to focus on the homeland security mission. Implied in this
imperative is the National Guard’s belief that training and
equipping its people to effectively respond to homeland security
missions is important. According to the executive offi cer of the
6644 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 6655
National Guard’s homeland security office (executive officer),
this imperative represents a paradigm shift that would mean
the National Guard would no longer look like its U.S. Army
counterparts. For example, the executive officer states that
money spent equipping National Guard units with Bradley
tanks, which are rarely needed to fight along with U.S. Army
forces, could be diverted to fund items more commonly used
in support of civil authorities, such as water purification
equipment, and engineering and transportation units. However,
he added that this change is controversial and is opposed by
some high-level staff in both the National Guard and active
forces; therefore, the National Guard may encounter difficulties
effecting this change.
The second imperative presented in the Homeland Strategy is that
the National Guard must secure adequate funding, from federal
and nonfederal sources, to finance the training, equipment,
manpower, and technology needed to prepare for, and prevent
when possible, future terrorist events. The Homeland Strategy
goes on to say that the National Guard cannot assume additional
missions without resources; to do so would risk developing a false
sense of security for the citizens and leadership of California.
According to the executive officer, this imperative addresses
the challenge the National Guard faces because of the federal
Department of Defense’s unwillingness to fund homeland security
missions. He added that the secretary of the Department of Defense
has maintained that its funds are for the National Guard’s federal
mission—fighting wars—and he does not want to get into the
homeland security arena. When we talked to him in May 2003, the
executive officer stated that he hoped to use federal funds that the
National Guard expected to receive soon through the State’s Office
of Homeland Security to establish two positions that will primarily
identify and secure funding for homeland security activities within
the National Guard.
The third imperative the National Guard includes in its
Homeland Strategy is that it must take all actions necessary
to ensure that legislative, policy, and regulatory actions are
completed to integrate the National Guard into the emergency
response community and to protect its members from liability
when responding to authorized homeland security missions.
According to the executive officer, this imperative raises issues
that are beyond the immediate control of the National Guard.
As an example, the executive officer referred to an April 2002
6666 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 6677
opinion issued by the attorney general. The opinion states
that, among other things, California law requires federal law
enforcement officers to satisfy the training requirements of
Penal Code Section 832 before they may exercise traditional
peace officer powers within the State. The executive officer
believes that this opinion would require National Guard
members, as federal law enforcement officers, to receive
the training described in the Penal Code before exercising
traditional peace officer powers such as search and seizure,
service of warrants, and certain types of arrests. However, the
executive officer believes this training is expensive and therefore
would be nearly impossible to offer to all National Guard
members. The executive officer believes that issues pending
before the U.S. Congress and the state Legislature, which affect
the National Guard’s response to state missions, are also
beyond the National Guard’s immediate control.
The Homeland Strategy further identifies 12 objectives that
the National Guard needs to complete to accomplish its three
imperatives and assume the homeland security mission.
Although the National Guard has begun to address several
of the objectives, the executive officer told us that many
require actions from bodies outside the National Guard,
such as the state Legislature and U.S. Congress; therefore,
the National Guard has not yet fully accomplished many of
the objectives. For each of the 12 objectives, the Homeland
Strategy identifies the entities responsible for taking action and
the date by which their efforts should be finished. Table B.1
on the following page presents the projected completion dates
established in the Homeland Strategy and the status as of
May 2003.
The first objective is to create a Ready Reaction Force that can
quickly respond to state missions. The National Guard has
recently implemented this force, and we discuss it in more
detail later in this appendix. The National Guard has established
its homeland security office, which is the second objective.
According to the executive officer, as of May 2003, the office
is staffed with six people on loan from other offices within the
National Guard. He expects the office to obtain permanent
staffing in December 2003.
The National Guard addressed its third, fifth, sixth, and 10th
objectives in November 2002 when it developed an analysis of
potential homeland security missions and identified more than
6666 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 6677
TABLE B.1
Status of the California National Guard’s
Homeland Security Strategy Objectives as of May 2003
Objective Projected End Date Completed
1. Establish a Ready Reaction Force. April 1, 2003 ü
2. Establish a National Guard homeland security office. May 1, 2003 ü
3. Analyze mission response requirements and develop a
plan to maximize military training systems. May 1, 2003 ü*
4. Reestablish a military field command training program. June 1, 2003
5. Assess equipment capabilities and develop a readiness
reporting system. June 1, 2003 ü*
6. Assess installations and infrastructure. July 1, 2003 ü*
July 1, 2003 (state)
7. Review current operational and legislative boundaries,
and develop a state and federal legislative and policy plan. October 1, 2003 (federal) ü†
8. Analyze future known “warfight” and homeland
security mission requirements, and develop a
transformation plan to meet requirements. October 1, 2003 ü*
9. Form collaborative partnerships to develop
standardized training. October 1, 2003
10. Analyze equipment needs to effectively operate with
other emergency responders. October 1, 2003 ü*
11. Identify and train liaison officers. July 1, 2004
12. Develop a public awareness program to raise the
visibility of its response capabilities. July 1, 2004
Source: National Guard Homeland Security Strategy.
* Analysis is complete; implementation is contingent on funding from federal or state sources and resolving the issue of the
National Guard’s Department of Defense mission versus its homeland security mission, as discussed in the text of the report.
† The National Guard has developed state and federal legislative issues; action is contingent on the approval of the state
Legislature and U.S. Congress.
$156 million in additional training, materials, and personnel
needs to meet these missions. The executive officer told us
that the National Guard submitted this analysis to the federal
National Guard Bureau for its consideration in funding the
needs but as of June 2003 has not been informed whether the
National Guard Bureau will fund these items. According to
the executive officer, the analysis also partially addressed the
eighth objective. However, he said that the National Guard
is constrained in fully implementing this objective because
of the barriers previously discussed in relation to the second
imperative, which concern challenges the National Guard faces
in funding homeland security missions. The fifth objective
6688 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 6699
also called for the development of a readiness
reporting system that tracks the availability of
Needs Identifi ed in the National Guard
Analysis of November 2002 major equipment and other critical items in short
(in Millions) supply. The Joint Operations Center completed this
part of the objective when it developed a color-
Law enforcement training $ 57.5
coded report that tracks these items, as well as the
Additional staffi ng 30.5 current capability of the National Guard personnel
Nuclear, biological, and operating them.
chemical equipment 26.8
Installation barriers 10.6 The executive offi cer said that the National Guard
Additional fl ying hours 7.0 has not yet addressed objective number four,
Additional operations which calls for reestablishing a training program
and maintenance 6.3 that would assist National Guard fi eld commanders
Ready Reaction Force 5.6 in transferring their skills to commanders of state
Nuclear, biological, and missions. The director of the Joint Operations
chemical training 4.5 Center advised us that implementing this
Weapons qualifi cation 2.0 objective is contingent on receiving state funds
Communications equipment 1.6 to pay for it. For objective number seven, the
executive offi cer stated that the National Guard
Clothing 1.2
had developed the legislative issues that present
Administrative training 1.0
obstacles to the National Guard in completing its
Explosive ordinance
homeland security mission but that it must work
disposal equipment 0.4
with the U.S. Congress and the state Legislature
Sighting equipment 0.4
to effect change. He added that the National
Exercises 0.3
Guard would not be the driving force behind the
Hazardous materials and
accomplishment of the ninth objective. Rather,
chemical training 0.2
it must work in concert with other training
Other 0.4
organizations to develop standardized training and
Total $156.3
exercises. Finally, the executive offi cer said that
addressing objectives 11 and 12 depends on the
National Guard receiving the necessary funding.
The National Guard Has Also Developed an Operational Plan
That Adequately Guides Its Responses to Emergencies
The National Guard responds to emergencies that occur within
the State when directed to by the Governor’s Offi ce of Emergency
Services (OES). To guide its responses to these missions, the
National Guard has developed a plan of operations that identifi es
the basic concepts underlying responding to all missions and
includes annexes that give guidelines for particular types of
emergencies, including terrorism. The operational plan appears to
provide an adequate level of guidance toward an organized and
effi cient response to state missions the National Guard receives.
6688 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 6699
The operational plan requires the National Guard
to use the task force concept in developing a force
Phases of the National Guard’s
Response to State Missions to respond to state missions. Under the task force
concept, the National Guard forms an ad hoc force
Situation assessment and preparation— from any of its available units, including Army
During this phase, commanders and
Guard and Air Guard, based on the skills that the
organizations conduct mission and logistical
planning, maintain alert rosters, conduct National Guard identifi es as necessary to fulfi ll the
training, and prepare equipment.
mission it has been given. For example, members
Deployment—This phase begins with the and equipment from an Air Guard wing might
receipt of the state mission from OES. The Joint
be put with members and equipment from an
Operations Center then establishes a task force,
which responds to the location of the mission. Army Guard company to form a task force that will
respond to a state mission.
Assistance to civil authorities—The task
force performs the requested services
during this phase. The National Guard’s operational response to
various threats is developed in fi ve phases. The
Transition to civilian agencies—When the
National Guard, OES, and civilian agencies operational plan also identifi es potential missions
determine the task force is no longer
and addresses administrative, logistical, command,
needed, the task force transfers the
mission to civilian agencies. and communications needs relative to a mission.
Other annexes to the operational plan cover these
Redeployment—During this phase, task force
same areas in the context of the type of emergency
members return to their home stations. The
task force completes an after action report to each annex addresses.
summarize the mission.
The terrorism annex to the operational plan
identifi es the following missions as among those
likely that the National Guard will respond to:
• Area and point security and traffi c control.
• Logistical support to emergency responders and to the civilian
populace.
• Shelter for emergency responders and the civilian populace.
• Ground and aerial transportation and evacuation of emer-
gency responders and the civilian populace.
• Support to local agencies that execute local emergency
response plans.
• Communications support via wire and wireless means.
• Deployment of civil support teams in support of weapons of
mass destruction activities, which may include chemical, bio-
logical, radiological, and nuclear agents.
7700 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 7711
The terrorism annex also describes the actions the task force
responding to the terrorism mission will complete in the five
phases of the National Guard response. It also establishes
responsibilities for various elements within the National Guard
to facilitate the mission.
Another annex to the operational plan describes the Ready
Reaction Force. The National Guard established the Ready Reaction
Force to quickly respond to certain emergencies occurring within
the State. The Ready Reaction Force is composed of Army Guard
and Air Guard units combined under the task force concept of
operations discussed earlier. The National Guard has established
a rotation for its various units to staff the Ready Reaction Force.
Under this rotation, certain units will be responsible for responding
as a Ready Reaction Force for a specified period, and then other
units will assume the responsibility.
The State’s two civil support teams are designated as the initial
response teams for the Ready Reaction Force. A civil support
team is expected to respond to an emergency within four hours
of notification by OES. The civil support team will maintain its
response until a task force comprising Army Guard and/or Air
Guard personnel and assets is established and responds, which
will be within 24 hours of notification.
In addition to the operational plan, the National Guard developed
procedures in February 2003 for its Joint Operations Center to
follow in coordinating the National Guard’s response to state
missions. These procedures delineate the roles and responsibilities
of staff in the Joint Operations Center during a response to a state
mission. The procedures appear to provide sufficient guidance to
allow for a coordinated response to state missions.
The National Guard Has Developed a Process to Periodically
Review and Update Its Operational Plan
In response to a concern we raised in a previous audit, the
National Guard has recently implemented a process to review its
operational plan annually, identify needed changes, and make
updates as required.
In an audit released in February 2002, we reported that the
National Guard did not have a process to annually review
its emergency plans and update them when necessary. As a
result, we recommended that the National Guard develop and
implement a system to review and update its state emergency
7700 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 7711
plans annually. The National Guard Bureau, the federal agency
that oversees state National Guard forces, requires such reviews
and performs reviews of the National Guard’s emergency plans
but does not provide formal approval. Additionally, we reported
that the National Guard had no process for ensuring that it
implements recommendations identified in after action reports.
An after action report, which is prepared by the task force that
responds to a state mission, summarizes the mission, identifies
problem areas the task force encountered, and recommends
corrective actions to mitigate the problems in future missions.
In our February 2002 audit, we recommended that the National
Guard establish a process to track and implement corrective
actions identified in after action reports.
In July 2002, the National Guard developed an operational
plan that included annexes outlining its plans for various
emergencies. Our subsequent review of these issues reveals that
the National Guard has developed a process for reviewing its
operational plan and implementing corrective actions from after
action reports. It has developed an annual review cycle that
begins March 1 each year and results in a revised plan to be
effective July 1. The National Guard implemented this review
process beginning in 2003. According to its director, the Joint
Operations Center also uses the annexes in the operational plan
to conduct internal exercises with other National Guard staff
on a quarterly basis. These exercises may bolster the process of
updating plans and give National Guard staff a chance to practice
organizing emergency operations before an actual event occurs.
To assist in operational plan reviews, the National Guard is
currently in the process of implementing a project management
software program that will enable it to track operational plan
reviews, ensuring that the plan is updated as appropriate and
that corrective actions identified in after action reports are
considered as updates occur. According to the National Guard’s
acting director for information management, the software is
being implemented in five phases. The acting director stated
that as of June 2003, the National Guard was in the fourth and
fifth phase and was nearing completion of the project.
7722 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 7733
Agency’s comments provided as text only.
Office of Homeland Security
Office of the Governor
State Capitol
Sacramento, CA 95814
July 18, 2003
Elaine M. Howle
California State Auditor
Bureau of State Audits
555 Capitol Mall, Suite 300
Sacramento, California 95814
Dear Ms. Howle:
Enclosed are the responses to the Terrorism Readiness Audit, No. 2002-117 for both the Offices of
Homeland Security and Emergency Services. We have included this letter and the responses in
the enclosed diskette.
Thank you for your time in this matter. Should you have any further questions or need any addi-
tional information, please contact Michael Levy, Deputy Director, at (916) 324-8908.
Sincerely,
(Signed by: George Vinson)
GEORGE VINSON
Director
Enclosure
7722 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 7733
Suggested Responses to BSA Audit 2002-117:
The Governor’s Office of Homeland Security (OHS) and Governor’s Office of Emergency Services
(OES) agrees with each of the Bureau of State Audits’ (BSA) recommendations under Audit No.
2002-117. We would like to provide these responses to the following items in particular:
OES Has No Formal Process to Periodically Review and Update the Terrorism Response Plan
OES and OHS understand and appreciate the benefit of a formal schedule and process for review-
ing and updating emergency plans to ensure that they are current, and both agencies are now
drafting up such a process. Nonetheless, in addition to such a formal process, OES has had many
informal opportunities in the last few years—perhaps more than if we had relied solely on a formal
schedule—to test our plans for responding to disasters and emergencies. In addition to an infor-
mal review in March and other updates, OES, as mentioned later in this audit report, has activated
its State Operations Center 48 times in the last several years. At the conclusion of those activa-
tions, OES has informally reviewed its plans to determine whether that activation required revisions.
OES Has Not Identified the Training Needs for All of Its Staff
OES agrees that a comprehensive training program should be developed and that critical staff train-
ing requirements should be identified. OES has in fact already taken steps to develop such a pro-
gram agency-wide, including an assessment of training needs. Training Coordinator staff represent-
ing all OES branches have met and developed the draft core competencies, which form the basis of
the needs assessment. The core competencies will be based on knowledge and skills necessary to
carry out basic emergency management functions (i.e., staff positions in the REOC or SOC) as well
as work in the OES office environment (e.g., knowledge of Lotus Notes, understanding what vari-
ous OES branches do). A draft agency-wide training program has already been provided to OES
Branch Managers for their input and is in the process of being forwarded to the OES Director for
his approval. We anticipate finalizing this prgram by the end of December, 2003 with the intent of
implementing it January 1, 2004.
Individual managers and supervisors will supplement this training program with technical train-
ing requirements specific to the individual employee/branch needs. Individual supervisors will
be required to review their staff’s training records against the core competencies included in the
agency-wide program, identify shortfalls, and address remediation of the shortfalls in future indi-
vidual training plans.
OES Has Not Conducted State-level Terrorism Readiness Exercises as Called for In Its Terrorism
Response Plan
As recommended, OES will continue to pursue any funding opportunities for exercises as well as
work with the National Guard to establish an effective exercise program that includes SOC and
REOC exercise opportunities for OES personnel and personnel from other state agencies with criti-
cal terrorism emergency response roles. (It should be noted that the $1.6 million in federal exercise
funding cited in the report is the State’s share of the FFY 2003 exercise funds for the benefit of
state agency and rural area first responders; an additional $6.3 million was provided to the locals
7744 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 7755
for exercises.) As mentioned by the BSA, while OES has in the past lacked funding to sponsor
terrorism readiness exercises, we have actively participated in exercises sponsored by other agen-
cies that have been beneficial to state and local preparedness. The RAND exercise, for example,
allowed state and federal agencies to discuss and review policy issues related to the State’s
response to a terrorist incident, consistent with SEMS, the State Emergency Plan, and the Federal
Response Plan. OES’ role in the exercise was broader than just “providing input to the exercise
design” as noted in the report; the role included modification of the scenario to assure it was rel-
evant to emergency response practices in California, development of questions used to facilitate
discussion, coordination with state and California-based federal agency representatives. At this
exercise, OES staff served as facilitators of the various discussion groups and key staff from OES
and other state agencies participated as players in the tabletop exercise.
7744 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 7755
Blank page inserted for reproduction purposes only.
7766 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 7777
Agency’s comments provided as text only.
Military Department
Office of the Adjutant General
9800 Goethe Road – P.O. Box 269101
Sacramento, California 95826-9101
July 18, 2003
Ms. Elaine M Howle
California State Auditor
Bureau of State Audits
555 Capitol Mall, Suite 300
Sacramento, California 95814
Dear Ms. Howle:
Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the Bureau of State Audits draft report titled, “Terrorism
Readiness: The Office of Homeland Security, Office of Emergency Services, and the California National
Guard Need to Improve Their Readiness to Address Terrorism.”
The Audit Team conducted a professional and thorough review, and identified areas where we can
improve our support to the State and our response to federal mobilizations. Attached is the Military
Department’s response to the recommendations made in the draft report.
As the report identifies, most of the training performed by the California National Guard is federally
funded and designed to prepare this organization to meet its federal mission. Although these federal mis-
sions are not specifically terrorism readiness, California National Guard members can use the specialty
skills they obtain during their federal training to respond to state emergency missions. The California
National Guard has and will in the future use the federal skills possessed by its forces to respond to all
State emergencies to include terrorist events.
With the increases in military actions abroad, and the demonstrated potential deployment of the
California National Guard in response to homeland security, the California National Guard is significantly
challenged to balance these two sometimes complimentary, sometimes conflicting mission requirements.
In December 2002, the California National Guard developed the Homeland Security Strategy, which
identifies the objectives we must achieve to prepare for, help prevent, and respond to terrorist events
within the State.
We have received a grant from the Office of Homeland Security through The Governor’s Office of
Emergency Services. Funding through this grant will allow for the California National Guard to sup-
port objectives of the Homeland Security Strategy by purchasing critical equipment and financing first
responder exercises and training classes.
If more information is needed related to the California National Guard’s responses in the attachment,
Major Louise Goodwater remains the point of contact at (916) 854-3820.
Sincerely,
(Signed by: Paul D. Monroe, Jr.)
Paul D. Monroe, Jr.
Major General
The Adjutant General
Enclosure
7766 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 7777
The following Military Department responses are provided for each of the five auditor recommenda-
tions included in the draft audit report.
Auditor Recommendation No. 1:
Determine the most critical training its Joint Operations Center staff need to fulfill their duties
and then allocate existing funding or seek the needed funding to provide the training documenting
why it is needed.
Military Department Response:
The Federal training requirements for each position in the Joint Operation Center (JOC) are funded
and scheduled through either the Army National Guard or the Air National Guard. While this train-
ing is ongoing and never really complete, the personnel in the JOC are current with Federal training
requirements. Attached is a Critical Training Course Matrix that includes both required federal and
self selected civilian courses which will enhance JOC personnel’s ability to interact with and support
civilian agencies. The self selected courses have not been mandated by any agency. While trying
to set a national standard, this additional expertise is not required for the National Guard’s federal
missions and therefore must be funded by the state. Education is scheduled to the extent that cur-
rent budget allows. On the job training is used where possible and on-line courses that require no
cost are listed for individuals to take on their own time. The Military Department has and will con-
tinue to pursue additional funding outside the Department in support of Joint Operations training.
Auditor Recommendation No. 2:
Develop guidance for its Army Guard Division to implement its terrorism readiness force protection
program.
Military Department Response:
The Army Division, Operations and Training Officer, has been tasked with publishing command
guidance to insure critical tasks 1 through 5 from Army Regulation 525-13 are fully implemented
within all California Army National Guard units by 31 December 2004. In June 2003, California
Army National Guard included the task “Homeland Security” with the sub-tasks “Weapons of Mass
Destruction (Terrorism)” and “Ready Reaction Force” within the Mission Essential Task List (METL)
and these tasks were briefed by the subordinate unit commanders at the Army Division Yearly Train-
ing Briefs. In addition, Army Division has requested State Homeland Security (HLS) funds from
the Joint Staff to conduct individual and unit training to include exercise participation.
7788 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 7799
Auditor Recommendation No. 3:
Ensure that its Joint Staff Division, including the Joint Operations Center, share best practices
between its Air Guard and Army Guard divisions.
Military Department Response:
Chief of Staffs for Army, Air and Joint Divisions meet once a week to brief the Chief of Staff for the
California National Guard. Any significant changes to regulations and/or instructions that affect
Army, Air or Joint Divisions will be added to the briefing agenda and discussed amongst the Chiefs.
As the JOC identifies best practices in either service, they will be brought to the attention of the
Chief of Staff, Joint Division.
Auditor Recommendation No. 4:
Use the recent awarded funds from OHS to identify the type and frequency of state-level exercises
responding to terrorist events that the State needs to be adequately prepared. The National Guard
should then provide the exercises it has identified.
Military Department Response:
The Military Department has received funding in the amount of $1,579,000 from a State Home-
land Security Grant for civil/military exercises. While the money will not be available until there is a
state budget in place, the Military Department’s Homeland Security Directorate has already started
planning for a minimum of one state-level exercise per quarter and coordination has begun with a
number of civilian agencies, i.e. Los Angeles County: Sheriff, Emergency Operations Center and
Emergency Management Office and Stanislaus County Sheriff. An application has been submitted
through the California Office of Emergency Services to the United States Department of Homeland
Security for a second grant to fund additional state and local level exercises. It should be pointed
out that both grants are funded to support civil exercises with military support, not solely
for training exercises for the Military Department.
Auditor Recommendation No. 5:
The National Guard should continue to monitor the results of its recruiting and retention efforts. If
those efforts begin to adversely affect its ability to respond to missions, it should seek legislative or
other remedies to address its problems.
Military Department Response:
Monitoring recruiting and retention for both the Army and Air Divisions is an ongoing process
throughout the California National Guard. Recruiting and retention reports are submitted and
briefed on a monthly basis to the Commanders of both Army and Air. Current management
controls over recruiting and retention ensure adequate readiness capability within the California
National Guard.
7788 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 7799
Military Department, Joint Operation Center
Critical Training Matrix
The following training courses include both required federal and self selected
civilian instructions which will enhance JOC personnel’s ability to interact
with and support civilian agencies.
JOC Training Instruction
Anti-Terrorism Awareness Training
9mm Familiarization
Disaster Basics (FEMA, Web Based)
Basic Incident Command (FEMA, Web Based)
EOC’s Role in Emergencies (FEMA, Web Based)
Principles of Emergency MNGT (FEMA, Web Based)
Community Disaster EX (FEMA, Web Based)
State Disaster MNGT (FEMA, Web Based)
Emergency Manager (FEMA, Web Based)
Emergency Preparedness (FEMA, Web Based)
Exercise Design (FEMA, Web Based)
Special Events Planning (FEMA, Web Based)
Emergency Planning (FEMA, Web Based)
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cc: Members of the Legislature
Office of the Lieutenant Governor
Milton Marks Commission on California State
Government Organization and Economy
Department of Finance
Attorney General
State Controller
State Treasurer
Legislative Analyst
Senate Office of Research
California Research Bureau
Capitol Press
8800 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 California State Auditor Report 2002-117 8811