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Reducing the Destructiveness of Wildfires: Promoting Defensible Space in California

Legislative Analyst's Office · lao-4457 · Report · 2021-09-30

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Reducing the Destructiveness of Wildfires: Promoting Defensible Space in California GABRIEL PETEK LEGISLATIVE ANALYST SEPTEMBER 2021 analysis full gutter AN LAO REPORT Cover Photo: The cover image is a modified version of a photo taken by the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE analysis full gutter AN LAO REPORT Executive Summary Defensible Space Is Valuable Tool to Reduce Destructive Wildfires Reducing Home Ignitions Helps Prevent Destructiveness of Wildfires. Many of the largest and most damaging wildfires have occured in recent years. One approach to mitigating future wildfire disasters is to reduce the chance that homes ignite when wildfires occur nearby, such as through the maintenance of defensible space—areas free of excess or dead vegetation—around homes. Importantly, maintaining defensible space not only helps to protect that home, it also reduces the risk that the wildfire will spread to neighboring homes, thereby helping to protect communities. Existing Defensible Space Requirements. Under existing state and local laws, homeowners in certain areas at high risk of wildfires are required to create and maintain defensible space. As shown in the nearby figure, state law requires implementation of certain defensible space practices within three separate zones around structures. State and Local Agencies Administer Various Defensible Space Programs. The California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CalFire) and local agencies administer a range of programs aimed at improving compliance with defensible space requirements. The most common defensible space activity is inspections of properties to assess compliance. Other programs include homeowner education activities, financial or other assistance, and enforcement. Homeowner Requirements in Defensible Space Zones Under State Law Trees and Shrubs The vertical space between Propane Roof and Chimney Area shrubs and the lowest branches Above-ground liquefied petroleum Remove any dead branches, shrubs, should be three times the height gas containers should be surrounded or other plants overhanging or adjacent of the shrubs underneath. by at least ten feet of bare soil in all to buildings. Keep branches ten feet directions. away from chimneys. Zone 2 Zone 1 100ft Ember- 30ft Resistant Zone 5ft Grasses and Groundcover Cut grass to a maximum height Woodpiles of four inches. Fallen leaves Dead Plant Matter Exposed woodpiles should be kept and other dead vegetation shall Clear all dry or dead plant outside of Zone 1, unless they are be no more than three inches thick. matter from yard, roof, and housed in fire-resistant material. rain gutters. Remove any Surround exposed woodpiles with at flammable plants near or least ten feet of bare soil in all directions. around windows, decks, and stairs. www.lao.ca.gov 1 analysis full gutter AN LAO REPORT Achieving Compliance Complicated by Various Factors Many communities report relatively high compliance rates with defensible space regulations, but there is significant variation by location. Moreover, given the large number of homes in fire-prone areas in California, even a moderately high compliance rate means that there are probably hundreds of thousands of homes out of compliance throughout the state. We find that efforts to improve compliance rates are complicated by factors including: • Fragmented and Overlapping Responsibilities. There are hundreds of state and local agencies involved in defensible space programs. Without consistent coordination, this can lead to gaps in the delivery of programs in some places and potential duplication in others. • Lack of Consistent Statewide Data. A lack of consistent statewide data on defensible space inspections and compliance makes it difficult to (1) identify where gaps in or overlapping inspection programs are occurring, (2) fully understand the extent to which homeowners are out of compliance with defensible space regulations in different communities, and (3) assess the effectiveness of programs at improving compliance. • Lack of Resources, Authority, and Motivation. Other key barriers to state and local agency efforts to improve compliance include insufficient funding and staffing, authority to fine non-compliant homeowners, and motivation to implement strong defensible space programs. • Cost-Effectiveness of Defensible Space Not Well Understood. The research literature has not yet provided clear information on the cost-effectiveness of maintaining defensible space compared to other risk-reduction activities, or on the cost-effectiveness of different programs designed to improve defensible space compliance. This lack of information makes it difficult to determine which specific steps, if any, state or local agencies should undertake. Recommend Legislature Take Steps to Improve Compliance Improve Data Collection, Sharing, and Quality. We recommend the Legislature take steps to improve the availability of consistent information on defensible space programs, which would benefit policymakers and program administrators. This includes increased state support for a shared data collector application and ensuring that state and local agencies feed inspections data into a centralized system. Take Steps to Address Other Barriers to State and Local Efforts. To begin addressing the barriers of lack of resources, authority, and motivation, we recommend: (1) increased ongoing resources for CalFire inspections, (2) providing CalFire with administrative fee authority, and (3) using oversight of reported compliance rates to improve transparency and help motivate agency actions. Support Additional Research Efforts to Identify Effective Strategies. We recommend that data collection and evaluation be integrated in defensible space grant programs as a condition of future state funding. We further recommend that the state fund demonstration projects to provide better information on the most cost-effective strategies for improving compliance, including the use of newer strategies involving insurance and emerging technology. Conduct Oversight to Inform Future Decisions. We recommend that the Legislature conduct ongoing oversight focused on (1) assessing the size and location of gaps and overlaps in programs, (2) the implementation of CalFire’s new training program, (3) the cost-effectiveness of defensible space activities, and (4) the outcomes of current and future demonstration projects. This oversight could inform future policy decisions and help the state target limited funding in ways that increase compliance and reduce wildfire risk to homeowners and communities. 2 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE analysis full gutter AN LAO REPORT INTRODUCTION Reducing Home Ignitability Through responsibility. When homeowners or other property Defensible Space Is a Key to Mitigating owners fail to maintain defensible space, however, Wildfire Disasters. In recent years, California has they can put their neighbors and the larger experienced a growing number of highly destructive community at greater risk of devastating wildfires, wildfires. Of the 20 most destructive wildfires in which can have myriad negative impacts on the California’s recorded history (as measured by the state. Accordingly, reducing wildfire disasters by number of structures lost), 13 have occurred since promoting defensible space is an issue of statewide 2017. Together, these 13 fires caused tremendous importance. This report focuses largely on how the damage, destroying nearly 40,000 structures, state—and Legislature in particular—can support taking 148 lives, and charring millions of acres. efforts undertaken by state and local agencies to There are two main approaches to mitigating encourage homeowners to comply with relevant wildfire disasters. One approach is to reduce the defensible space requirements. chance that homes will be exposed to wildfires, Research Approach Focused on Literature such as through a robust fire suppression program. Review, Survey, and Interviews. To formulate the A second approach is to reduce the chance that findings and recommendations presented in this homes ignite when wildfires occur nearby. There report, we drew upon a wide range of information is evidence that a key way to reduce these home sources. Our analysis was informed by a survey ignitions, and thus protect homes from being lost to we conducted of local fire agencies. In addition, wildfires, is for homeowners to maintain areas free we conducted roughly 50 interviews with groups of excess or dead vegetation around their homes— that have a variety of perspectives on the issue, commonly referred to as defensible space. When including local fire agencies, academic researchers, homeowners maintain defensible space, it reduces nongovernmental organizations, interest groups, the risk that the flames, radiant heat, and embers private companies, and state departments. We from wildfires will ignite homes, thus reducing home also accompanied inspectors from the California losses. Additionally, defensible space provides Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CalFire) more areas for firefighters to position themselves on some defensible space inspections. Finally, we and their equipment in order to defend homes reviewed relevant reports and academic literature. from wildfires. We list some of the key work that informed this Report Responds to Legislative Interest in report in the Appendix. Defensible Space. We prepared this report in Structure of Report. The report includes the response to legislative interest in wildfire mitigation following five main sections: and, more specifically, potential improvements to • In the first section, we provide background on the current defensible space practices in California. the role defensible space plays in preventing While we focus this report on defensible space, wildfire disasters. we acknowledge that defensible space is just one • The second section summarizes the state’s of several strategies to reduce the risk of wildfire main programs for verifying and promoting disasters, with other strategies including home defensible space, as well as what we learned hardening, implementation of fire breaks, and about local efforts based on our survey and projects to improve forest health and reduce excess interviews. vegetation. • The third section contains our analyses and Report Focuses Primarily on How State Can findings. Support Individual Efforts. The state does not bear the primary responsibility for defensible space. • In the fourth section, we provide Instead, the creation and maintenance of defensible recommendations for promoting defensible space around private properties is an owner space compliance. www.lao.ca.gov 3 analysis full gutter AN LAO REPORT • The last section discusses the main funding potential future state efforts to promote sources that the state could use to implement defensible space. our recommendations, as well as other DEFENSIBLE SPACE HELPS PREVENT WILDFIRE DISASTERS Wildfire Disasters in California fires to protect lives and property. Many species native to California adapted to regular, low- and Many Parts of the State Are Prone to moderate-intensity wildfires. These regular fires Wildfires. California’s climate makes it naturally played an important role in keeping the state’s susceptible to wildfires. The state’s rainfall is highly forests and landscapes healthy by periodically seasonal, typically falling mostly in the late fall and clearing underbrush and contributing to regrowth of winter. Starting in the spring, much of the state native plant species. typically experiences low levels of rainfall and Wildfire Disasters Are a Large and Growing increasingly warm conditions. These conditions Problem. While wildfires have potential benefits, begin to dry out vegetation, which makes the state they can also be highly problematic when they are increasingly susceptible to wildfires during the much more severe than they would be naturally summer and early fall. and threaten lives and property. In recent years, While California tends to be prone to wildfires— California has experienced a growing number particularly in the dry months of the year—some of problematic wildfires. As Figure 2 on page 6, areas of the state are at particularly high risk of shows most of California’s largest and most severe wildfires due to factors such as the type destructive wildfires have occurred in recent of vegetation present, the local weather patterns, decades. This trend has been particularly notable and the topography. CalFire designates such areas in the last few years, which have seen some of as high and very high fire hazard severity zones the worst wildfires in the state’s recorded history. (HFHSZs and VHFHSZs). For example, the 2018 wildfire season included As shown in Figure 1, HFHSZs and VHFHSZs the Camp Fire in Butte County, which became the are scattered across various parts of the state. single most destructive wildfire in state history Notably, many of them are in lightly populated areas with nearly 19,000 structures destroyed and 85 and small communities where human development fatalities, including the near-total destruction of abuts or intermingles with undeveloped wildlands, the town of Paradise. The 2020 wildfire season commonly referred to as the wildland-urban also included several particularly catastrophic interface (WUI). In addition, some more populated wildfires. Five of the 20 most destructive wildfires suburban areas also can be highly susceptible to in the state’s history occurred in 2020 alone. Many wildfires, such as during high wind conditions. of these fires were not only large and destructive, Wildfires Are a Natural Part of California’s but they also exhibited extreme behavior. These Ecosystems. Historically, significant parts of the wildfires overwhelmed the state’s fire response state would burn annually, especially during the capacity and led to the destruction of roughly 7,800 warm, dry months of the year. In the 1700s, an structures and the deaths of 23 people. estimated 4.5 million acres burned each year, on Experts Have Identified Some Factors That average, in these regular wildfires. This is more Are Contributing to More Wildfire Disasters. A than four times the average annual amount of few key factors are exposing more homes to large, acreage that has burned in recent decades, due intense wildfires, leading to more wildfire disasters. in large part to the state’s focus on suppressing These factors include: 4 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE analysis full gutter AN LAO REPORT Figure 1 Fire Hazard Severity Zonesa Very High High Moderate Unzoned a As identified by the Department of Forestry and Fire Protection. Includes draft and recommended Fire Hazard Severity Zones in Local Responsibility Areas. • Climate Change. Climate change is which increases wildfire risks. Combined with contributing to hotter weather and longer high winds, the results can be particularly dry seasons in California than was previously devastating, since embers from a wildfire typical. These conditions increasingly dry out can blow miles away from the main fire vegetation and lengthen the wildfire season, before igniting dry vegetation and homes. For www.lao.ca.gov 5 analysis full gutter AN LAO REPORT example, weather conditions were a major Wildfires Are Costly, Particularly When They factor in several of the recent wildfires that Become Disasters. Federal, state, and local were particularly destructive, such as the governments incur significant fiscal costs related Camp Fire. Additionally, climate change can to wildfires. State costs related to wildfires have negatively affect forest health by increasing increased markedly in recent years. For example, the frequency and severity of droughts, which as shown in Figure 3, the cost to the state General can put stress on trees and make them Fund of resource management and fire prevention more susceptible to pest infestations. This, is estimated to be about $550 million in 2020-21, in turn, can lead to more diseased, dead, up from about $60 million in 2005-06, which and dying trees, which can also exacerbate largely reflects increased state funding in more the severity of wildfires by providing more recent years. Additionally, the cost of providing combustible fuels. fire protection is estimated to reach $2.9 billion in • Poor Forest and Land Management 2020-21. This represents a substantial increase Practices. Over time, much of the state’s from the roughly $750 million that the state spent forestlands have become unhealthy, in part on fire protection in 2005-06. Part of the growth in due to the focus on suppressing naturally fire protection costs has been driven by the need occurring fires in recent decades. This has to respond to the recent large wildfires that the resulted in many forests densely filled with state has faced. For example, of the $2.9 billion in relatively small trees and brush, which serve estimated General Fund costs in 2020-21, about as “ladder fuels” to carry wildfires into tree $1.1 billion was spending from the Emergency canopies, increasing their spread. Importantly, Fund (also known as the E-Fund), which was largely there is growing recognition that forest related to responding to the large, destructive management practices should change to wildfires that the state confronted in 2020. (Total better support the natural role of wildfires E-Fund costs in 2020-21 are estimated at over in the California environment, including less $1.7 billion, but are anticipated to be offset by reliance on suppression and greater use of roughly $600 million in federal reimbursements.) prescribed fires. Large, destructive wildfires not only increase • WUI Development. Over time, as the state’s response costs, but can also result in significant population has increased, more homes and costs to governments, private property owners, communities have been built in the Figure 2 WUI. Development in these areas Largest and Most Destructive Wildfires Have Occurred in Recent Decades increases the risk of ignitions, since many 9 ignitions are caused 8 by human activity. 20 Largest 7 Also, development 20 Most Destructive 6 in the WUI means 5 that more people and property are located 4 in vegetated wildland 3 areas that are prone 2 to wildfires. Thus, 1 when wildfires occur, they are more likely 1930s 1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s 2020sa to be deadly and a Includes wildfires that occurred in 2020 and 2021 (through September). destructive. 6 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE analysis full gutter AN LAO REPORT insurers, and others related to cleaning up damage lives and property. However, the trends discussed and rebuilding homes and infrastructure. For above—climate change, changing landscape example, as of June 2021, the administration management practices, and increased populations estimated that the cost of removing debris living in the WUI—make it increasingly important to related to the 2020 wildfires would reach roughly ensure that homes are resilient to wildfires. These $1.8 billion, about $700 million of which is expected trends mean that many communities in California to be paid for by the state General Fund and will need to become more accustomed to living $1.1 billion of which is expected to be reimbursed safely alongside wildfire even if we have robust by the federal government. Additionally, the insured suppression programs. losses from the 2020 fires in California have been Defensible Space Plays Important Role estimated at $5 billion or more. in Reducing Home Ignitability. Researchers generally agree that it is important for homeowners Preventing Wildfire Disasters by to maintain an area free of excess or dead Maintaining Defensible Space vegetation around their homes, known as defensible space. (We summarize some of the state A Key Way to Reduce Wildfire Disasters Is to and local defensible space requirements later in Reduce Home Ignitions. As shown in Figure 4 on this report.) When defensible space is maintained, the next page, there are two general approaches there is less flammable material near homes that to reducing the likelihood that homes are lost to can ignite and spread to the homes themselves. wildfires. One approach is to reduce the chance Evidence supporting the protective effects of that homes will be exposed to wildfires in the first defensible space includes experiments that have place through a robust fire suppression program shown that when defensible space is maintained, and forest and landscape health treatments aimed radiant heat from nearby fires generally cannot at reducing fire severity. The other approach is ignite homes. Researchers have also conducted to reduce the chance that structures ignite when studies after individual wildfires to explore the role wildfires occur near populated areas. Reducing of defensible space and other factors in home the likelihood that individual homes ignite is an survivability. For example, a 2013 study of two large important part of preventing wildfire disasters fires in San Diego County found that structures that because burning homes can become added had vegetation cleared within 30 feet survived at fuel for the fire, which can then ignite nearby vegetation and homes, thereby increasing the Figure 3 spread of the wildfire. Spending on Wildfire Response and Prevention Activities If, however, homes and (In Millions) their surroundings are ignition-resistant, the $4,000 destructiveness of these 3,500 wildfires can be reduced. 3,000 Resource Management Historically, state, and Fire Prevention 2,500 federal, and local programs have focused 2,000 Emergency Fire Suppression primarily on the approach 1,500 of reducing the chance 1,000 that homes will be 500 Base Fire Protection exposed to wildfires in the first place, mostly 2005-06 2007-08 2009-10 2011-12 2013-14 2015-16 2017-18 2019-20 2020-21 by funding a robust fire suppression program aimed at protecting www.lao.ca.gov 7 analysis full gutter AN LAO REPORT about twice the rate of structures that did not have protect homes from igniting during wildfires, there that vegetation clearance. Additionally, in 2021, the are still gaps in knowledge. For example, there Insurance Institute for Business and Home Safety is limited information on the degree to which the (IBHS) collaborated with a private data analytics effectiveness of defensible space depends on the firm on an analysis of over 70,000 properties within specific setting of a home, including the adjacent wildfire areas over a three-year period. Using topography and vegetation types. We discuss pre- and post-satellite imagery, the study estimated some of these gaps in more detail in the “Findings” that homes with heavy vegetation coverage near section of this report. the structure were roughly twice as likely to be Area Closest to Home Likely Most Important destroyed by a wildfire than homes with less to Reducing Home Ignitions. Overall, existing vegetation. Furthermore, in 2019, CalFire staff research not only indicates that defensible space conducted an analysis of the relationship between can play an important role in reducing home defensible space compliance (as assessed through ignition and loss, it also suggests that the area its defensible space inspection program) and closest to the home is likely the most important destruction of structures during the seven largest to preventing home ignitability. For example, a fires that occurred in California in 2017 and 2018. 2014 study of homes burned in San Diego County Overall, this analysis concluded that the odds of a found that structures were more likely to survive a structure being destroyed by wildfire were roughly fire with defensible space immediately adjacent to five times higher for noncompliant structures them and that the most effective actions included compared to compliant ones. ensuring that vegetation does not overhang or Notably, while there is a general consensus touch structures. Based on this type of research, among researchers that defensible space can help organizations such as IBHS and the National Figure 4 Defensible Space Is One of Several Activities That Can Reduce Home Loss from Wildfires Goal Reduce Risk of Home Loss Reduce Likelihood That General Reduce Likelihood Home Exposure to Wildfire Will Approaches Will Be Exposed to Wildfire Result in Home Loss Reduce Number Reduce Wildfire Reduce Development Make Homes More Objectives of Wildfires Size and Intensity in Fire Prone Areas Resistant to Ignition Guide Development Maintain Improve Forest Health Respond to and Harden Activities Prevent Ignitions Through Zoning and Defensible and Reduce Fuels Suppress Wildfires Homes Local Land Use Decisions Space Modified from Calkin et al., 2014. 8 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE analysis full gutter AN LAO REPORT Fire Protection Association indicate that it is and Federal Responsibility Areas (LRAs, SRAs, most critical for homeowners to keep the areas and FRAs, respectively)—depending on which level immediately adjacent to their homes free from of government bears primary responsibility. Local flammable vegetation or other items. agencies—such as county fire departments and fire protection districts—are primarily responsible for Multiple Entities Have an Interest fire protection in LRAs, which include areas such as in Supporting Defensible Space incorporated cities and agricultural lands. CalFire is Practices responsible for fire protection in the SRA. (CalFire and local agencies sometimes provide primary Defensible Space Helps Homeowners Protect response and prevention services in each other’s Their Homes. Defensible space is generally jurisdictions under contractual relationships.) As considered to be the homeowner’s responsibility. shown in Figure 5, the SRA includes over Much of the defensible space work takes place 31 million acres—about one-third of the state—and on private property, generally around private primarily consists of privately owned wildlands. homes. Additionally, homeowners themselves have a significant stake in defensible space, since it can play an important role in protecting their homes—often Figure 5 their most valuable asset— from wildfire. Wildfire Responsibility Areas Defensible Space Is Also Important for Neighbors, Governments, and Insurers. Local Responsibility Area While homeowners benefit from defensible space on their State Responsibility Area properties, the benefits extend Federal Responsibility Area to others, as well. For example, when homeowners maintain defensible space, their homes are less likely to ignite other nearby homes, overwhelm firefighters, and ultimately threaten larger communities with wildfire disasters. As such, an individual homeowner’s decision to create and maintain defensible space can help protect communities, governments, and insurers from the significant costs of wildfire disasters. Federal, State, and Local Governments Share Responsibility for Response and Prevention. For the purposes of wildfire response and prevention, land in the state is divided into three main areas—Local, State, www.lao.ca.gov 9 analysis full gutter AN LAO REPORT State and Local Requirements for on their properties within two zones: (1) certain Maintenance of Defensible Space requirements within 100 feet of structures and (2) additional, more stringent requirements Given the broader public interest in defensible within 30 feet of structures. These regulations space, state and local governments impose include requirements related to maintenance various requirements on homeowners to create of live vegetation (trees, shrubs, and grasses), and maintain defensible space, as described clearance of dead vegetation, and the location further below. and storage of wood piles and other flammable State Laws Establish Minimum Defensible items near the structures. (Figure 6 shows some Space Requirements. Current state law requires of the requirements in these two zones, as well the Board of Forestry and Fire Protection (BFFP) as identifies a recently established third zone to establish defensible space requirements for discussed below.) structures in the SRA and VHFHSZs in the LRAs In recognition that the area immediately in California. (There are estimated to be about surrounding a home is likely the most important 768,000 structures in the SRA and roughly 700,000 for protecting a home from igniting during a structures in VHFHSZs in the LRAs.) Under the wildfire, the Legislature passed Chapter 259 of existing regulations set by the board, homeowners 2020 (AB 3074, Friedman), which creates a third, in these areas must meet specific requirements “ember-resistant zone” within five feet of structures Figure 6 Homeowner Requirements in Defensible Space Zones Under State Law Trees and Shrubs The vertical space between Propane shrubs and the lowest branches Above-ground liquefied petroleum Roof and Chimney Area should be three times the height gas containers should be surrounded Remove any dead branches, shrubs, of the shrubs underneath. or other plants overhanging or adjacent by at least ten feet of bare soil in all to buildings. Keep branches ten feet directions. away from chimneys. Zone 2 Zone 1 100ft Ember- 30ft Resistant Zone 5ft Grasses and Groundcover Cut grass to a maximum height of four inches. Fallen leaves and other Woodpiles dead vegetation shall be no more Dead Plant Matter Exposed woodpiles should be kept than three inches thick. Clear all dry or dead plant outside of Zone 1, unless they are matter from yard, roof, and housed in fire-resistant material. rain gutters. Remove any Surround exposed woodpiles with at flammable plants near or least ten feet of bare soil in all directions. around windows, decks, and stairs. 10 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE analysis full gutter AN LAO REPORT in SRAs and VHFHSZs. The statute requires jurisdictions to establish more stringent—but not BFFP to promulgate regulations to implement less stringent—requirements than those established the requirement for an ember-resistant zone by BFFP. As described further in the nearby and to create a related guidance document no box, in fall 2020, we surveyed local fire agencies later than January 1, 2023. Those regulations, on their defensible space programs. Of the 54 when completed, will provide specific information agencies that responded to a question in our on the types of vegetation allowed in the survey about their ordinances, 59 percent reported ember-resistant zone. that their local jurisdictions had adopted a local CalFire Enforces State Requirements in SRA. ordinance more stringent than required under state CalFire is responsible for enforcing defensible regulations. Some of these additional requirements space requirements in the SRA. In six “contract include specific management requirements for counties”—Kern, Los Angeles, Marin, Orange, certain types of vegetation, expanding defensible Santa Barbara, and Ventura—CalFire delegates space requirements beyond 100 feet for certain all wildfire response responsibilities in the SRA properties, creating more stringent requirements to the county fire agency and provides them with in areas immediately adjacent to structures, associated funding. These agencies also are and applying defensible space requirements to responsible for enforcement of defensible space additional areas—such as in HFHSZs and on requirements in the SRA within their counties. When vacant parcels. Some local ordinances also allow CalFire receives additional resources for defensible the local fire agency to assess an administrative space in the SRA, these contract counties receive fine for noncompliance with local defensible space additional resources, as well. requirements. (As we discuss later in this report, CalFire has authority to issue citations enforced by Local Agencies Sometimes Enforce Stricter the courts, but does not currently have authority to Requirements. Local agencies are responsible assess administrative fines.) for enforcing defensible space requirements in the VHFHSZs within their jurisdictions. In some State Does Not Require Specific Enforcement cases, local jurisdictional boundaries overlap with Activities. State and local defensible space the SRA, so both CalFire and local jurisdictions requirements apply to homeowners. While state can have shared responsibility for enforcing and local agencies are authorized to enforce defensible space requirements. According to defensible space regulations, there generally is CalFire, 95 percent of SRA where there are houses no requirement that they conduct enforcement or is in a local fire district or served by a county that homeowner compliance be verified, such as fire department. State law requires jurisdictions through inspections. Hence—and as discussed to adopt defensible space ordinances if they in more detail later in this report—the degree to have VHFHSZs within their boundaries. As part which inspections and enforcement occurs varies of these ordinances, state law authorizes local significantly across jurisdictions. The one exception LAO Survey of Local Fire Agencies in California In fall 2020, we conducted a survey of local fire agencies across the state to better understand the activities they are engaging in related to defensible space. The survey yielded responses from 110 local fire agencies, though not all agencies provided responses to every question. We estimate that there are over 500 local fire agencies in California, including those administered by city and county governments (though not all agencies are in locations that necessitate a defensible space program). Our survey respondents included agencies of different sizes and from various parts of the state. While instructive, we do not think the survey results can be generalized to all defensible space programs in the state. www.lao.ca.gov 11 analysis full gutter AN LAO REPORT to the absence of inspection requirements is under are relatively simple and inexpensive, but they Chapter 391 of 2019 (AB 38, Wood). Beginning must be conducted regularly to be effective. July 1, 2020, property sellers in HFHSZs and Some homeowners—such as those who are low VHFHSZs must disclose to buyers whether the income—might not have the necessary resources home complies with defensible space requirements. to complete these activities, even if they were The new law requires property sellers to obtain highly motivated to do so. In particular, it can be documentation of an inspection from CalFire or a particularly difficult for low-income individuals local agency that verifies this compliance. that have limited physical capabilities to maintain defensible space because they may not be able Barriers to Homeowners Maintaining to conduct the work themselves or afford to hire Defensible Space someone to help them do so. Homeowners Might Not Be Adequately Researchers have explored—mostly using Motivated to Maintain Defensible Space. The survey data and interviews—some of the barriers literature points to various potential reasons for homeowners typically face related to completing a lack of motivation among some homeowners. defensible space work, including prohibitive costs For example, some research has found that and/or time required, inadequate motivation to homeowners like the aesthetics or other amenities comply, and incomplete understanding of the (such as shade) provided by existing trees and nature of the risk to their home. Notably, the survey other vegetation. Additionally, homeowners responses we received from local agencies about might perceive that their actions have limited their perceptions of the barriers facing homeowners effectiveness, particularly if they see neighboring echoed these research findings. The responses property owners are putting them at risk by not to our survey are summarized in Figure 7. We maintaining their defensible space. Absent strong summarize some of the key barriers to compliance social pressures or financial incentives— such as identified by the research literature below. enforcement of fines for noncompliance—these Lack of Resources Deters Many Homeowners homeowners might not consistently prioritize taking From Maintaining Defensible Space. Research action to maintain defensible space. suggests that the resources required to complete Homeowners Might Not Fully Understand defensible space work—in the form of time Nature of Risk to Home. Research suggests and money—can be a significant barrier. Figure 7 In particular, certain activities, such as Main Reasons Homeowners Do Not Maintain removal of large trees, Defensible Space According to Our Survey Respondentsa can be difficult and cost thousands of dollars if 90% the homeowner hires 80 someone to conduct the 70 removal. Additionally, 60 much of defensible 50 space work is not a 40 one-time activity, but 30 instead involves the 20 trimming of vegetation 10 growth that should Cost Time/ Lack of Aesthetic Belief Not Abatement Few Few Citation happen periodically. Effort Knowledge Concerns Necessary/ Rare Citations Inspections Amounts Protective Too Low For example, activities such as cutting grasses a Survey of local fire agencies in fall 2020. and cleaning gutters 12 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE analysis full gutter AN LAO REPORT that homeowners generally are aware that their of potential damage to their properties, particularly properties are at risk of wildfires. In some cases, if their area has not experienced a wildfire recently. however, they might underestimate the level of risk CURRENT STATE AND LOCAL DEFENSIBLE SPACE EFFORTS CalFire and local agencies administer a range CalFire has identified about 768,000 parcels of programs aimed at addressing the barriers within the SRA subject to defensible space homeowners face in creating and maintaining inspections. The department’s goal is to inspect defensible space, as well as improving compliance each of these parcels once every three years with defensible space requirements. Below, we (roughly 250,000 parcels annually). In total, CalFire summarize the main defensible space programs (including contract counties) has completed over administered in California, including inspections, 200,000 inspections in each of the past couple homeowner education, homeowner assistance, years, so the agency is falling somewhat short of and enforcement. its goal. Also, as shown in Figure 8 on the next page, the rate of inspections varies considerably Defensible Space Inspections by unit. For example, among CalFire (noncontract) Inspections Contribute to Increased units, four units inspected 10 percent or fewer of Compliance in Multiple Ways. Inspections their parcels in 2019-20 (the most recent year for are the main type of activity state and local which data was available at the time this report was agencies undertake related to defensible space. prepared), while four units inspected more than During inspections, inspectors visit properties to half of their parcels that year. Notably, five out of assess their compliance with defensible space six of the contract counties have inspection rates requirements. State and local agencies vary in how exceeding 50 percent. they conduct inspections, which properties are The inspection rates cited above compare the prioritized for inspections, and the training provided number of parcels inspected to the number subject to inspectors. However, in general, inspections to inspection. Because some parcels are inspected can contribute to improved defensible space multiple times within the year, these inspection compliance in several ways. First, inspections verify rates overstate the percentage of parcels that are whether homeowners are complying with defensible inspected each year. At the time of the preparation space requirements and best practices. Failure to of this report, CalFire was not able to provide data meet requirements can then lead to enforcement on how many unique properties were inspected actions. Second, many agencies use inspections each year or how many properties had not been as an opportunity to educate homeowners about inspected within the past three years. So, it is specific steps they can take to reduce their risk. unclear what share of properties have received Third, inspections can play an important role in recent inspections. homeowner financial assistance programs. For CalFire Has Base Funding and Staffing, example, in some cases, inspections are used to Plus Recent Augmentations. The department identify specific activities (such as the removal of completes inspections with a base inspections certain trees) that are eligible for reimbursement budget of $3.4 million annually from the through these programs. Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund (GGRF)—which CalFire Inspection Rates Vary by Unit. is generated from the state’s cap-and-trade CalFire is organized into 27 units (including the system. CalFire’s base funding supports between six contract counties) with each comprised of 1 to 1.5 full-time equivalent defensible space the SRA within one or more counties. Statewide, inspector staff at each of its 21 noncontract county www.lao.ca.gov 13 analysis full gutter AN LAO REPORT units. (The six contract counties each receive Local Agencies Vary Widely in Share of similar levels of funding to the noncontract CalFire Parcels Inspected. A total of 35 local fire agencies units.) Units have flexibility in how they utilize this (excluding contract counties) provided data in position authority, and units generally use this base response to our survey on the number of defensible funding to employ between four and six seasonal space inspections completed and the number of inspectors for a three-month period. Notably, in parcels within their jurisdictions that are subject to addition to dedicated inspectors, CalFire also inspections. On average, these agencies reported deploys firefighters to conduct defensible space an annual inspection rate of roughly 35 percent. As inspections as time permits. In 2019-20, inspectors with CalFire, the inspection rate varied considerably performed 69 percent of CalFire inspections, and firefighters Figure 8 performed 31 percent. Inspection Rates Vary Across CalFire Unitsa In recent years, CalFire’s base funding for defensible 2019-20 space inspections staff has been Orange supplemented with additional Ventura funding from other sources—such Tulare as by utilizing a share of GGRF Fresno-Kings funds available for forest health Santa Barbara and fire prevention activities Siskiyou to extend the use of seasonal Marin inspectors to up to nine months. Los Angeles San Luis Obispo Recent budget actions have Tehama-Glenn provided three augmentations San Diego-Imperial for CalFire’s defensible space San Bernardino inspection programs. First, in April San Benito-Monterey 2021, the Legislature passed a Madera-Mariposa $536 million “early action” wildfire Statewide Average Contract Counties resilience package that added Mendocino Riverside $2 million on a one-time basis to Butte CalFire’s 2020-21 General Fund Kern budget for additional defensible Santa Cruz space inspectors. Second, the Tuolumne-Calaveras 2021-22 Budget Act includes Santa Clara $8.3 million ($6.1 million ongoing) Shasta-Trinity from the General Fund for 26 Amador-El Dorado Humboldt-Del Norte year-round positions to support Nevada-Yuba-Placer defensible space inspections Lake-Napa-Sonoma related to property sales in Lassen-Modoc accordance with Chapter 391. 20 40 60 80 100 120 140% Third, the 2021-22 budget was Inspection Rate amended in September 2021 to include a $988 million wildfire a Inspection rates compare the number of inspections completed to the number of parcels subject to inspection. If some parcels are inspected multiple times within a year, inspection rates can resilience package, which exceed 100 percent. included $13 million from the CalFire = California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection. General Fund on a one-time basis for defensible space inspectors. 14 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE analysis full gutter AN LAO REPORT across jurisdictions, with reported inspection wildfire. These community-based groups serve rates ranging from 3 percent to 100 percent. many, but not all, parts of the state. Local agencies report using a mix of dedicated Homeowner Assistance Programs year-round and seasonal staff of various titles to perform inspections. CalFire’s Fire Prevention Program Provides Local Agencies Use Various Resources to Grants to Support Assistance to Homeowners. Support Defensible Space Inspections. The CalFire administers the state’s Fire Prevention Grant most common funding source for inspections is the Program. This program is funded through GGRF local agency’s General Fund (including allocations and provides grants to government agencies, of property taxes received by fire districts). About nonprofits, and tribes to support projects that 90 percent of the 44 local agencies that reported reduce wildfire risk and increase community information on funding sources indicated that they resiliency. In recent years, among other things, this used their General Fund to support their inspection program has supported various activities related to programs. Other funding sources reported by defensible space, including community outreach local agencies include citations and fees, special and education; the purchase of equipment (such as taxes, and federal grants. For example, in 2020, wood chippers); and removal of dead trees or other voters in Marin County passed a special parcel hazardous vegetation on certain properties, such tax to fund the creation of a joint powers authority as those owned by seniors or the disabled. From focused on fire protection and prevention, including 2017-18 through 2019-20, roughly $33 million defensible space. of the $169 million awarded through the Fire Prevention Grant Program went to local agencies Homeowner Education Programs and nonprofits for projects related to defensible CalFire Engages in Public Education Efforts. space. (Some of these projects also included CalFire conducts general public outreach through other fire prevention activities, so the amount of different media outlets and provides printed funding directed to defensible space was likely less information to homeowners upon inspection. than $33 million.) CalFire also reports that the main purpose of its Some Local Agencies and Nonprofits Run inspection program is to educate the public. If Local Homeowner Assistance Programs. homeowners are present during inspections, CalFire Some local agencies and fire safe councils use inspectors will use the opportunity to engage funding from CalFire grants—and sometimes homeowners and educate them on defensible other sources such as local or federal funding— space. This could include walking around the home to support various types of assistance programs with the homeowner and visually identifying risks to for homeowners. For example, of the 52 survey the property, including violations of state defensible respondents who responded to our question space requirements, as well as the failure to follow about financial assistance or in-kind assistance other best practices—such as home hardening. (such as use of wood chippers) to homeowners, Local Agencies and Nongovernmental 23 reported providing such assistance. These Organizations Also Engage in Public Education. programs mostly consist of in-kind services such as Many local agencies reported that their defensible providing wood chipping and/or vegetation removal space programs include public education through services. Six agencies reported having a financial participation at community events and/or the assistance program. While CalFire does not provide provision of brochures or other written information any financial or in-kind assistance directly to to homeowners, often during inspections. homeowners, its inspectors often refer homeowners Some local agencies also use inspections as to relevant local programs if they exist. an opportunity to educate homeowners about Defensible Space Enforcement defensible space. Additionally, the state is home to over 100 local fire safe councils, which typically State and Local Enforcement Authority. focus on educating their local communities about Current law authorizes state and local fire agencies www.lao.ca.gov 15 analysis full gutter AN LAO REPORT to issue citations for noncompliance. The fine for issued for noncompliance with state laws or local the first citation is at least $100, which increases ordinances regarding defensible space. In total, to a misdemeanor and fine of at least $500 for the these agencies reported about 15,100 citations third violation. Local district attorneys and courts annually. Of the 43 respondents, 17 agencies are responsible for enforcing these penalties. As reported issuing no citations, 8 agencies reported noted above, some local agencies have ordinances issuing 10 or fewer citations, and 10 agencies that include provisions for administrative fines, reported issuing between 10 and 100 citations. which are enforced by the local jurisdiction rather The remaining eight agencies were responsible for than the court. State and local agencies also 14,500—96 percent—of the total citations issued. have the legal authority to direct the cleanup of Of the agencies that explained why they do not noncompliant properties and to assess the resulting issue citations, the most common explanations abatement costs on the property owner. were: (1) insufficient enforcement staffing or Agencies Rarely Issues Citations for funding, (2) the ineffectiveness of citations for Noncompliance. As discussed below, CalFire and encouraging compliance, and/or (3) a decision to local agencies generally report low noncompliance focus on education instead of citations. In addition, rates across the state. Nevertheless, with a total some agencies expressed a desire not to upset of 1.5 million properties in the SRA and VHFHSZs members of the local community by implementing within LRAs, there are still likely a couple hundred strict enforcement measures. thousand noncompliant properties throughout the CalFire and Most Local Agencies Rarely Use state. Moreover, even with the limited inspection Abatement. State law authorizes state and local programs currently in operation, there are tens agencies to direct the cleanup of noncompliant of thousands of noncompliant properties being properties and assess the resulting abatement identified each year. For example, in 2019-20, costs to the homeowners. CalFire reports that about 30,500 inspections in the SRA (14 percent) it does not enforce abatement of noncompliant resulted in a finding of noncompliance. properties because it does not have the staffing to Despite potentially large numbers of do so. In our survey, 37 local agencies reported the noncompliant properties in the SRA and VHFHSZs, number of abatement actions undertaken in their only a small share result in enforcement. In jurisdictions. Of these, the majority—21 agencies— 2019-20, CalFire and contract counties issued reported not conducting any abatements. Of the fewer than 1,000 citations, which account for remaining, only two agencies reported conducting only 3 percent of the noncompliant findings. more than 50 abatements each. Of the local Moreover, 21 of the 27 units (including contract agencies that explained why they do not conduct counties) reported issuing only two or fewer abatement, a large majority cited insufficient citations in 2019-20. (Kern County, a contract staffing or funding, including difficulty recovering county, accounted for 86 percent of the citations abatement costs. Our discussions with local issued by the remaining six counties.) According agencies indicate that if they use abatement, they to CalFire, its units rarely issue citations, partly typically do so as a last resort, giving homeowners due to a belief that local district attorneys will not ample notice and opportunities to correct violations prioritize enforcement of the citations. Additionally, before conducting abatement. Abatement activities in CalFire’s view, educating homeowners is more can result in large costs for homeowners— effective and less administratively burdensome than sometimes reaching thousands or as much as low issuing citations. tens of thousands of dollars to cover the cost of contractors to conduct the work as well as agency In our survey, 43 local agencies (excluding administrative fees. contract counties) reported the number of citations 16 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE analysis full gutter AN LAO REPORT FINDINGS In this section, we discuss the findings from location. As shown in Figure 10 on the next our review of the effectiveness of state and local page, compliance rates at CalFire units (including defensible space efforts, which we summarize contract counties) ranged from a high of 98 percent in Figure 9. We find that compliance rates vary (Santa Barbara) to a low of 35 percent (Marin). across the state and improving compliance in Similar variation existed among the local agencies areas with low rates is a worthwhile state goal. reporting in our survey. Specifically, 21 percent of However, we find that various complications reporting agencies had compliance rates below impede state and local efforts to improve 25 percent, while 38 percent had compliance defensible space compliance, such as the rates above 75 percent. In the box on page 19, fragmented and overlapping responsibilities of the we discuss some issues related to why measuring agencies involved, a lack of consistent statewide compliance rates is a valuable, though imperfect, data, various other barriers to state and local measure of wildfire risk reduction, as well as why agency efforts, and a lack of information on there is no clear optimal compliance rate that the the cost-effectiveness of strategies to increase state should target. compliance with defensible space. The state has Fragmented and Overlapping recently initiated various activities to explore how to best address some of these complications, and we Responsibilities Complicate Efforts to find that there are other promising efforts that the Improve Compliance state is not currently undertaking but which have Multiple entities are responsible for defensible the potential to improve the state’s approach to space in California. In addition to CalFire, there improving defensible space compliance. are hundreds of local agencies and community Reported Compliance Rates Generally organizations with responsibilities for inspections and other defensible space programs. As we High, but Vary Widely discuss below, this can lead to potential gaps Many communities report relatively high and overlap in programs and, absent consistent compliance rates. CalFire data show that coordination, potential duplication. 86 percent of their inspections in 2019-20 resulted Fragmented Responsibilities Among in a finding of compliance with defensible space Multiple Agencies Could Contribute to Gaps requirements. Similarly, the 39 local agencies that in Programs. The number of entities involved in provided data on compliance reported an average defensible space—many of which have limited compliance rate of 76 percent. resources—likely contributes to gaps in programs, While overall compliance rates appear to be such as inspection and homeowner assistance. For relatively high, there is significant variation by example, our interviews and survey revealed that Figure 9 Summary of Key Findings • Reported compliance rates generally high but vary widely. • Fragmented and overlapping responsibilities complicate efforts to improve compliance. • Lack of consistent statewide data and inspection standards hinders efforts to improve compliance. • Other barriers to state and local agencies’ efforts to improve compliance include lack of resources, authority, and motivation. • Cost-effectiveness of different strategies not well understood. • Recent efforts could inform best path forward, but are still in initial stages. • Other areas where additional evaluation and research could inform policy include role of insurance and technology. www.lao.ca.gov 17 analysis full gutter AN LAO REPORT some parts of the state are not subject to regular these inspections include that they (1) consider the inspections. Some properties in LRAs do not SRA to be primarily CalFire’s responsibility, (2) lack receive regular inspections because the relevant adequate resources, or (3) have not coordinated local agency has not dedicated resources to adequately with CalFire to identify and target gaps establish a defensible space inspection program of in inspections. Given the inconsistency of many properties in VHFHSZs. As discussed earlier in this state and local inspection programs, it is very report, some areas of the SRA do not appear to likely that there are many areas of the state where receive regular inspections from CalFire based on properties are not regularly—or ever—checked for recent inspection data. In addition, in many cases, compliance with existing defensible space laws local agencies do not regularly inspect properties and regulations. within their jurisdiction if they are in the SRA. It is also worth noting that there are gaps in the Based on our conversations with stakeholders, availability of homeowner assistance programs. reasons why local agencies might not conduct For example, fewer than half of the agencies that provided information on their Figure 10 programs identified having any homeowner assistance programs. Defensible Space Compliance Rates in CalFire Units (As we discuss in the next section 2019-20 of the report, we do not know the size of the gaps in inspection or Santa Barbara homeowner assistance programs Los Angeles due to the lack of consistent Santa Clara statewide data.) San Bernardino Overlapping Responsibility San Luis Obispo Could Lead to Ineffective Ventura Resource Allocation Absent Siskiyou Robust Coordination. While Humboldt-Del Norte San Mateo-Santa Cruz some local agencies do not San Diego-Imperial conduct inspections in the SRA, Madera-Mariposa other local agencies do. Based on Orange our interviews, two reasons local Shasta-Trinity agencies conduct inspections in Amador-El Dorado the SRA are (1) a view that the Nevada-Yuba-Placer number of inspections done by Statewide Average CalFire is insufficient and (2) a Tulare Riverside desire to apply the local agency’s Sonoma-Lake-Napa more robust regulations. (CalFire Kern generally inspects to state San Benito-Monterey regulatory standards, even if the Tehama-Glenn local regulatory standards in that Butte area are more stringent.) Having Mendocino multiple agencies conducting Fresno-Kings inspections in an area might not Lassen-Modoc Tuolumne-Calaveras Contract Counties be problematic when there is Marin sufficient inspection workload to occupy multiple agencies and the 25 50 75 100% agencies are coordinating their CalFire = California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection. efforts. In our conversations, we heard about a few areas where 18 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE analysis full gutter AN LAO REPORT CalFire is coordinating closely with local agencies, conducted inspections in the same areas within but it appears that in most areas there is only a short time frame. Clearly, such duplication is an limited and informal coordination between state and inefficient use of scarce inspection resources, and local agencies. To the extent that CalFire and local it can create other problems as well. For example, agencies do not coordinate adequately, inspections if CalFire and local agencies conduct inspections to could be poorly targeted or duplicative. Some different standards, duplicative inspections could properties might receive more frequent inspections yield confusing results for homeowners, potentially than others for reasons unrelated to their underlying undermining the educational aspect of inspections. risks. For example, we have learned of a few instances in which CalFire and local agencies Why Focus on Compliance Rates? Relying on Compliance Rates Is Imperfect but Best Proxy for Risk Reduction. The ultimate goal of maintaining defensible space is to prevent individual homes from being lost due to wildfires, thereby reducing the risk of greater wildfire spread, damage to property and infrastructure, and loss of life. In practice, however, it is difficult to directly measure the effectiveness of defensible space (and programs designed to increase adoption of defensible space practices) at reducing risk and structure loss. In part, this is because researchers can only observe the degree to which defensible space reduced losses in populated areas that actually experience wildfires—and only if information on defensible space adoption is even available. However, when large wildfires do not occur, it is not possible to evaluate how well defensible space practices and programs worked. For this reason, we find that it makes sense to use a proxy. In this case, available information suggests that compliance rates with defensible space requirements are correlated with home ignition risk from nearby vegetation, and thus can serve as a reasonable proxy. No Clear Optimal Compliance Rate. It is reasonable to ask what level of compliance the state should target. However, based on our conversation with researchers and fire officials, there is no clear “right” level of defensible space. In general, the greater a wildfire-exposed community’s compliance rate, the better the protection from wildfire risk. Thus, if risk reduction were the only consideration, it would make sense to target perfect compliance. In practice, however, risk reduction is not the only consideration. In particular, achieving compliance can be costly for various parties, including the homeowners who are responsible for modifying their properties and the state and local agencies charged with conducting programs to promote and verify compliance. It is important for the Legislature to weigh these costs against the benefits when determining what level of compliance it determines to be adequate. Adequate Defensible Space Compliance Rate Might Vary Across State. The benefits of defensible space—both to individuals and the broader community—and cost of achieving compliance can vary by location. For example, when homes are close together, an individual homeowner’s decision to maintain defensible space is more likely to affect the neighboring homes than when homes are far apart. Additionally, the risk-reduction benefits of defensible space are likely to be greater for homes in areas at highest risk of wildfire, for example, due to topography or the condition of nearby forests. Also, the amount of work necessary to maintain defensible space—and the associated costs to homeowners—can vary by location depending, for example, on the type and density of vegetation. Accordingly, determining what is an adequate level of defensible space compliance can vary across the state and even within regions. www.lao.ca.gov 19 analysis full gutter AN LAO REPORT Lack of Consistent Statewide Data or more robust internal and external reporting. For and Inspection Standards Hinders example, Marin County recently launched a new application that allows owners of inspected homes Efforts to Improve Compliance to review pictures and descriptions of violations With so many entities involved in defensible of the relevant defensible space ordinance, as space, it is important for state and local agencies well as other recommended defensible space and and policymakers to have programmatic home hardening improvements that go beyond information and outcome data to effectively the regulatory requirements. Additionally, several facilitate coordination, target limited resources, cities, including Los Angeles, use an application and make policy decisions regarding how to that provides additional reporting and case improve compliance. Currently, however, there is management functionality. not consistent data collection, sharing, or reporting Agencies Generally Do Not Share Data, across the many state and local agencies involved Contributing to Duplication and Overlap. in defensible space programs. Currently, while various state and local agencies State and Local Agencies Use Various use CalFire’s collector app, they do not share Programs to Collect Inspection Data. CalFire inspection information consistently. For example, and many local agencies collect information on our interviews indicate that local agencies that inspections and compliance, but they do not use CalFire’s collector app cannot always view regularly share this information with each other. CalFire’s inspection information. Among users of Specifically, CalFire inspectors input data from their other applications, data sharing is rare. In addition, inspections into tablets using an application that some of the applications that local agencies use CalFire calls its “collector app.” This application are not designed to provide data to CalFire. Our includes a map showing parcel boundaries. discussions suggest that it likely would not be Inspectors can click on the relevant parcel to see difficult to export data from these other systems some basic information on each property (such into CalFire’s current collector app system. as a structure’s age). As inspectors complete However, CalFire currently does not collect these their inspections, they mark in the application data, and there currently is no requirement that whether properties are compliant with the various this data sharing occur. Without data sharing, requirements for defensible space under state law. entities do not have access to information on which If inspectors find a property to be noncompliant, properties other entities have inspected or the they typically attach pictures of the relevant level of compliance of properties that have been violations. Inspectors can also enter notes into the inspected. Consequently, it is more difficult for application about conditions on the property that agencies to coordinate in order to avoid duplicating may not be violations, but could increase wildfire efforts or to better target gaps where inspections risks (such as lack of home hardening). When are not occurring, including in potentially the inspection is complete, inspectors leave a high-priority areas. handwritten paper form, shown in Figure 11, with No Consistent Statewide Data Collection the inspection findings. or Reporting on Defensible Space Activities. Based on our interviews with local agencies, we There is no comprehensive statewide data on found that many collect data on the inspections defensible space activities—such as inspections they perform; however, the format of that data and compliance—reported for both state and local varies. Some agencies reported that they use inspection programs. CalFire reports summary data CalFire’s collector app. Other agencies reported on its inspections by unit based on data collected using other applications to collect data on their by its inspectors (including in contract counties). inspections. In some cases, local agencies There is, however, no centralized collection or indicated that these other applications offer reporting of activities undertaken in the LRA or by additional features, such as more baseline other local agencies in the SRA. information on properties (such as about ownership) 20 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE analysis full gutter AN LAO REPORT Figure 11 CalFire Defensible Space Form In addition, even where state and local agencies inspected. Other agencies might track the collect data, the data reported on inspection and share of unique parcels inspected, making compliance rates may not be comparable for a it impossible to directly compare CalFire’s few reasons: inspection rate to the inspection rate of those agencies. • Different Reporting Approaches. As • Different Compliance Standards. Some local mentioned previously, CalFire’s reports only agencies are inspecting to different regulatory include the number of inspections done, standards than the state standard because, not the number of unique parcels that are as allowed by law, they have adopted more www.lao.ca.gov 21 analysis full gutter AN LAO REPORT stringent local ordinances. Consequently, Inconsistent Data Collection and Reporting what activities are deemed compliant can vary Hinder Policymaking and Oversight. Without across localities. consistent, reliable statewide data on inspections, • Different Inspection Practices. Agencies compliance, and programs being reported on an take different approaches to inspections, ongoing basis, it is difficult to for policymakers with some more thorough than others. For to make changes to improve compliance, target example, some agencies drive by properties resources efficiently, and conduct oversight. to verify compliance, while others perform Consistent statewide data could be particularly more thorough inspections that include valuable in at least three areas related to walking the property with the homeowner. defensible space: More thorough inspections might be more • Identifying Inspection Gaps and Overlap. likely to identify areas of noncompliance Having consistent data on which areas do and because some violations might not be readily do not have inspection programs could be apparent from the street. For example, important in at least a couple of ways. First, one local agency reported to us that it it would allow state and local agencies to inspected in the same area as CalFire and more efficiently target their existing resources found significantly lower compliance than to gaps in high-priority areas, as well as CalFire did, suggesting that some difference to ensure that duplication is not occurring. in reported compliance rates could be due Second, the information could help inform to differences in inspections rather than policymakers about the overall magnitude differences in underlying conditions. and location of program gaps, which • Different Levels of Training. CalFire reported could inform state and local policymakers’ to us that while it provides training to its decisions regarding whether and where to defensible space inspectors, it currently invest additional resources for inspections. does not have a standardized curriculum for Third, the availability of data on state and such training. Local agencies reported wide local inspection programs would enhance variation in the amount of training provided oversight, allowing elected officials and the to inspectors—with some providing minimal public greater information on the extent to training and others providing 40 hours which agencies are enforcing defensible space or more. Given the inconsistent training laws and regulations in different communities. provided, some inspectors might not have a • Understanding Scope of Problem of high level of expertise—informed by the best Lack of Compliance. Consistent data on available science—to guide them, resulting noncompliance across the state would in variation in inspection outcomes. Notably, provide policymakers better information CalFire reports that it currently is in the than is currently available on the extent of process of creating a training curriculum— the problem in various parts of the state. In which will cover inspections for defensible turn, this could inform how to best target space and home hardening—as part of its policy interventions. For example, to the implementation of Chapter 404 of 2019 extent that low compliance rates are a much (SB 190, Dodd). CalFire also reports that it more significant problem in certain parts plans to offer the resulting training to staff of of the state than in others, the Legislature local agencies and others, such as building could consider focusing a greater share of officials. Although the details of this training future budget appropriations to those areas. are not yet available, we think it has the Similarly, CalFire could be directed to direct potential to help improve the consistency a greater share of its inspection resources or and quality of inspections and the resulting grant funding to those areas with the largest data collected. compliance deficits. 22 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE analysis full gutter AN LAO REPORT • Assessing Program Effectiveness. Data on Efforts to Improve Compliance Can Be compliance rates across communities and Resource-Intensive. Our survey and interviews over time could be important to understanding suggest that a lack of resources is a barrier to of the degree to which different types state and local agency efforts to improve defensible of defensible space programs increase space compliance. For example, in our survey, compliance rates. If, for example, data inadequate resources—including funding and showed that communities that implement staffing—was the most common reason cited by abatement programs tend to have much agencies for not administering any defensible space higher compliance than those that do not, it program, cited by about two-thirds of respondents. could provide some suggestive evidence to Furthermore, lack of funding was the most support the value of abatement programs. frequently cited reason for declining to implement Additionally, longitudinal data could be used changes that would improve compliance, such as to compare changes in compliance rates issuing more citations or conducting abatement between communities that implement new activities. The interviews we conducted with local defensible space programs—such as new agencies and CalFire echoed these concerns. homeowner assistance programs—and These responses are not surprising given communities that do not. Such comparisons that administering robust programs can be could provide valuable insights into the resource-intensive. Completing thorough effectiveness of these programs. inspections requires hiring staff, and the inspections can be time-consuming, particularly for Other Barriers to State and Local large properties with multiple structures to inspect Agencies’ Efforts to Increase and in rural areas where the travel time between inspections can be significant. For example, we Compliance estimate that a 30-minute inspection—roughly the Below, we discuss various other barriers that average length cited in our survey—costs about state and local agencies face to achieving higher $20. (We discuss the amount of time required defensible space compliance rates. These barriers for inspections in the nearby box.) While this is include lack of resources, authority, and motivation not a large per inspection cost, an inspection to implement strong programs. program in even a moderately sized community How Long Does an Inspection Take? The amount of time required to conduct inspections can vary considerably, depending on factors such as the scope of the inspection and the amount of travel time between parcels. On average, local agencies that responded to our survey reported inspections taking more than a half hour each. There was, however, significant variation in the amount of time reported, with some local agencies responding that inspections take over one hour on average. Notably, California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CalFire) data show that its inspections take an average of less than 15 minutes to complete, including travel time. According to CalFire, this short inspection time is because it has focused its efforts in areas where homes are close together, which allows inspectors to inspect more homes within a shorter period of time. However, to the extent the department were to expand inspections to other areas that are less densely populated, total inspection times could increase. For reference, CalFire estimates that Chapter 391 of 2019 (AB 38, Wood) inspections will take an average of 1.5 hours each, including travel time, because homes for sale are not likely to be grouped together. www.lao.ca.gov 23 analysis full gutter AN LAO REPORT can cost hundreds of thousands or millions of enforcement programs since many community dollars annually. members do not want to face the prospect of Additionally, other components of defensible citations or other enforcement actions for failing to space programs—such as homeowner comply with defensible space requirements. assistance—can be resource-intensive. For Cost-Effectiveness of Different example, some recent state grant-funded programs Strategies Not Well Understood provided an average of roughly $1,000 per property to assist homeowners with removing dead and There are two key challenges with regard to dying trees and vegetation around their homes, understanding the cost-effectiveness of defensible and one program offered by a local government space programs. First, there is limited information provides up to $3,500 per property. Many local about the cost-effectiveness of maintaining communities do not have sufficient funds to offer defensible space compared to implementing other such services to their residents. While state and activities that reduce wildfire risk. Second, the federal grants may be available to help support relative cost-effectiveness of different approaches these types of activities, that funding is limited and to improving defensible space compliance is some smaller and poorer jurisdictions in particular unclear. This lack of information makes it difficult likely struggle to apply for and administer the grants to determine which specific steps, if any, the state given their limited resources. or local agencies should undertake to address the Agencies May Lack Authority for Certain barriers identified previously, such as how to best Activities. In some cases, a barrier that state and target funding where resources are limited. local agencies face is a lack of legal authority to Lack of Information on Cost-Effectiveness impose administrative fees that could help facilitate of Defensible Space Compared to Other enforcement of defensible space regulations. As Risk-Reduction Activities. While there is general mentioned previously, CalFire reports that its lack agreement that defensible space improves the of administrative fee authority is one reason it does likelihood that a home will survive a wildfire, there not issue many citations. Instead, CalFire must rely is much less agreement regarding (1) the extent on local district attorneys who might not regard to which maintaining defensible space reduces citation enforcement as a high priority. Additionally, the risk of losing a home, (2) the extent to which local agencies have administrative fee authority the likelihood that a home will be lost depends on only if their local governing body has adopted an an individual home’s surrounding vegetation and ordinance granting that authority. Accordingly, this topography, (3) the extent to which expected home authority is not consistently available statewide. losses depend on overall defensible space in the Agencies Do Not Always Have Strong broader community, and (4) the degree to which Incentive to Prioritize Defensible Space reductions in property losses offset the costs of Activities. State law does not require state and implementing and maintaining defensible space. local agencies to conduct specific defensible Importantly, limited information on the benefits space activities, such as community education, and costs of defensible space makes it difficult to homeowner assistance, inspections, and compare the value of increasing defensible space enforcement. Thus, the current system relies upon compliance to other activities that could reduce agencies’ motivation to undertake defensible space wildfire disasters, such as home hardening, fuel activities on a voluntary basis. In some cases, breaks, or forest health treatments. agencies we interviewed reported strong local The most relevant research on cost-effectiveness support for their defensible space programs. In that we found has been done by private firms using other cases, however, we heard that constituent proprietary catastrophe risk models. For example, opposition makes it difficult for some local agencies a recent analysis by a data analytics firm estimated to secure sufficient local support to run robust that about 850 homes and $1.3 billion in economic programs. In particular, we heard that it can be losses could be avoided statewide annually in difficult to secure sufficient support to undertake California if properties located in high wildfire risk 24 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE analysis full gutter AN LAO REPORT areas were cleared of vegetation overhanging and specific activities should be the focus of future within 30 feet of structures. Another recent analysis state funding. by a data analytics firm estimated that the financial Additionally, there is a lack of information on benefits of conducting vegetation management the cost-effectiveness of different approaches to around homes and home hardening exceeded the delivering each type of program. For example, costs in some communities but not in others. While it is unclear how frequently defensible space these analyses represent preliminary steps towards inspections should occur and whether some types improved understanding of the cost-effectiveness of parcels should be inspected more often than of defensible space, they do not fully address others. CalFire’s current approach, for example, is the gaps in understanding. Therefore, it remains to try to inspect every property at least once every difficult to determine the overall level of resources three years. While this may make sense, it could that should be devoted to promoting defensible also potentially make sense to inspect certain space compliance compared to other activities that properties of highest risk more frequently than reduce wildfire-related risks. those of lower risk. Lack of Information on Cost-Effectiveness Cost-Effectiveness Is Particularly Important of Approaches to Improving Defensible Space Given Potential Costs. Running defensible Compliance. Not only is there limited information space programs can be costly, particularly if about the cost-effectiveness of homeowners they are robust. For example, we estimate that a implementing defensible space, there is also a lack hypothetical program providing annual inspections of information regarding the cost-effectiveness for all of the roughly 1.5 million properties required of specific activities that promote defensible to comply with defensible space requirements, as space compliance. Specifically, we could not find well as $500 per homeowner to 10 percent of these any studies on the relative cost-effectiveness of properties, could cost over $100 million per year. various types of programs—such as inspections, Given this potential cost, it is particularly important enforcement, financial assistance, and in-kind for state and local agencies to have information assistance—aiming to improve compliance on cost-effectiveness. This information could with defensible space. For example, there is an help guide decisions about how much funding to absence of credible data on the effectiveness provide for defensible space compliance, which of enforcement, as well as widely divergent specific programs to support, and to whom to perspectives among practitioners about how offer these programs. Moreover, a more complete important enforcement is to improve defensible understanding of cost-effectiveness could be used space compliance. Additionally, while homeowner to inform homeowners about their risks, more assistance programs help address resource effectively addressing that barrier to implementing limitations that are barriers to some homeowners defensible space. maintaining defensible space, we did not find any studies assessing their cost-effectiveness at Recent Efforts Could Inform Best Path improving compliance or home survivability. Forward, but Are Still in Initial Stages Importantly, a key reason that the state does The Legislature has recognized many of the not have information on the cost-effectiveness challenges we identified previously—including of its defensible space programs is that there is potential gaps in programs, lack of coordination, no requirement for administering departments to and lack of information on cost-effectiveness of evaluate their programs’ effectiveness at increasing programs—and has funded some specific activities compliance or reducing risk. For example, although to begin to address them. We summarize some CalFire funds various efforts to support defensible of these key activities below, which we expect space (such as chipping programs) through its Fire will provide valuable information about gaps in Prevention Grant Program, it has not evaluated programs, improving coordination, and exploring the cost-effectiveness of this program. This lack innovative and cost-effective programs. of information makes it difficult to identify which www.lao.ca.gov 25 analysis full gutter AN LAO REPORT Efforts to Assess Gaps in Programs and Among other things, these coordinators are Improve Coordination. The Legislature has taken expected to (1) identify all active wildfire the following steps to begin to assess the gaps mitigation groups and projects; (2) analyze in programs, as well as to improve coordination gaps in countywide wildfire resiliency and among entities involved in wildfire mitigation. emergency preparedness; (3) develop recommendations to fill these gaps; and • Regional Capacity Assessment. The (4) improve outreach and coordination efforts Legislature recognized the problem of gaps focused on wildfire mitigation. We expect in fire mitigation programs, such as for that this effort will help demonstrate whether defensible space, and the importance of additional coordination at the county level can ensuring collaboration among entities when help identify and address gaps in programs, it passed Chapter 391. Among other things, ideally encouraging a more strategic approach Chapter 391 requires the California Natural to defensible space and wildfire mitigation. Resources Agency (CNRA), in consultation with the State Fire Marshal and the Forest Efforts to Pilot Innovative and Cost-Effective Management Task Force, to review the Approaches to Wildfire Mitigation. The regional capacity of each county that contains Legislature has taken the following steps to begin VHFHSZs to identify entities engaged in fire to pilot innovative approaches to defensible space prevention efforts, assess capacity deficits, programs and explore the cost-effectiveness of and provide recommendations to improve efforts to make homes more resilient to wildfires. capacity and collaboration within counties. • Defensible Space Programs in Three The Legislature appropriated $250,000 from Counties. As part of the 2019-20 budget, the the General Fund for this review as part Legislature gave CNRA $5 million from the of the 2021-22 budget. At the time of the General Fund on a one-time basis to support preparation of this report, this review had programs in up to three counties that provide not yet begun, and details on the scope financial assistance to help low-income, were not available. However, we think elderly, and disabled residents comply with that this review could potentially provide defensible space requirements. This funding, valuable information about the size and which is being administered by the Council, nature of gaps in defensible space programs is being used to explore different approaches and promising avenues for improving to increasing defensible space compliance in collaboration to address these gaps and limit Los Angeles, Butte, and Napa counties. At the potential duplication. time this report was prepared, these programs • County Coordinator Program. In further were at the beginning stages of design and recognition of the value of coordination implementation, and it was not clear when among entities involved in defensible space results would be available. They could, and other wildfire mitigation activities, the however, provide some lessons to inform Legislature provided $6 million from GGRF defensible space program implementation in to CalFire for grants to counties as part of the future. the 2019-20 budget. CalFire subsequently • Wildfire Mitigation Assistance Pilot selected the California Fire Safe Council Program. The Legislature also initiated (Council) to administer this grant program. another pilot effort to improve the In June 2021, the Council issued a request understanding of the cost-effectiveness of for proposals to identify up to 24 counties to wildfire mitigation efforts, including home receive one-time grants of $175,000 to be hardening and defensible space. Specifically, used over an 18-month period. These funds in 2020-21, the Legislature provided will help cover administrative costs related to $25 million on a one-time basis to the Office countywide coordination of wildfire mitigation, of Emergency Services (OES) and CalFire such as the cost of hiring county coordinators. 26 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE analysis full gutter AN LAO REPORT for a pilot required by Chapter 391. This activities, such as defensible space. Specifically, pilot will provide inspections, education, homeowners could receive rate reductions or be and homeowner-assistance to homeowners allowed to renew their existing policies if they can for defensible space and home hardening demonstrate that they maintain defensible space. activities. At the time this report was In concept, allowing and encouraging insurance prepared, many program details were not companies to consider specific wildfire mitigations finalized, such as which communities would in setting rates could help address the emerging be targeted, which homeowners would be challenges of insurance affordability and availability eligible, and which specific activities would be because homeowners undertaking these efforts funded. However, based on our discussions could qualify for lower rates and/or have access with OES and CalFire, the program likely will to more options for insurance coverage than focus on underserved areas of the state and they would otherwise. Additionally, it could also target low-income homeowners. Notably, as provide important incentives for homeowners to required by Chapter 391, a report assessing conduct mitigation activities because they would the cost-effectiveness of defensible space be rewarded with immediate, clear financial and home hardening compared to other incentives that help offset their costs. This idea is activities will be completed by 2024. This pilot particularly attractive because it could motivate program—and the required report—should homeowners to conduct wildfire mitigations without help inform how much should be spent on the need for state or local agencies to conduct defensible space compared to other potential enforcement activities. approaches to reducing wildfire disasters. Boulder County, Colorado is implementing this type of approach as part of a multifaceted Other Areas Where Additional program to encourage defensible space, known Evaluation and Research Could as Wildfire Partners. Under the Wildfire Partners model, homeowners can request assessments of Inform Policy their properties and receive financial assistance In addition to the efforts that the Legislature has to help offset the costs of addressing findings of already funded, some other promising ideas for noncompliance. Once homeowners address the improving defensible space compliance emerged findings, they receive a certificate. Participating from our conversations with experts. We describe a insurers, in turn, agree to renew coverage for few of these promising areas for additional research homeowners with these certificates. Implementing and evaluation below. a model similar to Wildfire Partners in California, Role of Insurance in Incentivizing Defensible however, could be complicated. The state is large, Space Compliance. Over the past few years, so providing the inspections and homeowner insurance companies have experienced large supports similar to those in the Wildfire Partners losses related to wildfires in California. In response, model would require significant resources. (The companies have been raising premiums and, in Wildfire Partners model relies partially on federal a growing number of cases, refusing to renew funding, which could be difficult to secure at the policies. Homeowners that cannot renew their scale of California.) Another complicating factor is insurance policies may have to seek insurance that the state’s insurance regulatory environment, which is more expensive and provides less coverage, is guided by rules established by voters through such as through the FAIR plan. (The California the initiative process, thus complicating potential FAIR Plan Association provides basic fire insurance legislative efforts to make modifications. A third coverage for high-risk properties that traditional complicating factor is the insurance industry’s insurance companies will not cover.) Recent recent loss history in the state, which likely makes insurance affordability and availability trends have insurance companies wary of agreeing to new, spurred growing interest in using insurance to untested factors that could reduce premiums at incentivize property-specific wildfire mitigation a time when many have sought rate increases. www.lao.ca.gov 27 analysis full gutter AN LAO REPORT Despite these complications, the Wildfire Partners used to create high-resolution, three dimensional model is conceptually promising, and there might images of the earth’s surface.) Such technology be opportunities to adapt the program model so potentially could be used in a variety of ways to that it could be piloted in California. support defensible space programs. For example, Notably, the Department of Insurance (CDI) it could support inspection programs by more has given considerable attention to the issue of efficiently identifying potentially noncompliant insurance availability and affordability in the WUI. As properties within certain communities—such part of this work, CDI released a report in 2018 that as in high-risk or rural areas—thereby allowing provided various recommendations, including that agencies to better target on-the-ground the Legislature require insurers to offer discounts inspection resources. and guarantee renewals to homeowners that The technology also could provide more conduct certain wildfire mitigation activities. CDI consistent data on compliance rates across also has expressed support for pursuing a Wildfire the state, which could be valuable in program Partners-type approach and, in addition, has evaluation and oversight efforts. While the data proposed demonstration projects to demonstrate would not be definitive—because there are the feasibility of insurance models to promote limits to what can be assessed from an aerial wildfire mitigation. perspective—it could provide helpful evidence for Role of Technology to Target Resources and what is happening in different areas. For example, Ensure Data Consistency. During the course of if detailed satellite or LiDAR data of areas with our interviews, various experts suggested that very high reported compliance rates showed the state explore the use of technology—such as widespread examples of vegetation overhanging high-quality satellite, drone, or Light Detection and roofs and chimneys, it could suggest that the Ranging (LiDAR)—to improve defensible space agencies undertaking inspections in that area are programs. (LiDAR is a method of remote sensing not accurately measuring compliance. RECOMMENDATIONS Based on our review of state and local efforts longer term. We summarize our recommendations and the findings described above, we recommend in Figure 12 and describe them more fully below. key steps the state should take to encourage Additionally, in the box on page 30, we discuss increased homeowner implementation of defensible how a greater focus on home hardening can space to better protect homes and communities complement these recommendations. from wildfire. This includes (1) gathering more Improve Data Collection, Sharing, and information in key areas through consistent and centralized data collection, (2) taking initial Quality steps to address other barriers to state and One of the fundamental obstacles to improving local defensible space efforts, (3) supporting defensible space compliance is a lack of additional research efforts to identify effective comparable statewide data, which complicates strategies to improve defensible space compliance, coordination, hinders program evaluation, and limits and (4) conducting oversight activities to gain oversight. So, a key first step is addressing this lessons learned and inform longer-term actions. lack of information. We recommend some ways to These recommendations focus on actions the do so below. state should take over the next few years. In Increase State Support for Shared Collector addition, we anticipate that implementing these App for Data Collection and Sharing. Currently, recommendations would provide information that CalFire’s collector app is a useful tool for CalFire would help inform future state and local actions and a number of local agencies. However, some to improve defensible space compliance in the 28 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE analysis full gutter AN LAO REPORT local agencies do not use it because it does not for reporting defensible space and home hardening meet their specific needs or because it lacks assessment data. The bill also requires CalFire to functionality that the agencies would find beneficial. compile the data submitted.) We recommend that the Legislature provide Ensure State and Local Agencies Feed Data funding to support additional enhancements to the Into Centralized System, Using Consistent current collector app (or the replacement of the Definitions. Regardless of whether local agencies current app with another application with additional use the collector app, it would be valuable for flexibility), as well as resources to better enable them to input information from their inspections CalFire to assist local agencies that would like to into a centralized data system. Without this data use the application. These resources could be sharing, it is difficult for agencies to coordinate modest, potentially in the low millions of dollars and direct limited resources in a strategic way. on a one-time basis and hundreds of thousands The Legislature could, for example, pass a law of dollars on an ongoing basis, to support a requiring CalFire and local agencies to provide couple additional CalFire staff and technology information into a centralized system. It is difficult development. Ensuring the availability of a common to know the precise costs of such a requirement, data collection app that meets the needs of local but it probably would be modest—potentially a few agencies at minimal additional cost to them will million dollars annually statewide—particularly if make it more likely that those agencies collect and local agencies have access to the state’s collector are able to share important information on their app. Alternatively, if the Legislature wanted to defensible space inspections. This, in turn, will help avoid adopting a reimbursable state mandate, address the challenge of coordinating inspections the state could make inputting data into a given overlapping jurisdictions, as well as address centralized database voluntary, but also incentivize other information-related challenges. participation in the system by conditioning future (We note that at the time this report was grant funding on providing this information. prepared, the Legislature had passed SB 63 Notably, it would be important for agencies to [Stern], which includes some provisions that are use common definitions of key terms, such as what similar to this recommendation for improved data constitutes an inspection and a citation, and what collection. Specifically, among other things, this bill is considered compliant for reporting purposes. requires CalFire to establish a common platform (This would not preclude local jurisdictions Figure 12 Summary of Recommendations Improve Data Collection, Sharing, and Quality • To address the lack of consistent statewide data to inform policymakers, increase state support for a shared collector application and ensure agencies feed data into a centralized system. Also, require public reporting of data. Take Initial Steps to Address Other Barriers to State and Local Efforts • To begin to address the other barriers of lack of resources, authority, and motivation, take the following initial steps (1) increase ongoing resources for California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CalFire) inspections, (2) provide CalFire with administrative fee authority, and (3) use oversight of compliance rates to improve transparency and help motivate agency actions. Support Additional Research Efforts to Identify Effective Strategies • Require data collection and evaluation as part of future state funding of defensible space grants. • Fund demonstration projects aimed at filling key gaps in knowledge, such as around the roles of insurance and technology in improving compliance. Conduct Oversight to Gather Lessons Learned and Help Inform Future Decisions • Focus legislative oversight on (1) assessing the size and location of gaps and overlap in programs, (2) the development and implementation of CalFire’s training program, (3) the relative cost-effectiveness of defensible space compared to other wildfire mitigation activities, and (4) the lessons learned about crafting cost-effective defensible space programs. www.lao.ca.gov 29 analysis full gutter AN LAO REPORT from continuing to have their own regulatory least an annual basis. The data should include requirements for defensible space.) Establishment information on the share of unique parcels that of common definitions would better standardize were inspected, what enforcement actions were inspection information, thereby ensuring greater taken, and the share of parcels that were found to consistency and reliability of the data reported. be in compliance across jurisdictions. These data The Legislature could direct BFFP to develop these would help program administrators, researchers, common definitions. and policymakers assess the extent to which gaps Require Inspection and Compliance Data or overlap in inspection programs is occurring, the to Be Publicly Reported and Shared With level of noncompliance with defensible space laws, Researchers. We recommend that the Legislature as well as the effectiveness of different state and require CalFire to compile data from state and local efforts to increase compliance. State and local local agencies and to publicly report it on at Home Hardening Can Complement Defensible Space Compliance Home Hardening Also Plays Important Role Reducing Home Ignition. This report has focused on defensible space. However, home hardening also plays an important role in preventing home ignitions. Even when defensible space is properly maintained, it is possible for wildfires to find the weakest part of the home. In particular, embers can penetrate unscreened vents, cracks, and other vulnerable parts of homes and start structure fires. Accordingly, experts emphasize the importance of combining defensible space with home hardening to provide maximum protection. Home Hardening Has Not Been Main Focus of Most State and Local Efforts. While home hardening is important to protecting homes from wildfires, state and local laws do not require it for existing homes. Additionally, home hardening has not traditionally been the main focus of state grant or many inspection programs. For example, the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection’s (CalFire’s) Fire Prevention Grant Program has supported local defensible space and other vegetation management activities but not home hardening. (Notably, the Legislature recently established the Wildfire Mitigation Pilot Program, which will encourage home hardening and defensible space practices once implemented.) Additionally, CalFire’s defensible space inspectors currently do not consistently receive training on home hardening, nor is a full review of home hardening included as part of a standard defensible space inspection. Also, based on the discussions we had with various agencies and our survey data, it appears that, while many local agencies might incorporate some aspects of home hardening review into their defensible space programs, it is generally a lesser focus compared to defensible space. Natural Opportunities to Integrate Home Hardening Into Defensible Space Efforts. In some ways, home hardening could fit naturally into defensible space programs. Defensible space training programs could incorporate curricula on inspecting for home hardening risks. For example, CalFire is developing a training program that is anticipated to cover home hardening. Additionally, defensible space inspectors could conduct a formal evaluation of home hardening at the same time they are reviewing a property for defensible space. The state could structure grant programs to target both defensible space and home hardening, rather than limiting the grants to defensible space. Although taking such steps would require additional resources, the marginal additional costs are likely to be modest if incorporated into existing programs, and the benefits to homeowners and communities from reduced wildfire risk could be significant if these practices were more widely adopted. 30 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE analysis full gutter AN LAO REPORT policymakers then could develop well-informed basis to temporarily meet its goal for defensible plans for addressing identified problem areas. space inspections, we estimate that the cost of Notably, in addition to the high-level data this ongoing staffing could cost about $6 million provided to the public, we recommend that the annually. It will be important, however, for CalFire Legislature require CalFire to make more granular to justify the specific amount of funding required to inspection data available to researchers. For meet its goal of inspecting every property at least example, inspection data could be helpful to once every three years. researchers as they attempt to better understand Additionally, given the wide variation in inspection the effectiveness of different defensible space rates across the state, it will be important for practices at reducing home losses. Additionally, CalFire to show how it plans to distribute any these data could enable researchers to better additional staffing in a way that will enable it to assess the effectiveness of various programs consistently meet the inspection rate goal in all designed to increase compliance rates by units across the state. Accordingly, we recommend comparing compliance rates in communities that any additional funding be predicated on CalFire that implement defensible space programs to providing a staffing plan showing how it intends compliance rates in other communities. to allocate the additional staff across units based on factors such as geography and the number of Take Initial Steps to Address Other parcels subject to inspection in order to meet its Barriers to State and Local Efforts inspection goal. The recommendations in this report focus on We have identified some initial steps to address actions the state can take to improve defensible the barriers of lack of resources, authority, and space practices. For this reason—and because motivation that agencies face. Specifically, we providing defensible space inspections and recommend that the Legislature (1) provide other fire prevention programs in the LRA are additional resources for CalFire defensible space fundamentally local responsibilities—we do inspectors, (2) provide CalFire with authority to not broadly recommend increased funding for administer fines for noncompliance, and (3) conduct local defensible space efforts across the state. oversight of existing state and local defensible However, given the statewide impacts of wildfires, space programs. we acknowledge that state funding for local Increase Ongoing Resources for CalFire activities can be warranted in some cases. In the Inspections and Require Staffing Plan. We box on the next page, we discuss some potential recommend that the Legislature provide an considerations for the Legislature to keep in mind ongoing, dedicated augmentation to CalFire to as it considers whether to provide local agencies meet its goal of providing inspections of every with additional funding in the future. property at least once every three years. While Provide CalFire With Administrative Fine there is uncertainty regarding the optimal frequency Authority. We recommend that the Legislature of inspections to improve compliance—and how provide CalFire with legal authority to fine property that could vary by community and parcel—ensuring owners that do not maintain defensible space that the department can meet a baseline number in accordance with state law and regulations. of inspections each year is important. Inspections This authority would mean that CalFire would no play a valuable foundational role in defensible longer have to rely on local district attorneys to space programs and can help the state track and enforce its administrative citations. This statutory evaluate its efforts to promote defensible space change would address one of the main barriers compliance. Additionally, they can help to educate that CalFire has identified to taking enforcement homeowners. One inspection every three years actions. In so doing, it would allow the department likely is a reasonable frequency necessary to serve to more easily take enforcement actions when these purposes, so providing this level of ongoing it deems it appropriate to increase compliance, resources is reasonable. Based on the amount such as when homeowners refuse to implement of funding requested by CalFire on a one-time www.lao.ca.gov 31 analysis full gutter AN LAO REPORT What Costs Should the State Bear? Our recommendations focus on state activities with relatively modest costs. However, there are some areas where the additional information gathered through data collection and research efforts could justify additional actions to improve defensible space compliance in the future. Should that be the case, there may be a question about which entities should fund those actions. When considering that question, it is important to recognize that many entities benefit from defensible space. This includes homeowners who help protect their homes when they maintain defensible space. This also includes governments, since defensible space mitigates the destructiveness of wildfires to communities, thus reducing response and recovery costs. Given that the benefits of defensible space are spread among multiple entities, it makes sense for the costs to be shared as well. Decisions on how to allocate these costs across the different entities that would benefit can involve trade-offs, for example, related to the ability to bear costs and effectively implement changes. Key considerations for assigning costs could include such things as: • Ability of Homeowners to Afford Costs. On the one hand, maintenance of defensible space is a homeowner responsibility that the state generally has not funded. Accordingly, homeowners generally should bear the costs of compliance. On the other hand, some homeowners are unable to afford the costs of implementing and maintaining defensible space. In such cases, it may make sense for governments to provide in-kind or financial assistance to homeowners that cannot afford to undertake defensible space efforts themselves. • Jurisdictional Responsibility. When thinking about how to assign costs across governmental jurisdictions, it is important to align financial impacts—both costs and revenues—with the legal authority of the jurisdictions that affect change. Typically, the state has responsibility for fire prevention activities—including those related to defensible space—in the State Responsibility Area (SRA). Locals, in turn, generally are responsible for fire prevention activities in the Local Responsibility Areas. Thus, in general, absent a strong rationale otherwise, it makes sense for the state to focus its resources in the SRA, while local governments should be responsible for program costs in the LRA. • Community’s Fiscal Capacity and Wildfire Risk Level. As noted in this report, some local agencies have few resources to devote to fire prevention activities, such as those related to defensible space. In some cases, agencies may be able to secure additional resources, such as through new charges. However, in other cases, such as when communities are very low income, it may not be feasible for local agencies to raise the funds necessary to implement robust defensible space programs themselves. In these cases, it could make sense for the state to provide some targeted grants or other financial support to assist these local agencies, particularly when they are at very high risk of severe wildfires and have low compliance rates. This could be informed by what the state learns over time about the scale of gaps in defensible space programs. • Type of Activity. There are some types of activities that it makes sense for the state to undertake, rather than relying on local agencies. For instance, this includes activities that are accomplished much more efficiently at a large scale (such as the development of training or educational materials) and those that require statewide coordination. It also includes research and demonstration projects that provide broad benefits to the state through filling key gaps in knowledge. 32 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE analysis full gutter AN LAO REPORT defensible space improvements even after multiple to include program evaluation as part of future findings of noncompliance. At this time, we were defensible space grants. Under such a requirement, not able to verify the extent to which a lack of recipients of state-funded grants related to local authority is a barrier to enforcement for defensible space would need to provide specified communities that are motivated to undertake it, and data, such as compliance rates before and after thus whether statutory changes are needed to local the implementation of grants. Requiring program agency authority. evaluation could add some additional costs to Conduct Ongoing Oversight of Defensible grant programs, but those costs are likely to be Space Compliance to Increase Motivation. We relatively modest. Moreover, we think the potential also recommend that the Legislature conduct long-term benefits this information could provide oversight hearings focused on why compliance to inform future policy, budget, and programmatic rates vary across the state. (This oversight could decisions—such as related to program design— be combined with additional oversight efforts we would likely outweigh these potential costs. recommend later in this report.) As part of this Fund Additional Demonstration Projects oversight effort, we recommend that the Legislature Focused on Filling Knowledge Gaps. As require CalFire to report on how it plans to improve discussed in the “Findings” section, some compliance in the SRA, particularly in the areas promising areas of research to explore include with low reported compliance rates. Once CalFire expanding the roles of insurance and technology in begins collecting data on local agency compliance increasing compliance. For example, the Legislature rates, we recommend the Legislature conduct could collaborate with CDI to develop and fund oversight hearings that examine compliance in demonstration projects that could demonstrate the LRA as well. These hearings would help the the feasibility of linking insurance rate reductions Legislature gather additional information on the and/or renewals to specific wildfire mitigations, drivers of variation in reported compliance rates potentially similar to the Wildfire Partners program. across the state (including distinguishing between Additionally, the state could fund demonstration differences in measurement and actual differences projects exploring the use of satellite and/or in compliance). These hearings could play an LiDAR technology to help CalFire increase the important role in drawing attention to areas in the number of inspections in more remote areas, more state with low levels of compliance. Importantly, strategically target inspections in those areas this additional transparency on the risks to different with higher risks of wildfire damage, and identify communities could motivate local agencies to take noncompliant properties. The cost to undertake actions to further improve compliance. each of these demonstration projects would depend heavily on the specifics of how many were Support Additional Research Efforts undertaken and how they were structured, but to Identify Effective Strategies could be in the millions to tens of millions of dollars. While these are specific areas of research While we think the pilots that have been funded that we have identified, other areas could merit by the Legislature to date will likely provide valuable exploration, as well. Importantly, we recommend information, we do not expect them to address that program evaluation be included in any pilot all of the key outstanding questions related to efforts the Legislature funds in the future. To defensible space. Accordingly, we recommend that ensure that pilots provide meaningful results, the state use future funding to continue to fill other we recommend that the Legislature require the gaps in knowledge, as discussed below. administration to consult with external researchers Require Data Collection and Evaluation as to help develop research strategies and protocols a Condition of Future Funding. Currently, the at the outset, so that programs are designed with state provides grants for local defensible space evaluation in mind. Additionally, we recommend activities—such as homeowner assistance and that the Legislature fund demonstration projects education—but does not evaluate them. We that have the potential to yield cost-effective recommend that the Legislature require CalFire www.lao.ca.gov 33 analysis full gutter AN LAO REPORT approaches that can be adapted in other locations county-based collaborative efforts on across the state. A solution that works in one part an ongoing basis. of the state might not work another, so in some • Development and Implementation of cases it may make sense to pilot approaches in CalFire’s Training Program. Upon its at least a few different places so that results are completion, oversight could also include a more generalizable. review of the training program that CalFire is developing. This oversight could help ensure Conduct Oversight to Gather Lessons that the Legislature can be confident the Learned and Inform Future Decisions training program that is ultimately offered by CalFire is robust and widely available We also recommend that the Legislature use enough to ensure that state and local oversight hearings to gather lessons learned from defensible space inspectors can access the state’s various information gathering activities adequate training. (such as its data collection and demonstration projects) once they are completed. Importantly, • Relative Cost-Effectiveness of Defensible we think that given the high financial and personal Space Compared to Other Activities. costs associated with wildfire disasters in Oversight could include a review of California, the Legislature should conduct ongoing information on the cost-effectiveness of oversight over the coming years to ensure that defensible space compared to other activities state and local agencies are making improvements aimed at mitigating the destructiveness of and that the lessons learned from various efforts wildfires. For example, the Legislature could are shared beyond local jurisdictional boundaries. use oversight hearings to review the results Ultimately, the information gathered through these of the Wildfire Mitigation Assistance Pilot ongoing hearings could be used to help inform Program. This information could help inform future legislative policy and budget decisions. legislative decision-making regarding how much should be spent by state and local Specifically, we recommend that the Legislature agencies on defensible space compared to conduct oversight hearings with an eye towards other potential approaches to reducing the gathering information on the following: damage from wildfires. • Size and Location of Gaps and Overlap • Lessons Learned About Crafting Defensible in Defensible Space Programs. Oversight Space Programs. Oversight could also should include a review of information include the review of information gathered gathered on the size and location of gaps and about how to best structure various defensible overlap in inspection and other programs. space programs to ensure they are working This information could come from sources effectively and are cost-effective. For example, such as the existing statewide inspection the Legislature could use oversight hearings and compliance data gathered by CalFire, to review the results and lessons learned additional inspection data collected via our from the three county efforts already funded, recommended centralized data collections as well as any other demonstration projects system, and the results of recently funded undertaken to fill knowledge gaps and to projects (including the Regional Capacity inform whether the state should take steps to Assessment and the county coordinator expand the activities statewide on an ongoing program). The Legislature could use the basis. For example, if specific homeowner results of this oversight to inform future assistance programs are found to reduce decisions to close gaps and increase wildfire losses very cost-effectively, then future coordination. For instance, if the county state and federal funding could be better coordinator program proves to be successful, targeted to support those types of programs the Legislature could consider supporting versus programs that are not evidence-based. 34 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE analysis full gutter AN LAO REPORT FUNDING OPTIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING RECOMMENDATIONS As discussed above, some of our defensible space-related activities, such recommendations would likely would result in as the implementation of defensible space additional costs. Below, we summarize some of inspections pursuant to Chapter 391. the main state and federal funding sources the Also, in 2021-22, the Legislature approved Legislature could use to support the expansion $100 million for OES to support community of defensible space programs and improve resilience to various hazards, including compliance. Additionally, as discussed previously, wildfires. Among other things, this funding local agencies also have an important role in could be used to support local governments’ supporting defensible space activities. cost share to participate in federal grant Existing State Funding Sources Being programs that support defensible space or Used for Defensible Space Efforts. GGRF and other activities to mitigate the destructiveness the General Fund are the two main sources of of wildfires. funding that the Legislature has used to support Various Federal Funding Sources Could Be defensible space and related activities in the past Used for Defensible Space. The state has access and that are available to support future activities. to two main federal funding sources for wildfire If the Legislature would like to support additional mitigation activities. There are some restrictions on activities to make homes more resilient to wildfire, this funding, including that projects must show that it could increase the funding level provided from the projected benefits exceed the implementation these sources or redirect some existing funding costs according to a methodology established by already used for similar purposes. the federal government. Additionally, state or local • Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund. In governments typically must provide a cost share recent years, the budget has included of 25 percent of the project costs. OES serves a roughly $200 million a year from GGRF key role in allocating and applying for these federal for CalFire wildfire mitigation programs, funds. The Legislature historically has deferred to consistent with legislative intent specified OES on the allocation of these funds. However, if in Chapter 626 of 2018 (SB 901, Dodd). defensible space is a priority for the Legislature, Additionally, the 2021-22 budget package it could direct OES to prioritize defensible space included language continuously appropriating projects in these programs to a greater degree. $200 million annually for these programs • Building Resilient Infrastructure and from 2022-23 through 2028-29. (For Communities (BRIC) Program. The context, annual GGRF revenues are generally federal BRIC program—previously known between $2 billion and $3 billion.) To date, as the Pre-Disaster Mitigation Program— the Legislature has given CalFire significant is a competitive grant program. In 2020, flexibility over the use of these funds, and $500 million was available nationwide for CalFire has allocated some of them towards projects that mitigate disaster risks and build defensible space. If, however, this issue is resiliency. Through OES, California submitted a priority for the Legislature, it could require project proposals totaling $369 million, about CalFire to dedicate a greater share of this 12 percent ($43 million) of which was for allocation to defensible space activities or wildfire-related projects. In September 2021, increase CalFire’s allocation of GGRF funds to the Federal Emergency Management Agency support these activities. (FEMA) announced that of the proposals • General Fund. The Legislature has submitted by California, $95 million were also provided General Fund support for selected for competitive funding, including www.lao.ca.gov 35 analysis full gutter AN LAO REPORT $37 million for a Sonoma County project that hazard mitigation projects. Since 2017, includes structural hardening, defensible California has received roughly $800 million space, and vegetation management. in HMGP funding, mostly related to recent • Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP). wildfire disasters. OES has recommended After a state experiences a large disaster this funding be provided to more than that receives a Presidential Major Disaster 400 projects across the state aimed at Declaration, FEMA provides funding for mitigating risk from flood, fire, earthquake, activities intended to lessen the impacts of and other hazards. Additionally, the state is future disasters through HMGP. The amount expecting to receive another $200 million in of the grant is up to 20 percent of the total HMGP funds as a result of the 2020 wildfires. federal disaster assistance provided in the In recent years, roughly 20 percent of HMGP relevant disaster. Upon receipt of funds, states funds have been provided to wildfire-related have the primary responsibility for prioritizing, projects, including several defensible selecting, and administering state and local space projects. CONCLUSION The state faces large and growing risks of with defensible space requirements. In sum, we find potentially devastating wildfire disasters. One key that the following actions could help move the state step towards mitigating the risk of these disasters towards greater resiliency and reduce future losses: is to make homes less likely to ignite through (1) gathering more information on defensible space defensible space practices. Current state and inspections and compliance through improved local efforts are complicated by the fragmented data collection, (2) taking initial steps to address and overlapping nature of responsibilities, lack of other barriers to state and local defensible space consistent statewide data, various other barriers to efforts, (3) supporting additional research efforts to state and local agency efforts, and a lack research identify effective strategies to improve defensible in important areas to guide policymakers. In this space compliance, and (4) conducting oversight report, we identify several steps the Legislature activities to gain lessons learned and inform future could take to improve defensible space programs policy decisions. and support higher rates of homeowner compliance 36 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE analysis full gutter AN LAO REPORT APPENDIX: SELECTED REFERENCES Arrowsmith, E., Fortier, F. D., & Cope, A. D. Hedayati, F., Stansell, C., Gorham, D., & Quarles, (2021) “Wildfire Fuel Management and Risk S. L. (2018). “Wildfire Research: Near-Building Reduction: Where to Start?” Insurance Institute for Noncombustible Zone.” Insurance Institute for Business & Home Safety and Zesty.ai. Business & Home Safety. Calkin, D. E., Cohen, J. D., Finney, M. A., & Hodgson, R. W. (1995). “Strategies for and Thompson, M. P. (2014). “How Risk Management Barriers to Public Adoption of Fire Safe Behavior.” Can Prevent Future Wildfire Disasters in the The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions Wildland-Urban Interface.” Proceedings of the in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems. National Academy of Sciences, 111(2), 746-751. Insurance Institute for Business & Home Safety. Caton, S. E., Hakes, R. S., Gorham, D. J., Zhou, (2020). “Suburban Wildfire Adaptation Roadmaps: A., & Gollner, M. J. (2017). “Review of Pathways for A Path to Coexisting with Wildfires.” Building Fire Spread in the Wildland Urban Interface Maranghides, A., McNamara, D., Mell, W., Part I: Exposure Conditions.” Fire Technology, Trook, J., & Toman, B. (2013). “A Case Study of 53(2), 429-473. a Community Affected by the Witch and Guejito Cignarale, T., Laucher, J., Allen, K., Fires: Report# 2: Evaluating the Effects of Hazard Landsman-Smith, L. (2018). “The Availability Mitigation Actions on Structure Ignitions.” National and Affordability of Coverage for Wildfire Institute of Standards and Technology, US Loss in Residential Property Insurance in the Department of Commerce and US Forest Service, Wildland-Urban Interface and Other High-Risk Gaithersburg, MD. Areas of California: CDI Summary and Proposed McCaffrey, S. M., Stidham, M., Toman, E., & Solutions.” California Department of Insurance. Shindler, B. (2011). “Outreach Programs, Peer Czajkowski, J., Russo, E., Brandenburg, A., Pressure, and Common Sense: What Motivates Groshong, L., Young, M., Nielsen, M., Cope, A., Homeowners to Mitigate Wildfire Risk?.” & Giammanco, I. (2020). “Application of Wildfire Environmental Management, 48(3), 475-488. Mitigation to Insured Property Exposure.” National Meldrum, J. R., Barth, C. M., Falk, L. C., Association of Insurance Commissioners’ Center Brenkert-Smith, H., Warziniack, T., & Champ, for Insurance Policy Research, Risk Management P. (2013). “Living with Wildfire in Log Hill Mesa, Solutions, Inc., and the Insurance Institute for Colorado.” US Department of Agriculture, Forest Business and Home Safety. Service, Rocky Mountain Research Station. Duerksen, C., Elliott, D., & Anthony, P. (2011). Mell, W., Manzello, S., & Maranghides, A., “Addressing Community Wildfire Risk: A Review (2010). “The Wildland-Urban Interface Fire and Assessment of Regulatory and Planning Tools.” Problem-Current Approaches and Research NFPA Fire Protection Research Foundation Report. Needs.” Journal of Wildland Fire, 238-251. Feo, T. & Evans, S. (2020). “The Costs of Wildfire Syphard, A. D., Brennan, T. J., & Keeley, J. in California.” California Council on Science and E. (2014). “The Role of Defensible Space for Technology. Residential Structure Protection During Wildfires.” Hakes, R. S., Caton, S. E., Gorham, D. J., & International Journal of Wildland Fire, 23(8), Gollner, M. J. (2017). “A Review of Pathways for 1165-1175. Building Fire Spread in the Wildland Urban Interface Syphard, A. D., & Keeley, J. E. (2019). “Factors Part II: Response of Components and Systems Associated with Structure Loss in the 2013-2018 and Mitigation Strategies in the United States.” Fire California Wildfires.” Fire, 2(3), 49. Technology, 53(2), 475-515. Wara, Michael. (2021). “A New Strategy for Hawks, S. & Brewer, W. (2019). “CalFire Addressing the Wildfire Epidemic in California.” Defensible Space and Damage Inspection Program Stanford Woods Institute for the Environment. Data Analysis.” www.lao.ca.gov 37 analysis full gutter AN LAO REPORT LAO PUBLICATIONS This report was prepared by Helen Kerstein, and reviewed by Brian Brown and Anthony Simbol. The Legislative Analyst’s Office (LAO) is a nonpartisan office that provides fiscal and policy information and advice to the Legislature. To request publications call (916) 445-4656. This report and others, as well as an e-mail subscription service, are available on the LAO’s website at www.lao.ca.gov. The LAO is located at 925 L Street, Suite 1000, Sacramento, CA 95814. 38 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE