CSA
Summary
Read the report at California State Auditor ↗
Office of
Emergency
Services:
Has Met Most of Its Emergency
Management Responsibilities Despite
Administrative Problems
January 1996
95114
Table of Contents
Summary S-1
Introduction 1
Chapter 1
OES Is Effective in Organizing
Immediate Responses to Disasters
and Preparing for Emergencies 7
Chapter 2
OES’s Management of the Recovery
Process Must Be Improved 23
Chapter 3
OES Has Serious Administrative Problems 37
Chapter 4
Recommendations 61
Appendix
Profiles of Three Disasters 67
Response to the Audit
Office of Emergency Services 79
Summary
Results in Brief
OES is very effective at T
his report presents the results of the California State
coordinating responses
Audit Highlights ...
Auditor’s comprehensive performance audit of the
to disasters and does a
Office of Emergency Services (OES), determining its
good job of helping
effectiveness in fulfilling its mission and its administrative
state and local
efficiency. OES
governments prepare
is responsible for administering the State’s emergency
for future emergencies.
management program. This program includes preparing
However, OES must
for emergencies before they occur, organizing the
improve its disaster
immediate response to emergencies, and overseeing the
recovery efforts by:
recovery from disasters after they have occurred. Our
audit revealed that OES is very effective in responding to
Working with
emergencies, quickly directing state and local resources to
FEMA to modify
assist areas struck by disaster. In general, OES is also
certain federal
doing a good job assisting the State and local governments
practices and
prepare for emergencies to help mitigate the effects of
policies; and
disasters.
Adequately
However, OES’s effectiveness in coordinating the disaster
managing recovery recovery effort is significantly impaired by certain policies
information. and practices of the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA), which provides most of the funding for
In addition, OES has state and local government recovery efforts, and by its own
serious administrative inadequate practices. FEMA’s inconsistent funding
inefficiencies, including policies and slow system for resolving disagreements make
its: an already cumbersome process for claiming federal funds
even more difficult. OES’s lack of an adequate system for
Inability to managing documents created during the recovery process,
demonstrate its tracking related costs for each disaster, and identifying its
staffing needs; costs for reimbursement from FEMA delays access to
important information needed for effective management of
Failure to manage the recovery process.
contracts and
information Although it is able to meet its emergency management
technology responsibilities, OES has serious administrative problems.
adequately; and A series of major disasters in California since 1989 has
overwhelmed OES’s ability to perform some of its basic
Failure to budget functions, such as budgeting, hiring, and using information
and estimate its technology, exposing many inefficiencies in its
cash flow needs administration. These inefficient practices have resulted in
accurately. an administrative crisis in which OES uses more resources
than necessary and incurs extra costs for the State.
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For example, in part because OES does not estimate its
budget needs accurately, lacks an information system to
support billings and account for pending claims, does not
ensure that
costs it incurs will be reimbursed, and is late in billing for
federal reimbursements, the State’s General Fund had to
lend $3.3 million to OES in November 1995 so that it could
meet its November payroll. Additional loans or deficiency
funding will be needed for the remainder of fiscal year
1995-96. Although federal funds may ultimately be
received, the interest costs on the loans from the General
Fund will be borne by state government. Federal
reimbursements may never be received for some costs
OES incurred, such as $770,000 for 140 laptop computers
and related equipment purchased during the winter storms
of 1995, because it failed to receive assurance of federal
reimbursement before purchasing the computers.
Until recently, OES has not had a strategic plan for
information technology. The resulting problems include
incompatible computer hardware and software and a poorly
defined and managed information technology contract.
The incompatibility that has resulted from the lack of central
planning needlessly consumes employees’ time. Also,
OES has spent over $5 million on a contract to automate
the management of recovery documents that does not yet
meet its needs. Although it needs a replacement for the
inefficient manual system it currently uses, better planning
of this automation project could have saved the time and
financial resources used to correct avoidable problems.
OES also does not consistently practice good contract
management, failing to assess the reasonableness of costs
on sole-source contracts and ensure that services for which
it contracts are received. Weaknesses in contract
management can be costly to the State in the form of
undelivered contract services and the payment of contract
rates that may exceed the “going rate” for such services.
In addition, OES has significant problems with staffing,
which contribute to inefficiencies. Its inability to
demonstrate its staffing needs with reliable workload
analyses has contributed to understaffing and high
overtime costs. Because FEMA does not reimburse OES
for overtime costs, the State loses money on those costs
that would have been reimbursable if the employees were
working regular time. Other staffing problems have led to
inefficiencies that are beyond OES’s control. When a
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major disaster strikes and OES needs large numbers of
additional employees, the number of employees in its own
personnel unit is not adequate to process personnel
documents, resulting in delayed hiring of needed
employees. Also, most of the employees OES hires for
the recovery process have a limited term of only two years
at the same position. Because the recovery from a major
disaster such as the Northridge earthquake takes longer
than two years, OES clearly needs these trained
employees beyond the two-year limit.
Recommendations
Several changes are needed to improve the effectiveness
with which OES fulfills its mission and the efficiency of its
administration. Specifically, to ensure that OES has
adequate facilities and equipment, the Legislature should
provide funding for facilities that meet the requirements of
an essential services building and for the replacement of
aging equipment, such as fire engines.
To remove federal impediments to the efficient recovery
from disasters, OES, with the support of the Legislature,
should negotiate with FEMA to make such changes as the
following:
Allow OES to review damage claim documents from
applicants affected by the winter storms of 1995 before
FEMA determines whether it will approve costs; and
Set up a procedure for an independent third party
review of major funding issues when FEMA, OES, and
the applicant cannot agree on the propriety of FEMA’s
decisions.
If these negotiations fail, the Legislature should
memorialize the Congress to amend federal codes to
address these issues.
To maximize reimbursements obtained from FEMA through
appeals, OES should solicit an opinion from the State’s
Attorney General that defines options available to OES and
applicants for challenging the propriety of FEMA’s funding
decisions and the circumstances under which each option
can be exercised.
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We recommend that OES do a number of things to improve
its administrative efficiency. To provide greater flexibility in
hiring and retaining trained employees to work in the
recovery phase of emergency management:
The Legislature should amend the California
Government Code to allow OES to retain limited-term
employees for the recovery process; OES should work
with the Department of Personnel Administration or
State Personnel Board to establish a task force of
trained personnel employees from other departments to
help OES hire employees when the workload exceeds
the capacity of its own personnel unit during
emergencies. Further, OES and the Department of
Personnel Administration or State Personnel Board
should work together to establish a cadre of trained
employees from other departments that would be
consistently available to assist with the recovery from
disasters for periods of up to a year; and
OES should establish a comprehensive time-reporting
system that will enable it to demonstrate staffing and
budgeting needs.
To ensure sufficient funds for OES to operate for the
remainder of the fiscal year:
The Legislature should appropriate sufficient General
Fund moneys for fiscal years 1995-96 and 1996-97 to
fund approximately 600 positions for OES’s Disaster
Assistance Branch;
The Legislature should consider increasing OES’s
General Fund support appropriation for the remainder of
the 1995-96 fiscal year to levels determined after a
thorough analysis of federal and other reimbursements
and cash needs; and
OES should establish a system for monitoring requests
for reimbursements of all eligible costs from FEMA and
ensure that such requests are made at least every
quarter.
To improve its contract management, OES should:
Exercise discretion in the use of executive orders
authorizing the suspension of contracting requirements
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for competitive bidding and for justifying the costs of
sole-source contracts; and
Monitor contract performance to ensure the contractor
complies with contract agreements.
Finally, to address its information technology needs, OES
should place the highest priority on the implementation of
effective systems for the management of documents
created in the recovery process, maintaining an
automated ledger for disaster assistance costs, and
completing implementation of the Emergency Response
Information Management System for tracking emergency
resources.
Agency Comments
OES agrees with most of the findings in our report, noting
that it has already begun to address some of our
recommendations and is committed to addressing the
remainder. However, OES does not believe that it
overused its emergency contracting authority.
Nevertheless, OES has accepted our recommendations for
its contracting practices in the future.
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Introduction
T
he Office of Emergency Services (OES) was
established within the office of the Governor of the
State of California in 1970. Its primary missions are
to coordinate emergency activities to save lives and limit
the loss of property during disasters, to prepare for and
mitigate the effects of future disasters, and to expedite the
State’s recovery from the effects of disasters after they
have occurred. In each of these activities, OES
coordinates its work with local governments, including
cities, counties, and special districts; other state
departments; and federal agencies, mainly the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
Although OES has its headquarters in Sacramento, it also
has offices throughout the State. The headquarters
houses the State Warning Center, which receives
notifications of emergencies all over the State; the State
Operations Center, which directs the response to
emergencies requiring a statewide effort; the law
enforcement and fire and rescue branches; the inland
regional branch; the Disaster Assistance Branch; and the
northern offices for planning and disaster assistance, as
well as most of the administrative offices for OES. OES
staffs two additional regional branches, the center for
coastal operations in Oakland and the center for southern
operations in the Los Angeles area. During the recovery
from disasters, OES employees also help run disaster field
offices. Currently, OES has employees in the disaster field
office in Pasadena. OES also operates the California
Specialized Training Center in San Luis Obispo, where it
provides training in various aspects of emergency response
and preparedness to employees from OES and other state
agencies, local governments, and other states and
countries.
OES’s proposed budget for fiscal year 1995-96 is $1.51
billion, consisting of $63 million for state operations
and $1.45 billion for local assistance.
OES’s Role in Responding
to Emergencies
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One of OES’s most visible roles is to organize the
immediate response to a disaster once the disaster has
escalated beyond the local area’s ability to effectively
respond. Its goal is to control the specific disaster, save
lives and property, and minimize the effects of the disaster.
OES plays a central role in emergency response in the
State. It acts as an information broker between local
governments requesting assistance in responding to
emergencies and the actual state departments, other local
governments, and federal agencies that have the resources
to assist in the response. For example, when the
firestorms of 1993 broke out in southern California and
escalated beyond the capacity of the local governments to
control the fires, OES coordinated the delivery of additional
help from other local governments’ fire departments and
the California Department of Forestry (CDF). OES’s role
was to assess the requests for assistance, determine
whether local governments and CDF had the appropriate
personnel and equipment, and then direct them to supply
the needed personnel and equipment. The responsibility
of the local governments and CDF was to direct their own
operations and employees once the orders to respond
were issued. OES itself did not actually supply or
supervise most of the personnel and equipment used to
fight the fires.
OES’s Role in Preparing for and
Mitigating the Effects of Future Disasters
In general, the more effective the State’s efforts are to
prepare for and mitigate the effects of disasters, the more
effective its response to emergencies is. OES helps to
prepare the State and local governments for dealing with
future disasters and minimizing the effects of those
disasters.
To meet its responsibility to prepare for disasters, OES
reviews emergency plans for local governments to ensure
their adequacy, integrates to the fullest extent possible
these local emergency plans with the federal and state
emergency plans, and trains OES personnel and
employees from other state agencies and local
governments in emergency preparedness and response.
In addition, OES is currently coordinating state and local
efforts to establish a standardized emergency management
system (SEMS) for use by all emergency response
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agencies. The California Government Code, Section
8607, requires the full implementation of SEMS by
December 1996.
OES also administers the hazard mitigation grant program
for the State. This program, authorized by federal
legislation and implemented after federally declared
disasters, provides
moneys to the State and local governments that have
identified structures or environments at risk from the kinds
of disasters that affect their areas. The goal of the
program is to modify these structures or environmental
conditions before another disaster strikes, limiting damage
and loss of life. Because the grant requests exceed the
amount of money available, OES assesses and prioritizes
the grant proposals it receives and submits the prioritized
requests to FEMA for approval.
OES’s Role in Recovering
From Disasters
Even before OES has finished coordinating the response to
an emergency, it begins recovery procedures. OES’s
primary responsibility during recovery is to administer the
disaster assistance program. The program provides
federal and state moneys to the State, local governments,
and certain nonprofit organizations for the repair and
restoration of public real property. This includes civic
buildings or hospitals damaged during disasters and allows
the restoration of necessary services to the citizens of the
affected areas. It also reimburses affected entities for
personnel and operating costs incurred during the
response and recovery and for the costs of cleaning up
after disasters.
For federally declared disasters, the federal government
provides moneys for approved projects through the
Disaster Assistance grant, which FEMA administers at the
federal level. Generally, the federal reimbursement rate is
75 percent of costs it approves, but this rate can be
increased. The State helps fund the remainder of these
approved costs and any additional costs that OES
considers acceptable. OES administers the Disaster
Assistance grant at the state level, working closely with
local governments and state departments affected by the
disasters and with FEMA. The process of performing the
damage surveys, preparing the requests for reimbursement
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to FEMA, processing appeals of FEMA’s denials, and
monitoring approved projects is labor intensive for all
parties.
Lack of Standards for Measuring
Performance in Emergency Management
Evaluations of OES’s performance are hampered by the
emergency management community’s lack of formal
standards for measuring performance for any of the major
functions of an emergency management agency. Our
interviews and review of reports issued by the United
States General Accounting Office and other federal
organizations indicated that they were not aware of any
such standards. In addition, OES has not prepared a
strategic plan for its own operations to define its goals for
the future. Although it has attempted to organize strategic
planning meetings, repeated disasters have required it to
cancel the meetings. Without these formal standards and
defined goals, we have relied on anecdotal information,
written comments in General Accounting Office and other
reports, and our own observations to evaluate OES’s
effectiveness in meeting its responsibilities to respond to
immediate disasters, help entities within the State prepare
for and mitigate the effects of future disasters, and assist in
the recovery from past disasters.
Scope and Methodology
The Bureau of State Audits was requested by the California
Legislature and through language in the Supplemental
Report of the 1995 Budget Act to perform a comprehensive
fiscal and performance audit of OES. The purpose of our
audit was to develop recommendations that, if
implemented, would improve operations, enabling OES to
operate more effectively in addressing recent and future
disasters. The review was required to encompass the
following areas:
The effectiveness of OES’s fiscal controls and
reporting;
The efficiency and propriety of OES’s contracting
and hiring practices;
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OES’s organizational effectiveness, including its
performance in carrying out its statutory
responsibilities; and
The adequacy of OES’s other administrative
support, specifically for information technology and
planning.
To gain an understanding of OES’s responsibilities and the
environment in which it operates, we reviewed the laws,
rules, and regulations relevant to OES in general and to the
audit mandate in particular. We also interviewed
employees in each of OES’s branches, employees involved
in emergency response at six state departments, 15
emergency response employees at various cities and
counties, administrators with FEMA, and two American Red
Cross representatives. In addition, we reviewed various
public reports that dealt with the effectiveness of the
national and state emergency management communities.
To determine the effectiveness of OES’s fiscal controls and
reporting, we interviewed OES employees about the nature
of the system it uses to accumulate financial costs and
request federal reimbursement for these costs for each
disaster. We also reviewed the accounting records that
comprise this system.
To assess the efficiency and propriety of OES’s contracting
practices, we reviewed selected contracts and interagency
agreements that OES entered into during fiscal years
1993-94 and 1994-95. We tested OES’s compliance with
contracting requirements in the Public Contract Code, as
modified by executive orders, with the State Administrative
Manual, and with good contract management practices.
To determine the efficiency and propriety of OES’s hiring
practices, we identified the hiring options available during
the response to and recovery from emergencies,
determined the extent to which OES used these hiring
options, and assessed
its compliance with related laws and regulations. We also
quantified OES’s overtime costs during fiscal year 1994-95.
To assess the extent of OES’s staffing needs, we reviewed
a partial workload study completed by the Department of
Finance in June 1995 for OES. We also reviewed OES’s
own workload analysis that formed the basis for its
proposals for staffing budgets for fiscal years 1995-96 and
5
1996-97. We determined the reasonableness of the
workload analysis and reviewed related documentation.
We also prepared our own analytical reviews of the
reasonableness of OES’s staffing requests by comparing
its current workload and proposed staffing levels to those of
prior periods.
We evaluated OES’s effectiveness in preparing for
disasters by assessing the reliability of the facilities housing
the Regional Emergency Operations Centers and the State
Operations Center. We determined whether the buildings
were constructed to comply with requirements for essential
services buildings and located in areas not prone to
disasters. We also determined whether OES had
established backup facilities. To assess the reliability of
selected emergency response equipment, we obtained the
equipment inventories and the applicable standards for
replacement and determined whether the equipment was
being replaced according to the recommended schedule.
In addition, we documented the status of the
implementation of the SEMS program and the status of the
hazard mitigation program.
We determined OES’s effectiveness in responding to
emergencies by reviewing various national reports that
discussed disaster issues and conducting interviews with
representatives of various emergency service
organizations. We reviewed selected requests for
assistance that OES processed and determined whether
and how promptly the requests were met.
To evaluate OES’s effectiveness in the recovery from
disasters, we identified legal and regulatory requirements
and the standard procedures for processing damage
survey reports (DSR). We also examined files for selected
DSRs to determine whether OES and FEMA followed
required procedures and timelines and to identify
conditions that can lead to delays in processing the
DSRs.
We assessed the adequacy of OES’s management of
information technology and planning by reviewing its
strategic plan for information technology, completed in
September 1995. We also compared the problems and
needs identified in this strategic plan to those we identified
through our interviews with OES employees and our own
observations during the audit, evaluating the propriety of
the strategic plan. We then reviewed evidence indicating
6
that OES is beginning to implement proposed changes in
its management of information technology. Our
examination included reviewing OES’s budget proposals
for fiscal years 1995-96 and 1996-97 that request
additional funding to implement its strategic plan.
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Chapter 1
OES Is Effective in Organizing
Immediate Responses to Disasters
and Preparing for Emergencies
Chapter Summary
T
he Office of Emergency Services’ (OES)
responsibilities in emergency management include
organizing the immediate response to disasters and
helping to prepare the State and local governments for
future disasters. The preparation for disasters includes
OES’s administration of the hazard mitigation program,
which provides funding for the modification of facilities or
environments that could be damaged in disasters before
those disasters actually strike.
Although we found areas in which it could improve, OES is
very effective during the immediate response to
emergencies. Specifically, OES quickly and effectively
organizes the distribution of emergency response
resources. It also does well in much of the preparation for
disasters. For example, OES offers a wide variety of
highly respected courses in the management of
emergencies at its California Specialized Training Center.
However, its future ability to respond to disasters effectively
is threatened by its own substandard facilities and aging
equipment needed during emergency responses. In
addition, OES does not currently have a system in place for
independently calculating funds available for hazard
mitigation. Instead, it relies on the Federal Emergency
Management Agency’s (FEMA) estimate of amounts
available. As a result, the State and local governments
may not be receiving all the funds for hazard mitigation to
which they are entitled.
Response to Disasters
One of OES’s primary functions is to organize the response
to disasters, with the purpose of minimizing the loss of life
and damage to property. OES’s role consists of receiving
requests for emergency assistance from the areas affected
by disasters and promptly directing the delivery of
8
requested resources. During an emergency, the director
of OES, acting as a representative of the governor, heads
California’s emergency management staff. This
emergency management staff performs its duties from one
of OES’s Regional Emergency Operations Centers (REOC)
or the State Operations Center (SOC) and is responsible
for coordinating the State’s response to disasters, including
the allocation of essential supplies and resources. For
example, this staff receives, evaluates, and disseminates
information regarding the status of a disaster. In addition,
the staff coordinates the mobilization of resources in the
affected area.
In organizing emergency responses, OES works closely
with local governments, other state agencies, and federal
agencies. These entities help OES manage the response,
and they supply most of the resources for assistance.
OES draws upon other entities’ resources to satisfy
OES organizes local,
requests for assistance because it has few resources of its
state, and federal
own for this purpose. OES has a very limited supply of
resources to respond to
equipment that can be
disasters in California.
used to respond to a disaster. For example, it has 106 fire
engines distributed throughout California, although the
response to the southern California fires of 1993 required
over 1,500 fire engines. Additional resources are supplied
by local governments, state agencies, the federal
government, or commercial vendors through the mutual aid
system in California.
A Statewide Mutual Aid
System Exists
The response to disasters in California is based on a
statewide system of mutual aid, which ensures that
emergency resources, including personnel and equipment,
are provided to local jurisdictions whenever their own
resources are inadequate during an emergency or disaster.
The California Master Mutual Aid Agreement is the basis
for this system and has been adopted by most cities and all
58 counties in California. This system provides a formal
arrangement within which each jurisdiction retains control
of its own personnel and facilities while giving and receiving
assistance. This mutual aid system for disasters is similar
to but separate from the mutual aid systems used in the fire
and law enforcement communities in California. California
also has mutual aid agreements with Oregon, Arizona, and
Nevada.
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The California Master Mutual Aid Agreement requires local
jurisdictions to rely first on their own resources to respond
to an emergency and then to rely on the resources of other
local governments in their area. As an emergency
escalates beyond the capacity of local governments to
respond, resources may be drawn from increasingly larger
geographical areas, moving from city to city, then to the
county or “operational area,” and to the region.
Although OES is alert to the existence and progress of
local emergencies and may have staff at the local
operational areas during emergencies, it does not become
heavily involved in the response until the regional areas are
called upon for state or federal assistance. OES staffs and
operates the REOCs. An REOC coordinates the
emergency response either independently or with the SOC
in Sacramento, which is activated until the REOC is ready
to assume responsibility for the response activities or when
more than one
REOC is activated. To allow a more effective response,
representatives from FEMA and state agencies, such as
the California National Guard, the California Department of
Forestry, and the California Conservation Corps, are
generally present in the REOCs and the SOC during the
emergency.
To provide examples of how the response to a disaster
may progress, we have included profiles of three
disasters—the Southern Wildfire Siege of October and
November 1993, the Northridge Earthquake of January
1994, and the Winter Storms of March 1995—in the
Appendix.
OES Is Effective in Responding
to Emergencies
While we found no formal standards for measuring the
effectiveness of an organization’s emergency response
performance, 18 of 19 interviews we conducted with
representatives of emergency response staff for FEMA and
FEMA considers OES
local governments, as well as observations in a national
one of the best state
report, indicated that OES is excellent in meeting its duty to
emergency management
respond to emergencies or disasters. For example,
agencies in the nation.
FEMA’s Region IX officials consider California’s emergency
management to be among the best in the nation. The
Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department, which operates the
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county’s Emergency Operations Center, regards OES’s
response performance as very effective, and Sonoma
County Emergency Services officials stated that OES is
excellent at supporting and advising the county during the
response phase of a disaster.
In a 1991 report, Disaster Assistance: Federal, State, and
Local Responses to Natural Disasters Need Improvement,
the United States General Accounting Office indicated that
California’s emergency response organizations responded
to the Loma Prieta earthquake in 1989 with relatively few
problems. The Capability and Hazard Identification
Program (CHIP), which is FEMA’s primary information
source for determining the status of state and local
emergency management capabilities to respond to any
emergency, indicated in June 1994 that OES ranged from
substantially to fully capable of responding to any disaster.
Another indication that OES is effective in responding to all
types of emergencies as well as major disasters is the
federal government’s interest in using two programs
developed by California as models for national programs.
California’s FIRESCOPE Program (Firefighting Resources
of California Organized for Potential Emergencies) is being
used as a national model for disaster response. The
FIRESCOPE Program is designed to develop ways to
California’s FIRESCOPE
improve the management of multiagency firefighting
program is a national
resources during an emergency. OES, which administers
model for firefighting
the FIRESCOPE Program in cooperation with the California
response.
Department of Forestry (CDF) and the State Fire Marshal,
has expanded FIRESCOPE’s two key components so they
can be applied to emergencies other than fires. These two
key components, the Multi-Agency Coordination System
and the Incident Command System, are included in
FEMA’s 1992 Federal Response Plan, which is used for
national emergency responses. Also, the national urban
search and rescue program, which is used to rescue
people trapped in structural collapses, is being modeled
after the California urban search and rescue program.
California has 8 of the nation’s
25 urban search and rescue task forces, and California’s
task forces respond to incidents anywhere in the United
States or its territories. The California urban search and
rescue program was developed by OES’s Fire and Rescue
Branch.
Lastly, to assess how effectively OES responded to
requests for assistance, we reviewed selected requests for
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assistance that came to the REOCs and the SOC for three
separate disasters. Many factors, such as assessment of
the actual need, availability of resources from other
departments and governments, and the priority of requests
for similar resources, affected the time it took OES to
process a request for assistance. If a request was not met
very quickly, OES, in general, was able to demonstrate that
one of these factors affected the promptness.
In summary, OES has performed well in responding to
disasters in the past and has adequate capabilities to
respond favorably to any emergency in the future. In
addition, OES has a proven system for responding to all
types of emergencies or disasters that has drawn positive
attention from the federal government. OES also
processes requests for assistance as quickly as possible,
given the circumstances of a particular disaster.
OES Can Improve Its Effectiveness
During Responses
Although OES has an excellent reputation for meeting its
duties to respond to emergencies or disasters, we identified
two areas in which it could improve its management of
emergency response. Specifically, OES has not fully
developed and tested an automated system for processing
requests for assistance and the assignment of
The lack of an automated
responsibility for meeting the requests. In addition, OES
system for tracking
does not sufficiently coordinate the transition from
requests for emergency
immediate response to emergencies to the recovery phase
assistance results in
of emergency management.
inefficiencies, confusion,
and possible loss of
Until recently, OES did not have an automated system for
federal
tracking and assigning requests for assistance during
reimbursements.
emergencies, resulting in inefficiencies, potential
confusion, and the possible loss of federal reimbursement
dollars. For example, under the manual system which
OES is in the process of replacing, when requests for
assistance were received, an OES employee manually
filled out a message form, contacted representatives of
agencies that might have the resources available to
respond, and ultimately assigned the responsibility for
responding. Once the responsibility was established, an
OES employee manually filled out a separate mission
number log, which indicated that an agency was formally
authorized to respond to a particular request. Matching of
the two manual documents ensured that OES was aware
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that the request for assistance was answered. However,
the preparation and matching of two separate manual
documents was time-consuming. In addition, if the
mission number log was not completed promptly, the
possibility existed that OES would either issue the same
mission number more than once or assign the responsibility
for responding to a request more than once.
The California Government Code, Section 8589.1, requires
OES to automate the collection and dissemination of
essential information during an emergency. OES has
OES has completed a recently completed a pilot project on the Emergency
pilot project to automate Response Information Management System (RIMS) to
information management address the mandate. RIMS is an automated system for
to improve disaster tracking requests, the availability of resources to meet
response. requests, and the status of the response to a disaster.
RIMS should further improve the timeliness of responses
and provide OES with better information on which to base
its decisions for answering requests.
For example, RIMS has a screen that has a detailed list of
questions that accompany a request, which when
answered will provide more detailed information for OES to
use in deciding the type and number of emergency
personnel and equipment to use in response to the
request. According to our interviews with an OES regional
administrator and employees from the California
Conservation Corps, this is one of the most important
aspects of the system because OES’s response
effectiveness can be limited by the quality of information it
obtains during a disaster. In addition, RIMS can sort
information in a wide array of categories, such as by the
various organizations that can be assigned the
responsibility to fill a request. This greatly improves OES’s
ability to coordinate and prioritize scarce resources.
Although the component of RIMS which tracks missions is
complete and has been used to track all missions in
California since September 1995, the full system has not
been tested in a major disaster.
Another problem related to OES’s response to
emergencies was identified by state and local government
representatives, who indicated that there is confusion
during the transition from the response to the recovery
phase of a disaster. In particular, Ventura County stated
for the Northridge earthquake that many different officials
from FEMA requested information that had already been
submitted to OES. Although this duplication of effort
added some administrative burdens on the local disaster
13
officials, it is a relatively minor issue that could be remedied
with better communication and sharing of information
between FEMA and OES. Notwithstanding these areas
that can be improved, OES was characterized by FEMA,
many state and local emergency organizations, and its own
staff as performing at its best when coordinating a
response to a disaster. On the whole, the interviews
indicated that OES’s response efforts are quick and
effective.
Preparedness
One reason for OES’s success in organizing responses to
disasters is its program to maintain preparedness for these
events. This preparedness program is intended to
minimize the devastation and loss of life that can
accompany any disaster. OES’s role in the statewide
preparation for disasters is to develop, implement, and
maintain the necessary state plans for responding to
emergencies; assist local governments with their own
emergency plans; coordinate federal, state, and local
emergency plans; provide training in emergency
management for state and local emergency staff; and
maintain facilities and equipment essential to the
management of emergencies. In general, OES effectively
administers the State’s preparedness program.
OES Is Generally Effective in
Preparing for Emergencies
No formal standards exist for the measurement of the
effectiveness of emergency response organizations in
preparing for disasters. Consequently, we relied on
information from interviews, information in national reports,
and the effectiveness of the State’s response to
emergencies as evidence that OES generally does a good
job of helping to prepare the State and local agencies for
emergencies. However, OES’s headquarters building is
substandard, and some equipment that is used
in emergency response is older than replacement
schedules recommend.
Three organizations with knowledge of the emergency
response community beyond California’s borders give high
ratings to the State’s commitment to its emergency
programs and OES’s effectiveness in preparing for
14
emergencies. In its 1991 report, Disaster Assistance:
Federal, State, and Local Responses to Natural Disasters
Need Improvement, the United States General Accounting
Office compared California’s level of preparedness to that
of other states. Noting that California conducted essential
emergency training courses and exercises, the report
concluded that its emphasis on disaster preparedness
resulted in few coordination problems during the immediate
response to emergencies. The National Academy of
Public Administration issued a report in February 1993,
Coping With Catastrophe: Building an Emergency
Management System to Meet People’s Needs in Natural
and Manmade Disasters, which noted that, of all the states,
California had the largest financial commitment to its
programs for building and administering emergency
management capability. In an October 1995 assessment
of OES’s capabilities, the regional director for FEMA
Region IX, which includes California, indicated that OES is
among the best state emergency organizations in the
country in preparing for disasters. Interviews with
representatives of some local emergency organizations
also indicated that OES staff were helpful and actively
involved in the local preparedness programs.
The training that OES provides, particularly the classes and
exercises available through the California Specialized
Training Institute (CSTI), met with consistent praise in the
interviews we conducted. CSTI provides a wide variety of
emergency management classes. They include training in
The California
public safety, state and federal emergency management,
Specialized Training
handling of hazardous materials, and criminal justice.
Institute has an
More than
international reputation
for excellence in 4,000 professional employees from other states, California
emergency management state departments, and local governments participate in
training. CSTI’s courses annually. The FEMA Region IX regional
director considers the training institute one of the best in
the country, noting that it has a national and international
reputation for excellence. Representatives of OES, other
state agencies’ emergency units, and local government
emergency organizations uniformly lauded the quality of
the training institute.
Implementation of SEMS
Is Progressing
One of the current goals of the preparedness program is to
help establish the statewide emergency management
15
system (SEMS). SEMS is intended to standardize the
statewide approach, procedures, and principles used in
responding to emergencies involving multiple jurisdictions
and define the roles of staff at the emergency site, local
government, operational area, regional area, and state
level. Most local governments have complied with the
requirement to organize into operational areas. However,
representatives of local governments indicated they were
confused about the nature and extent of the training
needed for SEMS and were concerned about the
availability of formal classes in its implementation. The
California Government Code, Section 8607, requires all
state agencies to use SEMS for multiple jurisdiction
responses to emergencies by December 1, 1996. To be
eligible for reimbursement under disaster assistance
programs for costs related to emergency responses, local
agencies must also comply with SEMS by this date.
OES’s role in the implementation of SEMS has been to
organize the committee of representatives from all levels of
emergency response in the State to develop it, design and
provide training in its implementation, and assist local
governments in planning and implementing it.
Although statutory deadlines have not always been met,
the implementation of SEMS appears to be progressing
SEMS is a management satisfactorily. OES coordinated the work of the SEMS
system to standardize advisory committee, which was established in 1993 and
procedures and consists of representatives from some local emergency
principles used in management agencies and
responding to
some of the state agencies with emergency response roles.
emergencies involving
The committee developed SEMS and wrote the proposed
multiple jurisdictions.
regulations for its implementation. The California
Government Code, Section 8607(a), required that the
regulations become effective by December 1, 1993, but the
regulations actually became effective in September 1994.
Additional regulations on training and compliance became
effective in January 1996.
OES has also developed and offered an approved course
of instruction in SEMS. This training includes a SEMS
introductory course, a field course, and a course in the
management of emergency operations centers. Our
interviews with employees at OES and representatives of
local governments indicated some concern over the
availability of these courses. However, the list of courses
offered through CSTI between October 1994 and
September 1995 indicates that 49 courses in SEMS were
offered in locations throughout the State. CSTI reports
16
that
1,897 trainees took these classes. In addition, CSTI
makes available sets of diskettes containing the approved
courses. CSTI reports that it has distributed over 600 sets
of the training diskettes to local governments and others.
This information suggests that the availability of SEMS
training is adequate.
The interviews also indicated some confusion over what
courses were required before a local government would
qualify for reimbursement of costs related to emergency
responses after December 1, 1996. In March 1995, OES
distributed a notice to emergency officials statewide,
including proposed regulations. These regulations state
that the emergency response agencies shall determine the
appropriate levels of SEMS training for each member of
their staff based on their potential assignment during an
emergency response. They also indicate that the local
governments must comply with SEMS when responding to
emergencies or risk losing reimbursement. The extent to
which staff take formal training in SEMS is a local decision.
Local governments in 54 of the 58 counties in California
either complied with the requirement of SEMS regulations
to organize into operational areas by December 1, 1995, or
were in the process of organizing. Operational areas are
an intermediate level of the state emergency services
organization, consisting of counties and all the political
subdivisions of those counties. By the deadline, 39 of 58
counties had formed operational areas and 15 others were
actively organizing. OES has assisted local governments
by providing workshops and examples of methods for
successful organization of operational areas.
OES Can Improve Its
Preparedness Program
Despite the current effectiveness of its preparedness
program and related response to emergencies, OES's
future capacity to respond well to emergencies is
threatened by inadequate facilities and aging equipment.
In particular, OES's headquarters facility, which houses the
OES’s headquarters State Operating Center and the State Warning Center, is
facility is substandard
substandard, and some fire engines and radio equipment
and fails to meet
are vulnerable to failure or obsolescence.
requirements for
essential services
buildings.
17
Section 16001 of the Health and Safety Code describes the
intent of the California Legislature that essential services
buildings be designed and constructed to minimize fire
hazards and resist, as much as practicable, the effects of
earthquakes, winds, and other natural elements. In
addition, the code requires new essential services buildings
to have communications systems, transformers, and
emergency backup systems that are adequate to ensure,
as much as practicable, continued operations during an
emergency.
Although OES’s emergency response activities clearly
constitute essential services as defined by the Health and
Safety Code, Section 16007, the building which houses
OES's headquarters, State Warning Center, and State
Operations Center does not meet the current requirements
for essential services buildings. The headquarters
building is located within the 100-year floodplain in
Sacramento. The floods of 1986 provide a measure of the
seriousness of this problem. During that disaster, the
California National Guard (CNG) had troop vehicles
standing by to evacuate OES headquarters in the event the
levees failed.
In reports issued in 1990 and 1992, the Department of
General Services described the following inadequacies of
the current facilities:
Failure to meet the requirements of the minimum fire
and safety codes;
Inadequate power to meet existing or anticipated needs;
Health hazards for employees working in the building,
including the presence of asbestos insulation;
Insufficient heating, cooling, and ventilation; and
Overcrowded conditions, with inadequate storage for
general as well as special supplies and equipment.
We observed many of the same conditions during our
audit. For example, OES uses the halls of the building for
storage and housing its library, and even though no major
emergency that would require additional electrical capacity
occurred during our audit, the electricity failed several
times, requiring the activation of the backup generator.
18
OES has attempted to obtain funding for either the
construction of new facilities or leasing more appropriate
facilities. For example, OES sought approval for the
construction of new facilities for fiscal year 1995-96, but the
request was rejected because the proposed funding
mechanism was not appropriate. OES has submitted a
budget request for a move to new facilities for fiscal year
1996-97.
Despite these problems with its facilities, OES has no
formal backup plans should the SOC become inoperative
during an emergency response. However, the director of
OES has indicated that it would relocate its emergency
operations to one of its other offices in Sacramento, one of
the REOCs, or the facilities of another state agency. One
of the objectives in developing the REOCs has been to
make each capable of taking over the responsibilities of
another REOC or the SOC. All the REOCs and SOC use
standardized staffing and procedures. The director also
indicated that OES has held informal discussions with the
CNG about the transfer of emergency operations.
Nevertheless, a formal backup plan is not in place.
Some of the fire engines that OES provides for use in
emergencies throughout the State have exceeded their
recommended replacement life of 20 years. These
engines are housed with local governments throughout the
State and are available for the use of these local
governments, as well as during more widespread
emergencies. Of OES’s 106 engines, 47 are more than 20
years old. OES has begun to replace some of its outdated
fire engines, purchasing a total of 14 new engines in fiscal
years 1990-91, 1991-92, and 1993-94. However, 1993-94
is the last year that OES replaced fire engines, leaving
Some of OES’s many outdated engines still in the fleet.
emergency equipment is
outdated. OES has similar problems with the potential obsolescence
of its radio equipment. The radio equipment is primarily
used for communication between emergency operation
centers and field units. Over 45 percent of this radio
equipment has exceeded its replacement life, which ranges
from six to ten years, depending on the type of equipment.
Although OES has purchased a satellite system for
communications throughout the State, radio equipment is
still used during emergency responses. Aging radio
equipment may increase the chances for equipment failure
and impair communications during emergencies. OES has
had approved funding for the radio equipment since fiscal
19
year 1990-91. However, the funding for this equipment
has been diverted to other uses.
The Hazard Mitigation Program
An important part of preparing for disasters is to anticipate
the kind of damage that can occur with each type,
determine what steps can be taken to avoid the anticipated
damage, and modify facilities and environments in areas
likely to be struck by disaster. The hazard mitigation grant
program provides funds for these purposes. With each
federally declared disaster, OES prepares a mitigation plan
specific to that disaster and the area in which it occurred
that describes the kind of projects to be funded. During a
subsequent application period, local governments in the
disaster area and state agencies apply for grants to fund
mitigation projects in their jurisdictions. Because the grant
requests exceed the funds available, OES evaluates,
prioritizes, and submits the prioritized requests to FEMA for
approval. OES disburses funds to grantees who
demonstrate that they have qualified for funding on
approved projects.
We noted a problem with OES’s administration of this
program. Specifically, OES does not independently
estimate the amount of grant moneys that will be available
for the federal portion of the program, relying instead on
information provided by FEMA. Without an independent
assessment of FEMA’s estimates, OES has little assurance
that the State and local governments are receiving all of the
funds allowed under the program.
Approval of Hazard Mitigation
Projects Takes Time
Table 1 provides OES’s October 1995 summary of FEMA’s
estimate of grant moneys available for hazard mitigation
and amounts obligated and remaining to be obligated by
FEMA for selected federal disasters since the Loma Prieta
earthquake. Because the period of application for the
winter storms of 1995 had not opened at the time OES
summarized this information, the table shows no amounts
obligated for this federal disaster. Because several years
can elapse between the disaster and the receipt of grant
funds, few projects have been approved for more recent
disasters.
20
Table 1
OES’s Summary of Selected Hazard
Mitigation Grant Programs
Federal
Estimate of Amount
Hazard Amount Not Yet
Mitigation Obligated Obligated
Name of Disaster Fundsa by FEMA by FEMA
Loma Prieta Earthquake, 1989 $ 53,110,000 $30,000,000 $ 23,110,000
East Bay Hills Fire, 1991 1,200,000 1,047,155 152,845
Winter Storms, 1993 14,934,000 238,757 14,695,243
Southern California Fires, 10,983,000 4,667,658 6,315,342
1993
Northridge Earthquake, 1994b 650,000,000 7,031,250 642,968,750
Winter Storms, 1995c 51,000,000 0 51,000,000
a The amounts in this column represent FEMA’s estimate of 15 percent of disaster
assistance funds for recovery efforts for the Southern California Fires, Northridge
Earthquake, and Winter Storms of 1995, and 10 percent for other disasters.
b Applications currently being reviewed; applications from state agencies were due
on October 31, 1995.
c Application period has not yet opened; Notices of Interest have been received in
the amount of $1.6 billion.
The Hazard Mitigation Program
Is Primarily Funded by the
Federal Government
Funding for the hazard mitigation program is primarily
federal, but also includes local funds. The Code of
Federal Regulations, Title 44, Chapter 1, Section 206.432,
currently provides that the total federal funding for the
hazard mitigation program can be up to 15 percent of the
funding it provides for the costs of recovery for the specific
disaster under the disaster assistance program. For
example, if $100 million of federal funds was spent in
California to repair the damage that occurred during a
disaster, then the area affected by the disaster would be
eligible for an additional $15 million in federal funds for
hazard mitigation. We discuss the disaster assistance
program in Chapter 2.
FEMA provides estimates of amounts available, which
change as the funding for the disaster assistance program
changes. For example, FEMA estimates of amounts
21
available for the hazard mitigation program related to the
Northridge earthquake have ranged from approximately
$568 million to $651 million. The federal government
funds up to 75 percent of the approved costs for each
individual grant, with the local governments funding the
remainder.
OES Does Not Verify FEMA’s
Estimate of Funds Available
Relatively little money was available for the hazard
mitigation program until the Northridge earthquake.
According to information provided by OES, FEMA's
estimates of total federal funds available for the
Loma Prieta earthquake of 1989, the East Bay fires of
1991, the 1993 winter storms, and the 1993 southern
California fires combined was $80 million. However, for
the Northridge earthquake alone, the federal estimate of
moneys available for hazard mitigation is $650 million.
We noted a shortcoming of the hazard mitigation grant
program that we believe should be addressed. OES does
OES does not not independently calculate or estimate the amount of
independently calculate federal funds available under this program. In addition,
the amount of federal OES does not have the detailed information describing how
funds available for FEMA arrived at its estimate that would allow OES to
hazard
assess the accuracy of the federal estimates. Without an
mitigation.
independent assessment of FEMA's estimates, OES has
little assurance that the State and local governments are
receiving all the funds allowed under the program.
Conclusion
OES is effective in organizing state and local response to
emergencies. It also is generally effective in helping the
State and local governments prepare for future
emergencies, but it has not addressed two issues to
maximize preparation and mitigation efforts. First, OES
has not ensured that its substandard facilities and the aging
equipment relied upon during emergency responses are
replaced. Second, while OES is responsible for managing
hazard mitigation funds, it does not independently assess
FEMA’s calculation of hazard mitigation funds that are
available to the State and local governments. As a result,
it has no assurance that all funds available for the hazard
mitigation projects are received from FEMA.
22
Blank page inserted for reproduction purposes only.
23
Chapter 2
OES’s Management of the Recovery
Process Must Be Improved
Chapter Summary
A
nother of the Office of Emergency Services’ (OES)
missions is to expedite California’s recovery from the
effects of disasters after they have occurred. OES is
responsible for helping applicants, including the State, local
governments, and certain private nonprofit organizations, claim
federal and state disaster assistance funds. OES disburses
these funds to applicants once their projects have received the
approval of both OES and the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) and repairs to damages have begun.
The process of claiming costs can be lengthy, paper-intensive,
and difficult, and OES has had limited success in meeting its
responsibilities in this area. Its current performance is
threatened both by some of FEMA’s policies and procedures and
its own administrative shortcomings. Specifically, FEMA has:
Not developed an effective system with OES to promptly
resolve disagreements about requests for assistance on
repairs to critical facilities such as hospitals;
Been inconsistent in allowing reimbursements for certain
costs;
Not promptly processed claims for assistance with damage
repairs; and
Eliminated OES’s review of claims for the winter storms of
1995 before FEMA approves them, rendering a lengthy
appeal process more likely.
Each of these policies and practices aggravates the already
difficult process of claiming costs.
In addition, OES does not have an adequate system for
managing the large volume of documents created during the
process
of claiming costs. Its current system is manual and outdated,
requiring an inordinate amount of time to access necessary
information and exposing OES to the loss of documents. As a
result, it does not have readily available information about the
status of individual claims or total claims for each disaster and is
not able to promptly summarize costs associated with each
24
disaster. Because the governor, Legislature, other state
agencies, and applicants all need this information, OES’s
ineffective system limits its ability to satisfy their need for the
information.
Normal Process for Claiming Costs
FEMA establishes the rules for claiming costs from the federal
government, and state reimbursements are claimed using similar
procedures. The flowchart below depicts the federal
procedures. As the flowchart indicates, the central document
for claiming costs is the damage survey report (DSR), which
establishes the scope of damage to be covered by the disaster
assistance
program and provides an estimate of the related costs. Once
FEMA approves the DSR, the federal and state governments
obligate funds to cover the estimated costs. In general, the
applicants do not receive funds until after they have incurred
costs to repair damage described in the DSR. Applicants are
allowed to appeal FEMA decisions on funding for a DSR.
25
Figure 1
Disaster Assistance Program
Disaster Event
Presidential Declaration
Applicant submits request for assistance
FEMA and OES Investigation Team surveys
damage and prepares DSR
After special reviews, FEMA approves DSR
Applicant can appeal DSR up to three times
Applicant completes project work
OES completes final inspections
When FEMA approves a DSR, it normally obligates, or agrees to
pay, 75 percent of the approved costs, and the State obligates
75 percent of the remainder. For example, for a DSR with
$100,000 in approved costs, FEMA will obligate $75,000 and the
State will obligate 75 percent of $25,000, or $18,750.
Applicants provide the remaining funds. However, either the
federal share or the state share can be increased.
Some differences exist between the state and federal programs.
For example, the state program does not provide benefits to
state departments and generally does not provide benefits to
private nonprofit organizations. In addition, OES prepares the
DSRs and evaluates the appeals for the state program, with no
involvement from FEMA.
Difficulties Are Inherent in
the Federal DSR Process
26
Even when there are no disagreements that can lead to appeals,
the process of preparing DSRs, approving the scope and
estimated costs, and claiming reimbursements for costs incurred
can be lengthy and labor-intensive. Although some claims are
Preparing, processing,
processed and paid quickly, many require months, even years,
and closing damage
before the applicant completes the project and receives final
survey reports is labor
reimbursement on a DSR. Several factors contribute to the
intensive and can take length of time and amount of effort required, including requests
years. for extensions of time to complete part of the claim process, the
need for special reviews, the size of the project and the need to
involve additional parties in the process, changes in the scope of
the project, and the requirement that applicants have the
appropriate insurance to help cover future costs.
Requests for extensions of time on projects can add months to
the time needed to complete the projects. For example, the
City of Ukiah requested an additional two years to complete work
on flood damage, and the Peralta Community College District
requested a time extension of 18 months to complete work
related to 26 DSRs.
Special reviews, such as historical and environmental reviews,
add to the normal time required to complete a project.
Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA)
requires all federal agencies with undertakings affecting
historical properties in California to consult with the California
State Historic Preservation Officer and the Advisory Council on
Historic Preservation to determine the effects of their projects on
historical structures. FEMA cannot fund projects until the
requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
have been met. Federal funding may be denied if the applicant
cannot comply with the NHPA or NEPA before work begins on a
disaster assistance project.
The largest DSRs take more employee time and are complicated
for other reasons. For example, with large projects FEMA often
reviews the bidding process for contractor selection and building
plans. FEMA, OES, the applicant, and other interested parties
such as contractors hold regular meetings about progress on
large project plans. Also, to formalize and provide clarity about
agreements they have reached for a major project, FEMA,
OES, and applicants may prepare and sign a memorandum
of understanding. Reaching an agreement and preparing a
memorandum of understanding may take years. For example,
FEMA, OES, and the Watsonville Community Hospital took over
four years to decide on the scope of the DSR and the nature of
work the federal government would fund. They finally
determined that the hospital, which was damaged during the
Loma Prieta earthquake in 1989, would be replaced as an
improved project.
27
Changes in the scope of projects also add to the length of time
and amount of effort required to process DSRs for an applicant.
For example, three supplemental DSRs were written because
Project scope changes of an increase in scope of work on repairs for the
also add to the time and American Conservatory Theater building damaged in the
effort required to process Loma Prieta earthquake. The third was approved in July 1994,
DSRs. almost five years after the earthquake. When the applicant
requested an expansion of the scope of the DSR, FEMA and
OES approved a supplemental DSR for the additional eligible
costs. During the assessment of the need for a supplemental
DSR, FEMA again reviews the original scope of the project, as
well as the additional request.
FEMA requires applicants to maintain insurance appropriate
to the disaster, such as flood or earthquake insurance, to protect
against future loss. Uninsured applicants must contact brokers
to determine the cost of insurance to meet this condition. If the
cost is prohibitive, the applicants must request and receive a
waiver from the state insurance commissioner. In either case,
additional time is required before the DSR process can be
completed.
Although each of these procedures is important in ensuring that
the scope of DSRs adequately answers the needs of the
applicant while limiting costs to the State and federal
government, they do contribute to the length of time and amount
of effort required for the completion of the DSR processing.
OES’s Recovery Activities Show
a Need To Improve
Despite the inherent difficulties in the recovery process, OES is
moderately successful in meeting the needs of applicantsand
FEMA. However, it has some significant problems with its
recovery operations, including its inability to appropriately
manage the volume of information created.
We found no formal standards for measuring the effectiveness
of an organization’s recovery efforts. However, several
interviews with members of the emergency management
Although moderately
community indicated that OES was generally meeting the needs
successful in meeting the
of those it serves. For example, the FEMA Region IX
needs of applicants and
administrator stated that OES was among the best state
FEMA, OES has some
emergency management agencies in meeting its responsibilities
significant problems with
in the recovery process, noting in particular OES’s effectiveness
its recovery operations.
at notifying potential applicants about the availability of disaster
assistance funds and educating the applicants about what
constitutes reimbursable costs.
Local government representatives also indicated that OES has
been essential in their recovery from the effects of disasters.
28
For example, like the FEMA administrator, the commander of the
Office of Research and Planning of the California Highway Patrol
(CHP) noted that OES is good at notifying them about the
availability of funds and the nature of the costs that are
reimbursable as a result of CHP’s response to disasters. In
addition, representatives of two local governments indicated that
OES acts as their advocate in dealings with FEMA, and they
appreciated OES’s support. One of these representatives also
noted that OES helps the recovery process move more quickly
by helping to resolve disputes with FEMA. Even applicants who
have been through several disasters and have experience
working with FEMA appreciate OES’s role as a central source of
information about the disaster assistance program and
coordinator of responses to FEMA. For example, the
emergency services manager of the City of Oakland stated that
OES was very helpful in negotiations with FEMA for the funding
of repairs for the Oakland city hall. In addition, in our review of
numerous DSR files, we noted several instances in which the
applicants expressed their appreciation for OES’s effectiveness
in helping them prepare and defend their requests for
assistance.
Not all comments during the interviews were positive, however.
Specifically, five of the interviewees indicated dissatisfaction
with the high staff turnover at OES. The lack of continuity in
OES’s high staff turnover
employees resulted in delays in processing DSRs while the new
has caused delays and
employees learned about past decisions. Our own observations
inefficiencies.
confirmed that turnover is high among OES employees working
in the recovery process. We discuss OES staffing issues more
fully in Chapter 3. In addition, one of the state agency
representatives expressed dissatisfaction with the “management
skills” of OES recovery staff, noting that they do not always
follow the established chain of command.
Our own observations also showed that OES had more
significant problems with the recovery efforts than the interviews
revealed. For example, OES and FEMA have had
disagreements about certain FEMA policies and practices that
have impaired OES’s effectiveness in the recovery process. In
addition, OES has not developed a reliable system for managing
documents related to the recovery process and for tracking
related costs. We discuss each of these issues in the following
sections.
Certain FEMA Policies and Practices
Hamper the Recovery Process
OES’s effectiveness is hampered by some of FEMA’s policies
and practices. FEMA’s slowness in resolving disagreements
about requests for assistance on repairs to critical facilities, its
recent changes to the process for preparing DSRs for the winter
29
storms of 1995, its inconsistency in allowing reimbursements for
certain costs, its failure to promptly process DSRs, and some of
its other practices aggravate an already difficult process.
In January 1996, we submitted questions about these problems
to the FEMA Region IX regional director for FEMA’s perspective.
FEMA indicated that our questions concerned issues of
agencywide policies and practices, and FEMA’s response would
require coordination among several FEMA offices and divisions.
Providing a thorough and adequate summary of FEMA’s official
position was impossible given the competing demands of our
deadlines, FEMA’s backlog of work resulting from the recent
government shutdown, and disaster activity in the eastern United
States. FEMA also indicated that it is receptive to suggestions
to expedite the delivery of disaster assistance.
Critical Facility Repairs
Were Delayed
Although FEMA has established the appeals process to resolve
disagreements about the scope and eligibility of costs for
reimbursement, FEMA and OES do not have an effective system
for promptly resolving such disagreements for critical facilities.
As a result, the repair or replacement of these critical facilities
can be delayed. The damages to the San Francisco city hall
during the Loma Prieta earthquake in October 1989 and to 21
medical centers, each with multiple buildings, in the Los Angeles
area during the Northridge earthquake in January 1994 illustrate
the inadequacies of the current process.
FEMA and the City and County of San Francisco disagreed
about two significant issues affecting the repair of the city hall.
First, FEMA questioned which building codes were applicable for
the repair. The other issue concerned whether FEMA would
fund the full seismic upgrade. The city and county’s position
was that the facility should be seismically upgraded at a cost of
approximately $180 million. FEMA, on the other hand,
determined that repair of the facility would still comply with the
building code and be less costly. As of December 1994, more
than five years after the earthquake, FEMA had obligated
$79 million in federal moneys for repair of the city hall.
30
Several hospitals in the Los Angeles area that were damaged
during the Northridge earthquake experienced similar difficulties.
A number of hospitals were closed or partially closed because
of the extent of damage to the facilities, threatening the
prompt delivery of essential health services to the Los Angeles
community. FEMA, OES, and the applicants did not reach
agreement on the building code interpretation that would be the
A plan to resolve basis for determining the scope and estimating the costs of
disagreements on DSRs until October 1995, almost 21 months after the
hospitals damaged in the earthquake. The actual scope and estimated costs of DSRs
Northridge earthquake and decisions about whether to repair or replace each hospital
was not in place until 21 could not be made until this issue was resolved. In October
1995, FEMA presented a second option to approximately 20
months after the disaster.
medical centers, offering to pay a predetermined amount per
square foot of space in the damaged hospitals. Applicants
taking this option would receive funds more quickly, avoiding
the lengthy process of evaluating all damages, but would forfeit
their right to ask for supplemental DSRs if additional damages
were discovered. Although FEMA acted more quickly to resolve
disagreements about critical facilities damaged by the Northridge
earthquake than it did
with the San Francisco city hall, a plan for addressing the
disagreements was not in place until October 1995, 21 months
after the disaster struck.
In each of these cases, the delivery of vital services was either
threatened or less available to the affected communities for
extended periods of time. Because of the critical nature of
these services, a faster, more equitable method of resolving
differences between FEMA and applicants is needed.
FEMA Procedural Changes May
Cause Additional Appeals
FEMA’s recent decision to change the procedures for the initial
preparation of DSRs has the potential for increasing the amount
of time and effort FEMA, OES, and the applicants spend on
the recovery from disasters. The change, which FEMA’s federal
coordinating officer announced in a July 1995 letter, eliminates
OES’s review of DSR files for the winter storms of 1995 before
FEMA approves them. As a result, OES does not have as
much preapproval input about the scope and estimated costs of
the DSRs as it did in the past. FEMA’s expressed intent in
making the change was to expedite the preparation of the DSRs,
allowing applicants access to funds more quickly. Although the
change clearly would reduce the amount of debate about the
DSRs during their initial preparation, we believe it merely
postpones that debate.
Because the change is so recent, it is too early to determine its
long-term effects. However, we believe that this less
31
collaborative process is likely to result in significantly more
appeals of DSRs. Because the appeals process is lengthy and
labor-intensive, we expect that the increase in administrative
effort and costs for all participants in the process could be
significant, outweighing any benefits to applicants from receiving
funds earlier. Also, those applicants who choose to accept
these expedited DSRs without appeals may be losing funds to
which they are entitled.
FEMA Has Changed the Eligibility
of Certain Costs
FEMA has apparently changed its position on the eligibility of
certain costs for reimbursement under the disaster assistance
program. In addition to causing confusion and uncertainty about
funding for OES and applicants, these changes result in appeals
and additional work for all participants. Our review of DSR files
revealed inconsistency in allowing the reimbursement for local
governments’ costs of processing new building permits and for
certain repairs on drainage channels damaged during floods, as
well as reversal of previous decisions by deobligating funds.
FEMA was inconsistent in its treatment of two requests from
Los Angeles County for reimbursement of costs for processing
new building permits. After the firestorms in the fall of 1993,
FEMA agreed to provide the county approximately $76,000 for
its costs for assessing properties damaged or completely
destroyed in the fires. However, after the Northridge
earthquake, Los Angeles County requested approximately $4.9
million for the same kinds of costs. Although it initially indicated
that these costs were eligible for reimbursement, FEMA changed
its position and refused to approve the county’s request.
Between 1993 and 1995, FEMA also changed its assessment of
the eligibility of costs for using rip rap to repair drainage
channels. Rip rap is 12- to 18-inch rock placed on the side of
earthen channels to prevent erosion and is more expensive than
the use of native materials, such as tightly packing the dirt of the
channel. FEMA made approximately $1.8 million in federal
funds available to Orange County for rip rap repairs required
after the 1993 winter storms. In contrast, FEMA disallowed
Orange County’s request to use $1.3 million of rip rap to repair
earthen channels after the January storms of 1995, obligating
only $17,400 to restore the channels to pre-disaster condition
using compacted native materials.
Another practice that can create problems for applicants is
FEMA’s reversal of previous decisions to reimburse certain
costs, called the “deobligation” of funds. According to
administrators in FEMA Region IX, it deobligates funds for three
reasons: to offset moneys advanced to applicants once actual
32
costs are incurred, to eliminate the unused costs on DSRs if the
actual costs are less than the DSR estimates, and to correct
DSRs that included ineligible costs that FEMA did not notice
when it originally approved them.
The third reason for the deobligation of funds can be the source
of significant problems for applicants. Once DSRs are
approved, the applicants can reasonably expect to receive these
funds and prepare their budgets and financial plans accordingly.
FEMA’s reversals of
When the applicants do not receive the funds, they must adjust
decisions and policy
their financial plans to compensate. For example, OES
changes cause distrust
requested almost $14 million to operate disaster assistance
and confusion.
centers after the Northridge earthquake. In March 1994, FEMA
approved a DSR for these costs. However, in June 1995, more
than a year later, FEMA deobligated the funds. We more fully
discuss the effect of FEMA’s deobligation of these funds on
OES’s current cash flow problems in Chapter 3.
Consistency in policy is crucial to the effective administration of
the recovery process. Inconsistencies can result in confusion
and cause distrust of the process, as indicated recently in
Sonoma County’s assessment of its recovery from the winter
floods of 1995. The county reported that changes by FEMA to
long-established rules for reimbursable costs “created havoc”
among county departments and, in some cases, changed the
way in which the departments responded to disaster operations.
Other FEMA Policies and Practices
Make the Recovery Process
More Difficult
Several other FEMA policies and practices unnecessarily
complicate the already difficult recovery process. Following are
descriptions of these policies and practices that we noted during
our review of DSR files.
FEMA requires that a separate DSR be prepared for each
applicant for each category of damage at each damage site.
This policy contributes to the large number of DSRs that
have to be written for some disasters. For example, OES
has estimated that as many as 60,000 DSRs will be written
for the Northridge earthquake. As of November 1, 1995, the
Los Angeles Unified School District alone had over 6,800
DSRs for this disaster. Because each DSR must be
prepared and processed, more DSRs contribute to increased
administrative time and effort for the recovery process.
33
FEMA’s basic procedures for preparing small DSRs differ
very little from those for large ones. We noted many DSRs
for amounts under $10,000 that required much the same
work as DSRs for substantially more money. For example,
a City of Modesto DSR for $6,000 for the winter floods of
FEMA’s requirements for
1995 had 36 pages of supplementary information. Because
processing small DSRs
the process of assessing damages and preparing the DSRs
with the same effort as
takes the combined efforts of FEMA, OES, and the applicant,
those that are far larger
we question the cost-effectiveness of using DSRs for small
are too costly.
projects. A similar condition exists with appeals on small
DSRs. A faster method for agreeing on costs, assessing
appeals, and expediting payment to the applicants would
reduce the amount of work for each of these participants in
the process, allowing them to concentrate their efforts on the
more difficult and costly projects.
FEMA frequently does not meet its established deadlines for
reviewing and approving DSRs. It failed to process 126 of
the 230 DSRs we reviewed within 55 days, 10 days longer
than the 45-day deadline included in federal regulations. As
a result, the availability of federal funds to applicants was
delayed.
Inspector General Raises Similar
Concerns Regarding FEMA’s
Policies and Practices
Some of our concerns about FEMA’s policies and practices have
been voiced before. In a February 1993 report, Public
Assistance Program Administration in FEMA Region IX
Following the Loma Prieta Earthquake, FEMA’s inspector
general (IG) also noted some of the same issues. For example,
the IG reported that determining when restoration of a damaged
facility required seismic strengthening in accordance with
applicable local codes and standards was a primary cause of
project delays following the Loma Prieta earthquake. The IG
added that FEMA’s procedures required a time-consuming
interpretation for each building code. The IG used the San
Francisco city hall as an example when discussing these delays.
Three years after the IG’s report was issued, repairs to the city
hall are not yet complete. Furthermore, we continue to see
these delays affecting critical facilities damaged in the Northridge
earthquake. The IG also noted that FEMA’s deobligation of a
previously approved DSR led to controversy and delays,
undermining confidence in the FEMA inspection processes and
increasing challenges and appeals. We also found that
changes in FEMA’s determination of eligible costs, whether by
deobligating a previously approved DSR or by changing the
eligibility of certain costs from one disaster to a subsequent
disaster, continues to undermine the confidence that OES and
applicants have in FEMA’s decisions.
34
Each of these FEMA policies or practices can have a significant
negative impact on either the availability of recovery funds to
applicants or on the amount of effort required to deliver those
funds to applicants. As a result, OES has a clear interest in
working with FEMA to modify the policies and practices.
OES Has Not Determined
All Legal Options
OES must know all the available options for challenging FEMA to
be an effective advocate for applicants when serious concerns
arise about policies and practices. Although it has consulted
with the State’s Attorney General about options for challenging
specific FEMA decisions, the OES has not sought or received a
formal opinion from the attorney general about all the options it
OES does not know and applicants have and under what circumstances each option
whether it has the right to can be exercised.
challenge FEMA’s
policies or practices. Based on communications from OES, the attorney general, and
FEMA’s general counsel, it appears that legal options may be
very limited. The attorney general has indicated to OES that a
legal challenge to FEMA’s use of “discretionary” funds might be
unsuccessful, and FEMA’s general counsel argues for a broad
interpretation of “discretionary” funds in FEMA’s disaster
assistance program. However, OES has not received a formal
opinion from the attorney general on either the right to legally
challenge FEMA’s use of discretionary funds or the definition of
what constitutes discretionary funds for the federal disaster
assistance program. FEMA’s general counsel has also opined
that FEMA cannot delegate its statutory obligation to determine
which repairs it will fund, as would be the case with third party
arbitration. Again, OES does not have an opinion from the
attorney general on this subject.
Legal challenges may also be an inefficient method of resolving
disputes. In disputes over specific FEMA rulings on findings for
individual DSRs, both OES and the applicant must consider the
factor of timing. OES has noted that protracted disputes in the
courts may delay action on damaged facilities beyond what
either OES or the applicant considers acceptable. This is
particularly true if challenges through the appeal process must
be exhausted before legal challenges can be made.
Although legal options may be limited and inefficient, they can be
important tools in resolving differences. OES cannot be certain
what options exist for challenging FEMA’s funding decisions until
it receives a formal opinion from the attorney general. Without
this information, OES will not be able to negotiate as effectively
with FEMA as it could.
35
OES’s Operational Inefficiencies
Contribute to the Recovery Problems
OES’s internal operational problems diminish its effectiveness in
helping with the State’s recovery from disasters. Primary
among these problems is OES’s failure to develop an adequate
system for managing the volumes of documents and
correspondence generated during the recovery process and for
tracking the status of DSRs individually and collectively for each
disaster. Other problems, which we discuss in Chapter 3,
include inappropriate contract management and inability to
demonstrate staffing needs.
The Current System Is
Manual and Outdated
OES’s current system for managing recovery documents is
outdated, with paper documents filed by applicant for each
disaster. All the DSRs and related documents and
correspondence about a disaster are included in the applicant’s
manual file. For example, the 6,800 DSRs written for the
Northridge earthquake for the Los Angeles Unified School
District are all part of one applicant file, which fills more than five
filing cabinets. Not only is this system cumbersome but it also
lacks the capability for tracking component parts of a file or a
whole file. For example, we noted instances in which there was
no record of who was using a missing file, and no one was able
to locate the file. Complicating the system even further, OES
does not house all DSR files in one location. Files relating to
southern disasters, such as the Northridge earthquake and the
firestorms during the fall of 1993, are kept in Pasadena, whereas
files for northern disasters, such as the Loma Prieta earthquake
and the East Bay Hills fires, are housed in Sacramento.
OES Cannot Manage Information
With the Current System
The current system for organizing and storing recovery
documents does not meet OES’s most basic needs for
information management. For example, because the files
consist of paper documents, they are available to only one
person at a time, and the separate locations can cause
inefficiencies. If employees in the northern California offices
need data about a DSR written for the Northridge earthquake,
they must contact employees in Pasadena, who have to find the
needed information in the files and transmit it to them. The form
of transmittal, such as a telephone conversation, FAX, or
overnight mail, depends on the volume and nature of the
requested information.
36
Even when they are in the same location as the files, OES
employees cannot quickly access information. Following are
some examples of the kinds of problems resulting from the
current system.
OES does not track the status of DSRs. Questions arising
about a particular DSR require a search of the paper files.
OES does not track information by disaster. If questions
arise about the total number or type of DSRs written for a
The lack of an effective
disaster or a summary of the status of those DSRs is
system for managing
requested, OES must manually collect this information.
damage survey reports
When we requested information about the status of DSRs for
diminishes OES’s ability
three disasters, OES estimated that it would take between 80
to perform routine work
and 160 hours of staff time to accumulate the information for
efficiently.
just the Northridge disaster.
OES also does not have a convenient system for tracking
costs associated with DSRs. It maintains only manual
ledgers organized by applicant for each disaster, without
summaries for each disaster and without separate detail for
each DSR. If questions arise about the amount disbursed
for a particular DSR, the information is not readily available.
OES does not keep a library of information about the
resolution of issues or disagreements affecting DSRs. In
addition, it does not routinely track DSRs with similar issues.
If the applicant and FEMA reach an agreement about eligible
costs, OES has no system for identifying other DSRs that
could be affected by the decision.
In each of these cases, the limited access to information
diminishes OES’s ability to perform routine work effectively.
OES sometimes uses FEMA’s database for information about a
DSR or an applicant. This reliance, in turn, causes problems.
Specifically, OES does not control the information and has little
assurance about its completeness or reliability. For example,
we noted an instance in which FEMA eliminated a DSR from its
database rather than indicating that the DSR was void. If the
applicant had questioned the disposition of the DSR, OES would
not have had a record of its existence and the applicant would
not be able to exercise the right of appeal. The FEMA database
is also not adequate for OES because it only starts tracking
DSRs after they have been initially reviewed and is not always
available to OES. For example, when some of FEMA’s
employees were furloughed during the federal budget crisis in
November and December 1995, OES’s employees were not able
to access the database.
37
OES must have the capacity to quickly provide accurate
information to a variety of users. After a major disaster, the
governor, the Legislature, and other state agencies have to know
the financial impact of that disaster. Applicants must be able to
obtain reliable information about the status of their DSRs. OES
itself is seriously hurt by its inability to quickly summarize the
status of DSRs and related costs. Without such information,
OES cannot present its own budget needs effectively, a subject
that we discuss more fully in Chapter 3.
OES Has Attempted To Address Its
Need for Better Information Management
OES’s administration is well aware of the problems caused by its
lack of an operational, effective automated system for tracking
recovery documents and related costs and has attempted to
create such a system. After the Northridge disaster, OES
contracted for the services of a consultant to design and
implement the Public Assistance Damage Survey Report
Management Information System (PADMIS). However, the
implementation of PADMIS has not gone smoothly, and OES
remains without a reliable DSR tracking system almost two years
after the earthquake. We also discuss this subject more fully in
Chapter 3.
Conclusion
Although there are inherent difficulties in the recovery process,
OES has generally met the needs of applicants and FEMA.
However, OES’s management of the State’s recovery from
disasters can be significantly improved. Certain policies and
practices of FEMA and OES’s inadequate management of the
volumes of information related to the recovery process cause
delays and potential loss of funds to the State and other
applicants for federal moneys.
38
Chapter 3
OES Has Serious Administrative Problems
Chapter Summary
A
lthough it is able to meet its emergency management
responsibilities, the Office of Emergency Services
(OES) has serious administrative problems that, if
uncorrected, threaten the continued effectiveness of the
organization as a whole. The recent series of disasters to
strike California has exposed the inherent weaknesses in
OES’s administration and overwhelmed its capacity to cope
with the resulting workload. Beginning with the
Loma Prieta earthquake in 1989, California has endured a
significant number of major emergencies, including 15
federally declared disasters and an additional 17 disasters
declared by the State. Among these are the most
widespread in California history—the winter storms of
1995, which affected all 58 counties in the State—and the
most expensive—the Northridge earthquake, with an
estimated $20 billion in damage.
As a result of these disasters, the staffing levels and
budgeted expenditures for OES have increased
dramatically. Figure 2 below, which is based on the
governor’s budgets, indicates that OES’s total budget grew
almost 2,000 percent between fiscal years 1988-89 and
1994-95. In addition, OES staff grew 150 percent in the
same period.
However, the increase in staffing has not compensated for
the impact of the many disasters on OES’s performance of
its routine functions. When OES responds to an
emergency, employees in all parts of the organization
contribute to the response efforts. Normal, day-to-day
activities are, therefore, disrupted. As the response effort
wanes, OES employees are faced with backlogs in their
routine work, such as processing claims, maintaining
financial records, and providing emergency management
training to local governments. The recovery from
disasters, which can last for years, is an even greater drain
on OES employees’ time.
Figure 2
39
History of OES Expenditures
by Program
11998888--8899
11998899--9900
11999900--9911
11999911--9922
11999922--9933
11999933--9944
11999944--9955
$0 $100,000 $200,000 $300,000 $400,000 $500,000 $600,000 $700,000 $800,000 $900,000 $1,000,000 $1,100,000
Expenditures for Program
(in Thousands)
Significant problems caused by the combination of
numerous disasters and inadequate administrative
procedures are OES’s:
Inability to identify clearly and justify its staffing needs;
Lack of a strategic plan before September 1995 that
identified OES’s information technology needs and
established a methodology for addressing those needs;
Serious cash flow problem, exacerbated by inaccurate
budgeting and late billing of the federal government;
and
Inadequate contract management, resulting in
expenditures of state and federal funds without
evidence of the benefits received for those
expenditures.
Both immediate and long-term solutions for these problems
are crucial to OES’s continued effectiveness. A weakened
OES will diminish the effectiveness of emergency
management throughout the State. Without these
solutions, OES will remain in an administrative crisis,
40
sraeY
lacsiF
Mutual Aid Response Plans and Preparedness Disaster Assistance
diverting scarce resources from its emergency
management needs to its administrative problems.
OES Has Problems With
Hiring Employees Rapidly and
Retaining Trained Employees
OES has serious problems in hiring and retaining
employees to deal with the workload needed for recovery
from disasters. The problems include high employee
turnover and significant overtime costs for which the State
does not receive
federal reimbursement. Causes of these problems include
the limitations that come with the hiring options OES has,
the temporary nature of the positions within OES’s Disaster
Assistance Branch, and the lack of a complete
time-reporting system. Without such a time-reporting
system, OES has been unable to assess and demonstrate
its staffing needs, which hinders its ability to prepare
meaningful budgets.
OES Has Several Hiring Options
During Disaster Recovery
When a disaster occurs, OES must be able to hire staff
very quickly for immediate recovery from the disaster.
When the disaster devastates an urban area, damaging
The law allows OES to
many public buildings and facilities as the Northridge
use emergency and
earthquake did, OES must be able to hire and retain
limited-term
professional employees for extended periods to help with
appointments and
the recovery. OES has several options for hiring
contracts to hire staff.
employees to meet the immediate and longer-term needs
of recovering from the disaster. The options include
making emergency appointments, using the employees of
other state agencies, contracting with employment
agencies, and hiring limited-term employees.
The California Government Code, Section 19888.1, and the
California Code of Regulations, Title 2, Article 12,
Section 302.1, address OES’s need to hire employees very
quickly during emergencies by giving it the authority to
make emergency appointments. Emergency
appointments allow OES to hire employees for short
periods without following
civil service procedures. This hiring process is quick and
convenient. However, because the emergency hiring
41
process is so fast and candidates do not go through normal
civil service testing, there may be less assurance of the
candidates’ competence.
Generally, an emergency appointment is limited by the
California Code of Regulations, Title 2, Article 12,
Section 303, to 60 working days in a 12-month period.
However, this rule can be waived. The Standing Order
Number One, issued by the governor under the
Government Code, Section 8567, and activated with the
governor’s proclamation of a state of emergency, waives
the general 60-working-day limit and gives OES authority to
determine the period of employment up to the termination
date of the state of emergency. However, the California
Constitution, Article 7, Section 5, limits all temporary
employment, including emergency appointments, to 9
months in a 12-month period. Therefore, it can only retain
emergency hires for the period of the declared state of
emergency or 9 months, whichever comes first. If it needs
these employees for a longer period, it must go through an
additional hiring process.
OES can also use employees from other state agencies
under the Emergency Services Act, Sections 8596(a) and
8649, but the amount of time these employees are
available is limited because the agencies they officially
work for also need their services. The Government Code,
Section 19130(b), also allows OES to use contract
employees under emergency conditions. Although this is
a quick way to get temporary help, using contract
employees may be more expensive, requiring the payment
of an administrative fee to the employment agency.
OES can also make limited-term appointments. Under the
Government Code, Section 18530, the limited-term
appointments must be made using civil service
employment lists. Therefore, OES must follow civil service
procedures, which require more time for hiring than making
OES’s hiring options do emergency appointments. In addition, limited-term
not meet its needs to appointments last for only two years according to the
quickly hire and retain Government Code, Section 19080.3. Although
large numbers of
Section 19080.4 allows certain limited-term appointments
competent staff.
to be extended for up to two additional years, this extension
applies only to construction projects still in progress and
does not include the hiring that OES does to recover from a
disaster. The California State Personnel Board’s
Personnel Management Policy and Procedures Manual,
Section 331, explains that the two-year maximum may not
42
be exceeded through any combination of extensions or
reappointments or by using a different limited-term
employee to complete the same work. However, it does
not preclude an individual from accepting another
limited-term appointment to another position.
These options give OES more flexibility and efficiency in
hiring than do the civil service procedures it is required to
follow in nonemergency circumstances. However, the
options individually and jointly still present limitations that
prevent OES from meeting its current staffing needs.
Recently, OES has attempted to resolve the problem of
hiring large numbers of competent employees quickly.
According to its lead personnel analyst, OES gave three
civil service examinations during fiscal year 1994-95 to
meet current and future demand and to avoid making
emergency hires or using contracted employees as much
as possible if another disaster occurs. By administering
these examinations, OES established a list of Disaster
Worker Specialty Services candidates, the most
commonly used classification of employees needed for
the recovery process. As of December 1995, at least 200
candidates remained on the list and were available should
OES need them. In addition, OES is currently working on
a “Disaster Field Office (DFO) in a box” concept that would
allow it to
expedite the hiring process when a disaster occurs. Much
of
the recovery work for disasters occurs in the DFO, and the
DFO-in-a-box concept establishes predetermined DFO
organizational charts, depicting the number of employees
required at each level, for various sizes of disasters.
When a disaster occurs, OES can project the number of
hires for each civil service classification quickly as soon as
the type of disaster and size of DFO is determined.
OES also has ongoing problems with its staffing needs for
recovery from the approximately 20 currently open
disasters, many of which are more than six years old. This
clearly illustrates that OES’s need for employees to assist
with these longer-term recovery efforts extends well
beyond the two
years that limited-term employees can work. For example,
OES records show that work remains on most of the
damage survey reports (DSR) written for the Loma Prieta
earthquake six years after the disaster.
43
The Northridge Earthquake Added
More Staffing Problems
The staffing needs for recovery from the Northridge
earthquake illustrate the inadequacy of OES’s hiring
options. The magnitude of the Northridge earthquake
created some hardships for OES in retaining trained
employees. For example, OES had to hire more
employees than were on their employment lists at that time.
It had to make many emergency appointments immediately
and then go through civil service procedures to establish
employment lists for limited-term appointments. At that
time, OES’s personnel office was staffed to accommodate
the normal volume of hiring. According to OES’s
personnel officer, the normal volume averaged less than 50
The large number of hires per disaster for disasters prior to the Northridge
additional staff required earthquake, excluding the Loma Prieta earthquake. To
for the Northridge determine the volume of hiring created by the Northridge
earthquake overwhelmed earthquake, we looked at OES’s personnel records, which
OES’s personnel unit. show that in calendar year 1994, a total of 1,194 personnel
action requests were received, and among those requests,
557 appointments were made.
To accommodate the increased volume of hiring, OES’s
personnel office itself had to hire and train additional
personnel specialists, which required time. In addition,
according to the personnel officer, the office was not
initially informed about the extent of OES’s hiring needs
when the disaster occurred. As a result, it was slow to
anticipate the number of additional personnel specialists
required to process hiring documents for the
new employees. The establishment of the civil service
employment lists was not completed before approximately
55 lead employees who were on emergency appointments
reached their employment limit of nine months.
Had OES been unable to retain these trained employees, a
significant disruption to the recovery from the Northridge
earthquake would have occurred because new employees
would have had to be trained. Consequently, OES
contracted with an employment agency, which in turn hired
the emergency hires when their employment with OES
reached the 9-month limit. Through this contract, OES
was able to continue to use the 55 trained emergency
hires and other emergency hires who subsequently
reached their 9-month limit. The contract met OES’s
immediate needs but was costly because the employment
44
agency charged an administrative fee to hire and supply
the employees to OES.
OES Does Not Always Comply With
Emergency Appointment Laws
and Regulations
We also analyzed OES’s hiring practices to determine
whether it complied with legal and regulatory requirements.
We reviewed the applicable laws, regulations, and rules in
the California Constitution, the Government Code, the
California Code of Regulations, and the State Personnel
Board’s Personnel Management Policy and Procedures
Manual regarding limited-term and emergency
appointments. We tested OES’s compliance with hiring
procedures for 15 hires during fiscal years 1993-94 and
1994-95. OES generally complied with the requirements
for emergency and limited-term hiring. However, it did not
exhaust all administrative and civil service alternatives
before making an emergency appointment to fill one of two
established clerical positions when the position was
temporarily vacant. In addition, OES did not release all
emergency hires when the state of emergency declaration
was revoked on September 1, 1995, as required by laws
and regulations.
On October 30, 1995, however, OES took steps to remedy
this situation. The personnel officer notified the
appropriate managers, supervisors, and branch chiefs that
the governor’s revocation of the states of emergency meant
that OES no longer had the authority to keep emergency
hires beyond the 60-day maximum.
The Temporary Nature of the Positions
Contributes to High Staff Turnover
OES has experienced high turnover in part because its
Disaster Assistance Branch, which administers the
recovery process, is largely staffed with limited-term
employees. For example, OES’s personnel records show
Staff turnover causes that while 485 employees were appointed during the period
loss of productivity and from January 1994 through July 1994, 173 were separated.
additional training and
Most of those appointed and separated during that period
personnel costs.
were employed in a disaster field office within the Disaster
Assistance Branch. OES believes that some limited-term
hires use the OES experience as an opportunity to get into
state employment with other agencies that can offer
45
permanent positions. High staff turnover causes problems
such as loss of productivity, additional costs of training, and
the need to conduct multiple examinations to keep lists of
potential candidates available.
The turnover has caused some concern for the local
governments that deal with OES. A few of our interviews
with local emergency management representatives
indicated their belief that high turnover among OES’s staff
contributes to delays in processing DSRs. In addition, one
expressed frustration with having to contact several
different people just to find out the status of a DSR. He
attributed the problem to the high staff turnover at OES’s
disaster field offices and noted several instances where a
DSR had to be reviewed over again because the OES
employee who had been reviewing it left before the review
was complete and the new OES employee was unaware of
what had already been reviewed.
OES Could Not Demonstrate
Its Staffing Needs
In January 1995, OES submitted its budget request for
fiscal year 1995-96 to meet its staffing needs for long-term
recovery
A $19.8 million request from the Northridge earthquake and other previous
for 340 additional
disasters. OES requested approximately $19.8 million to
positions was denied
establish
because OES could not
340 limited-term positions in addition to the approximately
document its needs.
15 permanent positions that existed at that time in the
Disaster Assistance Branch. The Legislative Analyst’s
Office, which assesses and makes recommendations on
budget requests for the Legislature, withheld its
recommendation in part because OES could not provide
adequate justification for the request. The Final Change
Book prepared by the Department of Finance shows that
OES’s budget request was funded for only nine months of
fiscal year 1995-96. As a result, OES had to do additional
work to demonstrate its staffing needs.
This work consisted of a workload analysis prepared by
OES’s Disaster Assistance Branch. The workload analysis
was based on the assumption that there would be no new
disasters.
The initial result showed that the Disaster Assistance
Branch needed a staffing level of 763 positions in fiscal
year 1995-96 to carry out its necessary program objectives.
When OES’s management reviewed the assessment, it
46
directed the employees who had prepared the workload
analysis to reduce the number of positions requested, and
as a result, part of the project workload was postponed. In
September 1995, OES submitted a revised budget
proposal for the Disaster Assistance Branch, requesting
601 total positions, an increase of approximately 245
positions from the original budget request, and spreading
the current workload over more than five years. The
revised budget proposal for fiscal year 1995-96 addresses
the workload created by the two newest federally declared
disasters, the January 1995 and March 1995 winter storms,
which were not addressed in the original budget request for
fiscal year 1995-96. The Department of Finance did not
approve this revised budget request, and, as of the end of
December 1995, the OES budget request was going
through another revision, continuing to divert OES
employees from performing their normal work.
OES’s Request for 600 Employees
for the Disaster Assistance Branch
Is Defendable
In an attempt to assess the current staffing needs for the
Disaster Assistance Branch, we reviewed the workload
analysis that formed the basis for the revised budget
request. Our assessment was complicated by the
absence of historical data on the
use of employee time. For example, OES does not have a
time-reporting system in place that allows it to track the
amount of time each employee spends on specific tasks.
In addition, OES does not have a system to effectively
track the number and status of DSRs, the primary
component of its workload in the Disaster Assistance
Branch.
However, we consider the basic methodology used by
Our assessment of
OES’s workload concurs the Disaster Assistance Branch to create its workload
with its estimated staffing analysis reasonable. The methodology consisted of the
needs. following procedures.
The employees identified their workload by tasks and
subtasks related to their activities and program
objectives and quantified their workload by deliverable
units, such as the number of DSRs and projects.
To determine the number of positions needed, they
estimated the average time required to complete a
47
workload unit and identified the hours by various civil
service classifications.
The employees also estimated the total number of
workload units to be completed for a specific disaster
and spread the workload units over a five-year time
frame, with expected changes in the nature of the work
from fiscal year to fiscal year. For example, OES
anticipated that it would finish writing all the initial DSRs
for the winter storms in fiscal year 1995-96, so the
estimated number of initial DSRs generated in fiscal
year 1996-97 was zero.
To calculate the total staffing needs for an operating
unit during a specific fiscal year, the employees
multiplied the average time per workload unit by the
number of workload units to be completed, by
classifications, by tasks, by disasters, and by fiscal
years.
Finally, the employees compiled all the hours and
translated them into the number of equivalent positions,
using a formula of 1,800 hours per position for a year.
After determining the reasonableness of the Disaster
Assistance Branch’s basic methodology, we also reviewed
in detail the workload analyses for the two units in the
Disaster Assistance Branch that requested the largest
number of employees. Our review focused on the
workload for fiscal years 1995-96, which was the subject of
the revised budget request, and 1996-97. We recalculated
the number of positions needed; interviewed participants in
the process; and reviewed selected tasks, the estimated
average time per workload unit, and the number of
workload units to be completed.
Additional reasons exist for our conclusion that the process
for creating the workload analysis is reasonable for these
two units. For example, the workload analysis was a
committee effort. The participants in the process had
knowledge of the work and came from varied perspectives.
Although the workload
Moreover, based on our knowledge of the work involved,
analysis methodology
was reasonable, it had we considered that for selected tasks, the average time per
numerous errors and workload unit was reasonable. Specifically, the Disaster
little supporting Assistance Branch estimated that the average time to
documentation. complete a DSR for the Northridge earthquake was
30 hours. The estimate was based on the program
review completed by the California Department of Finance
48
Office of State Audits and Evaluations in June 1995. We
vouched the employee hours during fiscal year 1993-94,
when the earthquake struck, to the actual time sheets and
determined that we could rely on that portion of the
program review.
However, we found numerous mathematical inaccuracies
in OES’s workload analysis, which made it less reliable.
Many other factors could affect the accuracy of the
workload projection, as well. For example, OES estimated
the average time per workload unit for most tasks based on
the participants’ experience and based estimates of the
number of workload units partially on participants’
experience and partially on historical data. Some
participants provided extremely limited information about
their workload analysis for certain tasks. For example, the
only information for which the southern region could
provide any supporting documentation for its field operation
workload for the winter storms of 1995 and Northridge
earthquake was the number of projects it expected to
monitor. Finally, some of the supporting documents
contain data entry errors that affect the projection of the
number of positions needed for fiscal year 1996-97.
As a result of these limitations on reliability, we could not
conclude that OES’s request for 601 employees for the
Disaster Assistance Branch was reasonable based on the
workload analysis alone. Therefore, we performed
additional audit procedures.
To independently assess the reasonableness of OES’s
request, we compared the average hours needed during a
month in 1994 to the estimated DSR workload for
December 1994. The Disaster Assistance Branch’s
activities during the months we selected closely paralleled
its current activities, with its workload primarily devoted to
long-term recovery work. Based on the 1994 ratio of the
estimated DSR workload to staff hours paid, we calculated
hours needed as of July 1995 to
address OES’s workload at this time. Our ratio analyses
show that OES’s request for 601 employees for the
Disaster Assistance Branch for fiscal year 1995-96 is
reasonable.
49
None of these methods of analysis alone had sufficient
Because the reliability of
supporting documentation to justify such a conclusion, but
OES’s workload analysis
the analyses had similar results, leading us to believe that
was limited, we performed
OES’s request for 601 employees for fiscal year 1995-96
an independent
for the Disaster Assistance Branch is defendable.
assessment.
However, the Disaster Assistance Branch’s staffing needs
for fiscal year 1995-96 have not been met. According to
OES’s personnel records, as of November 1995, the
Disaster Assistance Branch had only 490 employees,
including 200 working under special provisions without
established positions. OES currently has instituted a hiring
freeze because of a cash flow problem, which we discuss
later in this chapter. Consequently, a portion of the
workload projected for fiscal year 1995-96 will be
postponed to fiscal year 1996-97. Although the Disaster
Assistance Branch requested 510 positions for fiscal year
1996-97, it is reasonable to believe that its need for 600
employees will extend into fiscal year 1996-97. Our
analyses do not attempt to assess the staffing needs for
the period beyond fiscal year 1996-97 due to the limitations
on the reliability of data.
Our conclusion about OES’s staffing needs makes no
attempt to assess how many of these positions should be
permanent and how many should be part-time. The data
we reviewed provided no reliable basis for such judgments.
The Disaster Assistance Branch currently has
approximately 20 permanent positions and 330 limited-term
positions, a ratio of one to 16.5. To avoid the problems
with turnover among limited-term employees and retraining
new employees, OES clearly needs more permanent
positions. However, it has not yet demonstrated effectively
how many permanent positions it needs.
The Amount of Unreimbursed
Overtime Is Significant
Accounting records show that OES incurred over
$2.25 million in overtime costs during fiscal year 1994-95.
Some of these costs were incurred while staff were
performing work normally eligible for reimbursement from
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
However, FEMA does not reimburse the State for the costs
of overtime for state employees. If OES had additional
50
employees, overtime could have been reduced, and federal
reimbursement could have increased significantly.
OES Needs Adequate
Information Technology
Adequate information technology is vital to OES’s
continued or improved effectiveness in meeting its mission.
For example, without a well-designed and fully
implemented system for processing and tracking DSRs and
related fiscal transactions, the disaster assistance program
In September 1995, OES
consumes additional fiscal resources and employee time,
completed the
threatening to diminish the overall effectiveness of the
information technology
organization. The growth of the hazard mitigation
strategic plan.
program, with processes similar to those in the disaster
assistance program, indicates that a similar
information technology capability is needed for that
program. Until recently, OES did not have a strategic plan
identifying
its information technology needs and outlining a
methodology for meeting those needs. In September
1995, OES completed
its first strategic plan that clearly identifies its information
technology needs and proposes a reasonable approach
to addressing those needs. Our conclusions about OES’s
information technology are primarily based on OES’s
Information Management Strategic Plan, which was
completed in September 1995, and our own observations.
Lack of a Strategic Plan for Information
Technology Caused Problems
Numerous problems have resulted from the lack of a
strategic plan with a coordinated program for meeting
short- and long-term goals for information technology. For
example, OES did not have documented standards,
policies, or procedures for acquiring, issuing, and tracking
its computer equipment.
In the absence of such standards, policies, and
procedures, OES entered into a contract for its Public
Assistance Damage Survey Report Management
Information System (PADMIS) system without the benefit of
careful planning and oversight. As a result, the system
was developed without a stable work plan, project budget,
review of the contractor’s prior experience, consideration
51
for alternative solutions, or experienced project manager.
PADMIS is an automated system that was intended to
replace OES’s current time-consuming manual process for
tracking the DSRs and related correspondence and
documents used in the recovery process, which we discuss
in Chapter 2. The PADMIS system also includes a ledger
component for tracking disbursements for the DSRs and
includes applications for the Geographical Information
System.
Because OES did not thoroughly define its manual DSR
process, completely test the automated system, or exercise
good control over the contract, the PADMIS system has
experienced many problems. For example, OES
employees have experienced difficulties with scanning
documents into the system, network failures, and
incompatibility among software packages. In addition, the
system does not meet OES’s storage needs, and data from
the DSRs are consuming storage capacity more quickly
than anticipated. As a result, the storage capacity
originally expected to be adequate for the records of
several disasters may be fully consumed by the winter
storms of 1995.
As of September 1995, OES reported having invested over
$5 million in PADMIS, with $3.3 million used for hardware
OES has spent over
and software and the remaining $1.7 million for services.
$5 million on an
FEMA originally helped fund the PADMIS system but
automated system that
withdrew its support in April 1995 for several reasons,
does not meet all of its
including the technical problems with PADMIS and
needs.
PADMIS’s effect on FEMA’s responsibilities. As of
mid-January 1996, OES had not decided whether to
continue to implement PADMIS or develop a new system.
An additional problem arising from the lack of a strategic
plan was OES’s lack of oversight in the purchase of
information technology equipment. Individual units
purchased equipment based on their own needs without
consistent reference to the needs of OES as a whole. As
a result, OES uses many different types of incompatible
computer hardware and software. For example, OES has
a total of 662 personal computers that use the MS DOS
operating system and 288 that use the Macintosh operating
system. A strategic plan, such as the one completed in
September 1995, can improve OES’s purchasing decisions
because it calls for standards and policies for the
acquisition of computer hardware and software, a steering
committee to provide direction and oversight of the use of
52
information technology, and technical solutions that
consider the needs and expectations of all users as well as
OES as a whole.
OES’s Strategic Plan Was
Completed in September 1995
OES’s administration recognized the need for improved
management of its information technology capabilities and
contracted with a consultant to help prepare a strategic
plan. The strategic plan, which was completed in
September 1995, identifies the significant information
technology problems at OES. The definition of the
problems reflects the conditions we observed during our
audit. For example, the plan addresses the need for a
OES recognizes the reliable, fully implemented system for tracking DSRs and
problems with its
the related correspondence and fiscal transactions, as
management of
discussed above and in Chapter 2.
information technology
and has begun to
The strategic plan also proposes a general approach to
address those problems.
address the problems. The first steps are to create a
separate information technology branch in OES and form a
management information technology steering committee.
The purpose of these two groups is to provide a
mechanism for centralized decision making on information
technology, eliminating the ad hoc decisions by individual
units. The plan further proposes the following actions for
OES to take during fiscal year 1995-96:
Decide which computer hardware and operating
systems to use and develop a methodology for the
transition to a single, compatible system;
Establish standards and policies for the development of
new applications and the acquisition and use of
hardware and software;
Acquire and implement a system for asset inventory
control for computer hardware and other equipment;
and
Develop a system for tracking and reporting the use of
staff time.
The plan also proposes to establish guidelines for use of
long-term projects, such as an automated claims and grant
processing system and the Geographical Information
53
System, and emphasizes the need for planning and
prioritizing projects.
Steps Have Already Been Taken
To Implement the Strategic Plan
OES has begun implementing some of the initial steps
proposed in its strategic plan. For example, it has
submitted a
budget request for fiscal year 1996-97 for the funding to
create a separate information technology branch. OES
has requested funding for 23 positions, 15 of them new,
and $1.3 million, $0.9 million more than it is currently
spending on its information technology staff. In addition,
OES has hired an administrator to set up an inventory
control system for assets, including information technology
assets, and conduct an inventory of the assets currently
held. The strategic plan calls for a steering committee to
direct its information technology plans. For example, the
committee will formulate policies and standards for the
development of new information technology applications
and the acquisition and use of new software and hardware.
However, as of December 1995, the committee had not yet
convened, and any actions requiring the committee’s
direction have not been initiated.
OES has taken steps to identify its information technology
needs and is beginning to respond to those needs. The
adoption of the strategic plan, the continued
implementation of the Emergency Response Information
Management System and Geographical Information
System, and the hiring of an administrator to set up
controls over the inventory of information technology assets
are all important steps. Although it is too early to
determine how successful these steps will be or what
alternatives might be equally appropriate, the proposed
strategic plan appears to be a reasonable approach to
meeting OES’s information technology needs.
OES Has Had Serious
Cash Flow Problems
In the fall of 1995, OES experienced serious cash flow
problems with its operating expenditures. The cash flow
problems resulted from its inability to estimate its budget
needs accurately, which was exacerbated by FEMA's
54
decision to withdraw its approval to reimburse certain costs
OES incurred. In addition, OES failed to get assurance
that FEMA and the State would reimburse certain types of
costs before they were incurred and to identify all
reimbursable costs incurred and promptly bill FEMA.
It Is Difficult To Anticipate
Budget Needs
OES's budget for its operating costs, which includes
expenditures for personnel, equipment, and supplies, is
established assuming that some of the costs will be
reimbursed, primarily from federal disaster assistance
funds. For example, the budget act for the state fiscal year
1995-96 anticipated that OES would incur operating costs
of approximately $60 million, with $35 million in federal
reimbursements. When its costs are greater than
budgeted or the reimbursements are less than anticipated
or delayed, OES exhausts its budget, or spending
authority. This causes a cash flow problem, and OES is
not able to pay its vendors and employees until it either
gets an allocation from the General Fund or receives
additional cash from reimbursements.
Because it cannot anticipate the number and nature of
disasters that will occur during any fiscal year, OES
submits its budget requests for its operating costs
Uncertain costs and assuming that no major disasters that would dramatically
reimbursements make affect its expenditures will occur. When such a disaster
budgeting for OES’s does take place, OES incurs the necessary costs to
operations difficult.
respond to that disaster and begin recovery procedures. A
major disaster can also interrupt the normal flow of federal
reimbursements because OES's staff are busy responding
to the disaster and do not take time to request the
reimbursements. In either case, OES needs additional
funds or a loan to cover its cash flow needs.
If OES expects that the costs will be reimbursed by FEMA,
it requests a loan of state moneys through the Department
of Finance for the period until the reimbursement is
expected. For example, in May 1995, OES received a
loan of $11.3 million because its requests for federal
reimbursements were delayed when staff were busy with
the response and recovery from the winter storms of 1995.
For costs it does not expect FEMA to reimburse, OES
requests additional funds from the State’s General Fund.
Both the deficiency funding and the loan of
55
state funds are authorized under the Government Code,
Section 8690.
A Severe Cash Flow Problem
Occurred in the Fall of 1995
In the fall of 1995, OES experienced cash flow problems so
severe that it had already exhausted its budget to support
OES exhausted its its operations through the following June. As a result, it
operating budget for was not able to meet its November payroll costs without a
fiscal year 1995-96 by $3.3 million loan of state moneys. The Department of
November 1995. Finance authorized the loan with the expectation that
federal reimbursements would allow repayment by June
30, 1996. In addition, OES’s administration established a
freeze on travel and hiring, leaving it unable to fill many
vacant positions.
However, the loan was merely a temporary solution to a
much more significant problem. OES still needed funding
for its operating costs for the remaining seven months of
the fiscal year. By late December 1995, it had
accumulated over $1 million in vendors' invoices that it was
unable to pay. Some of these invoices dated from July
1995, five months earlier. This caused financial distress to
some of the vendors, one of whom threatened to sue the
State.
On December 26, 1995, OES received $5.2 million in
federal reimbursements of costs incurred for the winter
storms of 1995. It used these funds to pay vendors and to
meet its December payroll. However, as with the loan for
the November payroll, the reimbursement is not sufficient
to meet OES's long-term cash flow needs.
Cash Flow Problems
Have Several Causes
A circumstance that contributes greatly to OES's cash flow
problem is its inability to provide accurate and timely
estimates of its budget needs. This has several causes.
First, OES has limited control over the decisions FEMA
makes about costs it will reimburse. Costs that OES
expects to be reimbursed may not actually be approved by
FEMA. In addition, FEMA may reverse its decisions to
reimburse costs. We discuss this issue in detail in Chapter
2. In particular, FEMA's decision to deobligate almost
$14 million in OES costs for the operation of disaster
56
assistance centers for the Northridge earthquake had a
major effect on OES's anticipated reimbursements. Even
if OES successfully appeals FEMA's decision, the appeal
process could be lengthy and the timing of the
reimbursement unpredictable.
OES also does not respond quickly to changes that could
affect its budget. For example, although FEMA's reversal
OES inaccurately
of its decision to fund the costs of the disaster assistance
estimates its funding
centers came too late for the initial budget proposal, FEMA
needs and incurs costs
did announce its decision in June, before the State’s
without first ensuring that
1995-96 fiscal year began. OES could have anticipated
they will be reimbursed.
the effect of FEMA’s decision and tried to resolve its budget
problems before they threatened its ability to meet its
payroll and pay its vendors.
OES also does not have an adequate system for getting
assurance that FEMA will reimburse certain costs before it
incurs those costs. For example, it purchased 140 new
laptop computers and related equipment, at a cost of
$770,000, for use in the field during the recovery from the
winter storms of 1995. This purchase was made without
prior confirmation of reimbursement from FEMA, and it is
still not clear whether FEMA will agree to pay a share of
those costs. OES similarly did not get state approval to
purchase the laptop computers. We realize that it is
difficult to balance the need to respond immediately to an
emergency with the State's need for fiscal accountability.
However, to achieve this balance, OES needs a better
system for rapidly assessing and communicating its needs
to FEMA and the State and getting assurance that major
costs it incurs will be approved.
OES aggravates its cash flow problems by failing to identify
all reimbursable costs and bill FEMA for those
reimbursements on a routine basis. OES's lack of an
adequate cost accounting system contributes to the failure
to identify all reimbursable costs and routinely bill for
reimbursements. In a workload study it completed for
OES in June 1995, the Department of Finance noted that
OES's records for reimbursable costs were incomplete.
The Department of Finance recreated the records
manually, allowing OES to identify $3.8 million in
reimbursable costs incurred from 1989 through July 1994
that OES had not previously identified or claimed. Other
delays in requests for federal reimbursements during 1995
have resulted from FEMA’s decision not to reimburse costs
for the Northridge earthquake and winter storms of 1995
57
until the completion of an independent audit of Northridge
earthquake costs.
Without more effective systems for estimating its budgeted
costs and reimbursements, getting assurance that major
nonroutine costs will be approved for funding before it
incurs the costs, and identifying and routinely billing for
reimbursable costs, OES will continue to have serious cash
flow problems.
OES Has Weaknesses in
Contract Administration
OES entered into contracts for goods and services worth
$62 million in fiscal year 1993-94 and $12.5 million in fiscal
year 1994-95. These contracts purchased computer
equipment, software, and assistance on information
technology projects. OES also entered contracts that
involved training for its staff, assistance on legal matters,
and assistance from consultants in planning for future
disasters.
We reviewed 20 contracts and 3 interagency agreements
that OES entered into in fiscal years 1993-94 and 1994-95.
Of the 20 contracts, 12 were awarded on a sole-source
basis. Executive orders allow OES to suspend state laws
OES could not document
and regulations governing the award of contracts, allowing
that it justified costs on
OES to quickly obtain the goods and services needed
some of its sole-source
during the response and recovery stages of a disaster.
contracts.
However, OES still has the responsibility to properly justify
the costs associated with sole-source contracts. We found
that OES had overused the waivers allowed by the
executive orders, awarding contracts without competition
when this was not always warranted. In addition, OES
could not always provide evidence that it had justified the
costs for the sole-source contracts that we reviewed. We
also found other weaknesses in OES’s award and
management of contracts and interagency agreements.
More specifically, we found the following:
OES hired two contractors too inexperienced in the type
of work being contracted; and
OES did not always detail how the contractors would
report progress. In the absence of such controls, OES
did not receive all of the deliverables that it was
supposed to receive from these contractors.
58
OES Overused Its Emergency
Contracting Authority
In accordance with the executive orders issued by the
governor during major disasters, OES is allowed to
suspend its compliance with those state laws and
regulations that cover the award and management of state
contracts. The intent of these executive orders is to
enable OES to quickly procure the goods and services
needed during the response and recovery phases of a
disaster. However, the governor has made it clear that
OES can only suspend these contracting laws and
regulations when the contracts involved are for specific
services. We found three instances in our review where
OES suspended the State’s contracting requirements even
though the specific conditions set forth by the governor’s
executive order had not been met.
In each of the executive orders issued for major disasters,
such as the winter floods of 1995 and the Northridge
earthquake of 1994, the governor specified that before
OES could suspend the State’s laws and regulations for
awarding and managing contracts, the services being
contracted must be one of the following:
The investigation and technical analysis of the damage
and the correction thereof;
The evaluation of response and recovery and
emergency management systems; or
The restoration of facilities and services damaged or
interrupted by the disaster.
In one instance, OES hired a contractor to develop an
automated claims processing system (PADMIS) that would
enhance its ability to process, review, and pay claims of
organizations that suffered damage as a result of the
disaster. In our view, it was not proper for OES to
suspend the State’s contracting requirements for this
contract, since it was not for one of the three specific
services set forth in the governor’s executive order. When
we discussed our concern with OES administration, they
pointed to the urgent need to computerize the processing
of claims. We certainly do not argue that OES has a valid
need to automate the claims processing system.
However, we do not think it prudent for OES to embark on
59
the procurement of a major information technology system
without first taking all the steps that should be a part of any
such procurement. In its haste to get the project
underway, OES failed to assess the feasibility of the
OES did not always
approach adopted. It also failed to determine whether the
follow appropriate state
contractor had prior experience in designing and
contracting procedures.
implementing this type of project and did not appoint a
project manager with prior experience on the development
of this type of project. In the absence of these and other
controls, PADMIS, which we also discuss on pages 48
and 49, has not yet achieved all of the objectives set out for
it. OES acknowledges that the contractor has not yet
provided all of the deliverables set out in the contract.
One of the other two contracts that should not have been
exempted from the State’s contracting requirements was to
assist OES in fulfilling its hazard mitigation responsibilities.
The Northridge earthquake hazard mitigation plan provides
funding to prepare for future disasters, which is certainly an
important part of the department’s responsibilities but is not
specifically related to the response to or recovery from a
specific disaster, as specified in the executive order. The
third contract was for the training of employees in the use
of new software just purchased by OES and for
“troubleshooting” during the pilot stage of an information
technology project. This contract also did not meet the
specifications of the governor’s executive order.
OES Does Not Control Contract Award
and Management Adequately
State departments are responsible for establishing
sufficient controls to ensure the proper award and
management of contracts. It is important that OES assess
the reasonableness of the price it pays for goods or
services purchased under a sole-source contract. The
State Administrative Manual (SAM) recognizes the
importance of the proper justification of costs for
sole-source contracts by requiring that state departments
conduct a market survey. For 4 of the 20 contracts that we
reviewed, however, OES contract managers could not
provide evidence that they had surveyed the market to
assess whether the prices being proposed by these
contractors were appropriate and reasonable. OES hired
contractors for 2 of these 4 contracts who it later learned
were inexperienced in the type of work being contracted.
Since these contracts were for significant outlays of OES
60
moneys, ranging in cost from $54,000 to $1.13 million, it
was imperative that OES take steps to determine the
reasonableness of the costs of these contracts and review
the record of the consulting firms and the qualifications of
their key personnel.
When we discussed these matters with OES’s
administration, they told us that they base the
reasonableness of contract costs on the experience and
expertise of staff who manage contracts, similar costs from
current and past years’ contracts, and rates accepted by
the Departments of General Services and Personnel
Administration. OES’s administration also told us that
obtaining a comparison of the costs of a contract would
have delayed the immediate disaster recovery efforts and
thwarted the intent of the governor’s executive order.
However, the four contracts that concern us involved the
accomplishment of work designed to produce long-term
benefits to OES and others in the disaster response
community. Also, the time that it would have taken OES to
justify the costs for these sole-source contracts and to
OES does not always
review the record of the proposed contractors would have
ensure that the costs of
contracts are reasonable been minimal and certainly warranted given the dollar value
or that contract of each of these contracts.
agreements are met.
OES cannot ensure that it is getting the best price for
contracted goods or services when it has not taken steps to
determine that the costs for a proposed contract are
reasonable. During our review, we noted at least one
contract in which OES was paying above-market rates for
services. In this contract, OES agreed to pay $73 per hour
for the clerical support employees of a consultant on a
project for OES. We compared this rate to the rate that
OES paid for the clerical support employees of other
consultants on contract. We also reviewed the rates that
we have paid this past year for clerical support employees
of consultants that we have hired. The going rate for
clerical support employees in the Sacramento area ranges
from $25 to $45 per hour. This contractor also charged
OES $114 per hour for editing services, when the market
rate for editing services in this area is $46 per hour.
The controls that should be in place to ensure the proper
management of state contracts are set forth in the Public
Contract Code (PCC) and the SAM. The PCC and the
SAM detail those essential provisions that each contract
should contain, such as specifying how the contracting
department will periodically review the progress of the
61
contractor working on longer-term contracts. These
procedures also detail the steps that the contracting
departments are to take in making progress payments to
the contractor. However, OES did not always detail how
the contractors would report their progress. It is especially
important that this be done so that progress can be
monitored.
When OES does not take steps to ensure that all of the
controls associated with proper award and management of
contracts are in place, it is at risk of not receiving all of the
contract deliverables. In 2 of the 20 contracts and 2 of the
3 interagency agreements that we reviewed, OES either
did not receive all of the deliverables or could not show us
that all the deliverables had been received.
OES has acknowledged that in two contracts it did not
receive all of the deliverables for which it had contracted.
In four contracts or Both of these contracts had to do with the implementation
interagency agreements of an automated claims processing system. OES
we reviewed, OES could attributed some of the problems with this system to the
not assure it received all inexperience of these two contractors on this type of
deliverables required.
information technology project. According to another
information technology consultant OES hired and who also
reviewed this project, one of the contractor’s employees
had no previous experience in this type of project. The
inexperience of these contractors is not the only reason
that they were not fully successful. OES also had
responsibilities on these projects that were not fulfilled and
which impacted the contractors’ ability to deliver.
In another instance OES entered into an interagency
agreement with the State Controller’s Office (SCO) to
perform audits. OES is not sure it has received all of the
audits for which it contracted. The agreement called for
SCO to complete 251 audits of entities that had received
financial assistance through the federal and state disaster
assistance programs. However, the interagency
agreement did not specify how SCO would report its
progress to OES. Nor did the agreement stipulate that
SCO would invoice OES in a manner that would allow OES
to track how many and which audits were completed. As a
result, OES was unable to tell us which of these audits had
been accomplished. So far, $4.1 million of this $4.7 million
contract has been paid to SCO. Recognizing this problem,
OES has recently implemented a tracking system to
identify audits started, in progress, and already completed.
62
Conclusion
OES has experienced significant administrative problems
because of the increase in workload from the numerous
disasters that have recently struck California and because
of its own administrative weaknesses. Specifically, OES
has not been able to justify its requests for staffing
increases for budgeting purposes, has not adequately
managed the acquisition of
its information technology equipment or the implementation
of an information technology project, has not anticipated its
cash flow needs, and has not effectively managed its
contracts. These administrative problems threaten to
diminish OES’s effectiveness in emergency management
by needlessly diverting scarce resources from these
essential activities.
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64
Chapter 4
Recommendations
T
he Office of Emergency Services (OES) has generally
been effective in meeting its primary responsibilities
in the management of emergencies in California.
However, the series of major disasters that has struck the
State since 1989 has overburdened OES's staff and
exposed inherent weaknesses in many of its administrative
policies and practices. The combination of this increased
workload and the inefficiency caused by OES's
administrative problems has the potential for seriously
undermining OES's continued effectiveness in meeting its
responsibilities in emergency management. Therefore, we
are making recommendations to OES that address both its
immediate and long-term problems.
Because OES will need the assistance of the Legislature in
addressing the problems arising from its current workload
and administrative inefficiency, we are also recommending
that the Legislature amend state law to provide more
flexibility to OES in meeting its staffing needs and
appropriate more funds for certain OES needs.
OES will also need the assistance of other state agencies
when hiring employees for the recovery from emergencies.
Accordingly, we have made recommendations to address
this need.
To meet OES's needs for an increased level of staffing,
greater flexibility in hiring options and more effective
budgeting, the Legislature should:
Amend the California Government Code to allow OES
to retain limited-term employees longer than two years
for the recovery effort; and
Appropriate sufficient General Fund moneys to fund
approximately 600 employees for the Disaster
Assistance Branch for fiscal years 1995-96 and
1996-97.
OES should:
65
Work with the Department of Personnel Administration
or State Personnel Board to establish a task force of
employees trained in personnel matters to be available
to help OES hire employees when the workload
exceeds the capacity of its own personnel employees
during emergencies;
Work with the Department of Personnel Administration
or State Personnel Board to develop a cadre of
employees trained in disaster recovery that would be
consistently available to assist with the recovery from
disasters for periods of up to a year;
Continue its efforts to maintain civil service lists of at
least 200 candidates who can be available during an
emergency;
Establish a time-reporting system that documents
resources spent on specified tasks for each disaster;
and
Determine the number of permanent staff it needs in the
Disaster Assistance Branch and document its rationale
for the number.
To address its information technology needs, OES should:
Continue to implement its strategic plan, placing a high
priority on convening the steering committee for
information technology to set priorities for
implementation of projects and selection of hardware
and software; and
Place the highest priority on the implementation of
effective systems for managing documents for the
recovery process, maintaining an automated ledger
system for Damage
Survey Report (DSR) costs, compiling reimbursable
costs, and completing the Emergency Response
Information Management System (RIMS) for tracking
emergency resources.
To meet OES's needs for improved cash flow and
budgeting, the Legislature should increase its General
Fund appropriation for the remainder of this fiscal year to
levels justified by a thorough cash flow analysis. In
addition, OES should:
66
Establish a system for identifying costs and monitoring
requests for reimbursement of all eligible costs from the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and
ensure that such requests are made regularly, no less
frequently than once each quarter;
Develop a thorough analysis of anticipated expenditures
and reimbursements for annual budgeting purposes;
and
Work with the Department of Finance and FEMA to
establish a system to allow the immediate and binding
approval of reimbursement for costs related to
emergency response.
To improve its contract management, OES should:
Exercise discretion in the use of executive orders
authorizing the suspension of the State’s contracting
requirements;
Ensure the costs of contracts awarded on a sole-source
basis are reasonable;
Ensure that its contractors have experience in the work
required under contracts; and
Monitor performance to ensure the contractor complies
with the contract.
To correct federal impediments to the effective recovery
from disasters, the Legislature should support OES in
negotiations with FEMA to:
Establish an alternative method for requesting
reimbursement and appeals of disaster-related project
costs that are less than $10,000;
Allow OES to review DSRs for the winter storms of 1995
before FEMA determines whether it will approve any
costs; and
Set up a procedure for an independent, third party
review of major funding issues when FEMA, OES, and
the applicant cannot agree on the propriety of FEMA’s
decisions.
67
Should the negotiations with FEMA fail, the Legislature
should memorialize the Congress to amend federal codes
to address these issues.
To improve the effectiveness and thoroughness of appeals
of FEMA’s determination of the allowability of costs for
DSRs, OES should:
Consistently track DSRs with similar issues, so that
when the issue is resolved for one DSR, OES will know
what other DSRs are affected;
Establish a library of FEMA's decisions on major
funding issues to use as a reference when similar
issues arise; and
Solicit an opinion from the State’s Attorney General that
defines options available to OES and applicants for
challenging the propriety of FEMA’s funding decisions
and the circumstances under which each option can be
exercised.
For a smooth transition from the response to recovery
phase in its emergency management, OES should ensure
that data gathered from local governments for response
purposes are shared with both OES and FEMA recovery
staff, avoiding duplicate requests for information.
To ensure that OES has adequate facilities and equipment
during responses
to emergencies, the Legislature should provide funding for
facilities that meet the requirements of an essential
services building and for the replacement of vital
equipment, such as fire engines. Until OES has
appropriate facilities, it should have a formal back-up plan
should the current facilities be unable to function during an
emergency.
To ensure that all possible hazard mitigation funds are
available to the State and local governments, OES should
independently calculate the amounts available and assess
the propriety of FEMA’s allocations. Further, OES should
investigate any significant differences in the amounts
calculated.
We conducted this review under the authority vested in the
state auditor by Section 8543, et seq., of the California
68
Government Code and according to generally accepted
governmental auditing standards. We limited our review to
those areas specified in the audit scope of this report.
Respectfully submitted,
KURT R. SJOBERG
State Auditor
Date: January 31, 1996
Staff: Steven M. Hendrickson, Audit Principal
Lois E. Benson, CPA
Dave Frizzell
Young H. Hamilton
Virginia Anderson Johnson
Jerry A. Lewis
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Appendix
Profiles of Three Disasters
71
The Northridge Earthquake—1994
Described below is a summary of the response to the Northridge earthquake, which struck
southern California on January 17, 1994, at 4:31 in the morning. The earthquake had a
magnitude of 6.8 on the Richter scale and resulted in an estimated $20 billion in damage.
Date Disaster
1/17/94 An earthquake with a preliminary magnitude of 6.8 on the Richter scale struck
southern California at 4:31 a.m. The epicenter was about one mile
south-southwest of the City of Northridge. By noon, the California Institute of
Technology reported one aftershock of magnitude 5.5, 2 others with a magnitude
of about 5.0, 7 more between 4.0 and 4.5, and 26 with magnitudes greater than
3.0.
Substantial disruption occurred to the highway network due to downed overpasses
and elevated freeway sections. There was widespread damage to water
systems, particularly in Northern San Fernando Valley and Simi Valley. The Los
Angeles Department of Water and Power reported five major breaks in their
system. Building collapses were reported in Los Angeles and Ventura Counties.
Numerous fires were reported, but were under control. In Los Angeles County,
five hospitals conducted total evacuations, one conducted a partial evacuation,
three others were accepting walk-in patients only, and ten others were damaged
but still functional. All Ventura County hospitals were on emergency power.
There were utilities outages over a wide area of Los Angeles and Ventura
Counties; at one point, about 850,000 people were without electricity. At this
time, there were 14 confirmed fatalities.
Governor Wilson declared a “state of emergency” for Los Angeles County
within hours of the earthquake. This activated the State’s emergency action
plan, which was developed by OES following the Loma Prieta earthquake in
1989.
President Clinton issued a presidential declaration for Los Angeles County by
the afternoon, which made available federal funding, equipment, and
personnel.
Date Disaster
72
1/17/94 Response:
OES’s State Operations Center (SOC) was activated around 6:15 a.m.. In
addition, OES’s southern Regional Emergency Operations Center (REOC), as well
as many other state agencies, operational areas, and local emergency operations
centers (EOC) around the Los Angeles area, were activated. FEMA’s Region IX
EOC and its Disaster Field Office (DFO) in Pasadena were activated.
California Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) teams from Los Angeles, Orange,
and Riverside Counties rescued 29 people from damaged buildings and vehicles
by
mid-afternoon. The City of Los Angeles instituted a dawn-to-dusk curfew.
The following efforts were coordinated by OES during the response phase of the
disaster:
Medical—The California National Guard (CNG) dispatched nine air
ambulances with water buckets, and seven additional helicopters with water
buckets were on standby at Los Alamitos.
Law Enforcement—The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and the
Los Angeles Sheriff’s Office (LASO) were on tactical alert.
Transportation—Caltrans conducted damage assessments.
Anheuser-Busch Company was contacted to provide bottled water and the
Southern Pacific Lines to transport it.
Dam Safety—The Department of Water Resources (DWR) sent two
teams to investigate selected dams within 45 miles of the epicenter.
There were
120 jurisdictional dams within that area. Three additional teams were
to be in the area within 24 hours.
Fire and Rescue—The need for resources was being evaluated and, if not
needed, demobilization was to begin. The other four state US&R teams were
to provide relief for the four that were currently on duty.
Miscellaneous—The California Conservation Corps (CCC) had approximately
300 crew members available immediately for the debris clearance, shelter
assistance, and other tasks. An additional 600 to 700 CCC crew members
were available within 24 hours.
Date Disaster
73
1/18/94 Additional aftershocks were expected to continue for the next several weeks, with
the strongest anticipated during the first 72 hours following the earthquake. The
Weather Service reported an incoming weather front for Saturday, the 24th, with a
chance of rain.
Severe disruption of the highway network continued, especially in the northern
portion of Los Angeles County. Several oil pipeline breaks were also reported.
Confirmed fatalities rose to 30. In Los Angeles County, there were 1,867
confirmed injuries. In addition, 564 patients were evacuated or transferred from
hospitals.
Ventura County obtained a verbal presidential declaration and governor’s
proclamation of a state of emergency.
Response:
Response activities were conducted from the DFO in Pasadena, instead of OES’s
southern REOC in Los Alamitos. Although this speeded up the processing of
most requests, it virtually cut the REOC out of the decision-making loop. This
periodically caused confusion at the local level as to how reports and requests to
the State were to be processed.
The following efforts were coordinated by OES during the response phase of the
disaster:
Medical—Eight California National Guard (CNG) air ambulances were sent
back to base because they were no longer needed.
Fire and Rescue—US&R task forces were to continue to operate over the
next
24 to 48 hours as needed. The major search and rescue sites were a
collapsed apartment building and the Northridge Mall parking garage. The
OES had
45 fire engine strike teams mobilized for mutual aid purposes.
Hazardous Materials—The Department of Toxic Substances Control (DTSC)
had four hazardous materials specialists, two vans, and equipment located in
Ventura County ready to assist local hazardous materials teams.
The Department of Fish and Game deployed approximately 12 people to work
on the oil pipeline spills. Environmental damage was also being assessed.
Date Disaster
Law Enforcement—The California Highway Patrol deployed 215 officers and
31 sergeants to help with medical aid, rescue, escorts, and traffic control.
The CNG had 1,500 personnel deployed for street forces and approximately
500 support personnel to support the LASO.
74
1/19/94 No aftershocks occurred.
through
1/21/94 The unincorporated area of Los Angeles County had 6,000 to 10,000 customers
without water. The number of confirmed fatalities rose to 46.
A presidential declaration and a governor’s proclamation of a state of emergency
were issued for Los Angeles, Ventura, and Orange Counties.
Response:
Ventura County hospitals were all back to normal status except for those in
Simi Valley, which were still having to truck in their supply of water.
Twenty-four-hour water distribution centers were set up at 14 high schools.
Sanitation facilities were located at many of these locations. A total of 37 shelters
were open with an estimated population of 7,088 inside and 4,051 outside.
The following efforts were coordinated by OES during the response phase of the
disaster:
Law Enforcement—The OES law enforcement coordinators were sent to
assist at the federal DFO and the southern REOC.
Department of Toxic Substances Control (DTSC)—At the request of Los
Angeles County Hazardous Materials department, DTSC sought trained staff
to begin inspecting 1,000 facilities within the San Fernando Valley that contain
hazardous materials.
Fire and Rescue—All US&R teams were released.
DGS—Sent 6,000 blankets for people not staying in shelters.
1/22/94 Three major aftershocks occurred on January 24, 1995.
through
1/27/94 These aftershocks created the need for additional inspections of previously
inspected structures. Confirmed fatalities rose to 57. There were a total of 8,649
confirmed injuries and 1,567 hospital admissions in Los Angeles, Ventura, and
San Bernardino Counties.
Date Disaster
75
1/22/94 Response:
through
1/27/94 About 21,903 people were living in 37 shelters and 5 temporary facilities. An
unknown number of people were at temporary facilities at 13 park sites in the City
of Los Angeles. In Los Angeles County, two hospitals were still closed. Mobile
treatment vans provided medical support to the earthquake victims located in the
parks.
Alternate commute routes were identified by Caltrans and maps made available.
The LAPD provided a squad for each Department of Public Social Services
(DPSS) office in Los Angeles because major crowds began gathering at several of
these locations. It appeared that these crowds were the result of FEMA’s
decision to authorize emergency food stamps for earthquake victims.
1/28/94 No aftershocks were noted.
through
2/4/94 There were a total of 57 confirmed fatalities to date, 8,649 confirmed injuries, and
1,567 hospital admissions in Los Angeles, Ventura, and San Bernardino Counties.
These statistics were from January 27, 1994, which was the last day Los Angeles
County maintained these figures.
Response:
The CNG dispatched 86 linguists, speaking Spanish, Korean, Russian, Mandarin,
and Japanese, to serve in the Disaster Assistance Centers. The two remaining
5,000-gallon water tankers from CNG were demobilized on February 3, 1994.
The City of Los Angeles requested that CNG remove the tents at certain parks.
These sites were still occupied by many victims, and the City was concerned that
people would not go into the shelters. Los Angeles Unified School District
indicated that 14 schools were open while another 33 were to remain closed while
repairs were made. Utilities were mostly restored in Los Angeles County;
however, boil-water orders were still in effect in some areas.
The OES SOC closed at 5 p.m. on January 28, 1994. The southern REOC was
deactivated at 9 p.m. on February 4, 1994.
The Southern Wildfire Siege
October and November 1993
The following is a summary of the response to the Southern Wildfire Siege that occurred in the
fall of 1993. By the end of this 11-day disaster, 22 fires had burned nearly 200,000 acres in
southern California. Reimbursement costs for mutual aid responders exceeded $12 million and,
in total, the disaster was estimated to cost almost $1 billion.
76
Date Disaster
10/26/93 Three fires broke out in San Diego County, and Ventura, Orange, and Riverside
Counties each had one fire break out.
Response:
Various local fire departments and Ventura and Orange County EOCs were
activated to initially handle the breaking fires.
10/27/93 Eleven new fires broke out in six southern California counties. San
Bernardino, Los Angeles, and the four original counties had a total of 17 fires to
fight simultaneously.
About 56,000 acres were burned and about 250 homes were destroyed in
southern California.
The governor’s proclamation of a state of emergency was issued for all six
counties.
The governor requested a presidential declaration for the same six counties.
Humidity levels were extremely low and no rain was forecast for the next seven
days in southern California. Also, the Santa Ana winds were gusting up to
40-50 mph.
Response:
OES’s SOC and southern REOC were activated to provide assistance to local
jurisdictions and operational areas during the response to the disaster.
Coordination and communication were established by OES between its SOC,
southern REOC, and Fire and Rescue Branch, as well as with the California
Department of Forestry (CDF), the CNG, the California Conservation Corps,
and the governor’s staff. Overall coordination was accomplished through
conference calls.
77
Date Disaster
10/27/93 Eighty firefighting companies from Los Angeles responded to the fires. Sixty
strike teams from OES and 40 from CDF headed for southern California.
UNOCAL Corporation donated 8,000 gallons of diesel fuel for fire engines.
All available air tankers were committed to the southern California fires. CDF
requested six additional air tankers from Boise, Idaho, to be en route within
24 hours.
10/28/93 No new fires began. Three of the 17 fires in southern California were under
control and in “mop-up.” Three other fires were 80 percent or more contained.
During the previous two days, fires burned more than 127,000 acres and
damaged or destroyed over 500 structures.
The potential for more large, damaging fires was expected to continue until the
winds ceased.
Response:
Nearly 700 fire engines and more than 3,000 firefighters from throughout the
State were rushed to fight the wildfires in southern California. OES dispatched
79 of the strike teams from its SOC. At least 60 additional strike teams were
dispatched by regional mutual aid coordinators in southern California.
Projections showed 37 air tankers available in California within 24 hours. This
increased to 40 over the next 48 hours.
11/1/93 Of the 17 existing fires, 13 were 100 percent contained.
Over 173,000 acres burned.
To date, 53 injures were reported.
Response:
To date, a total of 7,453 personnel were assigned to the southern California
fires, and over 40 agencies were supporting the fire suppression efforts.
11/2/93 Los Angeles, Riverside, and San Diego Counties each reported one new fire.
This brought the total number of fires in southern California since October 26,
1993, to 20.
The previous presidential declaration remained in effect for these new fires.
78
Date Disaster
11/2/93 Response:
All available air tankers were in use or on standby awaiting assignment. In
addition, the mutual aid system provided 70 strike teams. Fifteen came from
the affected area and OES arranged for the other 55 strike teams to come from
the rest of the State.
Four disaster assistance centers remained open.
11/3/93 No new fires began. Of the three new fires that broke out on November 2,
1993, one was 95 percent contained.
The National Weather Service (NWS) discontinued its red flag warning at 2 a.m.
Response:
As of 11 a.m., it was estimated that all available Fire and Rescue resources
within California were responding to the southern California fires (total
“draw-down”). In addition, aircraft in the U.S.A. were at total draw-down. If
any additional aircraft were needed, they would be requested from Canada.
Over 1,000 engines were deployed to the Topanga fire in Los Angeles County.
The southern REOC was deactivated on this day.
11/4/93 No new fires began. All of the fires, except for the Topanga fire in Los Angeles
County that broke on November 2, 1993, were expected to be 100 percent
contained by the end of the day.
Response:
The Department of Corrections reported that it had 1,800 inmates, who were
specially trained, fighting the fires.
11/5/93 No new fires began. The Topanga fire was about 80 percent contained with
full containment expected at 6 p.m..
There were one confirmed fatality and 12 injuries.
About 350 homes were destroyed and 17,027 acres burned.
Preliminary estimates on losses were over $100 million.
79
Date Disaster
11/5/93 For all the fires statewide from October 26, 1993, through November 5, 1993,
there were:
Four fatalities.
Over 1,200 structures destroyed.
Response:
Demobilization began.
In response to this disaster, the California Mutual Aid System brought together
more resources than had ever been used in its 44-year history, including 15,000
personnel from the fire services and 1,525 fire engines. Most of these
resources were supplied through the fire and rescue mutual aid system, which
was coordinated by and operated through OES.
The 1995 Winter Storm—March
80
Below is a summary of the statewide response to the winter storms that occurred in March 1995.
Although this disaster appeared to be a continuation of the winter storms that started in
January 1995, officially it was considered a separate disaster. This second wave of storms
caused massive agricultural damage throughout the State and left tens of thousands of people
without electricity for several days. Ultimately, 57 of the State’s 58 counties received a
presidential disaster declaration. Most of the response efforts during these storms were handled
at the local level. However, OES was heavily involved during the recovery phase of this disaster.
Date Disaster
3/8/95 Persistent rains reached the northern California coast, and a flash flood watch
and and strong Pacific storms were expected for northern California. The storm also
3/9/95 continued to move towards southern California.
Interstate 5 was closed between Williams and Arbuckle. Highways 99 and 20
were closed in Colusa, and numerous local roads were closed as well. Napa
County expected the Napa River to rise equal to or greater than it did during the
1986 flooding. Some localized flooding and evacuations occurred. The City of
Napa had mud flows in downtown. In Sonoma County, 100 roads were closed.
A mudslide closed Highway 89 between Truckee and Squaw Valley. Three
southern California petroleum pipelines were shut down due to possible
mudslides. At this point, about 10,000 Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) coastal
range area customers were without service, but service was expected to be
restored by the next day.
Eight counties submitted local emergency declarations. Sonoma County
requested a gubernatorial declaration.
Response:
OES’s SOC and all three of its REOCs were activated to provide assistance to
local jurisdictions and operational areas. The following efforts were coordinated
by OES during the response phase of the disaster:
The CNG sent five troop-hauling trucks and three helicopters to Sonoma
County.
The CDF sent support to the three REOCs and had handcrews working
throughout California.
The Department of Water Resources opened its Flood Center operations and
was monitoring levees and rivers throughout the State.
Date Disaster
81
3/8/95 Eleven shelters opened in six northern California counties and four more were
and on standby.
3/9/95
The CCC had 35 crews in Yolo County and six flotation pumps in Orange
County.
3/10/95 The rainfall moved into the Los Angeles basin, affecting Los Angeles and Orange
through Counties. Rainfall of 2 to 5-1/2 inches was predicted in a 12-hour period.
3/12/95 Northern and central storm patterns continued.
Flooding occurred in downtown Susanville. Downtown Cambria had up to five
feet of water. Clear Lake was expected to reach flood stage on March 10, 1995,
and the Salinas River was expected to crest above flood stage that evening.
Pacific Bell and Contel reported critical facilities were out in northern California.
Sacramento Municipal Utility District (SMUD) also reported extensive outages.
PG&E reported that 120,000 customers were without electricity in northern
California. In Lake County, two wastewater facilities were discharging into Clear
Lake. The Arroyo Bridge, which is close to the Kings/Fresno County line,
collapsed and four vehicles went down, with four confirmed fatalities.
On March 12, 1995, OES received word that the President declared 39 counties
as disasters.
Response:
OES sent two strike teams to Sonoma County.
A boil-water advisory was put in effect for Guernville and Monte Rio.
In 23 counties, 29 shelters were opened and 5 were on standby. By
March 12, 1995, many of these shelters had closed. The shelters had an
overnight population of 1,459 people.
FEMA activated its REOC and a FEMA liaison was at the DFO.
Mexico requested Caltrans’ services. The request was referred to FEMA.
Sierra County called for sandbags. OES found 79,000 available sand bags
and the supplier stated that it would contact Sierra County. CNG delivered
10,000 of those sand bags to Sierra County and 40,000 to Colusa County.
The CHP and Caltrans were sent to search for survivors at the Arroyo Bridge.
The southern REOC was deactivated at 5 p.m. on March 12, 1995.
82
Date Disaster
3/13/95 Rainfall in southern California ceased. However, northern California was
through expecting more rain. On March 15, 1995, the NWS forecast a drying trend for
3/17/95 California for the next three days.
As of March 14, 1995, 10 fatalities were confirmed and 5 were unconfirmed. As
of March 17, 1995, 16 fatalities were confirmed and 6 were unconfirmed. SMUD
was expected to make all storm damage repairs by March 24, 1995.
The presidential declaration for the March 1995 storms was effective beginning
February 13, 1995. As of March 17, 1995, 49 of the State’s 58 counties were
granted gubernatorial declarations. As of April 3, 1995, 57 of the State’s
58 counties received a presidential declaration.
Response:
Some evacuated communities were allowing people back to their residences.
The Red Cross reported that seven shelters were still open on March 17,
1995, with a population of 969.
Flooding was expected to continue around the Clear Lake shoreline for at
least another week.
The SOC and inland REOC scaled down operations and prepared to
transition into recovery issues on March 14, 1995.
The coastal REOC began demobilizing at 5 p.m. on March 17, 1995.
Some flood response missions were still being conducted throughout the
State, performing activities such as debris removal, road clearing, and levee
monitoring.
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