LAO
The 2019-20 Budget: The Governor's Individual Health Insurance Market Affordability Proposals
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The 2019-20 Budget:
The Governor’s Individual Health
Insurance Market Affordability Proposals
GABRIEL PETEK
LEGISLATIVE ANALYST
FEBRUARY 7, 2019
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Executive Summary
Broad Concerns Have Been Raised About Health Care Costs and Access . . . The
Legislature, among others, has raised concerns about underlying costs, efficiency, and access in
the state’s overall health care system.
. . . As Well as Specific Concerns About Affordability of Individual Market Coverage.
In addition to broader concerns about the health care system, the Legislature has raised more
specific concerns about affordability in the individual health insurance market. At the Legislature’s
direction, Covered California recently released a report that outlines a series of policy options to
improve affordability and increase enrollment in the individual market.
Governor Proposes Two Policies to Make Individual Market Coverage More Affordable.
The Governor’s proposed budget includes elements intended to help address the above
concerns. The subset of the Governor’s proposals we review in this report focus more narrowly
on encouraging enrollment and reducing consumer costs in the individual market, as opposed to
broader questions of underlying health care system cost and efficiency. Specifically, the Governor
proposes two policies: (1) the creation of a state individual mandate with an associated financial
penalty, to take the place of the federal individual mandate penalty that was effectively eliminated
by Congress beginning in 2019, and (2) the use of revenues from the state individual mandate
penalty to provide state subsidies to reduce the cost of individual market coverage.
Individual Mandate Proposal Merits Serious Consideration. While the full extent of its
impact is subject to some uncertainty, the individual mandate may be one of the state’s most
effective policy options to increase enrollment in the individual market and reduce the cost of
individual market coverage, particularly for households that currently do not receive federal
subsidies. The individual mandate does involve trade-offs. In particular, the individual mandate
would generate revenue at the expense of individuals who would choose to pay the penalty
rather than obtain coverage, perhaps because they do not view available coverage options as
affordable. However, on balance, we think the Governor’s proposal to create a state individual
mandate warrants serious consideration. We think it makes sense for the Legislature to
consider—as the Governor has proposed—the proposed state individual mandate in conjunction
with other policies that would improve the affordability of health insurance coverage. This could
serve to increase the level of compliance with the mandate, meaning that more people would
have health coverage than otherwise.
Legislature Has Multiple Policy Options to Increase Individual Market Coverage and
Improve Affordability. We recommend that the Legislature consider the Governor’s proposal in
the context of a range of policy options, such as those presented in Covered California’s report,
and consider what policies would best align with the Legislature’s policy and budgetary priorities.
Many Implementation Questions Remain. If the Legislature wishes to create a state
individual mandate along with some form of insurance subsidies, as proposed by the Governor,
many questions remain to be addressed. In particular, funding subsidies from individual
mandate penalty revenues as proposed by the Governor could be problematic. The goal of the
individual mandate as a deterrent against forgoing insurance coverage is at odds with the goal
of raising revenue for insurance subsidies. To address this issue, the Legislature could consider
using whatever penalty revenues are generated to simply offset—at least partially—the cost of
subsidies, with other state funds covering any difference.
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INTRODUCTION
Broad Concerns Have Been Raised About market excludes coverage obtained through
Health Care Costs and Access. The Legislature, employer-sponsored insurance and government
among others, has raised concerns about the programs such as Medi-Cal.) These proposals
underlying cost and efficiency of the state’s overall do not directly address, nor are they intended to
health care system, and the extent to which the address, broader concerns about the underlying
state’s residents can access quality health care cost of health care services or the efficiency of
services through that system. The significant health care delivery systems.
number of California residents without health Legislature Has Taken Recent Actions Related
insurance coverage—roughly estimated to be to Broader Concerns About Underlying Costs. As
3.5 million people—has been a particular concern. part of the 2018-19 budget package, the Legislature
The state’s health care system is complex— set in motion two ongoing, multiyear efforts that
numerous factors influence who can access care, are intended to explore issues related to broader
how that care is delivered, and at what cost. concerns about underlying costs in the state’s
Proposals Reviewed in This Report Focus health care system. Specifically, the Legislature
Narrowly on Encouraging Enrollment and provided funding to begin planning and developing
Reducing Consumer Costs in the Individual a database that would collect information on public
Health Insurance Market. The Governor’s and private health care costs and utilization in
2019-20 budget proposal includes elements the state. The database is intended to be used to
intended to help address some of these concerns. increase transparency of health care pricing and
The subset of the Governor’s proposals we review inform state policy decisions. The Legislature also
in this report focus more narrowly on encouraging established a Council on Health Care Delivery
enrollment in health insurance coverage purchased Systems that will develop options for structural
on the individual market—where over 2 million reforms to the state’s health care delivery system
people obtain their coverage—and on making to accomplish universal health care coverage and
that coverage more affordable. (The individual reduced health care costs.
BACKGROUND
Overview of Health Insurance Over Two Million Californians Purchase
Coverage Through Individual Market. Individuals
Coverage in California
who are not enrolled in insurance through their
Most Californians Have Health Insurance employer or public health insurance programs can
Coverage. As shown in Figure 1 (see next page), purchase coverage directly from insurers in what
we estimate that most Californians—91 percent— is referred to as the “individual market.” As shown
have health insurance coverage. (Compared in Figure 1, about 2.2 million individuals had health
with other states, California’s rate of insurance is insurance coverage through the individual market
roughly in the middle—some states have higher in 2017. As will be described in more detail later, a
rates of insurance, while others have lower rates of little less than 1.1 million of these received federal
insurance.) Employer-sponsored insurance is the subsidies to reduce the cost of coverage through
most common source of coverage. Major public the state’s health benefits exchange, known as
health insurance programs, including Medi-Cal, the Covered California. About 150,000 additional
state’s insurance program for low-income people, individuals who do not receive subsidies also
and Medicare, the federal program that primarily purchased coverage through Covered California,
provides health coverage to the elderly, also cover for total enrollment through Covered California of
large portions of the state’s residents. a little over 1.2 million at the end of 2017. About
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1 million additional people purchased insurance coverage, which provides coverage for emergency
from insurers outside of Covered California— and some pregnancy-related services. However,
sometimes referred to as “off exchange.” Federal due to the limited nature of restricted-scope
subsidies are not available off exchange. Medi-Cal, we consider these individuals uninsured.
Roughly 3.5 Million Californians Are Although the number is uncertain, a portion of
Uninsured. While most Californians have health the uninsured are eligible for subsidized coverage
insurance coverage, an estimated roughly through Covered California, as will be described in
3.5 million people in the state are uninsured. In more detail later.
general, the uninsured are more likely than the
Federal Patient Protection
general population to be low income. A large
and Affordable Care Act (ACA)
portion of the uninsured—likely around 1.5 million—
are undocumented adults. We note undocumented Significantly Altered Health Insurance
adults may not purchase coverage through Covered Landscape
California and are ineligible for Medicare and the full
The ACA—most of the provisions of which
scope of Medi-Cal benefits. Some undocumented
became effective in 2014—brought about
adults may enroll in “restricted-scope” Medi-Cal
significant changes to the way
that health insurance coverage
Figure 1
is provided in California. Broadly
Most Californians Have Health Insurance,
speaking, the ACA led to more
Obtained From a Variety of Sources
comprehensive and standardized
2017 Estimated health insurance options on
the individual market, limited
Individual Market
the ability of health insurers to
Subsidized
charge higher premiums or deny
1.1 Million
(All on Covered coverage to individuals with costly
California)
preexisting medical conditions,
Unsubsidized and provided both incentives and
1.1 Million Uninsured
(About 150,000 About penalties to encourage individuals
on Covered 3.5 Million to enroll in health insurance
California)a
Medi-Cal coverage. Below, we describe
several key aspects of the ACA in
greater detail.
Covered California
Public Established as Centralized
Insurance
Medicare Marketplace for Comparing and
and Medi-Cal
Purchasing Coverage. The ACA
Private
Insurance provided for the establishment of
state health benefits exchanges,
Medicare
Employer- including Covered California,
Sponsored where people in the individual
Insurance
market can compare health
insurance coverage options.
Consumers who shop for
Other Public
Insurance coverage on Covered California
can choose among health
insurance plans organized into
a Remaining roughly 1 million purchased coverage “off exchange.”
standardized metal tiers, including
Note: Estimates reflect LAO adjustments to California Health Interview Survey 2017 data.
bronze, silver, gold, and platinum.
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These tiers vary in the amount of monthly premiums For those who do not have minimum coverage,
they charge and out-of-pocket costs they require the ACA provided several exemptions from
households to pay, such as annual deductibles the individual mandate penalty. For example, a
and co-pays for medical visits. Bronze plans household is exempt from the individual mandate
have the lowest premiums but have the highest penalty if (1) it does not have any “affordable”
out-of-pocket costs. For example, bronze plans health insurance options (for purposes of the
feature a large deductible that must be met before individual mandate, coverage is considered
many medical services are covered. Silver, gold, affordable if it costs less than 8.05 percent of the
and platinum plans require progressively lower household’s annual income), (2) it has income
out-of-pocket costs, but also come with higher below the minimum threshold required to file a
premiums. federal income tax return, or (3) its members are
Federal “Individual Mandate” to Require undocumented. In 2016, the most recent year for
Most to Obtain Health Insurance Coverage which data are available, almost 600,000 tax filers
or Pay Penalty. As originally enacted, the ACA in California paid a total of $446 million in individual
imposed a requirement, referred to as the individual mandate penalties to the federal government.
mandate, that most individuals obtain specified Federal Subsidies to Reduce Cost of
minimum health insurance coverage or pay a Health Insurance Purchased Through Covered
penalty. (As will be discussed later, subsequent California. The ACA also created two types of
federal action eliminated the penalty beginning subsidies that work together to reduce the cost of
in 2019.) The individual mandate was intended health insurance for most households that purchase
to discourage people from going without health coverage through Covered California, as described
insurance coverage, particularly younger and below:
healthier individuals who have lower risk of incurring
• Advance Premium Tax Credit (APTC). The
health care costs and who otherwise would be less
APTC offsets the cost of health insurance
likely to enroll in coverage. Increased coverage
premiums for households with incomes
of younger, healthier populations leads to a more
between 100 percent and 400 percent of
balanced insurance risk pool and allows the costs
the federal poverty level (FPL). As shown in
of covering higher-risk populations to be spread
Figure 2 (see next page), the APTC effectively
more broadly. This in turn reduces the average
limits a household’s net premium for a silver
cost of coverage and helps to offset the increased
plan (after accounting for the APTC) to
cost of making individual market coverage more
between 2 percent and 10 percent of annual
comprehensive under the ACA.
income. (This percentage increases as income
As outlined in the ACA, the individual mandate
increases.) Each year, Covered California
required households to certify on their annual
estimates the amount of APTC a household
federal income tax return that they have health
will qualify for before coverage begins and the
insurance coverage that meets minimum
household can choose to “advance” some or
requirements. For those who do not have minimum
all of the estimated APTC amount to insurers.
coverage, the individual mandate penalty in 2018,
This immediately reduces the household’s
for example, was set at the greater of a flat amount
monthly premiums. At the end of the year, any
($2,085 for family of four) or 2.5 percent of family
remaining APTC is claimed on the household’s
income, up to a maximum (just over $13,000 for a
federal income tax return. In the event that
family of four). Households subject to the individual
a household was ultimately eligible for less
mandate penalty for that year calculate the amount
APTC than was advanced to insurers through
of the penalty and pay the amount owed through
the preceding year, the household is required
their federal income tax return. Most households
to pay the difference through the income tax
that have paid the penalty have paid the flat
return.
amount.
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Figure 2
Portion of Annual Income Spent on Health Premiums After APTC
For a Family of Four in 2019a
12%
10
8
Income Too High to
Qualify for APTC
6
4
2
25,100 50,200 75,300 100,400 $125,500
(100% of FPL) (200% of FPL) (300% of FPL) (400% of FPL) (500% of FPL)
a Assumes that the household purchases the second-lowest-cost silver plan.
APTC = Advanced Premium Tax Credit and FPL = federal poverty level.
• Cost Sharing Reductions (CSRs). While the concerns have been raised that individual
APTC offsets premium costs, CSRs reduce market coverage may not be affordable for some
households’ out-of-pocket costs. Under the households, including those that are currently
ACA, the federal government provided CSR eligible for federal subsidies and those with higher
funding for insurers on Covered California incomes that are not.
to offer three different “enhanced” plan Concerns Among Those Eligible for Federal
options that have the same premiums as a Subsidies . . . Although federal subsidies limit
silver plan but require lower out-of-pocket the cost of coverage for those who are eligible,
costs for covered households. Households there are indications that some households that
with incomes between 100 percent and are eligible for federal subsidies still view individual
250 percent of FPL may enroll in these market coverage as unaffordable. According
enhanced silver plans. Figure 3 shows to Covered California, almost 30 percent of
examples of out-of-pocket costs for a regular households that are eligible for federal subsidies
silver plan and the three enhanced silver plan do not take up coverage, making them subject
options in 2019. to the individual mandate penalty (unless they
are exempt). Among this group (and among the
Concerns Raised About Cost of uninsured of all incomes), the cost of coverage is
Individual Market Coverage the most commonly cited reason for lacking health
insurance coverage.
Despite ACA policies intended to reduce the
average cost of individual market coverage,
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Figure 3
Enhanced Silver Plans Reduce Out-of-Pocket Costs
Cost Sharing for Selected Services, 2019
Enhanced Silver Plans
Silver Silver 73 Silver 87 Silver 94
Household income to enroll No income limitations 201 percent to 151 percent to 100 percent to
250 percent of FPL 200 percent of FPL 150 percent of FPL
Portion of average annual medical 70% 73% 87% 94%
costs covered by plan
Annual out-of-pocket maximum $7,550 for an individual $6,300 for an individual $2,600 for an individual $1,000 for an individual
$15,100 for a family $12,600 for a family $5,200 for a family $2,000 for a family
Selected Co-Pays
Primary care visit $40 $35 $15 $5
Specialist visit 80 75 25 8
Emergency room visit 350 350 100 50
FPL = federal poverty level.
. . . And Those Above Threshold to Qualify APTC eligibility threshold that have older individuals
for Federal Subsidies, Who Face Subsidy or that are located in areas of the state with higher
“Cliff.” While the APTC limits premium costs premiums are particularly likely to spend a higher
to no more than about 10 percent of income percentage of their income on premiums.
for eligible households, federal subsidies end Because net premium contributions are limited
abruptly for households with income just above the to a fixed percentage of income for households that
threshold to qualify for APTC. The abrupt end of receive the APTC, these households are insulated
subsidies is sometimes referred to as the subsidy from changes in gross premiums (premiums before
cliff. Households at this income level can pay accounting for the APTC). If gross premiums
substantially more than 10 percent of their income increase from year to year, the household’s APTC
for coverage. (This percentage declines the further increases so that the net premium cost as a
above APTC income threshold a household is.) percentage of income remains roughly the same.
Figure 4 (see next page) displays premiums as a However, households that do not qualify for federal
percentage of income for a hypothetical household subsidies are exposed to annual increases in
consisting of two adults, each age 50, living in premiums. Year-over-year increases in premiums
Sacramento. If the household had annual income of in the individual market have been significant.
$65,000, their premiums for a silver plan purchased Covered California reports that average premiums
through Covered California would be limited to for unsubsidized enrollees with coverage through
about 10 percent—close to $6,500 for the year— Covered California grew by over 10 percent in each
because of the APTC. If the household’s income of 2017 and 2018.
increased to $66,000 per year, they would no
Federal Individual Mandate Penalty
longer qualify for APTC and their premium costs to
Effectively Eliminated Beginning in 2019. As
keep the same plan would increase to 25 percent
part of the federal Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017,
of their income—over $16,000 for the year. If the
Congress set the penalty for violating the individual
household instead switched to the least expensive
mandate’s coverage requirement to zero beginning
bronze plan available, their premiums would be
in 2019. The requirement that most individuals have
18 percent of their income—almost $12,000 for
coverage technically remains in effect, but without
the year—and the household would have increased
the penalty this requirement is unenforceable.
out-of-pocket costs. Households just above the
(Because of the timing of tax filing, households that
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Figure 4
Premium Costs Higher for Households Just Above Subsidy Threshold
Premium Costs as Percentage of Income for Two 50-Year-Old Adults in Sacramento
30%
Second Lowest Cost
25
SIiver Plan
20
Lowest Cost Bronze Plan
15
10
Income Too High to
Qualify for APTC
5
16,460 32,920 49,380 65,840 $82,300
(100% of FPL) (200% of FPL) (300% of FPL) (400% of FPL) (500% of FPL)
APTC = Advanced Premium Tax Credit and FPL = federal poverty level.
did not have coverage during 2018 and are subject federal individual mandate penalty is uncertain.
to the individual mandate penalty are paying penalty Several research organizations have estimated the
obligations during the current tax filing season in potential impact of ending the federal individual
early 2019.) mandate penalty on individual market enrollment at
End of Individual Mandate Penalty Expected the state and national levels using varying sets of
to Lead to Greater Number of Uninsured. By assumptions and methods. These estimates project
removing the financial disincentive for not having reductions in individual market enrollment ranging
coverage, ending the individual mandate penalty from around 7 percent to around 26 percent.
is expected to lead to fewer individuals taking Recently, University of California researchers
up coverage and a larger number of uninsured. used the California Simulation of Insurance
The federal individual mandate was implemented Markets (CalSIM) model to project that enrollment
at the same time as several other policies that in California’s individual market would be
affected the number of people enrolling in 10 percent lower in 2020 and over 14 percent
insurance. This makes it challenging to separate lower in 2023 than it would have been if the
the effects of the individual mandate from the federal individual mandate penalty had continued.
effects of these other policies. Additionally, states This equates to about 260,000 fewer individual
implemented ACA policies differently, so the effect market enrollees in 2020 and about 370,000 fewer
of the individual mandate, when enforceable, on enrollees in 2023. The CalSIM researchers also
enrollment may have been different in each state. projected the impact that ending federal individual
For these reasons, the number of people who will mandate penalty would have on enrollment in
discontinue coverage because of the end of the other forms of coverage, as shown in Figure 5.
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In particular, CalSIM researchers
Figure 5
projected that enrollment in
Projected Enrollment Change Due to End of
Medi-Cal will drop by a few
Federal Individual Mandate Penalty
hundred thousand people. (Under
the ACA, Medi-Cal enrollment Calendar Years 2020 and 2023
grew significantly due to an
2020 2023
expansion in eligibility and as
Individual market -260,000 -370,000
previously eligible individuals
Medi-Cal -170,000 -350,000
newly enrolled in coverage, the
Employer-sponsored insurancea 130,000 60,000
latter sometimes referred to as
Net Decrease in Enrollment -300,000 -660,000
the “woodwork effect.” Growth in
a
Employer-sponsored insurance is projected to increase as more employers offer coverage to
Medi-Cal enrollment was driven employees in response to higher premiums in the individual market because of the end of the
in part by the individual mandate. federal individual mandate penalty.
Source: UC Berkeley/UCLA California Simulation of Insurance Markets projections, November 2018.
Accordingly, the end of the federal
individual mandate penalty will
these premium changes, but the changes would
have the opposite effect as people
directly affect households in the individual market
have reduced incentive to seek or renew Medi-Cal
that do not qualify for federal subsidies.
coverage.) After accounting for changes across
Coverage Affordability and Enrollment Are
these forms of coverage, CalSIM researchers
Linked. The cost of individual market coverage and
projected that 300,000 additional people will be
the extent to which individuals choose to take up
uninsured in 2020 and 660,000 additional people
coverage are linked in two ways. First, a greater
would be uninsured by 2023 as a result of the end
number of individuals will choose to purchase
of the federal individual mandate penalty.
coverage at lower costs than at higher costs. At
Since 2019 is the first year in which the federal
the same time, as a greater number of younger and
individual mandate will not be enforced, the end
healthier individuals purchase coverage, the risk
of the penalty could affect enrollment in coverage
mix of the insurance pool improves and premiums
purchased on Covered California beginning in
decrease relative to what they otherwise would
2019. Covered California recently announced
have been. In this way, policies intended to reduce
that new enrollment was down 24 percent in
the cost of coverage, such as the APTC and CSRs,
2019 relative to the prior year (although a higher
can have the added effect of increasing enrollment,
number of previous enrollees renewed their
potentially leading to additional reductions in
coverage, leading to roughly flat levels of plan
premiums. Similarly, policies intended to increase
selections in 2019 overall relative to 2018). Several
take-up of coverage, such as the individual
factors likely contributed to these changes, but the
mandate, can have the added effect of reducing
end of the federal individual mandate penalty may
premiums.
have played a role.
End of Individual Mandate Penalty Expected Legislature Required Report on
to Lead to Increased Cost of Individual Market
Options to Improve Individual
Coverage. Those who choose not to enroll
Market Affordability
in coverage because of the end of the federal
individual mandate penalty are expected to be In light of concerns about affordability in the
lower-risk (less costly to insure) than those who individual market, the Legislature directed Covered
remain covered. This is expected to increase California to develop options for providing financial
average premiums on the individual market. assistance to help low- and middle-income
CalSIM researchers estimate that the end of the Californians access health insurance coverage.
individual mandate penalty will lead to an increase Covered California submitted a report to the
in premiums of between 8 percent and 10 percent. Legislature pursuant to this requirement on
Households that qualify for APTC are insulated from February 1, 2019.
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Report Lays Out Several Policy Options significantly from other affordability proposals
for Legislature’s Consideration. The Covered in that it generates revenue for the state.
California report lays out several options for • State Reinsurance Program. Finally, the
improving affordability and increasing enrollment Covered California report includes options
in the individual market. Specifically, the report that would establish a state “reinsurance”
identifies three “market-wide” options that would program. In a reinsurance program, the state
generally have a larger impact in the individual would cover part of the cost of particularly
market overall but also require a larger commitment high-cost claims on behalf of insurers in the
of state funds, as well as eight “targeted” options individual market. This would reduce the
that would generally have less impact but would risk for insurers of having to pay high-cost
require a smaller commitment of state funds. claims. This, in turn, would allow insurers
Some options include a single affordability policy, to charge lower premiums for individual
while other reflect a package of policies. The market coverage. The Covered California
policies included in the options fall into three main report describes how the state could receive
categories: federal funding to offset some of the costs
of a reinsurance program through a federal
• State Insurance Subsidies. Several of the
Section 1332 State Innovation Waiver. More
options presented in the Covered California
information on Section 1332 waivers is
report would provide state subsidies to further
provided in the box on page 12.
reduce the cost of insurance in the individual
market. These subsidies include additional Options Vary in Estimated State Fiscal Impact
premium assistance, similar in concept to the and Effect on Enrollment. Figure 6 provides a
APTC. Some options include supplemental high-level summary of the parameters of each
premium assistance for households with option in the Covered California report, along
incomes below 400 percent of FPL that with their estimated impact on enrollment in the
currently qualify for the APTC. Other options individual market and their estimated state fiscal
include premium assistance for households impact. While most options have a state cost
with incomes above 400 percent of FPL that (sometimes net of offsetting revenues or federal
currently do not receive federal assistance. funding), one option—Targeted Option 8, which
Insurance subsidies described in the Covered would implement a state individual mandate without
California report also include additional any other policies—generates revenues. Generally,
state-funded CSRs that would further reduce options that result in greater enrollment impacts
out-of-pocket costs for some households. have greater associated net state costs, but this is
• State Individual Mandate With Penalty. The not always the case. The impact on enrollment per
Covered California report includes options dollar of net state cost varies significantly across
that would create a state individual mandate the options. Similar to estimates of the potential
and an associated penalty, modeled on the impact of ending the federal individual mandate
federal individual mandate before its penalty penalty, these estimates are based on a series of
was set to zero. The individual mandate differs assumptions and are subject to uncertainty. Overall,
however, we find the estimates reasonable.
OVERVIEW OF THE GOVERNOR’S PROPOSAL
As part of the 2019-20 Governor’s Budget, the state individual mandate with a penalty. Second,
Governor proposes two policies along the lines of the Governor proposes to use revenues generated
the options presented in the Covered California by the state individual mandate penalty to increase
report. First, the Governor proposes to create a insurance subsidies for households purchasing
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coverage on Covered California. The stated outline of these proposals, with few details on
objectives of these proposals include improving structure and implementation. Below, we describe
the affordability of health care and increasing the the broad contours of the Governor’s proposal
number of people with health insurance coverage. based on information provided by the administration
The administration has so far provided only a broad as of the time this analysis was prepared.
Figure 6
Summary of Options Presented in Covered California Report
Estimated New Individual Estimated State
Market Enrollment Fiscal Impacta
Options With Greater State Cost
Market-Wide Option 1
Provide supplemental premium subsidies and cost-sharing reductions for
households under 400 percent of federal poverty level (FPL). 290,000 $2.2 billion cost
Provide premium subsidies for households over 400 percent of FPL.
Market-Wide Option 2
In addition to policies included in Market-Wide Option 1, enact state individual 648,000 $2.1 billion net costb
mandate with penalty, modeled on federal individual mandate.
Market-Wide Option 3
In addition to policies included in Market-Wide Option 1 and Market-Wide Option 2, 764,000 $2.7 billion net costb,c
establish state-based reinsurance program.
Options With More Limited State Cost
Targeted Option 1
Provide more limited (relative to market-wide options) supplemental premium 70,000 $425 million cost
subsidies for households under 400 percent of FPL.
Targeted Option 2
Provide more limited supplemental cost sharing reductions for households under 27,000 $215 million cost
400 percent of FPL.
Targeted Option 3
In addition to policies included in Targeted Option 1, provide more limited additional 125,000 $765 million cost
premium subsidies for households with incomes between 400 percent and
600 percent of FPL.
Targeted Option 4
In addition to policies included in Targeted Option 3, enact state individual mandate 478,000 $409 million net costb
with penalty, modeled on federal individual mandate.
Targeted Option 5
Provide more limited premium subsidies for households with incomes between 47,000 $285 million cost
400 percent and 600 percent of FPL only.
Targeted Option 6
Provide slightly more generous subsidies relative to Targeted Option 5 for 50,000 $324 million cost
households with incomes above 400 percent of FPL.
Targeted Option 7
Establish state-based reinsurance program. 118,000 $578 million net cost
Targeted Option 8
Enact state individual mandate with penalty, modeled on federal individual mandate. 359,000 $526 million revenueb
a
Where a net cost is shown, reflects net effect of new state spending and offsetting revenues from individual mandate penalties or federal pass-through for reinsurance.
b
Does not reflect state costs in Medi-cal—potentially in the hundreds of millions of dollars—from increased enrollment under a state individual mandate.
c
Assumes offsetting federal pass-through revenues, which are uncertain. Net costs could be higher by about $800 million.
Source: Covered California “Options to Improve Affordability in California’s Individual Health Insurance Market.”
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Create State Individual Mandate that FTB, which administers the state’s personal
With Penalty income tax, would implement the proposed state
individual mandate penalty. This would be similar
State Mandate Would Be Modeled on Federal
to the federal individual mandate penalty that
Mandate, Before Penalty Elimination. Similar to
is administered by the federal Internal Revenue
an option presented in Covered California’s report,
Service (IRS).
the Governor proposes to model a state individual
mandate on the federal individual mandate, before Provide State Insurance Subsidies
the federal penalty was set to zero. Based on the
Additional Subsidies for Households
amount of federal penalties paid by Californians
Currently Eligible for Federal Assistance. The
in 2016, the administration estimates that the
administration has indicated that proposed state
proposed state individual mandate would generate
subsidies would be available to households with
roughly $500 million annually in new revenues.
incomes between 250 percent and 400 percent
Franchise Tax Board (FTB) Would Administer
of FPL, households that are generally eligible
State Mandate. The administration has indicated
Federal Section 1332 State Innovation Waivers and Reinsurance
Section 1332 State Innovation Waivers Can Provide Additional Federal “Pass-Through”
Funding. Section 1332 of the Federal Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) allows
states to apply for a waiver of certain ACA requirements in order to implement policies that
improve the quality and affordability of health insurance coverage. Policies implemented under
a Section 1332 waiver are required to not increase overall federal spending. However, if a policy
implemented under a Section 1332 waiver reduces federal spending (such as spending on the
Advanced Premium Tax Credit, or APTC), the federal government will pass these savings through
to the state. Such funding is referred to as pass-through funding.
Several States Receive Pass-Through Funding for Reinsurance Programs. State
reinsurance programs reduce average premiums for health insurance coverage purchased in
the individual market. Since the amount of APTC a household receives is tied to the level of
premiums on the exchange, reinsurance programs generally reduce federal APTC spending.
Several states, including Alaska, Minnesota, Oregon, Maryland, Wisconsin, Maine, and New
Jersey, have received approval of Section 1332 waiver that included reinsurance programs
and federal pass-through funding to offset the costs of these programs. The ratio of federal
pass-through funding to the cost of the reinsurance program varies by state and depends on the
risk profile of the state’s individual market.
Amount of Potential Federal Pass-Through Funding Subject to Some Uncertainty. The
Covered California report estimates that California could potentially receive federal pass-through
funding equal to about 66 percent of the total cost of the program. However, the amount
of federal pass-through funding is uncertain, in part because it could depend on whether a
state reinsurance program is packaged with other state affordability policies for purposes of
a Section 1332 waiver. Many other policies, including state insurance subsidies and a state
individual mandate, are projected to increase individual market enrollment and therefore increase
federal APTC spending. If the state were to adopt a package of policies that included policies
that both increased and decreased federal APTC spending, the federal government might
require that all of these policies be considered together when determining the amount of federal
pass-through funding. This would result in less federal pass-through funding than if a reinsurance
program was considered on its own.
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for federal subsidies. It is unclear whether these and 600 percent of FPL, households that are not
subsidies would be structured similar to the APTC, currently eligible for federal subsidies. The structure
CSRs, or some other form of assistance. of these proposed subsidies is similarly unclear.
New Subsidies for Relatively Higher-Income Covered California Would Administer State
Households Currently Not Eligible for Federal Subsidies. The Governor’s proposal assumes that
Assistance. The administration has indicated that Covered California would administer the proposed
proposed state subsidies would also be available subsidies. Details on implementation are yet to be
to households with incomes between 400 percent determined.
LAO ASSESSMENT
Governor’s Proposal Would Likely costs for administration) and in fact would generate
state revenues.
Reduce Number of Uninsured and
. . . But Could Indirectly Result in Increased
Improve Individual Market Affordability
State Costs in Medi-Cal. As noted previously
On Its Own, State Individual Mandate With and shown in Figure 5, some of those projected
a Penalty Would Likely Increase Take-Up and to discontinue coverage because of the end of
Reduce Premiums. As noted previously, the full the federal individual mandate penalty would have
extent of the negative impact on insured levels and otherwise been enrolled in Medi-Cal. Decreased
premium costs of the end of the federal individual Medi-Cal enrollment will result in reduced state
mandate is uncertain. Accordingly, the full extent of costs. Under a state individual mandate, most or
the impact of enacting a state individual mandate all of the individuals who otherwise would have
with penalty is similarly uncertain. However, by not enrolled in Medi-Cal would still enroll, likely
avoiding or mitigating reductions in coverage eliminating any reduced Medi-Cal costs otherwise
and premium increases associated with the end associated with the end of the federal individual
of the federal individual mandate penalty, a state mandate penalty. While very uncertain, these
individual mandate could potentially be one of the changes could result in state Medi-Cal costs in the
state’s most effective policy options to increase hundreds of millions of dollars annually that would
coverage and reduce premiums. As shown at least partially offset penalty revenues generated
previously in Figure 6, Covered California projects by the state individual mandate, but would also
that implementing a state individual mandate on its reflect a reduced number of uninsured. Even
own would result in 359,000 additional individuals after accounting for these potential state costs in
with coverage, 235,000 of whom would be Medi-Cal, a state individual mandate likely remains
potentially eligible for federal subsidies. Covered a very cost-effective option from a state budgetary
California further estimates that the state individual perspective for increasing coverage and reducing
mandate would also reduce premiums for currently premiums.
unsubsidized households off exchange by a
Enacting State Individual Mandate Involves
projected $24 per month. These are a large effects
Some Trade-Offs. A state individual mandate
in comparison with most individual policy options in
would have additional costs beyond the state
the Covered California report.
budget. Unlike other policy options that directly
State Individual Mandate Penalty Generates subsidize consumers, the individual mandate
State Revenues . . . Unlike some other policy reduces premiums primarily by bringing additional,
options that directly subsidize household insurance lower-risk individuals to the insurance risk
costs, the state individual mandate could increase pool. These individuals would have the cost of
enrollment and reduce premiums without significant purchasing coverage they otherwise would not
state spending (other than some relatively limited have purchased, although they would also benefit
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from greater access to health care services and of the trade-offs associated with implementing a
reduced financial risks from not having insurance. state individual mandate, we think the Governor’s
Revenues from the individual mandate would proposal to consider the individual mandate in
come at the expense of individuals who choose to conjunction with proposals that would reduce the
pay the penalty instead of obtaining coverage. In cost of coverage makes sense.
addition to the cost of the penalty, these individuals
Multiple Policy Options to Increase
would not benefit from insurance coverage.
Coverage and Improve Affordability
Modeling State Mandate on Federal Mandate
Has Benefits . . . Since the federal individual
Should the Legislature wish to enact policies to
mandate has been in effect for a few years,
accomplish the twin goals of improving affordability
households are now generally familiar with its
and increasing coverage in the individual market,
structure. Closely modeling a state mandate on the
there are several options to choose from, in place
federal mandate could make understanding and
of or in combination with those included in the
complying with a state mandate easier. Additionally,
Governor’s proposal. Available options include
policies have already been developed for the
those presented in Covered California’s report,
operation of the federal individual mandate. The
such as variations on additional state-funded
state could create a state individual mandate more
premium subsidies or CSRs for households below
efficiently by adapting existing federal policies and
400 percent of FPL, new premium subsidies for
structures for the California context.
households above 400 percent of FPL, and a
. . . Although the Legislature Could Consider state reinsurance program. Different policy options
Some Changes. At the same time, in enacting to improve affordability and increase coverage
a state individual mandate, the Legislature could present different trade-offs. Choosing which, if
consider some changes to the federal individual any, policies to enact will require weighing these
mandate, depending on its policy priorities. For trade-offs against the Legislature’s priorities.
example, the state individual mandate penalty in Below, we outline some key decision points for the
Massachusetts is generally lower than the federal Legislature’s deliberations.
penalty, particularly for lower-income households.
Assistance for Currently Subsidized Versus
Such changes could potentially serve to reduce
Unsubsidized Households. One decision point is
the impact of the penalty on certain populations,
whether to focus assistance on households below
but would need to be balanced against potential
400 percent of FPL, households above 400 percent
weakening of the mandate’s deterrent effect and
of FPL, or both. Some policy options, such as the
possible increased complexity of implementation
state individual mandate and reinsurance, would
and administration.
primarily have the effect of reducing premiums in
State Subsidies Would Be Relatively the individual market. These policies would directly
Modest . . . Assuming that total state spending lower the cost of coverage for households currently
on the Governor’s proposed insurance subsidies enrolled in individual market coverage without
would be roughly $500 million (consistent with federal subsidies, since these households are
the rough estimated amount of penalty revenues exposed to the full premium charged by insurers.
from the individual mandate), the subsidies would For this reason, these policies are projected to
be relatively modest compared to the existing significantly reduce costs and increase enrollment
federal insurance subsidies. By comparison, among unsubsidized households.
federal spending on individual market subsidies in
However, premium changes that result from
California is estimated to be over $6 billion in 2018.
these policies (the state individual mandate
. . . But Would Likely Ease Compliance With and reinsurance) would not significantly affect
State Mandate. At the same time, these subsidies households that are currently receiving federal
would reduce the cost of coverage for households subsidies, since the APTC would adjust downward
that are eligible to receive them and would ease to reflect reduced premiums so that subsidized
compliance with a state individual mandate. In light households’ net premium cost would remain the
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same. (The individual mandate is projected to on coverage and affordability may be possible,
increase enrollment among current subsidy-eligible but would require a substantial commitment
households not because of its effects on premiums, of state funding. Projections in the Covered
but primarily because the penalty provides an California report provide a helpful guide for gauging
incentive for people to remain insured.) Instead, in the impact on coverage enrollment of various
order to reduce the net premiums for individuals options and spending levels. This can facilitate
currently receiving subsidies, the state would need balancing potential state spending on insurance
to provide additional premium subsidies on top of subsidies against other state funding priorities.
the federal APTC. Alternatively, providing additional The Legislature will also need to decide whether to
assistance to reduce out-of-pocket costs, such as use revenues from an individual mandate penalty
through state CSRs, is another avenue to provide to fund affordability policies, use other funding
assistance to households currently receiving federal sources, or a combination of both.
subsidies.
Initial Comments on
Premium Assistance Versus Reduced
Implementation Issues
Out-of-Pocket Costs. Another decision point
is whether to focus on reducing premiums,
In this section, we highlight several issues related
out-of-pocket costs, or both. Research suggests
to implementation that could arise in relation to the
that consumers are more sensitive to the premium
Governor’s proposals or alternative policy packages
cost of insurance in the individual market than
the Legislature may evaluate.
they are to the level of out-of-pocket costs. As a
Funding Subsidies Solely From Penalty
result, policies that reduce premium costs, such as
Revenues Could Be Problematic. If subsidies
premium subsidies and reinsurance, are more likely
were to be funded solely from penalty revenues,
to result in larger increases in new enrollment than
problems could arise for a few reasons. First,
policies that are intended to reduce out-of-pocket
the goal of the individual mandate penalty as a
costs, like state CSRs. However, reducing
deterrent against people foregoing health insurance
out-of-pocket costs can be a goal in its own right,
coverage is at odds with the goal of generating
as it can increase access to health care services.
funds for insurance subsidies. Prioritizing the goal
Reducing out-of-pocket costs may also make it
of deterrence would mean maximizing compliance
more likely that individuals that take up coverage
with the mandate and minimizing penalty revenues,
remain insured. If increased new enrollment is a
which would have the effect of reducing funding
priority, then policies that reduce premiums would
available for subsidies. Prioritizing the goal
be preferred. Policies that reduce premiums can
of funding subsidies would mean maximizing
also result in reduced cost sharing to the extent
penalties, or minimizing compliance with the
that households take advantage of lower premiums
mandate.
to purchase more comprehensive, higher-tier plans.
Second, the effects of the state individual
However, if improving access to health care and
mandate and insurance subsidies will interact—
encouraging the currently insured to remain insured
increasing enrollment through the individual
is the priority, then CSRs may be more direct and
mandate will make state subsidies more costly,
may be the preferred policy.
and reducing the net cost of coverage with state
Funding Level. The Legislature would also need
subsidies will in turn increase the number of people
to determine at what level to fund affordability
taking up coverage, reducing the amount of penalty
policies. The Governor proposes to fund state
revenues generated. Accounting for this interaction
subsidies consistent with the amount of penalty
would be a key part of designing subsidies that
revenues generated by a state individual mandate.
would be funded solely from penalty revenues.
As noted previously, subsidies funded at this level
Finally, if the amount of penalty revenues
would likely be relatively modest compared with
collected is not stable over time, there could be
federal subsidies currently available. As outlined
a need to update the structure of state subsidies.
in the Covered California report, larger impacts
This could be disruptive for administering agencies
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and for households that receive the subsidies. as households file their taxes. Closely following
One way to address these issues would be to use this model in California would involve households
whatever penalty revenues are generated to simply reconciling their advanced credit amounts on their
offset—at least partially—the cost of subsidies, with state income tax returns. This final reconciliation
other state funds covering any difference. may provide an additional level of accuracy and
One-Time State Funding Might Be Required increase program integrity, but would also add to
Until Penalty Funds Are Available. Assuming administrative complexity and cost. Other states
a state individual mandate penalty is modeled that have state premium assistance (Massachusetts
after the federal penalty, revenues from the and Vermont) fully advance the assistance to
penalty would first be collected through state immediately reduce premiums and do not reconcile
tax returns in the months following its first year subsidy amounts at the end of the year through
of implementation. In contrast, many options their tax system. (In this sense, the state premium
for providing state subsidies, such as premium subsidies in these states are not actually tax credits
assistance that is advanced throughout the year, like the APTC.) As the Legislature evaluates the
would result in costs in the same year that the possibility of providing a state-funded premium
assistance is provided. If the Legislature wished to subsidy in California, it could consider whether
use penalty funds to cover some or all of the costs reconciling premium subsidies through the tax
of subsidies but wants to avoid the penalty being system adds sufficient value to justify the additional
in place before subsidies are available, the state costs, or whether to adopt an approach similar to
may need to provide one-time startup funding from that used in these other states.
other sources to cover the costs of the first year of State CSRs Likely More Challenging to
subsidies. Implement and Administer Than State Premium
In General, Closely Modeling Premium Subsidies. For at least two reasons, state CSRs
Subsidies on Federal APTC Would Reduce would likely be more complex to administer
Implementation Complexity . . . Covered than state premium subsidies. First, initial
California and health insurers have developed implementation of federal CSRs was complex and
systems and processes to administer the federal involved extensive reconciliation activities. Second,
APTC. These include Covered California information the current federal administration determined in
technology systems that collect household October 2017 that it lacked the authority to make
information, verify this information against electronic CSR payments to insurers and discontinued the
data sources, estimate APTC amounts, and allow payments. In response to this change, California
households to apply APTC to a chosen health plan. and many other states adopted a strategy under
Processes also exist for regular reconciliations which the cost of continuing to provide enhanced
among Covered California, the federal government, silver plans is largely covered by increased federal
and health insurers to account for changes in APTC. It is unclear how the state’s strategy in
household circumstances that impact the eligible response to the end of federal CSR payments might
tax credit amount after it has been advanced. If affect the implementation of a state CSR subsidy.
the Legislature wished to provide state premium If the Legislature wished to pursue state-funded
subsidies, closely modeling them on the federal CSRs, these and potentially other implementation
APTC could allow the state to utilize systems questions would need to be addressed.
and processes developed for the APTC, reducing Legislative Guidance Would Be Needed on
implementation complexity and cost. Desired Level of Mandate Enforcement by FTB.
. . . But Some Adjustments to Final Finally, how FTB would administer a state individual
Reconciliation Process Worth Considering. mandate, and at what cost to the state, will
The federal APTC—specifically the portion that significantly depend on what level of enforcement
is advanced—is adjusted throughout the year the Legislature desires. Stronger enforcement of
to reflect changes in household circumstances, a state mandate would likely require enhanced
with a final reconciliation at the end of the year coordination and data-sharing among agencies and
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additional resources for FTB to review tax filings. proceeds with a state individual mandate, it will
Increased enforcement could also increase the be important to consider the benefits of additional
deterrent effect of the mandate. If the Legislature enforcement against its costs.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Individual Mandate Proposal Warrants federal mandate. For example, the Legislature could
Serious Consideration. While the full extent of consider adjusting the amount of penalties paid at
a state individual mandate’s impact on improving different income levels or types of exemptions that
insured levels and reducing individual market are available. Additional state assistance to reduce
premiums is subject to some uncertainty, it may be the cost of coverage could also help alleviate the
one of the most effective policy tools available to negative impact of the individual mandate penalty
the state to accomplish these twin goals. Because on some households.
it raises revenues (likely at least partially offset by Consider Proposed State Subsidies
increased state costs in Medi-Cal), the individual Among Range of Additional Policy Options to
mandate is also very cost-effective from a state Improve Affordability. The administration has
budgetary perspective. However, a state individual so far provided few details on the structure of
mandate would result in costs for some households the Governor’s proposed insurance subsidies.
purchasing coverage that otherwise would not, and However, we think it makes sense to consider a
others paying penalties while remaining uninsured. state individual mandate in conjunction with policies
On balance, we recommend that the Legislature to further reduce households’ insurance costs.
give serious consideration to the Governor’s We recommend that the Legislature consider the
proposal. Governor’s proposal in the context of a range of
To address some of the trade-offs inherent in policy options, such as those presented in Covered
the proposal related to increased costs borne by California’s affordability report, and consider what
individuals that do not comply with the mandate, policies would best align with the Legislature’s
the Legislature could consider making adjustments policy priorities and desired level of General Fund
to the structure of the state mandate relative to the commitment.
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LAO PUBLICATIONS
This report was prepared by Ryan Woolsey and reviewed by Mark C. Newton. The Legislative Analyst’s Office (LAO) is
a nonpartisan office that provides fiscal and policy information and advice to the Legislature.
To request publications call (916) 445-4656. This report and others, as well as an e-mail subscription service, are
available on the LAO’s website at www.lao.ca.gov. The LAO is located at 925 L Street, Suite 1000, Sacramento,
CA 95814.
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