CSA
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Department of
Industrial Relations
Its Failure to Adequately Administer the
Qualified Medical Evaluator Process May
Delay Injured Workers’ Access to Benefits
November 2019
REPORT 2019‑102
CALIFORNIA STATE AUDITOR
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Elaine M. Howle State Auditor
November 19, 2019
2019‑102
The Governor of California
President pro Tempore of the Senate
Speaker of the Assembly
State Capitol
Sacramento, California 95814
Dear Governor and Legislative Leaders:
As directed by the Joint Legislative Audit Committee, my office conducted an audit of the Department
of Industrial Relations’ Division of Workers’ Compensation (DWC) and its oversight and regulation of
qualified medical evaluators (QME). This report concludes that DWC’s failure to adequately oversee
QMEs and administer the process for selecting them to examine workers may delay injured workers’
access to benefits. DWC has not ensured that it has enough QMEs to meet demand, that it follows the
department’s regulations to discipline certain QMEs, and that QMEs produce high-quality reports.
QMEs are physicians who examine injured workers when disputes arise between the workers and
their employers regarding medical issues in workers’ compensation claims. DWC oversees QMEs by
appointing physicians to be QMEs, and it administers the QME selection process by generating lists from
which a QME is selected to evaluate an injury. Although DWC is responsible for overseeing QMEs and
the selection process, it has not adequately ensured that it has enough QMEs to keep up with demand for
their services. Without an adequate number of available QMEs, injured workers can experience delays in
receiving evaluations and therefore delays in receiving the benefits they need.
Furthermore, DWC inappropriately used its reappointment process to discipline certain QMEs alleged
to have committed overbilling violations. We believe that this practice raises concerns about due process.
Specifically, instead of having used its regulatory process to discipline QMEs at the time it identified alleged
violations, DWC denied their reappointments because of the alleged violations. When DWC denied their
reappointments, QMEs were prohibited by law from performing QME services until the allegations were
resolved, a process that can take months.
Finally, DWC has not ensured that QMEs produce high-quality reports. Although state law requires DWC
to continuously review QME reports for quality and to generate an annual report with the results of those
reviews, it has not done so since at least 2007. These reports provide medical evidence to help judges
and others resolve disputes related to workers’ compensation claims; therefore, their quality is especially
important. QME reports that are inaccurate or incomplete can delay resolution of disputes and workers’
receipt of benefits, and delays can increase costs for employers involved in the disputes.
Respectfully submitted,
ELAINE M. HOWLE, CPA
California State Auditor
621 Capitol Mall, Suite 1200 | Sacramento, CA 95814 | 916.445.0255 | 916.327.0019 fax | www.auditor.ca.gov
iv California State Auditor Report 2019-102
November 2019
Selected Abbreviations Used in This Report
DWC Department of Industrial Relations’ Division of Workers’ Compensation
OMFS Official Medical Fee Schedule
QME qualified medical evaluator
California State Auditor Report 2019-102 v
November 2019
Contents
Summary 1
Introduction 5
Audit Results
DWC Has Failed to Address Its QME Shortage 11
DWC’s Practices for Disciplining Some QMEs Raise
Due Process Concerns 16
DWC Has Failed to Comply With State Law to Ensure That
QMEs Produce High‑Quality Reports 22
Recommendations 25
Appendix
Scope and Methodology 29
Response to the Audit
Department of Industrial Relations’ Division of
Workers’ Compensation 33
California State Auditor’s Comments on the Response
From the Division of Workers’ Compensation 43
vi California State Auditor Report 2019-102
November 2019
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California State Auditor Report 2019-102 1
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Summary
Audit Highlights . . .
Results in Brief Our audit of the DWC and its oversight and
regulation of QMEs revealed the following:
Qualified medical evaluators (QMEs) are physicians who examine
injured workers when disputes arise between the workers and their » Although DWC is responsible for
employers regarding medical issues in workers’ compensation overseeing QMEs and administering the
claims. Workers’ compensation benefits can include payment for process for selecting QMEs to examine
medical treatment, paid time off during recovery, and compensation workers, it has not adequately ensured
for any permanent disability incurred as part of a work-related that it has enough QMEs to keep up with
injury. The Department of Industrial Relations’ (department) the demand for their services.
Division of Workers’ Compensation (DWC), whose mission is to
• From fiscal years 2013–14
minimize the adverse impact of work-related injuries on California
through 2017–18, the total number
employees and employers, is responsible for overseeing QMEs and
of QMEs decreased by 12 percent
administering the process for selecting QMEs to examine workers. It
and requests for QMEs increased
oversees QMEs by appointing physicians to be QMEs, investigating
37 percent.
complaints against QMEs, and disciplining QMEs who violate the
department’s regulations. It administers the QME selection process » DWC inappropriately used its
by generating a list of QMEs (known as a panel) from which a QME reappointment process to discipline
is selected to evaluate an injury. However, DWC has not adequately some QMEs alleged to have committed
ensured that it has enough QMEs to meet demand and that QMEs overbilling violations, which raises due
are producing high-quality reports containing the findings of process concerns.
the examinations. By not fulfilling these responsibilities, DWC
• DWC lacks sufficiently
may delay injured workers’ access to benefits and increase costs
detailed, written policies and
for employers.
procedures for investigating
and resolving complaints.
Without an adequate number of available QMEs, injured workers
can experience delays in receiving evaluations and therefore
» DWC has not continuously reviewed QME
delays in receiving the benefits they need. Furthermore, employers
reports for quality and has not tracked
can incur increased costs. Our review found that from fiscal
when workers’ compensation judges have
years 2013–14 through 2017–18, the total number of QMEs
rejected QME reports that failed to meet
decreased by 12 percent while requests for QMEs increased by
minimum standards.
37 percent. Consequently, the availability of QMEs has decreased
during those years, indicating that the current number of QMEs • Low-quality QME reports can delay
is not meeting the demand for their services. For example, during injured workers’ receipts of benefits
this time period, the number of panels that were requested to be and add expenses for employers
replaced because QMEs were unavailable more than quadrupled— involved in disputes.
from about 4,600 replacement panels in fiscal year 2013–14 to
nearly 19,000 in fiscal year 2017–18. DWC’s data show that if
a workers’ compensation case required one replacement panel
because of an unavailable QME, the case was delayed more than
two months nearly half of the time. Nevertheless, DWC has not
taken sufficient action to address the QME shortage, such as
establishing a process to recruit new QMEs and updating the
13-year-old rates on the fee schedule that QMEs use to charge for
their services, which could help DWC attract and retain QMEs.
2 California State Auditor Report 2019-102
November 2019
Because QMEs have become more frequently unavailable, we
believe changes to the panel selection process are also warranted.
Injured workers represented by an attorney have a different selection
process than unrepresented injured workers. Data show that the rate
of replacement panel requests for represented cases is three times
higher than the rate of requests for unrepresented cases, partly
because unrepresented workers generally can select from among a
panel of three QMEs while represented workers generally have to
use the remaining QME after each party strikes one from a panel
of three. Thus, unrepresented workers can select from more QMEs.
Furthermore, DWC inappropriately used its reappointment process
to discipline some QMEs alleged to have committed overbilling
violations, a practice that we believe raises due process concerns.
Rather than following the department’s regulations to discipline
QMEs at the time it identified alleged violations, DWC denied
the QMEs’ reappointments, citing the alleged violations. The QMEs
whose reappointments were denied were prohibited by law from
performing QME services until the allegations were resolved, a
process that can take months. Moreover, we found that DWC was
slow to schedule hearings QMEs requested after DWC denied
their reappointment appeals, or it did not schedule the requested
hearings at all, which were deviations from its regulatory hearing
process. Consequently, the QMEs had an incentive to settle
with DWC so that they could resume providing QME services
and earning income from those services. We found that DWC
generally entered into settlement agreements with QMEs while
they were unable to practice as QMEs. These agreements required
the QMEs to make restitution payments to insurance companies
for alleged overbilling violations instead of proceeding with the
disciplinary process outlined in the department’s regulations. We
believe DWC’s lack of sufficiently detailed, written policies and
procedures for investigating and resolving complaints contributed to
these concerns.
Finally, DWC has not continuously reviewed medical-legal reports,
prepared by QMEs and containing the findings of the examinations,
for quality and has not tracked when workers’ compensation
judges have rejected medical-legal reports because those reports
failed to meet minimum standards. These reports must provide
medical evidence to help judges resolve disputes related to workers’
compensation claims. The quality of these reports is especially
important because reports that are inaccurate or incomplete can
delay resolution of disputes and workers’ receipt of benefits, and
the delays can increase costs for employers involved in the disputes.
Because it did not perform these reviews or track when workers’
compensation judges rejected reports, DWC lacks the data to
identify whether report quality is a systemic problem or whether
individual QMEs are producing low-quality reports.
California State Auditor Report 2019-102 3
November 2019
Summary of Recommendations
Legislature
To ensure that DWC maintains a sufficient supply of QMEs and
appropriately compensates these individuals, the Legislature should
amend state law to specify that DWC review and, if necessary,
update the fee schedule for compensating QMEs at least every
two years based on inflation.
To reduce the delays that replacement panels cause in resolving
workers’ compensation claims, the Legislature should revise state
law to increase the number of QMEs on the panels DWC provides.
DWC
To ensure that DWC appoints enough QMEs to keep up with
the demand for services, it should, by April 2020, develop and
implement a plan to increase the number of QMEs, prioritizing
specialties with the greatest shortage relative to demand.
To ensure consistency and transparency in overseeing QMEs,
DWC should, by April 2020, develop and implement separate
written policies and procedures that define and specify its internal
processes for disciplining and reappointing QMEs.
To ensure that DWC monitors and reviews QME report quality
and to ensure the efficient resolution of workers’ compensation
claims, it should, by April 2020, create and implement a plan to
continuously review QME reports for quality and report its findings
to its administrative director annually.
Agency Comments
DWC accepted our recommendations but it disagreed with certain
statements in our report. DWC’s response to our report begins on
page 33 and our comments on DWC’s response begin on page 43.
4 California State Auditor Report 2019-102
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California State Auditor Report 2019-102 5
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Introduction
Background
California workers who experience injuries or illnesses caused by
their employment generally have the right to receive workers’
compensation benefits, including employer-paid medical care,
temporary wage replacement during recovery, and compensation
for any permanent disability that is work-related, as well as other
potential benefits. Workers injured in California during fiscal
year 2017–18 submitted 684,000 workers’ compensation claims.
When disputes between employees and their employers arise over
medical issues in workers’ compensation claims, medical
professionals—including qualified medical evaluators (QMEs)—
conduct medical-legal evaluations and generate reports that play a
major role in determining the benefits to which injured workers are
entitled.1 In fiscal year 2017–18, 100,000 new requests were
submitted for QMEs to resolve disputes, or about 15 percent of
claims. This audit report focuses on QMEs and the process for
selecting QMEs to examine workers overseen by the Division of
Workers’ Compensation (DWC) within the Department of
Industrial Relations (department). In fiscal year 2017–18, DWC had
about 2,800 participating QMEs in the State in more than
30 specialties, including chiropractic, dentistry, internal medicine,
neurology, pain medicine, psychology, and hand and spine issues.
QMEs generate medical-legal reports to help clarify
disputed medical issues. Contested claims may Medical-Legal Evaluations and Reports
involve a dispute over whether work caused an
QMEs conduct evaluations and issue medical‑legal reports
injury, the total period of temporary disability, the
to determine the following for an injured worker:
existence and extent of permanent disability, or
• Eligibility for workers’ compensation benefits.
the need for future medical care. The text box
• Ability to return to work.
lists the various issues that QMEs may consider as
part of their evaluations and reports. To make these • Permanent and stationary status (when the medical
condition reaches the maximum medical improvement).
determinations, QMEs review medical records,
examine injured workers, perform tests if necessary, • Existence and extent of permanent disability.
and write medical-legal reports that can be used • Ability to engage in his or her usual occupation.
as evidence before workers’ compensation judges. • Need for future medical treatment.
The medical-legal reports must address the issues
• Existence of new and further disability.
in dispute and include the QME’s findings that a
workers’ compensation judge may need to resolve Source: Analysis of documents obtained from the department.
a dispute.
1 Medical professionals also include agreed medical evaluators (AMEs), who both parties may agree
to have perform the medical evaluation without going through the QME selection process.
However, because the DWC generally does not oversee AMEs in the same way it oversees QMEs,
we did not include AMEs in our analysis.
6 California State Auditor Report 2019-102
November 2019
DWC Oversees QMEs and Administers the QME Selection Process
DWC’s mission is to minimize the adverse impact of work-related
injuries on California employees and employers, and it is
responsible for overseeing QMEs, as Figure 1 summarizes. Those
responsibilities include appointing and reappointing QMEs.
To become QMEs, physicians must be licensed to practice in
California, spend at least one-third of their time providing direct
medical treatment, report specified financial interests, take at
least a 12-hour course on writing medical-legal reports, and pass
a competency exam. Certain types of medical providers may have
other requirements. DWC schedules competency exams at least
twice each year. After passing the exam, physicians must pay an
annual fee to DWC before it appoints them as QMEs for a two-year
term. This fee ranges from $110 to $1,150 based on the number of
office locations they maintain as well as the number of evaluations
they performed within the past year, if applicable.
Figure 1
DWC Oversees QMEs
DIVISION OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
QME
Appoints QMEs Investigates Complaints
• Evaluates physicians’ eligibility to participate in the program. • Accepts and reviews complaints against QMEs.
• Administers the QME exam. • May review billing for medical-legal reports and
determine violations of the department’s regulations.
• Ensures that applicants have paid applicable fees.
• Appoints QMEs for 2-year terms.
Reappoints QMEs Disciplines QMEs
• Accepts applications and fees. • Administers discipline based on sanction guidelines
in state regulations.
• Verifies that QMEs have complied with specific requirements.
• Reappoints QMEs for 2-year terms.
Source: Analysis of state law and the department’s regulations.
California State Auditor Report 2019-102 7
November 2019
DWC’s oversight responsibilities also include receiving and
investigating complaints against QMEs and disciplining those
found to have violated the department’s regulations.2 Its QME
Investigations and Enforcement Section (investigations section) has
12 staff who investigate and help resolve complaints filed against
QMEs.3 Anyone may file a complaint against a QME, and the
DWC’s medical director may file a complaint on his or her own
initiative. For instance, an injured worker could file a complaint
alleging that a QME did not treat the worker professionally or
discriminated against the worker, or that he or she experienced
a wait time exceeding one hour at a QME’s office before being
examined. Also, an insurance company, for example, could submit a
complaint alleging that a QME billed for services he or she did not
provide. The investigations section investigates such complaints and
forwards evidence of alleged violations to DWC’s administrative
director, who then may issue a statement of charges (accusation)
to the QME specifying which regulations he or she allegedly
violated and notifying the QME of his or her right to a hearing.
After a hearing, DWC may pursue disciplinary actions including
terminating the QME’s appointment.
DWC also administers the QME selection process. When an
injured worker or employer has a dispute and requests a QME, as
Figure 2 shows, DWC creates a panel—or list—of three QMEs.
It also generates a replacement panel when necessary. DWC uses
a computer program to randomly generate these panels based
on the requested specialty of the QME and the proximity to the
injured worker’s residence. The next step in the process differs
for represented workers (those represented by an attorney) and
unrepresented workers. Generally, for a represented worker,
after the injured worker and employer each strike one QME
from the list, the injured worker makes an appointment with the
one remaining QME. In the case of an unrepresented worker,
the injured worker generally selects one QME from the list and
makes an appointment. In both cases, state law requires the
selected QME to see the injured worker for an evaluation within
60 days of the request for an appointment; however, parties can
agree to extensions of up to 30 additional days, or waive the 90-day
time limit. If the chosen QME is not available within the required or
extended time frame, the parties may ask DWC to generate a
2 Although DWC also determines violations of state law through Labor Code section 139.2, the
violations we reviewed for the purposes of this report are mostly related to the medical‑legal fee
schedule, which is described in the regulations.
3 In addition to DWC’s investigations section conducting investigations of QMEs, DWC has an
audit unit—separate from the investigations section—that consists of 29 filled staff positions
and three vacant positions and is responsible for auditing insurers, self‑insured employers, and
third‑party administrators by conducting routine reviews at least once every five years to
determine whether they met their obligations under state law. These audits do not include
reviews of QMEs.
8 California State Auditor Report 2019-102
November 2019
Figure 2
Injured Workers and Their Employers Use the QME Selection Process to Resolve Certain Disputes
After filing the claim, the injured worker may be reimbursed up to $10,000
for treatment until the claim is accepted or denied.
Injured worker can obtain medical treatment paid by the employer if claim
is accepted or from another source if claim is denied.
Injured worker files workers’
compensation claim form.
If a dispute arises between the injured worker
and the employer on issues such as whether the
injury occurred on the job or the existence/extent
of permanent disability sustained:
THE QME PROCESS
The injured worker or the employer may request a QME.
DWC generates a panel, or list, of three QMEs.
For unrepresented worker: Generally, for represented worker:
Generally, injured worker selects Injured worker eliminates one QME.
QME and makes appointment
Employer eliminates one QME.
within 10 days.
Injured worker makes appointment with
the remaining QME within 10 days.
Generally, if the selected QME is not available
within 60 days, the injured worker or The QME reviews records and
employer can request a replacement QME examines the injured worker.
or a replacement panel.
Within 30 days of the evaluation, the QME
writes and distributes the medical-legal report.
Injured worker and employer may use the medical-legal report to resolve the
dispute, or meet before a workers’ compensation judge to resolve the dispute.
If entitled, the injured worker’s benefits are provided.
Source: Analysis of state law and the department’s regulations.
California State Auditor Report 2019-102 9
November 2019
replacement QME or QME panel, from which the
parties select a new QME. After conducting an Key Parties Involved in
Workers’ Compensation Claims
evaluation of the injured worker, the QME has
30 days to write the medical-legal report and
Injured workers—Employees who have a
provide it to both the injured worker and the
work‑related injury or illness and are seeking workers’
employer, who then may use it to resolve the compensation benefits.
dispute. DWC received more than 145,000 requests
Applicant attorneys—Attorneys who represent injured
for new and replacement QME panels during fiscal
workers in their workers’ compensation cases. “Applicant”
year 2017–18. Injured workers and applicant refers to the injured worker.
attorneys made 57 percent of these requests, while
Claims administrators—Individuals or companies who
claims administrators and defense attorneys made
handle workers’ compensation claims for employers. Most
the remaining 43 percent of requests. The text box
claims administrators work for insurance companies or
defines these parties. other organizations that handle claims for employers, but
some work directly for large employers.
DWC is also responsible for adopting and revising
Defense attorneys—Attorneys who help insurance
a medical-legal fee schedule—the fee schedule
companies and self‑insured employers defend against
QMEs use to charge for their services, and it last workers’ compensation claims.
updated the rates for this fee schedule in 2006.
Source: DWC’s Physician’s Guide to Medical Practice in
Based on this schedule, which the department
the California Workers’ Compensation System, and the
includes in its regulations, QMEs can bill entities, department’s Guidebook for Injured Workers and website.
which may include insurance companies, for their
evaluations in several different categories, including
a basic comprehensive medical-legal evaluation, a
complex comprehensive medical-legal evaluation, a comprehensive
medical-legal evaluation involving extraordinary circumstances,
and a supplemental medical-legal evaluation. Generally, when
an insurance company does not pay a QME or does not pay in
full, the QME may dispute the payment by going through DWC’s
independent bill review process. DWC generally is required to
conduct a preliminary review of requests for independent bill
review, and if eligible for review, DWC’s independent bill review
contractor will review the QME’s bill and determine whether the
claims administrator owes the QME additional compensation.
DWC’s contract requires it to monitor the performance of
its independent bill review contractor and oversee the entire
independent bill review process.
The department’s regulations also outline an appeals process for
resolving QME applicants’ disputes over denials of appointments
or reappointments. DWC may deny a QME’s reappointment for a
number of reasons, such as delivering reports late or performing
a QME evaluation without a valid QME certification. If DWC
denies a QME applicant’s appointment or denies a QME’s
reappointment, DWC sends a notice of denial containing the reasons
for the denial. In accordance with regulations, the QME or QME
applicant may submit a specific, written response to the notice of
denial within 30 days. DWC may then overturn or uphold its denial.
If it upholds the denial, it provides a statement of issues specifying
the reasons for denial and notifies the QME or QME applicant of
10 California State Auditor Report 2019-102
November 2019
the right to a hearing. If the QME wants to further contest DWC’s
denial, he or she must request a hearing within 15 days, and DWC
may assign the case to an administrative law judge from the Office of
Administrative Hearings, or at its discretion, a DWC hearing officer.
Since 2017 QMEs have filed at least three lawsuits against
DWC regarding the denial or potential denial of certain QME
reappointments. The three lawsuits all included allegations that
DWC denied some QMEs’ reappointments without a hearing.
Two alleged that DWC based some denials on regulations that
were not approved in accordance with the State’s Administrative
Procedures Act. The third lawsuit also alleged that DWC made some
reappointment decisions based on whether insurance companies
viewed QMEs as tending to make medical conclusions that
favored injured workers or that favored the employers/insurance
companies, and whether the QME prepared medical-legal reports
that were billed at a higher rate than appropriate. According to the
department’s acting chief counsel, DWC resolved the three lawsuits
in 2018.
California State Auditor Report 2019-102 11
November 2019
Audit Results
DWC Has Failed to Address Its QME Shortage
Even though DWC is responsible for overseeing QMEs and
administering the QME selection process, it has not adequately
ensured that it has enough QMEs to keep up with the demand
for their services. Without an adequate number of QMEs, injured
workers can experience unnecessary delays in the resolution of their
disputes, which can postpone benefits for workers and increase
costs for employers. State law requires DWC to appoint QMEs
to evaluate the medical-legal issues in the workers’ compensation
system; therefore, we expected DWC to ensure that it maintains
enough QMEs to handle demand without significant delays.
However, the number of QMEs has declined steadily from fiscal
years 2013–14 through 2017–18, while requests for services have
risen significantly. The subsequent QME unavailability means that
the current number of QMEs is not meeting the demand.
As Figure 3 indicates, from fiscal years 2013–14 through 2017–18,
the total number of QMEs decreased from 3,157 to 2,782, a
12 percent drop; during the same period, requests for QMEs
rose from 105,732 to 145,093, an increase of 37 percent. However,
the availability of some specialty QMEs dropped even further.
For example, from fiscal year 2013–14 to fiscal year 2017–18, the
number of QMEs in otolaryngology (head and neck surgeons)
decreased by 32 percent—from 38 to 26 QMEs—while the number
of requests in this specialty increased significantly, from 914
to 1,484—a 62 percent increase. Further, although the number of
physical medicine and rehabilitation specialist QMEs decreased
by 21 over this time period, from 132 to 111, the number of panel
requests more than doubled from 3,810 to 7,939.
The decrease in the number of QMEs corresponds with a
significant increase in replacement panels because, if the original
QME is unavailable, another is generally selected, creating a delay in
selecting a QME. As described in the Introduction, when an injured
worker or employer requests a QME to help resolve a workers’
compensation dispute, DWC generates a panel of three from which
one QME is selected to perform the evaluation. If the QME chosen
from the original panel is not available within 60 days to conduct
the evaluation, generally the injured worker can choose to wait
for an appointment within 90 days, or either party can request a
replacement panel. As Figure 4 shows, from fiscal years 2013–14
through 2017–18, the number of replacement panels that were
requested because QMEs were not available within 60 days
more than quadrupled—from about 4,600 replacement panels to
nearly 19,000. In addition, in fiscal year 2017–18, 31 percent of all
QME requests were for replacement panels—45,000 replacement
12 California State Auditor Report 2019-102
November 2019
panels out of 145,000 total requests. DWC’s data show that if
a workers’ compensation case required one replacement panel
because of an unavailable QME, the case was delayed by more than
two months nearly half of the time.
Figure 3
As Requests for QME Services Increased, the Number of QMEs Decreased
Fiscal Years 2013–14 Through 2017–18
3,500
3,000
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
0
2013–14 2014–15 2015–16 2016–17 2017–18
Fiscal Year
sEMQ
fo
rebmuN
150,000
120,000
90,000
60,000
30,000
0
2013–14 2014–15 2015–16 2016–17 2017–18
Fiscal Year
Number of QMEs
decreased by 12 percent
slenaP
EMQ
rof
stseuqeR
Requests for QME services
increased by 37 percent
Source: Analysis of the department’s QME database.
California State Auditor Report 2019-102 13
November 2019
Figure 4
The Number of Replacement Panels Is Increasing Because QMEs Are Not Available
50,000
40,000
30,000
20,000
10,000
0
2013–14 2014–15 2015–16 2016–17 2017–18
Fiscal Year
fo
rebmuN
slenaP
tnemecalpeR
Total number of
44,569 replacement panels
Replacement panels
37,589
36,401
because QME is not
available within 60 days
28,905
23,648
18,929
14,423 14,489
8,360
4,573
Source: Analysis of the department’s QME database.
Note: Other reasons for replacement panels include, among other things, a workers’ compensation judge’s decision to change the panel, the QME has
a conflict of interest, and the QME report is late.
Replacement panels may delay injured workers’ access to their
workers’ compensation benefits and increase employer costs. If
there is a question about whether an injury is work-related, claims
administrators may not accept the workers’ compensation
claim until a QME provides a medical-legal opinion on the injured
worker’s entitlement to benefits, and employers are generally not
liable for benefits to injured workers until a claim is accepted—
when an injured worker is eligible to receive workers’ compensation
benefits.4 Delays caused by the replacement panels because QMEs
are unavailable can potentially delay injured workers’ access to
benefits that they are entitled to for several months. According
to the acting president of the California Applicants’ Attorneys
Association, in some cases, workers postpone treatment until they
make it through the initial QME process because of the uncertainty
of eventual benefit payouts or reimbursements. We, therefore, are
concerned that delays of medical treatment could lead to greater
temporary and/or permanent disability for injured workers,
and that this prolonged process may increase the overall costs
to employers.
4 Under California law, the employer is required to provide up to $10,000 of specified medical
treatment to the injured worker until the acceptance or denial of the worker’s claim.
14 California State Auditor Report 2019-102
November 2019
Despite the declining number of Despite the declining number of QMEs, the significant increase
QMEs, the significant increase in in requests for them, and the increase in replacement panels
requests for them, and the increase because of QME unavailability, DWC has not acknowledged
in replacement panels because that there is a shortage of QMEs. The administrative director of
of QME unavailability, DWC has DWC told us that there is no independent study or data analysis
not acknowledged that there is a showing that accessing QMEs is a problem. DWC’s chief of
shortage of QMEs. medical administrative services also referenced a 2017 study,
which states that a high proportion of panels are assigned to the
busiest 10 percent of QMEs. The study also notes that certain
QMEs have up to 10 office locations while others have fewer. The
chief of medical administrative services implied that QMEs with
more office locations can be selected more often and therefore are
more likely to be unavailable based on the increased workload. She
suggested this could be a significant factor that drives the requests
for replacement panels because of unavailability.
However, when we looked at the data on unavailable QMEs in fiscal
year 2017–18, we found that QMEs operating out of fewer than
six zip codes—which DWC uses for assigning panels—accounted
for more than half of all panel replacements because of unavailable
QMEs. Further, the study DWC cited concluded, from data
through 2016, that the increase in QMEs being unavailable calls for
close monitoring by DWC. As we discuss later in the report, DWC
has data to identify its need for additional QMEs, but it has not
acted on them. Consequently, DWC should not continue to ignore
the indicators of its dwindling supply of QMEs.
DWC acknowledged that the number of QMEs is decreasing and
identified three reasons why physicians may not be applying to
become QMEs. First, fewer are joining the system because of a
general shortage of physicians in California. Although we found
that the number of licensed physicians and surgeons in the State
has been increasing from 2014 through 2018, a 2017 report by the
Healthforce Center at the University of California, San Francisco,
concludes that the supply of primary care physicians in California
is insufficient to meet the population’s needs. Second, DWC
believes that many physicians are no longer going into private
practices that would better facilitate them serving as a QME.
Surveys conducted by the American Medical Association show
that the percentage of physicians in private practice dropped from
around 53 percent in 2012 to 46 percent in 2018. Third, DWC
indicated that barriers exist for physicians who work in particular
settings to become QMEs, such as managed care organizations.
According to the administrative director, one managed care
organization indicated that having its physicians involved in more
lengthy QME evaluations would adversely affect the physicians’
availabilities to serve their regular patients.
California State Auditor Report 2019-102 15
November 2019
Despite these warnings signs, DWC has not taken sufficient DWC has not updated the rates
action to address its QME shortage. For example, it has not taken of its medical‑legal fee schedule
one key step that could help it attract and retain QMEs: updating that QMEs use to charge for their
the rates of its medical-legal fee schedule—the fee schedule QMEs services since 2006.
use to charge for their services. This fee schedule’s rates have not
been updated since 2006. However, state law requires DWC to
adopt and revise the medical-legal fee schedule in tandem with
its Official Medical Fee Schedule (OMFS), which establishes
reasonable maximum fees paid for specific workers’ compensation
medical services. Although DWC updated the OMFS multiple
times from 2014 through 2018, it has not updated the rates in the
medical-legal fee schedule for QMEs in 13 years. According to the
administrative director, DWC has not done so because of limited
resources. Consequently, QMEs are billing for their services at
2006 rates, which are much lower than what the rates would be
if they had kept pace with inflation. We calculated that costs for
professional medical services have increased by roughly 30 percent
since 2006 because of inflation, which means that the current
fee of $625 for a basic medical-legal evaluation without allowable
adjustments would be $812 if adjusted for inflation.
DWC began the process to amend its medical-legal fee regulation
in 2018. After it first released its proposed medical-legal fee
schedule in May 2018, DWC held a public hearing and solicited
fee schedule proposals. In July 2019, two assemblymembers
took action to update DWC’s medical-legal fee schedule. The
assemblymembers introduced legislation that would make the
compensation rates 1.5 times higher than what is currently
allowable—$937 for a basic medical-legal evaluation without
allowable adjustments—and would require DWC to update the
compensation rates quarterly, as necessary. As of October 2019,
the bill is pending action in the Legislature. In August 2019,
DWC released a new, updated proposal for the fee schedule
for public comment. DWC’s new proposal creates a fixed fee
schedule and includes potential adjustments to the fixed fee, such
as if an interpreter is needed, or if the evaluation is performed in
an underserved area. DWC anticipates it will have the updated
medical-legal fee schedule in place sometime in 2020.
In addition, DWC does not have an established process for
recruiting QMEs, despite facing a QME shortage. The executive
medical director said that DWC representatives have informally
encouraged physicians to become QMEs as opportunities arise,
such as at educational and professional conferences. In addition,
the administrative director said that in July 2019, DWC contacted
a major medical group and asked it to consider allowing its
physicians to participate as QMEs, but it was unsuccessful because,
as we state earlier, the medical group asserted that more lengthy
QME evaluations could impact the physicians’ availabilities to serve
16 California State Auditor Report 2019-102
November 2019
their regular patients. He further indicated that DWC intends to
contact other medical groups to explore the possibility of recruiting
more QMEs.
Although it has data to identify its needs for additional QMEs, it
has not yet acted on them. DWC has data on QME demographics,
such as location and specialty, and demand statistics such as
requests for QMEs and replacement panels overall, per specialty,
and by claim. However, it has not used these data to better manage
the QME supply and recruit more QMEs. Further, it does not
DWC should determine how many have benchmarks for evaluating the capacity of its current supply,
evaluations QMEs can perform on which could inform DWC of how many QMEs it needs to recruit
average to ensure that it maintains to mitigate its shortage. Specifically, DWC should determine how
the necessary QME supply to many evaluations QMEs can perform on average to ensure that it
meet demand. maintains the necessary QME supply to meet demand.
Because QMEs have become more frequently unavailable, we
believe changes to the panel selection process are also warranted.
DWC previously had a process of “dueling QMEs” if the injured
worker was represented by an attorney, in which each party
obtained its own QME and generated separate medical-legal
reports. However, this process made the system even more
adversarial by producing potentially contradictory QME reports.
The State abandoned this approach in 2004. Our proposal is to
increase the size of certain panels. Data show that the rate of
replacement panel requests for represented cases is three times
higher than the rate of requests for unrepresented cases, partly
because unrepresented workers generally can select from among a
panel of three QMEs while represented workers generally have to
use the remaining QME after each party strikes one from a panel
of three. For represented workers, we believe that expanding the
panel size to five QMEs, allowing each party to strike one, and
then allowing the party that did not request the panel to select
from the remaining three would better ensure availability and
reduce the number of replacement panels needed. If the selected
QME is unavailable, the parties would then select from among the
remaining two QMEs until they find one that is available.
DWC’s Practices for Disciplining Some QMEs Raise Due Process Concerns
DWC did not discipline some QMEs for alleged overbilling
violations until they came up for reappointment, a practice that we
believe raises due process concerns. Rather than using its formal
regulatory process to discipline QMEs before their terms expired,
DWC denied the QMEs’ reappointments because of the alleged
violations. When DWC denied those QMEs’ reappointments, the
QMEs were prohibited by law from performing QME services
until the allegations were resolved, a process that can take months.
California State Auditor Report 2019-102 17
November 2019
Further, this practice removes QMEs from the available supply
without a final decision that the QMEs committed the alleged
violations. Moreover, we found that DWC was slow to schedule DWC was slow to schedule hearings
hearings that QMEs requested after it denied their reappointment that QMEs requested after it denied
appeals, or it did not schedule requested hearings at all. their reappointment appeals, or it
Consequently, the QMEs had an incentive to settle with DWC so did not schedule requested hearings
that they could resume providing QME services and earn income at all.
from those services. We found that DWC generally entered into
settlement agreements with QMEs while they were unable to
practice as QMEs, and that these settlement agreements required
them to make restitution payments to insurance companies for
alleged overbilling violations instead of proceeding with the
disciplinary process outlined in the department’s regulations. We
believe that DWC’s lack of sufficiently detailed, written policies
and procedures for investigating and resolving complaints led to
these concerns.
DWC has a regulatory process for imposing discipline on QMEs
due to alleged violations of state law. As Figure 5 shows, DWC’s
Investigations and Enforcement Section (investigations section)
reviews complaints regarding QMEs and obtains evidence of
statutory or regulatory violations. When evidence of a regulatory
violation exists, DWC’s medical director submits the case to
DWC’s administrative director. If DWC’s administrative director
agrees, state law requires DWC to send the QME a statement of
charges (accusation) that specifies the statutes and regulations the
QME allegedly violated and to notify the QME of his or her right
to a hearing before an administrative law judge or a DWC hearing
officer to contest the alleged violations. If a hearing on the alleged
violations is conducted, the administrative law judge or hearing
officer files a statement of findings and proposed decision with the
DWC’s administrative director. The administrative director has
several options after receiving the proposed decision, including
the authority to adopt the proposed decision or to reject it. The
administrative director makes the final decision on disciplinary
action, which can include probation, suspension, and termination
of QME status. With the exception of specific circumstances
described in state law, DWC cannot suspend or terminate a QME
during his or her term without following this procedure.
In a separate regulatory process, again as Figure 5 shows, DWC
considers applications for reappointment. According to state law,
DWC shall reappoint a QME for a two-year term if the QME
meets specific requirements. A QME must submit completed
application forms and evidence of completed continuing education
requirements and pay appropriate fees, among other requirements.
However, DWC may deny a QME’s reappointment for a number
of reasons, including if the QME was not in compliance with all
applicable regulations and evaluation guidelines or because the
18 California State Auditor Report 2019-102
November 2019
Figure 5
DWC Used the Reappointment Process to Discipline QMEs, a Practice We Find Inappropriate
COMPLAINT APPLICATION
DENIED
IInnvveessttiiggaattiioonn aanndd
RReeaappppooiinnttmmeenntt DDeenniiaall PPrroocceessss
DDiisscciipplliinnaarryy PPrroocceessss
The investigations section receives QME submits a reappointment application,
complaints against a QME. supporting documents, and appropriate fees.
DWC may deny the QME’s reappointment
The investigations section gathers evidence of if the QME was not in compliance with all
violations of the department’s regulations. applicable regulations and guidelines.
DWC used the DWC must notify the QME in writing of
reappointment denial the reappointment denial, which
process for discipline. contains the reason for the denial.
The QME has 30 days from the notice of
DWC’s medical director forwards evidence of
reappointment denial to appeal, and DWC
violations to DWC’s administrative director.
has 60 days from receipt of appeal to notify
the QME of its decision to grant the appeal
or uphold the denial.
If the administrative director sustains the
After DWC denies
medical director’s case, DWC issues an
If DWC upholds the denial, it issues a a QME’s reappointment,
accusation to the QME specifying which
statement of issues specifying which the individual cannot
regulations he or she allegedly violated,
regulations the QME has not complied with legally provide QME
notifies the QME of his or her right to a
and notifies the QME of his or her right evaluations or earn
hearing, and schedules a hearing.
to a hearing. related income.
If the QME requests a hearing within 15 days,
DWC assigns the case to a hearing officer or DWC assigns the case to a hearing officer or
administrative law judge, who hears the administrative law judge, who hears the
case and may propose discipline. case and proposes a determination
regarding the QME’s reappointment.
Administrative director makes the final Administrative director makes the final
decision on disciplinary action. decision on whether to reappoint the QME.
Source: State law, the department’s regulations, and DWC.
California State Auditor Report 2019-102 19
November 2019
administrative director took disciplinary action against the QME
during his or her most recent term. Under the department’s
regulations, a QME may submit a written response to DWC
appealing its denial of his or her reappointment and request a
hearing if DWC upholds the denial after reviewing the QME’s
timely response. However, state law does not allow an individual to State law does not allow an
perform QME services after DWC denies his or her reappointment. individual to perform QME
Because such services may constitute up to two-thirds of a QME’s services after DWC denies his or
practice, such a denial can have a significant impact. her reappointment.
Despite these separate regulatory processes, DWC used the
reappointment process to discipline some QMEs for alleged
overbilling violations without scheduling hearings, even though
the QMEs requested hearings in some cases, a practice that raises
due process concerns. Injured workers and insurance companies
submitted some of the complaints alleging that certain QMEs
overbilled for services. Although billing-related complaints made
up a relatively small portion of all types of complaints—around
7 percent of complaints that DWC logged in its complaint database
for 2017 and 2018—we focused on these complaints in light of
one of our audit objectives—to determine whether DWC collected
funds on behalf of the insurance industry from QMEs—and
because QMEs can agree to pay restitution to insurance carriers
to resolve allegations of overbilling. We reviewed 24 billing-related
complaints DWC received from 2014 through 2018, 11 from 2014
through 2016, and 13 from 2017 through 2018. For six of the
11 billing-related complaints DWC received from 2014 through
2016, DWC denied the QME’s reappointment application based
on alleged violations for overbilling. Although DWC’s acting chief
legal counsel believes it is appropriate for DWC to deny QME
reappointments when it has evidence that the QME violated the
department’s regulations, we believe the alleged violations remain
allegations until later in the disciplinary process, such as when
an administrative law judge files a proposed decision with the
administrative director after a hearing or the QME declines to
participate in the hearing process. We found no evidence in DWC’s
records that either of these circumstances had already occurred
when DWC denied reappointment to these QMEs.
In these six cases, DWC in effect used the reappointment
process to impose discipline on the QMEs without a hearing,
which may have denied the QMEs due process. Additionally,
by using the reappointment process to impose discipline, DWC
delayed the QMEs’ reappointments. For two of the six cases, the
individuals are no longer QMEs. One of these QMEs did not
respond to DWC’s statement of issues, and we saw no evidence
that the other resubmitted the required application and fees to
be reappointed. For the other four of the six cases, DWC delayed
the reappointments for about six to 15 months. As a result, these
20 California State Auditor Report 2019-102
November 2019
individuals could not perform QME evaluations and potentially lost
income they could have earned as QMEs during this time. During
the time they were unable to practice as QMEs, these physicians
had an incentive to settle with DWC so that they could resume
providing QME services and earning income from them. The QMEs
in these four cases agreed to pay restitution to insurance companies
for the alleged overpayments. DWC also agreed to reappoint them.
In one example, the individual would have been unable to perform
QME services for about 15 months while he and DWC worked to
resolve alleged overbilling violations. DWC received a complaint
in May 2014 alleging that, among other issues, this QME billed
for services that were not provided. After requesting evidence
from the QME in June 2014 and February 2015 and reviewing it
shortly thereafter, DWC waited until June 2016 to deny the QME’s
reappointment, effective July 2016. The QME responded to the
denial in July 2016, and DWC provided the QME with a statement
of issues affirming the denial in August 2016. Within a week, the
QME requested a hearing, but DWC never attempted to schedule
one because it said settlement negotiations were ongoing. In
October 2017, DWC and the QME resolved the alleged violations
by reaching a settlement agreement that required the QME to pay
more than $32,000 to nine insurance companies. The settlement
also contained a stipulation and proposed order that DWC would
reappoint the individual as a QME. The prolonged resolution
period between the QME’s July 2016 reappointment denial and
the October 2017 settlement resulted in a 15-month lapse in the
individual’s ability to perform QME services. We believe DWC
should have resolved the complaint solely through its disciplinary
process rather than denying the QME’s reappointment based on
allegations that had not yet been heard by an administrative law
judge or department hearing officer.
We found instances in 2017 Even though DWC resolved some complaints more quickly
and 2018 where DWC denied during 2017 and 2018, we found further instances in those years
QMEs’ reappointments based on where DWC denied QMEs’ reappointments based on alleged
alleged overbilling violations. overbilling violations. We reviewed 13 billing-related complaints
DWC received during 2017 and 2018 and found that for nine of
them, DWC issued a warning to the QME or settled the complaint
before the QME was due for reappointment or soon thereafter.
DWC did not pursue discipline for the remaining four complaints
because the individuals were no longer active or DWC had
resolved the allegation in a previous settlement. Under the process
described in the department’s regulations for disciplining QMEs,
DWC must issue an accusation and notify the QME of his or
her right to a hearing before taking disciplinary action except in
specific circumstances. In four of the nine instances from 2017
and 2018, instead of issuing accusations and notifying QMEs
of their right to a hearing, DWC sent letters stating that it had
California State Auditor Report 2019-102 21
November 2019
identified billing violations, listing the amounts of the billing
violations, and informing the individuals that they could contact
DWC if they wanted to discuss a resolution to the matter. DWC’s
records indicate that those four QMEs made restitution payments
to insurance companies or entered settlement agreements to make
payments. We also identified four additional instances from 2017
and 2018 when DWC denied the QMEs’ reappointments based on
alleged overbilling violations, which did not adhere to its regulatory
process for disciplining QMEs.
Although DWC’s administrative director does not agree with our
characterization that DWC has used the reappointment process
for discipline, he indicated that, due to staffing shortages, it was
possible that DWC did not inform some QMEs of complaints
or did not initiate discipline for violations before denying their
reappointments. He also stated that, with increased staffing levels
now, it is less likely to happen; DWC filled the last of its four special
investigator positions in February 2017 and hired an additional
attorney in August 2017.
We also believe that DWC’s lack of sufficiently detailed, written
policies and procedures for investigating and resolving complaints
contributed to the concerns we identified. Although DWC’s
administrative director indicated that the investigations section
has policies and procedures in the form of a high-level flowchart of
key investigation steps, we believe that a one-page flowchart
is insufficient to provide adequate guidance to staff. We would
expect the section to have procedures that, at a minimum, provide
sufficiently detailed instructions for staff to follow, a list of expected
deliverables, and internal timelines for completing each phase of the
investigation process.
While examining DWC’s reappointment denials, we identified an
additional concern with the reappointment process: DWC was
slow to request the Office of Administrative Hearings to schedule
hearing dates after the QMEs requested hearings following DWC’s
reappointment denials in two instances, and we saw no evidence
that it requested hearings in two other instances. State law requires State law requires DWC to notify a
DWC to notify a QME of the right to a hearing when it sends a QME of the right to a hearing when
statement of issues. We reviewed 10 cases for which the QMEs it sends a statement of issues.
appealed DWC’s reappointment denials from 2016 through 2018
where the QME could have requested a hearing. The statements
of issues we reviewed for each of these cases included the hearing
notification, and four of the QMEs requested a hearing. For two of
those four, we saw no evidence that DWC attempted to schedule
hearings with the Office of Administrative Hearings. DWC
attempted to schedule hearings for the remaining two hearing
requests, but it scheduled a hearing in only one of these instances
while settling the other case five months after the hearing request.
22 California State Auditor Report 2019-102
November 2019
DWC scheduled this hearing for one year after the QME made
the request. In all four cases, including the one for which it had
scheduled a hearing, DWC resolved the alleged violations by
entering into settlement agreements.
Although DWC can submit requests for scheduling a hearing, it
has not always done so. DWC’s acting chief legal counsel told us
that an applicant submitting a “Request for Hearing” form to DWC
does not automatically indicate that the applicant is seeking a
hearing. She indicated that DWC will attempt to reach an amicable
settlement of the discipline issues with the applicant or his or her
legal representative. She further stated that the mutual decision
to schedule a hearing might be delayed by this process. However,
given the negative financial consequences for a QME who DWC
does not reappoint, we are concerned that prolonged delays in
reappointing QMEs may unnecessarily make them more inclined to
settle than they might otherwise be.
DWC Has Failed to Comply With State Law to Ensure That QMEs
Produce High-Quality Reports
DWC has not continuously reviewed DWC has not continuously reviewed medical-legal reports for
medical‑legal reports for quality quality and has not tracked when workers’ compensation judges
and has not tracked when workers’ have rejected medical-legal reports that failed to meet minimum
compensation judges have rejected standards. As we describe in the Introduction, these reports must
medical‑legal reports that failed to provide medical evidence that can help judges resolve disputes
meet minimum standards. related to workers’ compensation claims. The quality of these
reports is especially important because reports that are inaccurate
or incomplete can potentially delay resolution of disputes and
workers’ receipt of benefits, and they can increase costs for
employers involved in the disputes. Because DWC did not perform
these reviews or track rejected reports, DWC lacks the data to
identify whether report quality is a systemic problem or whether
individual QMEs are producing low-quality reports.
State law provides at least two ways for DWC to help ensure that
QMEs produce high-quality reports. First, state law requires the
DWC’s medical director to continuously review the quality and
timeliness of QMEs’ reports by reviewing a random selection of
reports as well as reports alleged to be incomplete or inaccurate.
This state law further requires the medical director to submit an
annual report to DWC’s administrative director that summarizes
the results of those reviews and recommends improvements to the
QME system. Second, when DWC reappoints a QME, state law
requires DWC to reappoint only those QMEs that meet certain
criteria, including not having more than five reports rejected by
a workers’ compensation judge. The rejections are based on the
report’s failure to prove or disprove a contested issue or failure to
California State Auditor Report 2019-102 23
November 2019
comply with relevant guidelines. State law also requires a workers’
compensation judge or the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board
(Appeals Board) to inform DWC of QME reports that have been
rejected for failing to meet minimum standards.
DWC has not complied with these state laws. Other than one effort Other than one effort in 2015, the
in 2015, the executive medical director could neither provide executive medical director could
the required annual reports nor demonstrate that DWC has neither provide the required annual
continuously performed a review of report quality since 2007. reports nor demonstrate that DWC
According to an email from the associate medical director to has continuously performed a
DWC management, he began reviewing a selection of 100 reports review of report quality since 2007.
for quality in 2015, but he discontinued that effort in 2016 after
reviewing 69 reports. The associate medical director told us that
he found that approximately 85 percent of those reports were
substandard in one or more ways. However, DWC did not follow up
on his findings. The executive medical director does not recall why
DWC took no action on the findings identified in the 2015 effort.
Although DWC provided several reasons for why it has
not complied with the law requiring continuous reviews of
medical-legal reports for quality, we found its reasons insufficient.
First, although the executive medical director asserted that
DWC needs additional medical and legal resources, he could not
demonstrate that DWC has made a good-faith effort to identify
the additional resources it needs to comply with state law or that
it has attempted to obtain those resources. For instance, according
to the chief of medical administrative services, DWC has had a
vacant associate medical director position since 2016. Based on its
duty statement, the position would be appropriate for reviewing
and reporting on QME report quality and timeliness. However,
this does not explain why DWC did not produce the required
annual reports for at least nine years before 2016. The executive
medical director also stated that DWC has trouble attracting
candidates for these positions because it is located in an area with
a high cost of living, and DWC does not offer the most competitive
compensation. However, the chief of programmatic services at
DWC indicated that DWC has not conducted a salary survey to
justify raising the compensation through the California Department
of Human Resources, but would consider it. Alternatively, the
executive medical director indicated that DWC can allocate existing
resources to give QME report review a higher priority. Ultimately,
to meet its legal obligation, we believe DWC has a responsibility to
use existing resources or seek additional resources to help ensure
the quality and timeliness of QME reports, which injured workers
and their employers rely on to resolve disputes.
Not tracking rejected reports also inhibits DWC’s ability to identify
poor QME reports. The compliance manager of the DWC medical
unit (compliance manager) informed us that DWC assigned staff
24 California State Auditor Report 2019-102
November 2019
to start tracking reports rejected by judges or the Appeals Board
in May 2019, which was after the start of our audit. Without such
tracking, DWC misses the opportunity to improve QME report
quality, to educate QMEs, and to resolve less serious regulatory
violations as described in DWC’s sanction guidelines. Although
DWC’s chief judge could not provide us with documentation for how
many reports the presiding judges in her jurisdiction had rejected,
she polled her presiding judges to provide this information. Based on
the poll, DWC’s chief judge told us that the workers’ compensation
judges rejected about 70 QME reports over the last year alone
because they did not provide substantial medical evidence. However,
DWC could only provide us with one report rejected by a workers’
compensation judge or the Appeals Board within the last five years.
After we inquired about this, DWC’s chief judge stated that she
intends to work with the presiding judges to help establish a process
for reporting to DWC when the judges reject QME reports for not
meeting minimum standards, as state law requires.
In part because DWC has not complied with these state laws, it
lacks data regarding the quality of QME reports and whether this
is a systemic problem. We spoke with multiple interest groups
about the scope and prevalence of low-quality reports, and
some stakeholders expressed concerns. Lawyers from both an
applicant attorneys’ association (representing injured workers)
and a defense attorneys’ firm (representing insurance companies
or employers) told us that QME report quality is sometimes
an issue. For example, the reports may not contain all required
medical evidence or do not contain the needed level of complexity.
The manager of DWC’s Disability Evaluation Unit—the unit
responsible for reviewing QME reports to rate an injured worker’s
level of permanent disability—told us that while he does not think
it is a widespread problem, he has concerns that certain QMEs
are not producing high-quality reports for the purpose of rating
disability. For example, he indicated that one QME did not base his
medical-legal evaluations on the guidelines DWC adopted. Another
QME failed to evaluate impairment in his report, which is necessary
to determine potential permanent disability.
Low‑quality QME reports can delay Low-quality QME reports can delay injured workers’ receipt of
injured workers’ receipt of benefits benefits and add expenses for employers involved in disputes. A
and add expenses for employers workers’ compensation judge can reject a report or ask the QME
involved in disputes. to develop it further if the report fails to meet minimum standards;
in such cases, the judge may order a supplemental report from the
QME, a deposition of the QME, or a new panel from DWC. All
of these scenarios—a supplemental report, a deposition, or a new
panel—add time and expense to the resolution of the claim. As we
explain in the first section, generating a new panel can cause delays,
postpone workers’ receipt of any applicable benefits, and increase
costs for employers.
California State Auditor Report 2019-102 25
November 2019
In addition, DWC has not reported on the timeliness of QME
reports for reasons similar to its reasons for not performing the
continuous reviews of report quality. However, it has collected data
on complaints of late reports and in some instances, it has taken
action to deny QMEs’ reappointments based on late reports. State
regulations require QMEs to provide written medical-legal reports
within 30 days of the face-to-face evaluation of the injured worker.
If a QME does not comply with this time frame, either the injured
worker or the employer can object in a timely manner and request a
replacement panel, which can result in a new evaluation and a new
report. According to DWC’s complaint data for 2017 and 2018, late
reports are the most common reason for complaints against QMEs.
For 19 of the 20 reappointment denials we reviewed from 2018
and 2019, DWC denied the reappointment of QMEs who had
three or more late reports in a calendar year, as the department’s
regulations authorize. DWC later granted the appeals of all
19 QMEs, and approved their reappointments.
Recommendations
Legislature
To ensure that DWC maintains a sufficient supply of QMEs and
appropriately compensates these individuals, the Legislature should
amend state law to specify that DWC review and, if necessary,
update the medical-legal fee schedule at least every two years based
on inflation. DWC’s review of the medical-legal fee schedule should
be separate from its review of the Official Medical Fee Schedule.
To reduce the delays that replacement panels cause in resolving
workers’ compensation claims, the Legislature should revise state
law to increase the number of QMEs on the panels DWC provides.
Specifically, unrepresented employees should continue to choose
from a panel of three QMEs, and represented employees should be
provided with a panel of five QMEs, of whom the employee and the
employer can each strike one, leaving both parties with the same
number of QMEs to choose from as unrepresented employees. The
party—the worker or the employer—that did not request the panel
would select the final QME. If the selected QME is unavailable, the
parties would then select from among the two remaining QMEs
until they find one that is available.
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DWC
To ensure that DWC appoints enough QMEs to keep up with the
demand for QME services, it should, by April 2020, develop and
implement a plan to increase the number of QMEs commensurate
with demand. The plan should describe how DWC will actively recruit
for and increase the pool of QMEs, prioritizing specialties with the
greatest shortages relative to demand. It should also use QME data
trends to project the necessary QME supply to meet demand. The
plan should include continuing negotiation with medical groups to
allow their physicians to become QMEs, as well as establishing goals
for recruiting new QMEs in specific specialties.
To ensure consistency and transparency in overseeing QMEs, DWC
should, by April 2020, take the following actions:
• Develop and implement written policies and procedures that define
and specify its internal processes for disciplining QMEs, including
timelines for taking disciplinary action and for scheduling hearings
or responding to settlement proposals.
• Develop and implement written policies and procedures that define
its internal process for reappointing QMEs and how that process
should proceed if any disciplinary investigations are pending.
To ensure that DWC monitors and reviews QME report quality
and timeliness and to ensure the efficient resolution of workers’
compensation claims, DWC should, by April 2020, take the
following actions:
• Create and implement a plan to continuously review the quality
and timeliness of QME reports, including time frames for review,
methodology for selecting reports to review, and the minimum
number of reports to be reviewed annually.
• Develop and implement a process for annually reporting to DWC’s
administrative director its findings on the quality and timeliness of
QME reports and recommended improvements to the QME system.
• Create written policies and implement a consistent process for
ensuring that workers’ compensation judges and the Appeals
Board inform DWC of QME reports they rejected for not meeting
minimum standards.
• Create written policies and implement a process for tracking QME
reports rejected by workers’ compensation judges and the Appeals
Board for not meeting minimum standards. DWC should consider
and include these reports in its annual review of report quality and
recommend improvements to the QME system.
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We conducted this audit under the authority vested in the California State Auditor by Government
Code 8543 et seq. and according to generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to
provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives specified in
the Scope and Methodology section of the report. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Respectfully submitted,
ELAINE M. HOWLE, CPA
California State Auditor
November 19, 2019
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Appendix
SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
The Joint Legislative Audit Committee (Audit Committee)
directed the California State Auditor to examine the oversight and
regulation of the QME process by DWC. The table below lists the
objectives that the Audit Committee approved and the methods we
used to address them.
Audit Objectives and the Methods Used to Address Them
AUDIT OBJECTIVE METHOD
1 Review and evaluate the laws, rules, and Researched and reviewed relevant laws, rules, regulations, and policies.
regulations significant to the audit objectives.
2 Identify the number of QMEs and the number • Analyzed data from the department’s database to identify the number of QMEs and
of requests for their services during the requests for their services for fiscal years 2013–14 through 2017–18.
last five fiscal years. To the extent possible,
• Reviewed trends of replacement panels that DWC generated during fiscal years 2013–14
determine whether the current number of
through 2017–18 caused by QME unavailability.
QMEs can meet the demand for the program’s
services. Determine what efforts, if any, DWC • Interviewed key staff regarding DWC’s efforts to increase the number of
has made to increase the number of QMEs participating QMEs.
participating in the program.
• Interviewed an applicants’ attorneys organization to gain an understanding of injured
workers’ access to QME services.
3 Review DWC’s policies and procedures for • Reviewed relevant laws and regulations for appointing and reappointing QMEs.
appointing and reappointing QMEs and
• Reviewed a selection of 20 QME appointments and reappointments for 2018 and 2019
determine whether they comply with state laws
to determine whether DWC complied with state laws and regulations when it appointed
and regulations. Review a selection of QME
and reappointed QMEs.
appointments and reappointments to determine
whether DWC is following its processes and • Reviewed a selection of 20 QME reappointment denials (five from the selection in the
complying with statutory requirements. bullet point above and 15 additional denials) for 2018 and 2019 to determine the reasons
DWC denied reappointments.
• Interviewed key stakeholders within the workers’ compensation system, including an
applicants’ attorneys association, a defense attorneys’ firm, and DWC’s chief judge to
gain an understanding on one of the issues we identified related to reappointment:
poor‑quality medical‑legal reports by QMEs.
4 Review DWC’s policies and procedures for • Reviewed relevant laws and regulations that allow applicants and QMEs to appeal denial
QMEs to appeal denial of appointments and of appointments and reappointments, including their rights to hearings.
reappointments and determine whether they
• Reviewed a selection of 10 reappointment denial appeals QMEs submitted for 2018
comply with state laws and regulations. Review
and 2019 to determine if DWC complied with regulations when it processed the appeals.
a selection of appeals by QMEs to determine
whether DWC is following its processes and • Reviewed an additional selection of 10 reappointment denial appeals in which DWC
complying with statutory requirements. provided to QMEs a statement of issues to uphold the denial from 2016 through 2018 to
determine whether DWC complied with its regulations to grant hearings when requested.
continued on next page . . .
30 California State Auditor Report 2019-102
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AUDIT OBJECTIVE METHOD
5 Assess the process used by DWC to establish • Reviewed state laws for updating DWC’s Official Medical Fee Schedule and medical‑legal
its existing fee schedules for the program and fee schedule.
determine whether the process complies with
• Evaluated the process DWC is currently using to revise its medical‑legal fee schedule and
state laws and regulations. In addition, evaluate
determined when DWC last updated the rates. We considered the increases in inflation
the process, if any, DWC uses to update or
when assessing the reasonableness of DWC’s rates from 2006—the last time DWC
modify program fee schedules. To the extent
updated its rates.
possible, assess the reasonableness and fairness
of the fee schedules.
6 Review DWC’s process for investigating and • Reviewed state laws and regulations related to the independent bill review process and
resolving complaints filed by QMEs when DWC’s independent bill review contract.
insurance carriers deny or reduce their
• Reviewed a selection of 12 independent bill review cases, which are initiated to resolve
payments for services. Review a selection of
a QME’s billing‑related dispute or complaint, and found that from 2015 through 2018,
complaints filed by QMEs to determine whether
DWC’s independent bill review contractor generally followed its process and complied
DWC followed its process and complied with
with statutory requirements.
statutory requirements.
7 Assess how DWC allocates its audit resources Compared the roles, responsibilities, and staffing for DWC’s audit unit—which audits
and prioritizes reviews of QMEs and insurance carriers—and investigations section—which reviews QMEs. Based on the
insurance carriers. separate organizational structure, staff, and roles and responsibilities, we concluded that
the audit unit and the investigations section are separate. The evidence did not indicate
that DWC prioritized its investigations section or its audit unit over the other.
8 Evaluate the relationship between DWC, the • Reviewed DWC’s contract with its independent bill review contractor from 2015
insurance industry, and the independent bill through 2019 to gain an understanding of the contracted services and DWC’s
review process. To the extent that specific involvement in the bill review process.
concerns are identified, review communications
• Reviewed communications between relevant DWC staff, the independent
between DWC and the various parties.
bill review contractor, and insurance carriers. Our review did not identify any
inappropriate communications.
9 Determine whether DWC collected funds on • Selected and reviewed 19 billing complaints that DWC received from 2014 through 2018.
behalf of the insurance industry from QMEs and For each of the billing‑related complaints we reviewed, we determined whether
distributed those funds to insurance carriers correspondence and settlement documents directed QMEs to pay restitution to
or other parties. To the extent it occurred, insurance carriers and determined whether restitution amounts were recorded in DWC’s
determine whether DWC’s collection and financial records.
payment of those funds complied with state
• Reviewed DWC’s financial records from 2016 through 2018 to identify the source of
laws and regulations.
DWC’s collections.
• We found that DWC generally directed QMEs to make restitution payments to insurance
carriers and we did not identify instances where DWC deposited the money in its account.
10 Review and assess any other issues that are Reviewed 24 billing‑related complaints (19 selected from Objective 9 and five additional
significant to the audit. items) to determine whether DWC followed its disciplinary and reappointment processes.
Source: Analysis of Audit Committee’s audit request number 2019‑102, state law, and information and documentation identified in the column
titled Method.
California State Auditor Report 2019-102 31
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Assessment of Data Reliability
The Government Accountability Office, whose standards we are
statutorily required to follow, requires us to assess the sufficiency
and appropriateness of the computer-processed information that
we use to support our findings, conclusions, and recommendations.
In performing this audit, we relied on the department’s QME
database to determine the number of available QMEs and requests
for QMEs. To evaluate these data, we reviewed existing information
about the data, interviewed agency officials knowledgeable about
the data, and performed data set verification procedures and
electronic testing of key data elements. In addition, we performed
accuracy and completeness testing related to available QMEs. As a
result, we found the data to be sufficiently reliable for our purposes.
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* California State Auditor’s comments begin on page 43.
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Comments
CALIFORNIA STATE AUDITOR’S COMMENTS
ON THE RESPONSE FROM THE DIVISION OF
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
To provide clarity and perspective, we are commenting on DWC’s
response to our audit. The numbers below correspond to the
numbers we have placed in the margin of DWC’s response.
Notwithstanding its comments to the contrary, the evidence we 1
obtained demonstrates clearly—as our results summarize on
pages 11 through 15 of our report—that DWC has not adequately
ensured that California has enough QMEs to keep up with demand
for their services. In its response, DWC mentions two studies that
describe the underuse of certain portions of the pool of existing
QMEs. However, as we state on page 14, QMEs who operate out of
fewer than six zip codes accounted for more than half of all panel
replacements because of unavailable QMEs. Moreover, DWC cited
the CWCI study’s results that only 53.1 percent of registered QMEs
had medical-legal billing records. However, it failed to disclose
that CWCI calculated the percentage based on billing data for
only the first six months of 2017 and that the study noted that this
percentage will likely increase as the data mature beyond the initial
six months of 2017.
As we mention on page 11, the increasing number of replacement
panels because of unavailable QMEs means that the current QME
supply is not meeting the demand for their services. Furthermore,
despite DWC’s denial that it ignored the decline of QME supply, we
mention on page 15 that it does not have an established process for
recruiting QMEs. Therefore, we stand by our findings, conclusions,
and recommendations regarding QME availability.
DWC’s comment regarding outside causes for a decline in the 2
number of QMEs deflects the reader’s attention away from its lack of
action regarding this decline. Although we acknowledge that other
factors can contribute to the decline in QME numbers, such as the
drop in the number of primary care physicians as we state on page 14,
we believe DWC is responsible for taking actions within its control to
mitigate the decline. For instance, as we discuss on page 15, DWC has
not updated the rates on its medical-legal fee schedule as state law
requires, which could help it attract and retain QMEs.
As the entity responsible for overseeing QMEs and administering 3
the QME selection process for California’s workers’ compensation
system, we would expect DWC to have proactively studied or
engaged a contractor to study why doctors are leaving the QME
process, rather than merely encouraging such a study.
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4 Contrary to DWC’s assertion, DWC’s data is sufficient to demonstrate
the linkage between replacement panels and delays in resolving
workers’ compensation disputes and injured workers’ access to benefits.
As we state on page 12, if a workers’ compensation case required
one replacement panel because of an unavailable QME, the case was
delayed by more than two months nearly half of the time. Therefore,
these injured workers are not able to see a QME within 60 days of their
initial panel request, thus delaying resolution of their disputes.
5 DWC’s disagreement with our conclusions regarding the effects of
replacement panels is misplaced. As we mention on page 13, replacement
panels may delay injured workers’ access to their workers’ compensation
benefits and increase costs for employers. DWC argues that because
the number of denied workers’ compensation claims accounted for
11.3 percent of total reported injuries, the number of injured workers who
may not have access to medical care is relatively small. However, in each
case when an injured worker does not have access to medical care, the
health impact on that injured worker can be significant.
We also disagree with DWC’s argument that delays in seeing a QME
should not result in a delay of permanent disability benefits. When
an injured worker disputes a treating physician’s finding regarding the
existence or extent of permanent disability and QME unavailability
delays resolution of this dispute, the final resolution of the permanent
disability status can also be delayed.
Further, as we mention on page 13, the acting president of an attorneys
association stated that some workers postpone treatment until they
make it through the initial QME process because of the uncertainty
of eventual benefit payouts or reimbursements. We also state that we
are concerned that delays of medical treatment could lead to greater
temporary or permanent disability and that a prolonged process may
increase overall costs to employers.
6 DWC appears to mischaracterize our report: we do not conclude
that updating the fee schedule will end the persistent decline in the
number of QMEs. As we indicate on page 15, updating the rates of the
medical-legal fee schedule could help DWC attract and retain QMEs.
7 We disagree with DWC’s assertion that it currently has policies
and procedures in place for both its reappointment and discipline
processes. Early during our audit when we asked it for relevant
policies and procedures, DWC told us that its staff accomplished
QME appointments and reappointments, as well as appeals of denials,
pursuant to the department’s regulations, but it did not provide us
with policies and procedures. It was not until nearly six months
later when DWC provided us with written policies and procedures
for investigating and disciplining QMEs. Because DWC provided
these documents well after we had concluded fieldwork for the audit
California State Auditor Report 2019-102 45
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and because DWC told us that its staff followed the department’s
regulations, we did not assess whether DWC staff actually followed
these policies and procedures. Moreover, DWC did not provide
us with written policies and procedures regarding appointing and
reappointing QMEs. We therefore stand by our recommendations
that DWC should develop and implement written policies and
procedures regarding its reappointment and discipline processes.
8
We disagree with DWC’s statement that it does not take
disciplinary action based on allegations. As we mention on page 19,
we believe violations remain allegations until an administrative law
judge files a proposed decision or the QME declines to participate
in the hearing process.
9
DWC’s comment that we failed to cite any legal authority to
support our conclusion that its use of the reappointment process to
impose discipline could result in the denial of due process is wrong.
As we indicate in Figure 5 on page 18, state statutes and DWC’s own
regulations for investigations and discipline and for reappointments
include due process steps for QMEs. We also state on page 19 that
DWC in effect used the reappointment process to impose discipline
on QMEs without a hearing.
Furthermore, we believe that the Roth and Paramount cases that
DWC cites do not conclusively support its argument that an
applicant does not have a right to a hearing before DWC denies
a QME application. In both cases, the courts found that because
neither plaintiff had a vested property interest, those plaintiffs
were not entitled to due process. However, state law imposes on
DWC a mandatory duty to reappoint QMEs if they meet specific
legal criteria. In our view, this mandatory reappointment right may
trigger due process rights and require DWC to provide a QME with
notice and a fair hearing before it strips the QME of his or her right
to reappointment because of alleged regulatory violations DWC
identified during the QME’s term.
10
We agree with DWC’s statement that its accusation process and
statement of issues process, which it should use for discipline
and reappointment, respectively, should not be conflated. However, as
we depict in Figure 5 on page 18, DWC conflated its investigation and
discipline process and its reappointment process in certain instances.
We specify on page 19 that DWC denied QME reappointments on
six occasions based on allegations of misconduct during their terms;
neither had an administrative law judge yet heard their cases nor had
the QME declined to participate in the hearing process.
11
DWC’s statement regarding activities that former QMEs can
perform is misleading. DWC’s regulations only explicitly authorize
former QMEs to issue supplemental reports for unrepresented
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employees. DWC’s interpretation that its current regulations
authorize former QMEs to both issue supplemental reports for
represented employees and sit for depositions is unsupported by the
plain language of its regulations. Even if DWC’s interpretation of
its regulations is appropriate, these two activities make up less than
40 percent of a QME’s activities. According to the 2018 annual report
of the California Commission on Health and Safety and Workers’
Compensation, the testimony and supplemental reporting activities
made up only 0.6 percent and 37 percent of statewide QME activities,
respectively. We therefore stand by our conclusion that DWC’s denial
of reappointments limits QMEs ability to earn income.
12 Contrary to DWC’s statement, our report takes no issue with
DWC’s proactive efforts to settle alleged violations with QMEs.
In fact, we point out on page 20 that, of the 13 billing-related cases
we examined from 2017 and 2018, DWC issued warnings or settled
the complaints for nine before the QME was due for reappointment
or soon thereafter. However, we also point out on that page that
we identified four other instances from that time when DWC
denied the QMEs’ reappointments based on alleged overbilling
violations, which did not adhere to its regulatory process for
disciplining QMEs.
13
DWC’s comment that the “return of a ‘Request for Hearing’ form is
not a request to schedule a formal hearing” is incorrect. This form,
which the QME signs and dates, states clearly, “I hereby request
a hearing … to permit me to present my defense to the charges
contained in said Accusation.” Submission of such a request should
be sufficient for DWC to begin the process of scheduling a hearing.
14
DWC misinterprets our report: we do not say that it used the
setting of a hearing as a tactic for negotiation or that it refused
to set hearings for physicians. As we discuss on page 21, DWC
was slow to request and schedule hearings QMEs requested after
it denied their reappointment appeals, or it did not schedule
requested hearings at all. We also state that QMEs had an incentive
to settle with DWC so they could resume providing QME services
and earn income from those services.
15
DWC’s comment that it “will assess and update the existing process
as appropriate” is misleading. As we state on page 22, state law
requires DWC to continuously review the timeliness and quality
of QME reports by reviewing a random selection of reports and
those reports alleged to be incomplete or inaccurate. It also requires
DWC to submit an annual report that summarizes the results of
the reviews and recommend improvements to the QME system.
DWC’s failure to perform the reviews or prepare the annual reports
in the 12 years since 2007, as required by law, clearly demonstrates
it has no such process to comply with this law.