LHC
State Fiscal Condition
Read the report at Little Hoover Commission ↗
MARCH 1995
LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
Richard R. Terzian
Chairman
Mary Anne Chalker
Vice Chairman
Nathan Shapell
Past Chairman
Michael E. Alpert Senator Alfred E. Alquist
Charles G. Bakaly, Jr. Carl D. Covitz
Pier A. Gherini, Jr. Senator Lucy Killea
Angie Papadakis Assemblywoman Jackie Speier
Stanley R. Zax
STAFF
Jeannine L. English
Executive Director
I(athleen Beasley
Deputy Executive Director
State Fiscal
Condition Report
March 1995
Table of Contents
Executive Summary ..................................... .
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Current Budget Agreement ................................. 2
Setting the Context ...................................... 6
The Future ...................... ,.................... 13
Conclusion ........................................... 14
Illustrations
Chart 1 ............................................... 7
Chart 2 .................. , ............................ 8
Chart 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Chart 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
0/
State California
LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
March 29, 1995
Riehm! R. T eni",
Ch.timf4'!1
Muy Anne Chalker
Vice--Chdif71f471
N1than Sh'peU
P.s, Cb.irma.
Michael E. Alpert
The Honorable Pete Wilson
Allred E. Alquist
Sm.1'" Governor of California
Chari .. G. Bak.uy, Jr.
The Honorable Bill Lockyer The Honorable Kenneth L. Maddy
Cu, D. Covill
President Pro Tempore of the Senate Senate Republican Leader
Pier A. GheriW. Jr.
and Members of the Senate
Lucy Kill ..
Sm.,,,,
The Honorable Willie Brown Jr. The Honorable James Brulte
Speaker of the Assembly Assembly Republican Leader
J:lCkie Speier and Members of the Assembly
A"""b/y. ..o "",.
StmleyR.Z. .
Dear Governor and Members of the Legislature:
Jeannine L. English
Exeottiw Dirtaor
F or several years, California has borrowed money to stay afloat -- and then
borrowed again when certain of those loans came due. At a personal level, such
, actions would be viewed as irresponsibly living beyond one's means and flirting
with financial ruin. When a state does it, the consequences are no less grave -- and
in fact are more so, since millions of lives may be affected.
The Little Hoover Commission has examined the State's actions in crafting the 1994-95
budget agreement, actually an unconventional two-year plan for $10 billion in external
financing and a trigger mechanism to slash state spending if revenues do not
materialize to repay the loans. The plan included the largest financing effort ever
undertaken by any state or local government in the history of the nation's financial
marketplace -- and was almost double any previous external borrowing by the State.1
Because of the magnitude and unusual nature of the budget elements, the Commission
reviewed California's fiscal condition, the context for its actions, the reaction of the
financial markets and the implications for the long-term future of the State.
We found that policy makers met the State's short-term financing problems with
creativity but with little success in dealing with the structural deficit created in prior
years or other long-term policy considerations. Tough budget choices were made over
the past four years during the deepest recession California has seen since the Great
Depression, but a structural deficit that may be as high as $6 billion to $8 billion
continues to exist. It is the Commission's position that a clarion call must be sounded
strongly against the pattern of rolling over short-term debt to fund long-term structural
deficits. Otherwise, California will join the ranks of governments -- like New York two
decades ago -- that lived dangerously and lost.
Milton Marks Commission on California State Government Organization and Economy
660 J Street, Suite 260. Sacramento, CA 95814 • tel (916)445-2125. fax (916)322-7709
State Fiscal Condition
provisions are more circuitous. The Constitution requires
the Governor to offer the Legislature a budget that
matches expenditures to revenues. The Legislature is
responsible for maintaining a prudent reserve. And no
debt in excess of $300,000 is to be incurred without a
vote of the people.2
The debt limit has been defined by the courts to mean the
State cannot borrow more than $300,000 without voter
authorization except in two cases: The State can issue
notes (Revenue Anticipation Notes -- RANs) through the
Treasurer's Office to help even out cash flow and pay bills
as long as the notes are redeemed within the same fiscal
year. When there is an unanticipated shortfall of funding
at the end of a fiscal year, the State can issue warrants
(Revenue Anticipation Warrants -- RAWs) through the
Controller's Office that will be repaid within the next fiscal
year. In both cases, state officials must certify that there
is a reasonable expectation that funding will exist to pay
off the notes and warrants when they become due.3
The financial marketplace: Certifying the ability to repay
is important from a legal and a marketing perspective.
The notes and warrants would find few buyers if doubt
existed that the money and interest would be repaid. In
addition, the assurance greatly affects both the ability to
borrow and the cost to the borrower, particularly when
the amounts are as large as those required by the State.
To further enhance the attractiveness of the notes and
warrants, banks may guarantee that the money will be
repaid in case the State defaults. Although the banks
charge a fee for providing the guarantee, the overall
package can represent a cost savings if the guarantee
allows a lower interest rate to be paid.
A key factor in the ability of the State to market debt
instruments is the financial rating that is intended to tell
potential buyers whether their investment is extremely
safe, moderately safe or risky. Extremely safe
investments in general pay lower interest rates and
therefore are less costly from the borrower's perspective.
Higher interest rates and therefore larger costs are
associated with risky investments.
Through the late 80s, California had the highest possible
financial rating (AAA or Aaa, depending on the system
used by the service). By 1992, the effects of the
recession and the State s budgetary responses had
I
pushed the ratings down to AA, A + and Aa. Shortly
after the two-year budget agreement described below was
3
State Fiscal Condition
costly than the interest rate for the enhanced
notes plus the bank consortium fee.)
• The issuance of $3 billion in RANs on August 3,
1994 to be redeemed on June 28, 1995. The
issuance of another $3 billion in RANs in August
1995 to be repaid before the end of that fiscal
year.
• A check-and-balance process for pulling a "trigger"
if the State's year-end cash position was going to
be worse than expected in November 1994 (the
so-called first trigger) and October 1995 (the so
called second trigger). The Controller makes the
assessment, which is double-checked by the
Legislative Analyst. The trigger requires the
Governor and the Legislature to take immediate
action to address the shortfall, or across-the-board
cuts on all programs not constitutionally protected
will take place.
The trigger was an important element of the package
because of the uncertainty -- some would say the
unlikelihood -- of the State receiving the federal funding to
the extent it was assumed in the budgets. In addition,
long-range revenue forecasts are tricky under the best of
circumstances and often may be adopted in a rosy form
for budgets.
The Attorney General's Office, which issues legal opinions
that are a prerequisite for selling the notes, had advised
the Treasurer early in the budget process that any external
borrowing plan had to include a realistic repayment
method. In testimony to the Commission, the Controller
said that, given the uncertain revenue picture (particularly
the probability that most of the $3.6 billion in federal
funds would not be received), the trigger was necessary
for him to certify that there was a reasonable expectation
of repaying the RAWs (whose issuance made the
repayment of the RANs possible). While the bank
consortium told the Commission it did not require the
trigger as a condition for providing the credit
enhancement, it did require some mechanism for lessening
the chances that the State would default.5
Avoiding the trigger: The first trigger was avoided on
November 15, 1994, when the Controller certified that
the State's cash position had not worsened but had
actually improved -- despite the State only receiving $33
million of the first year's anticipated $ 763 million in
federal funding.6 With the recovering economy providing
5
State Fiscal Condition
The impact of the recession on the state budget can be
seen in the following chart, which shows total revenues
and total expenditures for the past six years:
.,:.' :
Chart 1
GENERAL FU~DREVENUESA"',QEXPt;NDITURES
ofcfqrrlii) ,
1:988.1"99~hn(1b"iions
Year 1988-89 1989-90 1990·91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94
";Y.y,-.,,?/":;
Total 37.01 39.08 :3$l:g~ 42.22 41.03 40.15
-'''·''z:"\'';.";.· ~"<
Revenues
*z~~,
Total 36.18 39.82 41.94 44.44 40.92 39.32
Expenses
Difference .84 -.73 -1.99 -2.21 .11 .84
Source: State Controller's Annual Report
A s the highlighted area of the chart shows, the
1 990-91 budget reflected the impact of the
. . nascent recession, with revenues almost flat from
the year before and expenses growing unchecked.
Spending outstripped funding by almost $2 billion.
Recognizing the dilemma they faced, policy makers
approached the 1991-92 budget with a combination of
tax increases and selective budget cuts to tackle a $14
billion gap between the anticipated unenhanced revenues
and the case load-driven increases in expenditures.
Revenues rose but despite the budget cuts, expenses
continued to increase dramatically. The result fell $2.21
billion short of a balanced budget.
Off-budget items: While the recession continued to erode
revenues in 1992-93 and 1993-94, policy makers
relentlessly pushed spending down even as case loads
were increasing. Some of the cutbacks were achieved by
one-time -- and in some cases, questionable -- actions,
such as deferring state worker pension contributions,
accelerating tax collection and "loaning" schools almost
$2 billion in funding that was not reflected in the budget.
Other cuts, such as trimming welfare benefits and using
cigarette taxes for general health care, had short life
spans because of court reversals. (The Legislative
Analyst has estimated that these adverse court rulings,
which are subject to appeal, threaten to place a $4.1
billion burden on future budgets. These include rulings
that call into question the school loans, the pension
s
contribution deferral and welfare cuts.l The largest
savings came from two actions: the elimination of the
7
State Fiscal Condition
some point due to a raise or seasonal overtime, or it may
decline for some amount of time because of unpaid leave
or cutbacks in hours. Expenditures come in fits and
starts: There are the regular monthly obligations, like the
mortgage and utilities, and then there are the occasional
large sums, like property taxes, insurance, holiday gift
giving or emergencies. On a month-to-month basis, it is
not unusual to have revenues and expenditures that are
not in sync with each other. And simply having a budget
that says at the end of the year that all of the bills will be
paid does little good if this month's paycheck is gone but
the property tax bill is due.
Similarly, the State's budget reflects assumed annualized
revenues and expenses. But much of the revenue arrives
in the spring when taxes flow in -- and some even arrives
after the budget year has ended. The outgo may be fairly
steady, except when an earthquake strikes or a lump-sum
pension payment is due or a court hands the State an
unexpected liability. In addition, while the budget always
presumes a clean slate at the beginning of the fiscal year,
the cash management side of the ledger knows that a
deficit soaks up cash that cannot be spent elsewhere.
The State has many of the same tactics at hand to deal
with the mountains and valleys of cash management that
a family does. A responsible family may set aside money
in separate funds for special purposes: a Santa Saver
account for Christmas, mad money under the mattress for
a vacation trip and a regular savings account for
emergencies. And when a bill comes at the wrong time,
the family may borrow from one fund to cover another,
and then replace the funds at a later date. Or the family
may use a short-term loan to tide it over, knowing the
income will be there when the loan is due.
California, for many years, was able to satisfy its cash
management needs by surpluses or borrowing internally
from the special funds that it has set aside. In fact, when
it began borrowing externally in 1982, it did so because
it could borrow the money cheaply and invest it at a
higher rate of return. But in 1988, according to the
Treasurer's Office, California began to market notes from
need rather than financial advantage. By 1992, the State
was borrowing money to pay back loans as they came
due. The chart on the following page illustrates the
State's borrowing practices in escalating amounts from
1988 through the anticipated levels for 1996:
9
···· State Fiscal Condition
A
s the chart on the previous page indicates, the
............. \f State's borrowing has become more frequent and
....... for longer periods. Where the bars overlap, new
funding needed to be borrowed before the previous loans
could be retired. For instance, in the 1991-92 fiscal year
$4.1 billion in notes were issued on August 15, 1991
with varying maturity dates, the earliest of which was
March 3, 1992. On March 3, 1992 a new note for $2
billion was issued with a due date of June 30, 1992.
Then just days before that due date, warrants in the
amount of $475 million were issued with a due date of
July 24, 1992.
To put this practice into more familiar terms, one can use
a credit-card analogy. A person who learns he is
inheriting $10,000 might use his American Express card
to buy a new houseful of furniture. However, when the
American Express bill arrives, he discovers that the
probate process will hold up the inheritance for at least six
months. He then uses his Mastercard to payoff the
American Express bill and begins paying a high rate of
interest. The plot thickens when the long-awaited
bequest turns out to be only $2,000. He applies to a
crotchety uncle for bailout funds and in the meantime
continues to juggle the debt by paying the Mastercard bill
with a Visa card and then the Visa bill with the
Mastercard. The cost -- and the anxiety -- mounts.
Similarly, the State's costs have risen as its debt load has
increased and its financial ratings have declined. The
chart on the following page tracks the State's borrowing
for General Fund purposes from both internal and external
sources:
11
State Fiscal Condition
extent California is viewed as weak financially, businesses
will be reluctant to expand or invest because of concern
that the problems will be solved through higher taxes and
fees.
The Future
T
he growing crescendo of the State's budgetary
problems and cash management practices has not
gone unnoticed. The media writes about them,
policy makers bemoan them, fiscal analysts despair over
them. Solutions so far have run to coping with -- rather
than solving -- the problem, usually with an emphasis on
getting through the present budget year.
In mid-1993, a year before the present debt-heavy, two
year budget arrangement was created, the California Debt
Advisory Commission conducted a hearing about the then
"cash crisis." Experts including bond counsel and rating
service analysts were asked about financing solutions
and, in general, offered four untested routes that were felt
to require legislative action and court validation. They
were:
• An extended RAN: Rather than limiting the
external financing to one year, a note could be
issued for two years. The reasoning ran that the
courts have found RANs not to be debts because
they will be paid with revenues anticipated within
a short period of time. Since the courts have
never defined "short period, a two-year RAN
It
might be found to be constitutional.
• Asset-transfer lease financing: Basically, state
property would be mortgaged and the State would
make lease payments to retire the mortgage. The
courts have recognized such arrangements as not
falling under the constitutional debt limit.
• Formation of a separate entity: A method used by
both New York and Louisiana, this skirts the debt
limit by having a new body handle the financing of
the deficit, with payments to be made through the
"discretionary" action of the Legislature in
appropriating funds from future budgets.
• Obligations imposed by law: Under this theory, a
separate entity is created to issue notes to cover
the cost of services that the State is required to
provide by the federal government, such as health,
13
State Fiscal Condition
government with fiscal responsibility. Their response to
policy makers actions will come next A~gust, analysts
told the Commission, when the State seeks to market its
next RAN. A RAN that is larger than the planned $3
billion would be cause for alarm, as would any sign that
the new RAN payoff would require floating yet another
RAW.
To break the vicious cycle, policy makers must take
several steps:
• They must craft a budget that is based on real
numbers, including reasonable estimates of
revenues, federal reimbursements and debt
obligations.
• They need a realistic cash flow plan to
complement the budget plan.
• They must cut programs as deeply as necessary to
end the 1995-96 fiscal year in a balanced position.
• And they must adopt long-term policies that both
ensure the growth of the State and provide for a
surplus to meet unanticipated cash contigencies.
The fulfillment of these goals should result in a return to
AAA and MIG1 ratings -- and it is the ratings that will
serve as a barometer that indicates whether change is real
or merely rhetoric.
hort-term borrowing has worked successfully for the
. .. State to date -- but the strategy has been costly
s.. .
and, as Mexico has found, the result can be
devastating when the markets decide they will no longer
take a seat at the table. California can continue to put
together new and innovative ways to package debt. Or it
can find a way to live within its means and eliminate its
structural deficits. The Commission advises that policy
makers promptly choose the latter course.
Sincerely,
~~ '~
Richard Terzian ")
Chairman
15
Appendix &
Endnotes
Appendix
APPENDIX
Witnesses Appearing at the Little Hoover Commission
State Fiscal Condition Public Hearings
December 7. 1994. Sacramento
Gray Davis Assemblyman Phil Isenberg
State Controller
Tim Gage
Manny Mateo Assembly Ways & Means Committee
State Treasurer's Office
Steve larson
Anthony J. Taddey Senate Budget & Fiscal Review
BA Securities, Inc. Committee
December 8, 1994, Sacramento
Elizabeth Hill J. Clark Kelso
legislative Analyst McGeorge law School
Renee Boicourt Rebecca K. Taylor
Moody's Investor Service California Taxpayers Association
Steven Zimmermann A. Alan Post
Standard & Poor's California Citizens Budget Commission
Claire Cohen William B. Baker and John O. Wilson
Fitch Investors Service California Business-Higher Education
Forum
February 27, 1995. Sacramento
Steve Olsen
Department of Finance
19
Endnotes
ENDNOTES
1. Anthony J. Taddey, Managing Director, BA Securities Inc., testimony to little Hoover
Commission, December 7, 1994.
2. Califomia Constitution, Article IV, Section 12 (a); Article XIII B, Section 5; and Article
XVI, Section 1.
3. Floyd D. Shimomura, Senior Assistant Attorney General, letter to the Director of the
Department of Finance, June 13, 1994.
4. Testimony to little Hoover Commission on December 8, 1994 from Renee Boicourt,
Moody's Investor Service; Steven Zimmermann, Standard & Poor's; and Claire Cohen,
Fitch Investor Service.
5. State Controller Gray Davis and Anthony J. Taddey, Managing Director, BA Securities
Inc., in testimony to little Hoover Commission, December 7, 1994.
6. State Controller Gray Davis, letter to Governor and Legislature, November 15, 1994.
7. Cal-Tax News, April 1, 1994.
8. An Overview of the 1995-96 Governor's Budget, Legislative Analyst, January 20,
n n
1995.
9. State Treasurer's Office, January 17, 1995 memo to little Hoover Commission.
10. State Controller's Office, January 17, 1995 memo to little Hoover Commission.
21
LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION FACT SHEET
The little Hoover Commission, formally known as the Milton Marks Commission on
California State Government Organization and Economy, is an independent state oversight
agency that was created in 1962. The Commission's mission is to investigate state
government operations and -- through reports, and recommendations and legislative
proposals -- promote efficiency, economy and improved service.
By statute, the Commission is a balanced bipartisan board composed of five citizen
members appointed by the Governor, four citizen members appointed by the Legislature,
two Senators and two Assembly members.
The Commission holds hearings on topics that come to its attention from citizens,
legislators and other sources. But the hearings are only a small part of a long and thorough
process:
* Two or three months of preliminary investigations and preparations come
before a hearing is conducted.
* Hearings are constructed in such a way to explore identified issues and raise
new areas for investigation.
* Two to six months of intensive fieldwork is undertaken before a report -
including findings and recommendations -- is written, adopted and released.
* Legislation to implement recommendations is sponsored and lobbied through
the legislative system.
* New hearings are held and progress reports issued in the years following the
initial report until the Commission's recommendations have been enacted or
its concerns have been addressed.
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Additional copies of this publication may be purchased for $ 5 .00 per copy from
Llttie rloover Commission
660 J Street, SUite 260
Sacramento, CA 95814
Make checks payable to Little Hoover Commission.