LAO
Taxation of Sugary Drinks
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Taxation of Sugary Drinks
MAC TAYLOR
LEGISLATIVE ANALYST
NOVEMBER 26, 2018
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LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE
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Executive Summary
Sugary Drink Taxes. Excise taxes on sugary drinks have become increasingly common in
recent years. In June 2018, the Legislature passed a law prohibiting local governments from
levying such taxes. The Legislature may now face two decisions:
• Should the state levy an excise tax on sugary drinks?
• If so, how should the tax be designed?
This report provides information and perspectives for the Legislature to consider as it weighs
these choices.
Why Tax Sugary Drinks?
Sugary Drink Taxes Have Two Purposes. Sugary drink tax proponents tend to emphasize
two goals: a fiscal goal of raising revenue and a policy goal of improving health.
• Fiscal Purpose: Revenue. Sugary drink taxes are one of many options available to
policymakers who want to raise revenue. However, sugary drink taxes—and excise taxes
more generally—are not an ideal way to achieve this fiscal goal. Excise taxes impose undue
burdens on narrowly defined groups. Additionally, such taxes—and narrowly targeted
tax policies more generally—make businesses’ success less dependent on marketplace
competition and more dependent on political competition.
• Policy Purpose: Health. A statewide sugary drink tax likely would reduce sugary drink
consumption, potentially leading to improvements in health—such as reduced rates of
heart disease and diabetes. However, consumer responses to a sugary drink tax would be
complex, so the net health effects of such a tax are uncertain.
Key Design Decisions
Defining the Tax Base. Many recent sugary drink tax proposals exclude artificially sweetened
“diet” drinks, dairy-based drinks, and 100 percent juice. The juice exclusion illustrates a key
trade-off. On one hand, policymakers could take a relatively aggressive approach by taxing
a broad range of sugary drinks, maximizing potential health benefits. On the other hand,
policymakers could take a relatively cautious approach by limiting the tax to drinks—such as
soda—that provide no beneficial nutrients.
Choosing the Type of Tax. A sugary drink tax can be based on the volume of the drink (for
example, 2 cents per ounce) or on the amount of sugar in the drink (for example, 3 cents per
teaspoon of sugar). A third alternative is a tiered tax that combines aspects of the other two (for
example, 1 or 2 cents per ounce, depending on the amount of sugar). Volume-based taxes are
simplest, but sugar-based taxes align more closely with the health goals of the policy.
Setting an Initial Tax Rate. A statewide sugary drink tax would reduce sugary drink
consumption. For example, a 2 cent per ounce tax likely would reduce consumption by
15 percent to 35 percent. This effect on consumption is central to the policy purpose of the tax,
but it affects the fiscal outcome as well.
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Adjusting the Tax Rate Over Time. As time passes, inflation reduces the effectiveness of
taxes whose rates are defined as fixed amounts of money (such as 2 cents per ounce). Indexing
the rate to inflation can help maintain the fiscal and policy effectiveness of the tax over time.
Allocating the Revenue. Allocating sugary drink tax revenues—and tax revenues more
generally—to special funds is not a good budgetary practice. Doing so:
• Constrains the Legislature’s budgetary choices.
• Exacerbates the conflict between the tax’s fiscal goals and policy goals.
Moreover, revenues from specific taxes can diverge from the costs of specific programs over
time, making ongoing commitments problematic.
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INTRODUCTION
Taxes on sugary drinks have become local action. As such, the Legislature may face the
increasingly common in recent years. In June 2018, following decisions:
the Legislature passed a law (Chapter 61 of 2018
• Should the state levy an excise tax on sugary
[AB 1838, Committee on Budget]) prohibiting local
drinks?
governments from levying such taxes (and other
• If so, how should the tax be designed?
taxes on groceries) through 2030. The law stated
the Legislature’s intent to regulate the imposition
This report provides information and
and collection of such taxes to the exclusion of
perspectives for the Legislature to consider as it
weighs these choices.
BACKGROUND
State and Federal Governments Levy Excise such, the term excludes many other drinks—such
Taxes. Unlike broad-based taxes—such as income, as milk—that contain naturally occurring sugars.)
property, and sales taxes—excise taxes apply
Excise Taxes on Nonalcoholic Drinks
to narrow categories of goods. Figure 1 lists
examples of goods that are subject to state and
Many Jurisdictions Have Levied Excise Taxes
federal excise taxes in California. For example, the on Nonalcoholic Drinks. Four California cities
federal government and the state of California both levy excise taxes on sugary drinks. As shown in
levy excise taxes on alcoholic beverages. Currently, Figure 2 (see next page), Berkeley has levied
however, they do not levy excise taxes on sugary such a tax since 2015, while Albany, Oakland,
drinks. (In this report, we use the term “sugary and San Francisco have done so since 2017. (The
drinks” to refer to drinks containing added sugar, recent ban on local grocery taxes left these four in
such as soda, energy drinks, and fruit drinks. As place). Additionally, the state Legislature and the
Figure 1
Notable California Excise Taxes
Representative Retail Price
Tax Base State Rate Federal Rate (Including Taxes)
Gasoline $0.42 per gallon $0.18 per gallon $3.50 per gallon
Diesel $0.36 per gallon $0.24 per gallon $3.80 per gallon
Cigarettes $2.87 per pack $1.01 per pack $8.00 per pack
Other tobacco products 63% of wholesale price Varies across products Varies across products
(cigars, chewing tobacco, etc.)
Beer 0.2 cent per ounce 0.1 to 0.5 cent per ounce 10 cents per ounce
Wine 0.2 cent per ounce 0.1 to 2.7 cents per ounce 40 cents per ounce
Distilled Spirits 2.6 cents per ounce 0.7 to 13.4 cents per ounce 50 cents per ounce
Cannabisa $9.25 per ounce of flowers, — $300 per ounce of flowers
$2.75 per ounce of leaves, and
15 percent of retail price of final
product
a
Local taxes also apply.
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Figure 2
Some Notable Nonalcoholic Drink Tax Proposals
Applies Year Tax
Only to Went
Sugary Status as of Into
Jurisdiction Tax Drinks? November 2018 Effect
California
Berkeley 1 cent/oz of drink volume Yes In effect 2015
Albany 1 cent/oz of drink volume Yes In effect 2017
Oakland 1 cent/oz of drink volume Yes In effect 2017
San Francisco 1 cent/oz of drink volume Yes In effect 2017
El Monte 1 cent/oz of drink volume Yes Did not pass (2012 ballot measure) —
Richmond 1 cent/oz of drink volume Yes Did not pass (2012 ballot measure) —
California 1 cent/tsp of sugar Yes Did not pass (2009-10 Legislative Session) —
California 1 cent/oz of drink volume Yes Did not pass (2013-14 Legislative Session) —
California 2 cents/oz of drink volume Yes Did not pass (2017-18 Legislative Session) —
California 2 cents/oz of drink volume Yes Collecting signatures (Initiative) —
Other States in U.S.
West Virginia 0.1 cent/oz of drink volume No In effect 1951
Arkansas 0.2 cent/oz of drink volume No In effect 1993
Washington 0.2 cent/oz of drink volume No Repealed in 2010 2010
Other Local Governments in U.S.
Boulder, CO 2 cents/oz of drink volume Yes In effect 2017
Philadelphia, PA 1.5 cents/oz of drink volume No In effect 2017
Seattle, WA 1.75 cents/oz of drink volume Yes In effect 2018
Cook County, IL 1 cent/oz of drink volume No Repealed in 2017 2017
Outside of U.S.a
Norway 0.5 to 1.4 cent/oz of drink volume No In effect 1924
France 0.3 to 0.7 cent/oz of drink volume, No In effect 2012
depending on amount of sweetener
Chile 8 percentage-point difference in value- Yes In effect 2014
added tax rate between higher-sugar and
lower-sugar drinks
Mexico 0.3 cent/oz of drink volume Yes In effect 2014
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, 50 to 100 percent of retail price No In effect 2017
and the United Arab
Emirates
Catalonia 0.4 to 0.5 cent/oz of drink volume, Yes In effect 2017
depending on amount of sugar
Philippines 0.3 to 0.7 cent/oz of drink volume, No In effect 2018
depending on type of sweetener
South Africa 1.4 cent/tsp of sugar (except the first tsp Yes In effect 2018
per 3.4 oz)
Sri Lanka 0.1 cent/tsp of sugar Yes In effect 2018
United Kingdom and 0.75 to 1 cent/oz of drink volume, Yes In effect 2018
Ireland depending on amount of sugar
Denmark 0.7 cent/oz of drink volume No Repealed in 2014 1934
a
Foreign tax rates converted to U.S. dollars based on purchasing power parity.
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cities of El Monte and Richmond have considered first policy, the second one levies a larger tax on
sugary drink tax proposals but have not adopted the sodas and the cranberry juice cocktail—which
them. Outside of California, a variety of local, state, contain relatively large amounts of sugar—and a
and national governments have levied excise taxes smaller tax on the lemon iced tea and the sports
on nonalcoholic drinks. Most of these policies have drink, which contain more moderate amounts of
been in place for less than a decade. sugar.
Many Drink Taxes Not Limited to Sugary
Sales Taxes on Nonalcoholic Drinks
Drinks. The state and local nonalcoholic drink taxes
proposed in California have applied only to sugary State and Local Governments Levy Sales Tax
drinks. Outside of California, however, many excise on Many Goods. The sales and use tax (hereafter,
taxes apply to broader categories of nonalcoholic sales tax) applies to retail sales of tangible goods.
drinks. Philadelphia’s tax, for example, applies both The rate varies across the state, ranging from
to sugary drinks and to artificially sweetened drinks, 7.25 percent to 10.25 percent, with a statewide
such as “diet” soda. average of 8.5 percent.
Sugary Drink Tax Examples. Figure 3 illustrates State Constitution Exempts “Food Products”
how two hypothetical sugary drink taxes would From Sales Tax. The state has developed a
apply to five types of drinks. The first tax is based complex system of rules for determining whether
on drink volume: two cents per fluid ounce. This a particular food or drink qualifies for the food
tax ranges from $0.24 on a 12-ounce can of cola products exemption. These rules classify many—
to $1.28 on a 64-ounce bottle of cranberry juice but not all—drinks as exempt food products.
cocktail. The second tax is based on sugar content: For example, juice, milk, and bottled water are
3 cents per teaspoon of sugar. Compared to the considered food products and therefore exempt
Figure 3
Sugary Drink Tax Examples
$1.60
3 Cent Tax Per Teaspoon of Sugar
2 Cent Tax Per Ounce of Drink Volume
1.20
0.80
0.40
12-oz can of cola 16-oz bottle of 20-oz bottle of 28-oz bottle 64-oz bottle of
lemon iced tea lemon-lime soda of sports drink cranberry juice cocktail
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from sales tax. As shown in the
Figure 4
first column of Figure 4, however,
Does Sales Tax Apply?
almost all carbonated drinks—
including sugary soda, diet soda,
and unsweetened sparkling
Drink California Texas Florida New York
water—are not considered food
products and therefore are
subject to sales tax. Sugary Soda
Sales Taxes on Drinks in
Diet Soda
Other States. Like California,
other states levy sales taxes
100% Juice
on many drinks. As shown in
(Non-Carbonated)
Figure 4, the four most populous
states all apply sales tax to
Juice with Added Sugar Depends on Depends on
sugary soda and to diet soda (Non-Carbonated) Juice Content Juice Content
but exempt milk and 100 percent
juice. Sales taxation of some
Milk
other drinks, however, varies
across these states. For example,
Unsweetened
all four have different rules Sparkling Water
regarding fruit drinks that contain
added sugar. Texas is the only Unsweetened Bottled Water
(Non-Carbonated)
one of the four that exempts
sparkling water from its sales tax,
while New York is the only one of
the four that applies its sales tax
to non-carbonated bottled water.
WHY TAX SUGARY DRINKS?
Sugary drink tax proponents tend to emphasize • Reducing “Tax Expenditures.” Tax
two goals: a fiscal goal of raising revenue and a expenditures are exceptions to the basic
policy goal of improving health. tax structure that apply to certain types of
taxpayers or transactions. As described
Fiscal Purpose: Revenue
above, for example, California exempts food
A sugary drink tax is one of many options products from the sales tax.
available to policymakers who want to raise
Excise Taxes Not an Ideal Way to Raise
revenue. Other options include:
Revenue. As fiscal tools, excise taxes have several
• Raising Rates of Existing Taxes. For shortcomings, including:
example, Proposition 30 (2012) raised state
• Undue Burdens. The cost of funding basic
revenue by increasing income tax and sales
government services is generally borne by the
tax rates.
entire public—based on broad measures such
• Expanding the Base of Existing Taxes. For as income and wealth. An excise tax, on the
example, some policymakers have proposed
other hand, is borne by a narrowly defined
expanding the sales tax base to include
group of businesses or consumers. As such,
services.
the tax burden can be disproportionately
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borne. For instance, excise taxes are usually Purpose of Tax
regressive, meaning lower-income people tend Should Guide Its Design
to spend a higher share of their incomes on
Design Choices Should Reflect Rationale for
the tax than higher-income people.
Tax. Policymakers considering sugary drink taxes
• Political Competition. Narrowly targeted
face several major design choices:
tax policies make businesses’ success less
dependent on competition in the marketplace • What types of drinks should be included in the
and more dependent on competition for tax base?
favorable policy treatment.
• Should the tax be based on the volume of the
drink, the amount of sugar, or something else?
Policy Purpose: Health
• What should the tax rate be?
A statewide sugary drink tax likely would reduce • How should the revenue be used?
sugary drink consumption, potentially leading to
As discussed later in this report, the answers to
improvements in health.
these questions can depend on whether the main
Heart Disease and Diabetes Kill Many
purpose of the tax is to raise revenue or to improve
Californians. Heart disease was California’s leading
health.
cause of death in 2016, accounting for 23 percent
Consider Administrative Burden. In addition to
of the state’s deaths. Diabetes was the seventh
the fiscal goal of raising revenue and the policy goal
most common cause of death at 3.5 percent.
of improving health, the design choices listed above
These diseases have adverse effects not only on
hinge on a third factor: the administrative burden
life expectancy, but also on quality of life. Many
imposed by the tax. To account for this factor,
behavioral and genetic factors contribute to these
policymakers should ask two questions of any tax
diseases.
proposal:
Sugary Drink Tax Potentially Could Improve
Health. Sugary drink consumption can contribute • Can tax administrators and taxpayers
to heart disease and diabetes in multiple ways. For implement the tax successfully? (For
example, consumption of these drinks can lead to simplicity, we use the term “taxpayers” to
excess caloric intake. Additionally, some research refer to businesses that would register and
suggests that the links between sugary drinks and remit the tax. As discussed below, however,
chronic disease might not be limited to their caloric consumers would pay much of the tax
content. In particular, sugary drinks enable rapid indirectly through price increases.)
consumption of large amounts of sugar, and they • How difficult is it for taxpayers to comply with
do not contain other nutrients—such as fat, protein, the tax?
or fiber—that can help the body process sugar. As
Continue Monitoring Evidence Regarding
a result, these drinks could contribute to diabetes
Efficacy. If the Legislature enacts a sugary drink
to a greater extent than would be suggested by
tax, it should continue to evaluate the tax and
their caloric content alone. (A full assessment of
make adjustments as necessary. This evaluation
this body of research falls outside of the scope of
should monitor evidence not only from California,
our expertise.) As discussed later in this report,
but also from other states and countries. Ideally,
however, consumer responses to a sugary drink tax
the evaluation would focus on the ultimate goals
could be complex, so the net health effects of such
of these policies—such as improvements in health.
a tax are uncertain.
In practice, however, estimating the effects of
the taxes on those ultimate goals could be very
difficult. Accordingly, monitoring some intermediate
outcomes—such as consumption of sugary
drinks—could be useful as well.
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DEFINING THE TAX BASE
Should the Tax Base Include Food? An excise Should the Tax Exempt Milk? Most sugary
tax designed to reduce heart disease and diabetes drink taxes do not apply to dairy-based drinks
need not be limited to sugary drinks. It also could despite their significant sugar content (including
apply to foods that contribute to those diseases. naturally occurring sugars). If the main goal of the
In principle, broadening the base in this way could tax is to raise revenue, then this narrowing of the
help the tax achieve both its health goals and its base clearly is counterproductive. If, however,
fiscal goals more effectively. In practice, however, the main goal of the tax is health-related, then
designing, administering, and complying with such the decision to exclude dairy from the base is
a tax could be difficult at the state or local level for more nuanced. Although most dairy-based drinks
a couple of reasons: contain sugar, they also contain fat and protein.
If, as some researchers argue, sugary drinks
• The distinctions between taxed and untaxed
contribute to diabetes primarily because they lack
foods could be subtle and hard to track.
these nutrients, it is reasonable to exclude dairy
• Such a tax would apply to a much larger
from these taxes. Furthermore, some types of dairy
set of taxpayers with a much wider variety
products—such as yogurt-based or cream-based
of products, business models, and industry
products—can blur the line between drinks and
structures.
food, which could make administration and
compliance more difficult.
Common Features of Recent Proposals.
Many recent sugary drink tax proposals—including Should the Tax Exempt Juice? Sugary drink
local ordinances enacted in Boulder, Seattle, and tax bases typically exclude 100 percent juice but
four California cities, and recent bills introduced include other fruit drinks. Excluding 100 percent
in the Legislature—define their tax bases similarly. juice reduces revenue, just as excluding dairy
In particular, their bases do not include artificially does. However, the nutritional case for excluding
sweetened drinks, dairy-based drinks, or 100 percent juice appears to be much weaker
100 percent juice. than the case for excluding dairy. Some types of
100 percent juice contain protein or fiber, but many
Below, we discuss the merits of each of these
others do not. Many types of 100 percent juice
choices.
contain vitamins and minerals, but so do many
Key Decisions Regarding the sugary fruit drinks and energy drinks. Accordingly,
Tax Base the American Academy of Pediatrics has
recommended limiting children’s intake of juice.
Should the Tax Apply to Artificially Sweetened
Key Trade-Off: Main Policy Goal vs. Other
Drinks? As shown in Figure 2, some soft drink
Health Effects. The potential exclusion of
taxes apply only to sugary drinks, while others
100 percent juice illustrates a general trade-off
apply to artificially sweetened drinks as well. If the
in the design of sugary drink taxes. Some sugary
primary goal of an excise tax is to improve health,
drinks contain beneficial nutrients. At one end of
then the decision to omit artificially sweetened
the spectrum, policymakers could take a relatively
drinks should depend on an assessment of the
aggressive approach by applying the tax to as
health effects of consuming those drinks. If sugary
many sugary drinks as possible. This approach
drinks present much greater health concerns than
likely would lead to the greatest reduction in
artificially sweetened drinks, then a health-focused
sugary drink consumption, maximizing potential
tax should apply only to sugary drinks and not to
reductions in the key diseases of interest—heart
any others.
disease and diabetes. However, this approach also
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could reduce intake of some beneficial nutrients, This approach likely would have weaker effects
such as vitamins. At the other end of the spectrum, on sugary drink consumption, but it also would be
policymakers could take a relatively cautious less likely to reduce intake of vitamins and other
approach by limiting the tax to sugary drinks— nutrients.
such as soda—that provide no beneficial nutrients.
CHOOSING THE TYPE OF TAX
Different Types of Sugary Drink Taxes equivalent to 0.8 cent per ounce U.S.) for drinks
with three-eighths to three-fifths of a teaspoon;
Volume-Based Tax. Under a volume-based
and a higher rate (roughly equivalent to 1 cent per
tax, the amount of tax owed depends only on the
ounce U.S.) for drinks with more than three-fifths
volume of the taxed drink. As shown in Figure 3,
of a teaspoon. (For example, many sweetened teas
for example, a one cent per ounce tax results in
are in the middle tier, while most sodas are in the
a tax of $0.12 on a can of cola and $0.64 on a
highest tier.)
large bottle of cranberry juice cocktail. For a given
container size, this type of tax treats all sugary Trade-Offs Among Types
drinks equally, regardless of their sugar content
Volume-Based Tax Simplest. The simpler a tax,
or other characteristics. This is the most common
the easier it is for taxpayers and tax administrators
type of excise tax levied on sugary drinks.
to implement. Volume-based taxes are the simplest
Sugar-Based Tax. Sugar-based taxes have
sugary drink taxes, as they depend only on
rates that vary depending on the amount of sugar
information that is commonly tracked and relatively
that drinks contain. In the 2009-10 session, for
easy to verify. Sugar-based or tiered taxes are
example, the Legislature considered two bills that
more complex, as they require taxpayers and tax
would have levied a tax of one cent per teaspoon of
administrators to track drinks’ sugar content. This
sugar in each drink. Compared to a volume-based
information already appears on federally mandated
tax, a sugar-based tax would lead to higher taxes
nutrition labels, so a sugar-based or tiered tax
on drinks with more sugar and lower taxes on
likely would be feasible at the state level. Local
drinks with less sugar. As shown in Figure 3,
governments have less tax administration capacity
for example, a sugar-based tax would result
than the state, so their ability to administer such a
in somewhat higher taxes on many sodas and
tax is less clear.
fruit drinks, and somewhat lower taxes on many
Sugar-Based Tax Likely Most Effective for
sweetened teas and sports drinks.
Health. Volume-based taxes discourage production
Tiered Tax. Many volume-based taxes exempt
and consumption of all sugary drinks similarly. In
drinks with small amounts of sugar. Berkeley’s
contrast, a sugar-based tax would discourage
tax, for example, does not apply to drinks that
production and consumption proportionally to
contain less than two calories per ounce. (Very
the amount of sugar in the drink. As a result, we
few sugary drinks fall below this threshold.) As
would expect a sugar-based tax to reduce liquid
a result, these taxes effectively separate sugary
sugar consumption to a greater degree than a
drinks into two categories, or tiers, based on sugar
volume-based tax. Furthermore, sugar-based taxes
content. Some other jurisdictions—such as the
give drink manufacturers an incentive to reduce
United Kingdom (U.K.) and Catalonia—have taxes
the sugar content of their drinks—an incentive that
that extend this concept with more than two tiers.
volume-based taxes do not provide. Tiered taxes
The U.K. tax, for example, has three tiers: a zero
provide this incentive to some degree, but much
rate for drinks with less than three-eighths of a
more weakly than sugar-based taxes. Given the
teaspoon of sugar per ounce; a middle rate (roughly
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central role of sugar content in the health rationale sugar-based, and tiered taxes affects the relative
for these taxes, we would expect sugar-based tax rates on different types of sugary drinks.
taxes to be more effective for achieving health However, the rates of any of these taxes could
goals than volume-based or tiered taxes. be set to raise a given amount of revenue, so
All Types Could Raise Similar Amounts of this choice has little bearing on the tax’s fiscal
Revenue. The choice among volume-based, effectiveness.
SETTING THE TAX RATE
Setting Rate to Achieve a Policy Goal Setting Rate to Achieve a
Revenue Goal
Statewide Tax Would Reduce Sugary Drink
Consumption. Based on our review of available Revenue Depends on Initial Size of Base . . .
evidence (discussed in the Appendix), we would At a basic level, the amount of revenue produced
expect a statewide sugary drink tax to lead to by a given tax is equal to the tax rate times the
higher prices for the taxed drinks and lower size of the tax base. Based on this relationship,
consumption of those drinks. The Legislature can policymakers can set the tax rate to raise the
set the tax rate based on the reduction in sugary desired amount of revenue. A complication arises,
drink consumption that it wants to achieve. For however, due to the consumer response described
example, a two cent per ounce tax likely would earlier. Due to that response, the size of the tax
reduce consumption by 15 percent to 35 percent. base depends, in turn, on the tax rate.
Complex Relationship Between Tax and . . . And Magnitude of Consumer Response.
Potential Health Improvements. The tax would As noted above, we estimate that a two cent per
affect health due to the drop in aggregate sugary ounce statewide sugary drink tax likely would
drink consumption described above. The net reduce the size of the tax base by 15 percent
effects of the tax on health would depend not only to 35 percent. A lower rate would lead to a
on that drop in consumption, but also on: proportionally smaller reduction in the tax base,
while a higher rate would lead to a proportionally
• How the reductions in consumption are
larger reduction in the tax base.
distributed among people who face different
health risks. In particular, the health effects of
Adjusting Rate Over Time
the tax would depend disproportionately on
the responses of people who face a relatively Inflation Can Reduce Real Tax Rates Over
high risk of heart disease and diabetes. Time. Prices tend to rise over time. Due to this
inflation, the real value of any fixed amount of
• Other consumer responses, such as changes
money—such as a tax rate defined as a specific
in consumption of other foods and drinks.
number of cents per ounce—diminishes over time.
If, for example, consumers respond by
As shown in Figure 5, for example, California’s real
consuming more candy or beer, the net health
tax rate on distilled spirits has declined gradually
benefits of the tax could be minimal. If, on
due to inflation. This gradual decline has more than
the other hand, consumers respond to the
offset the modest one-time rate increases enacted
tax by eating more vegetables, the tax could
by the Legislature in 1968 and 1991. In the case
lead to larger health improvements than
of cigarettes, however, several large one-time rate
those resulting from the drop in sugary drink
increases have more than offset the gradual decline
consumption alone.
resulting from inflation, so the real rate has risen
over time.
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Inflation Indexing Helps Figure 5
Achieve Fiscal Goals . . . Due to
Inflation Can Reduce Real Tax Rates Over Time
inflation, sugary drink taxes that
are fixed in dollar terms will raise
Real Tax Rate on Distilled Spirits
declining amounts of real revenue
2018 Dollars Per Ounce
over time. Instead of keeping
$0.14
excise tax rates fixed in dollar
Legislative Increase 1967
terms, policymakers could index 0.12
them to inflation—automatically
0.10
keeping their real value constant
over time. For example, an 0.08
inflation-indexed tax on sugary
0.06
drinks would raise an amount of Legislative Increase 1991
real revenue per ounce that is 0.04
constant over time, instead of
0.02
one that diminishes over time. (In
either case, total revenue would
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
depend not only on revenue per
ounce, but on the total number of
ounces consumed.) Real Tax Rate on Cigarettes
. . . And Policy Goals. Inflation 2018 Dollars Per Pack
gradually erodes fixed-rate taxes Proposition 56
$3.00
2016
not only from a fiscal standpoint,
but also from a policy standpoint.
2.50
As the real value of the tax
gets smaller, the incentives it
provides—and hence its effects 2.00
on consumers’ behavior—
Proposition 10
become weaker. In contrast, 1.50 1998
the incentives provided by an
inflation-indexed tax are unlikely
Legislative
to decline over time. 1.00 Increase 1967 Proposition 99
1988
Multiple Indices Available.
0.50
Inflation measurement is not
straightforward. Many economists
have raised concerns that the
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
most commonly used measures
of inflation—Consumer Price
Indices—tend to overstate
increases in the cost of living.
Some alternative measures
Furthermore, some key prices in California—such
of inflation—known as chained indices—likely
as housing prices—historically have risen faster
overstate inflation to a lesser degree. However,
than the national average, so nationwide indices
chained indices are not available at the state level.
may well understate inflation in California.
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ALLOCATING THE REVENUE
Tax Revenues Are Typically Available the resulting funding often diverges from program
for General Fund Purposes. Historically, the costs over time.
Legislature has placed almost all tax revenue in the
• Example: First 5 California. First 5
General Fund. This has also been the case for most
California—which funds services for children
excise taxes (except for fuel taxes). For instance,
under 5 years old—receives the vast majority
the Legislature has placed revenues from the excise
of its funding from tobacco taxes. As shown
taxes on cigarettes and alcoholic beverages into
in the top panel of Figure 6, the number
the General Fund. In recent decades, however,
of births in California—the main factor
ballot measures have allocated increases in excise
determining the number of children served by
tax revenue—such as tobacco tax increases
First 5—has remained roughly constant over
and new taxes on cannabis—to special funds
time. Real tobacco tax revenue, however, has
designated for specific purposes. In our view, this
declined steadily over time.
is not a good budgetary practice, as it constrains
• Example: Developmental Services. Several
the Legislature in its annual budgetary choices.
years ago, the Legislature considered—
In addition, the revenues from an excise tax can
but did not adopt—a proposal to fund the
diverge from the costs of a specific program over
Department of Developmental Services (DDS)
time. Below, we elaborate on these concerns.
by raising taxes on distilled spirits. As shown
Legislature’s Priorities Tend to Change Over
in the bottom panel of Figure 6, however,
Time. If the current Legislature sets aside revenue
DDS regional center caseloads—the primary
for specific programs, then it will be more difficult
driver of the department’s costs—have grown
for future Legislatures to make choices that are
steadily over time, while real revenue from the
consistent with their own priorities. This is because:
distilled spirits tax has remained flat.
• Future Legislatures could assess the value
General Fund Reduces Conflict Between
of alternative programs very differently. For
Fiscal Goals and Policy Goals. As noted above,
example, a future Legislature might feel
the Legislature can use excise taxes to meet policy
that additional spending on child care was
goals as well as fiscal goals, but these goals can
preferred over whatever program had been
conflict with each other in some scenarios. In the
specified to receive the excise tax funds.
first panel of Figure 6, for example, the decline
• Future Legislatures could face circumstances
in cigarette sales has reduced funding for certain
that the current Legislature does not
early childhood services. In this instance, the
anticipate. In a budget crisis, for example,
policy goal of reducing smoking conflicts with the
the current Legislature might want the future
fiscal goal of funding early childhood services.
Legislature to use the excise tax revenue to
Depositing excise tax revenues in the General
lessen cuts to existing programs supported by
Fund can help the Legislature avoid such conflicts.
the General Fund rather than go for expanded
Proportionally large changes in an excise tax
services to the program specified for the
base—such as the dramatic decline in smoking
excise tax revenues.
over the last half-century—lead to revenue changes
Excise Tax Revenue and Program Costs Often that are minor compared to General Fund revenue.
Diverge Over Time. When policymakers link a Consequently, if such revenues are part of the
program’s budget to revenue from a specific tax, General Fund, the Legislature can deal with the
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fiscal effects of such revenue
Figure 6
changes by making proportionally
Excise Tax Revenues and
modest adjustments to spending
Program Costs Often Diverge Over Time
or to other tax rates. This
approach would enable the
Legislature to design and adjust Example A: First 5 California
excise taxes based primarily on Total Percent Change Since 2001-02
policy goals rather than fiscal
10%
goals. As described below, Births
however, there are some limits
to the flexibility of General Fund -10
revenue. -20 Tobacco Tax Revenue
(2018 Dollars)
Tax Likely Would Increase
-30
Funding Requirement for
-40
Schools. Proposition 98,
approved by voters in 1988 and -50
modified in 1990, establishes 01-02 03-04 05-06 07-08 09-10 11-12 13-14 15-16
a minimum funding level for
schools and community colleges.
Example B: Developmental Services Proposal
This minimum guarantee
Total Percent Change Since 2007-08
depends, in part, on General
Fund tax revenues. When the 35%
Legislature raises General Fund 30
tax revenue, the minimum
25
guarantee generally increases.
20
Over the long run, the minimum DDS Regional Center Caseloads
15
guarantee increases by roughly
10
40 cents for every dollar of new
5 Distilled Spirits Revenue (2018 Dollars)
revenue. As a result, the net
increase in revenue available for
nonschool purposes is smaller -5
2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16
than the increase in General Fund
revenue.
DDS = Department of Developmental Services.
CONCLUSION
The effectiveness of sugary drink taxes as fiscal revenue. We encourage the Legislature to consider
tools and as policy tools depends on several each of these features carefully as it decides
aspects of their design, such as the tax base, whether and how to enact such a tax.
the type of tax, the tax rate, and the use of the
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APPENDIX: THE EFFECTS OF SUGARY DRINK TAXES
This Appendix discusses our estimates of the • In most cases, retailers charge sales tax at
effects of a statewide tax on sugary drinks in the register instead of including it in posted
California. prices. As a result, sales taxes likely have
smaller effects on consumers’ behavior than
Research on Sugary Drink Taxes
equivalent excise taxes, which tend to be
Assessing Studies. We reviewed a wide range reflected in posted prices.
of studies related to the effects of sugary drink
LAO Estimates Place Very Little Weight on
taxes. To assess the usefulness of each study, we
Sales Tax Studies. Summaries of evidence on
considered many factors, including:
sugary drink taxes often draw heavily upon studies
• The quality of the data and methods used. of changes in sales tax rates. As discussed above,
changes in sales tax rates are different from sugary
• The degree of similarity between the context
drink taxes in several important ways. As a result,
studied and present-day California.
these studies do not tell us much about sugary
• The degree of similarity between the policies
drink taxes.
studied and the policies discussed in this
report. Effects on Prices
LAO Estimates Place Very Little Weight on Higher Prices for Sugary Drinks. A statewide
Studies of Local Taxes. Local excise taxes tend tax on sugary drinks would lead to higher prices for
to be less effective fiscal and policy tools than the taxed drinks. The higher the tax rate, the larger
statewide or national excise taxes for two reasons: the resulting price increase. For example, a tax of
two cents per ounce likely would increase the price
• Cross-Border Shopping. Some consumers
of the taxed drinks by 15 percent to 25 percent
respond to the tax by buying the taxed good
on average. This estimate is based on research
in other jurisdictions instead of reducing their
on nationwide sugary drink taxes implemented
consumption.
in Mexico and Chile and on statewide fuel and
• Price Setting. Large retail chains often set
tobacco taxes implemented in the U.S.
prices on a regional basis. Consequently,
Broad Price Increases on Groceries Very
a modest tax that covers only a small area
Unlikely. Some discussions of sugary drink taxes
might not lead such chains’ stores to raise
have raised the possibility that retailers would
their prices.
respond to these taxes by raising prices across
Sugary Drink Taxes Are Different From Sales the board, resulting in a de facto “grocery tax.”
Taxes. As mentioned in the “Background” section This outcome is very unlikely for several reasons,
of the report, state and local sales taxes apply to including:
many sugary drinks. However, sugary drink taxes
• Sugary drink taxes have no direct effect on the
are distinct from sales taxes in four important ways:
cost of selling other products.
• Sales taxes apply to a wide variety of goods • Changing prices can be costly. These costs
besides sugary drinks. discourage retailers from making small price
• Many sugary drinks—such as fruit drinks—are changes to a large number of products.
exempt from sales tax. • When the cost of a product increases, it can
• Recently proposed sugary drink tax rates become harder for retailers to compete for
are much larger than typical sales tax rate shoppers by selling that product cheaply. As
changes. a result, retailers can have an incentive to
compete for shoppers by lowering the prices
of other products.
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• Just like sugary drink taxes, most existing Allcott, Hunt, Rebecca Diamond, and
excise taxes—including taxes on fuel, Jean-Pierre Dube (2018). “The Geography of
tobacco, and alcohol—apply to products sold Poverty and Nutrition: Food Deserts and Food
by multiproduct retailers. We are not aware of Choices Across the United States.” National Bureau
any credible evidence that these taxes have of Economic Research Working Paper 24094.
led to across-the-board price increases at the Allcott, Hunt, Benjamin Lockwood, and Dmitry
affected retailers. Taubinsky (2018). “Regressive Sin Taxes, with an
Application to the Optimal Soda Tax.” Mimeo, New
Effects on Food and York University.
Drink Consumption Chetty, Raj, Adam Looney, and Kory Kroft (2009).
“Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence.”
Lower Consumption of Sugary Drinks. Due to
American Economic Review 99(4):1145-1177.
the price increases described above, consumers
Colchero, M. Arantxa, Carlos Manuel
would buy fewer sugary drinks. The magnitude of
Guerrero-Lopez, Mariana Molina, and Juan Angel
the drop in consumption would depend crucially
Rivera (2016). “Beverage Sales in Mexico Before
on the tax rate. For example, a two cent per ounce
and After Implementation of a Sugar Sweetened
tax likely would reduce consumption by 15 percent
Beverage Tax.” PLoS ONE 11(9).
to 35 percent. This estimate is based primarily
Colchero, M. Arantxa, Juan Carlos Salgardo,
on studies of sugary drink taxes implemented in
Mishel Unar-Munguia, Mariana Molina, Shuwen
Mexico and Chile and of simulated sugary drink
Ng, and Juan Angel Rivera-Dommarco (2015).
taxes in the U.S. In our view, the most useful study
“Changes in Prices After an Excise Tax to
is Allcott, Lockwood, and Taubinsky (2018), which
Sweetened Sugar Beverages Was Implemented in
uses data on U.S. households’ grocery purchases
Mexico: Evidence from Urban Areas.” PLoS ONE
from 2006 through 2015 to estimate the consumer
10(12).
response to hypothetical sugary drink taxes.
DellaVigna, Stefano and Matthew Gentzkow
Potential Changes in Consumption of Other
(2017). “Uniform Pricing in U.S. Retail Chains.”
Foods and Drinks. A sugary drink tax would
National Bureau of Economic Research Working
lead to changes in behavior extending well
Paper No. 23996.
beyond a reduction in sugary drink consumption.
When consumers buy fewer sugary drinks, they Grogger, Jeffrey (2017). “Soda Taxes and the
also reduce their purchases of complementary Prices of Sodas and Other Drinks: Evidence
goods. At the same time, they increase their From Mexico.” American Journal of Agricultural
purchases of substitute goods. For example, to Economics 99(2).
the extent that people buy drinks because they are Harding, Matthew, Ephraim Leibtag, and Michael
thirsty, we might expect the reduction in sugary Lovenheim (2012). “The Heterogeneous Geographic
drink consumption to coincide with increased and Socioeconomic Incidence of Cigarette Taxes:
consumption of other drinks. As noted above, the Evidence from Nielsen Homescan Data.” American
net effects of the tax on health depend crucially Economic Journal: Economic Policy 4(4):169-198.
on a broad range of behavioral responses beyond Harding, Matthew and Michael
the change in sugary drink consumption. Available Lovenheim (2017). “The Effect of Prices
evidence, however, does not support clear on Nutrition: Comparing the Impact of
conclusions about these effects. Product- and Nutrient-Specific Taxes.” Journal of
Health Economics 53.
Selected References
Kopczuk, Wojciech, Justin Marion, Erich
Aguilar, Arturo, Emilio Gutierrez, and Enrique Muehlegger, and Joel Slemrod (2016). “Does
Seira (2017). “The Effectiveness of Sin Food Tax-Collection Invariance Hold? Evasion and the
Taxes: Evidence From Mexico.” Mimeo, Instituto Pass-Through of State Diesel Taxes.” American
Tecnológico Autónomo de México. Economic Journal: Economic Policy 8(2).
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Marion, Justin and Erich Muehlegger (2011). Powell, Lisa, Zeynep Isgor, Leah Rimkus, and
“Fuel Tax Incidence and Supply Conditions.” Frank Chaloupka (2014). “Sugar-Sweetened
Journal of Public Economics 95. Beverage Prices: Estimates From a National
McMillan, Rob (2007). “Different Flavor, Sample of Food Outlets.” Bridging the Gap
Same Price: The Puzzle of Uniform Pricing for research brief.
Differentiated Products.” Mimeo, Federal Trade Rahkovsky, Ilya and Samantha Snyder (2015).
Commission. “Food Choices and Store Proximity.” United States
Nakamura, Ryota, Andrew Mirelman, Cristobal Department of Agriculture Economic Research
Cuadrado, Nicolas Silva-Illanes, Jocelyn Dunstan, Service Report No. 195.
and Marc Suhrcke (2018). “Evaluating the 2014 Thomassen, Oyvind, Howard Smith,
Sugar-Sweetened Beverage Tax in Chile: An Stephan Seiler, and Pasquale Schiraldi (2017).
Observational Study in Urban Areas.” PLoS “Multi-Category Competition and Market Power: A
Medicine 15(7). Model of Supermarket Pricing.” American Economic
Review 107(8).
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LAO PUBLICATIONS
This report was prepared by Seth Kerstein and reviewed by Brian Uhler and Carolyn Chu. The Legislative Analyst’s
Office (LAO) is a nonpartisan office that provides fiscal and policy information and advice to the Legislature.
To request publications call (916) 445-4656. This report and others, as well as an e-mail subscription service, are
available on the LAO’s website at www.lao.ca.gov. The LAO is located at 925 L Street, Suite 1000, Sacramento,
CA 95814.
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