LHC
When Consumers Have Choices: The State's Role in Competitive Utility Markets
Read the report at Little Hoover Commission ↗
=[I]~l= ~~l~~lIl~=lIl ~
~~- -1Il~~~~C.=[l]
l!J!,,[;J~=[I] !J!~
[I] l=[ I]
~!J!" ~
l!J!,,[I]~=[l] !J!"
•
~~~~l=lIl
•
~=[I]!J!~
~l=[I]
LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
Richard R. Terzian
Chairman "
Michael Alpert
Vice Chairman
Nathan Shapell
Past Chairman
Charles G. 8akaly, Jr. Carl D. Covitz
Pier A. Gherini, Jr. Gwen Moore
Angie Papadakis Assemblyman Charles Poochigian
Stanley R. Zax
PUC & Energy Subcommitee
Charles G. Bakaty, Jr., Chairman
Michael Alpert
Senator Alfred Alquist *
Carl D. Covitz
Pier A. Gherini, Jr.
Angie Papadakis
(* Senator Alquist's Commission membership ended on December 2, 1 996 -- the last
day he was a Senator -- shortly before this report was adopted. Other Commissioners
who served during the report's preparation but who were no longer members at the
time of adoption were Senator Lucy Killea and Assemblyman Dominic Cortese.)
STAFF
Jeannine L. English
Executive Director
Kathleen Beasley Jim Mayer
Deputy Executive Director Project Manager
State o/California
LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
RlLh.!f.! R ! frILl!] December 10, 1996
Cb,t!nn~J}
tlil!("k,,·! J- I\lpen
~'Ii·(" CJHf1rm.1J1
The Honorable Pete Wilson
'<J! b.m ~ll.l.pell
{J.'1.f! {J}Jlrm,PI Governor of California
(:lurl",C R"bl\.lr
The Honorable Bill Lockyer The Honorable Rob Hurtt
( Jri (J (,OVlll
President Pro Tempore of the Senate Senate Republican Leader
I'll'fA Gil""",
and Members of the Senate
The Honorable Cruz M. Bustamante The Honorable Curt Pringle
(-]url('\ l'oLKll1):1.\1\
Speaker of the Assembly Assembly Republican Leader
4ssonh!Y"'.J11
and Members of the Assembly
~t.mle\' R
k.llltlln,·! Elll;(["h
I 't.t'I.JI!1~·r /)'rn/or Dear Governor and Members of the Legislature:
Over the last 20 years, state and federal policy makers have charted a course toward
competition among utility and other essential service providers -- allowing whenever
possible for market forces to replace government regulation. Earlier this year,
California affirmed its leadership in this pursuit with the adoption of landmark
legislation establishing competitive electricity markets.
Accordingly, government structures appropriate for competitive utility services need
to be created in order to obtain the maximum benefit from these changes.
The State should adopt a strategy that results in two separate commissions: one that
focuses on telecommunications and the other expert in energy. Both commissions
should be required to routinely seek legislative approval for Significant policy changes,
and should be held accountable for implementing those policies according to
legislatively set goals. The commissions also should be required to gather
information, deliberate on evidence and make decisions in public.
The Little Hoover Commission began this review by determining the functions that the
State will need to perform now and in the immediate future. The Little Hoover
Commission then identified the agencies best equipped to perform the needed
functions. These are the same questions that were asked when these government
structures were established over the last 100 years. But times change, and so do the
needs of the governed.
The structure recommended is as fundamentally different as the emerging markets it
will serve. But the recommendations also provide a reasonable path -- an evolution
of responsibilities -- for making this transition while maintaining the public interest as
the lodestar for government action.
The Little Hoover Commission's report, wh,ch is being transmitted to the State's top
policy makers with this letter, includes findings and recommendations in six issue
areas:
Milton \!larks CommlSSlon on CahiomiJ. Sute GovemmcrJt Organiz;nion ,11ld Economy +lmpj/v.wwlhc.cJ..govllhc.hmil
660 J St reCl, Sune 260+S.ln<lmtnto. CA 95814+91 ()-44 5-2123+/ax 916-U2-7709+c·ma I! lIttle, hoover@lhc.ca.gov
• Energy. The Energy Commission and Public Utilities Commission need to be divested
of obsolete functions intended for government planners to make decisions that will
soon be made instead by consumers and producers. The Energy Commission should
be assigned the functions needed to facilitate competitive energy markets -- and over
time assume all energy-related oversight. The PUC needs to determine what can be
done to make electricity distribution competitive and to systematically retreat from the
energy markets. While the State will want to maintain its public purpose programs,
that function can be better administered by a department than by a commission
focused on facilitating competitive markets.
• Telecommunications. The telecommunications industry is so dynamic and so
complex that California residents and businesses will best be served if over time the
PUC focused solely on telecommunications. The transition to competitive
telecommunications markets will be enhanced if clear standards are established for
when the PUC will cease economic regulation. And the State's telecommunications
policy making will be improved if the PUC collaborates annually with the Legislature to
set goals and assess progress toward those goals.
• Transportation. The transportation industry is nearly free from the price regulation
that often protected the industry at the expense of consumers. The public interest that
remains largely concerns licensing and public safety -- and the State's expertise in
these areas rests within the Business and Transportation and Housing Agency. While
some consumer protection needs remain, the Department of Consumer Affairs is
charged with that responsibility.
• Water. Ironically, the last monopoly in utility services may be the investor-owned
water suppliers that serve fewer than 20 percent of Californians. However, the
economic challenges facing these companies are the result of water conservation
requirements and increasing health standards. The PUC has been unable to adequately
integrate those public policy goals into its rate-making procedures. The State Water
Resources Control Board has the expertise and the legal structure that would provide
a better venue for integrating those policies.
• Consumer Protection. As fewer decisions are made in the PUC's regulatory arena,
and more consumer issues arise in the competitive marketplace, the State will need to
expand the duties of the Attorney General to represent consumers in a variety of
administrative, legislative and judicial forums.
• Process and Management. Competitive markets will dramatically increase the need
for public and accountable decision making. While the Legislature made substantial
progress in this area in 1996, further reforms are needed to ensure that PUC decisions
concerning the marketplace are made in a factually sound, legally accountable and
publicly fair manner. In addition, the PUC will be better equipped to make the needed
changes if it is allowed to develop the kind of partnership between management and
labor that is possible when civil service restrictions are eased.
The restructuring recommended in this report will be difficult to execute, as agencies defend
their turf and companies who have developed relationships with their regulators resist efforts
to shift that oversight elsewhere. The recommendations are not intended as criticism of the
hard work and dedication of those who serve in any of these government agencies. The task
of redefining the State's role in energy is particularly burdened by the historic friction between
the PUC and the Energy Commission and a political stalemate over how to reform the two
agencies. And finally, reformers are challenged by market and technological changes that
make even the near-term difficult to foresee with confidence.
But the risks associated with not reforming the structure are too great to dismiss. The
transition to competitive utility markets is costing hundreds of millions of dollars, and the
success of this transition rests largely on a compatible government structure. The same
fortitude mustered to pursue competitive markets is needed to realign the public agencies that
will be charged with helping those markets function effectively. The Little Hoover Commission
stands ready to work with the Legislature and the Governor to make these reforms a reality.
Sincerely,
~--z;:: ~
Richard R. Terzian "\
Chairman /
Upon adoption of this report, the Commission directed that a letter of support from Senator
Alfred Alquist be appended. Senator Alquist, a long-time member of the Little Hoover
Commission~ was instrumental in creating the California Energy Commission.
When Consumers
Have Choices:
The State's Role
in Competitive Utility Markets
December 1996
Table of Contents
Table of Contents
Section Page
Executive Summary
Introduction 1
Background 5
Energy ........ . 33
Telecommunications 77
Transportation 103
Water 127
Consumer Protection ........ . 145
Process & Management ..... 155
Conclusion 173
Appendices 179
Endnotes 191
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
Table of Contents
Table of Sidebars
Title Page
A Generation of Attempted Reforms 13
Beyond Regulation: How to Remain Relevant 14
Bulking Up for Competition ........... . 17
Behind the Higher Rates ....... . 20
How Technology Slew Monopolies 21
The Race for Competition and Lower Prices 22
Congress Embraces Competition 25
Assessing Competition: Work in Progress 26
PUC-Regulated Transportation Providers 27
The Government as Market 36
When Information is Policy Enough 44
More Opportunities ...... 52
Mergers that Missed the Mark 54
Advocacy vs. Neutrality ......... . 56
The War to End all Resource Planning 72
Focus and Coordination 73
Four Hurdles for Decision Makers 75
Demonopolizing Telecommunications 82
IIExtraordinarily Slow" Decision-making 84
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
Table of Sidebars (continued)
The Energy and Telecommunications Link 87
When Regulation Meant Higher Prices 92
From Rates to Prices 93
The Federal Checklist 95
Policies Before Rules 99
For Example, Airline Deregulation 106
The Role of the Regulator ................................... . 108
The Industry View: One Example 110
In the Case of Sacramento Airport 111
Planning Prevents Accidents ................................. . 125
The Milwaukee Crisis ...................................... . 133
Low-Flow Toilets -- An Untapped Resource 135
Table of Contents
Table of Graphics
Graphic Page
PUC & Energy: Evolution of Responsibilities XIX
PUC & Energy Commission Personnel 10
PUC & Energy Commission Budgets 1 1
Total Energy Costs 16
Gasoline Expenditures 18
The Price of Power 19
Meeting Electricity Demands .................................. . 39
Telecom Proceedings ....................................... . 81
PUC Decisions 85
Water Company Classifications ............................... . 131
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
Executive
Summary
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
ii
Executive Summary
Executive Summary
T
he purpose of pursuing competition in utility services is to replace
the inherent inefficiencies of government regulation with the
promised efficiency of market forces. In making that choice, the
State has the opportunity and obligation to realign its oversight of these
markets and to resolve notorious inter-agency disputes and overlaps.
As soon as feasible, California needs a keen and unified energy oversight
agency, schooled in the economic dynamics and environmental sciences
that permeate the public interest in this area. The State cannot reach
this goal overnight. But the emerging markets provide for an evolutionary
consolidation of authority in the California Energy Commission that could
accomplish this long-sought objective with minimal disruption to public
agencies and private concerns. The chart at the end of this summary
illustrates this transition.
Despite the growing faith in the ability of markets to provide utility
services, the State will maintain programs intended to make up for the
possible failure of the market: to utilize the most energy-efficient
construction techniques and to provide research, development and
demonstration of efficiency technology, renewable resources and
alternative fuels. These programs, however, can best be managed by a
department and, to reduce the potential of government intervention into
the market, are best separated from the agency charged with market
oversight.
iii
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
The emerging telecommunications market by itself presents an enormous
challenge. The Public Utilities Commission is uniquely qualified to nurture
competition and to redefine the public interest in this rapidly changing
industry. Its chances of success in this endeavor would be greatly
improved if telecommunications were to become its sole focus.
Deregulation of the transportation industry is nearly complete, but the
State has yet to eliminate the PUC's jurisdiction in transportation and
consolidate the functions related to licensing and safety of transportation
service providers so as to streamline the role of government and better
serve the public. That consolidation should occur immediately, as
indicated in the organizational chart.
Investor-owned water companies may be the last monopolies of the sort
the PUC was created to regulate. But water quality and water supply
issues now dominate the finances of the State's relatively few private
water companies. The economic regulation of those companies should
be moved immediately from the PUC to the State agency more familiar
with those challenges.
And finally, as more Californians receive utility service from competitive
enterprises, California will need to enhance the role of the Attorney
General in protecting consumer interests, bolster the credibility of public
decision making and enlist cooperation in managing the public work
force.
The findings and recommendations in this report do not assess or
endorse the policy choices that have been made in PUC hearing rooms
and the halls of the Legislature to replace monopoly utility services with
competition and consumer choice. Rather, they offer a government
structure that matches the market-oriented choices that have been made.
Where feasible, the structure removes the economic regulator when the
need for economic regulation ceases to exist. Where necessary, it
provides for market oversight -- such as gathering detailed information
and monitoring for potential market power abuses -- that is needed for
investors and consumers to make decisions. Where appropriate, it
preserves public policy goals that· competitive markets may shortchange,
including research and development and universal access to essential
services.
The findings and recommendations represent what the Little Hoover
Commission believes to be the best solutions at this time. The path to
competition is both promising and unknown, and the recommendations
offer a course for navigating the transition.
While the recommendations set some structural goals -- such as a single
iv
Executive Summary
energy oversight authority -- unforesecen particulars will define the
ultimate shape and timing of these changes. The best strategy the State
could craft would begin with a constant commitment to assess what has
been done and to make needed course corrections.
Discussions of PUC reform are often stymied by a debate over the degree
that the PUC can be changed without amending the State Constitution.
If that issue persists. it should be resolved expeditiously by the
appropriate authorities. The Little Hoover Commission makes its
recommendations independent of that issue. The government structure
advocated here should be pursued -- either statutorily, or if necessary by
amending the Constitution.
After 10 months of research and analysis, with the cooperation of the
agencies involved, and generous assistance from the regulated
companies, consumer and environmental interests, the Little Hoover
Commission has reached the following findings and recommendations:
Energy
F
inding 1: As presently constituted, neither the Public Utilities
Commission nor the CaHfornia Energy Commission is well
designed to perform the state functions needed by competitive
energy markets.
The need and political consensus to reform the State's energy regulatory
structure is increasing as energy markets undergo fundamental change.
Because of the physical nature of electricity and natural gas and because
of their importance to the economy and public welfare, some state
oversight of a competitive energy industry may be essential. The agency
will have to be focused on energy and expert on the economic forces and
environmental issues that shape energy markets and public policies.
Recommendation l-A: During the transition, the Governor and
the Legislature should divest the PUC oft he obsolete regulatory
functions governing generation and transmission facilities.
The PUC's economic regulation of generation and transmission facilities
will not be needed when competition begins and the transmission system
is managed by the Independent System Operator, which is now slated for
January 1998. The PUC will no longer need to conduct environmental
reviews of new generation and transmission facilities and will not be in
a position to monitor safety and reliability of new generation and
transmission facilities.
v
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
Recommendation I-B: During the transition to competitive
electricity markets, the Governor and the Legislature should
divest the Energy Commission of obsolete regulatory and
planning functions.
The obsolete functions known at this time are the Energy Commission's
economic forecasting and needs analysis associated with approving most
generating facilities, its load management responsibilities and its periodic
informational reports. As competitive markets develop, additional
functions may prove to be unneeded, as well.
Recommendation J-C: During the transition to competition, the
Governor and the Legislature should assign to the California
Energy Commission the new functions needed to make
competitive energy markets operate.
In a competitive electricity generation market, the State will need a
consolidated siting, environmental review and safety compliance
authority for generation and transmission facilities. The State also will
need to provide variations of functions already performed by the Energy
Commission -- in particular, the gathering and disseminating of detailed
market information, monitoring for possible market power abuses and
representing the State in regional, national and international regulatory
venues. The Energy Commission also should be given the ability to grant
facility applicants the power of eminent domain on a case-by-case basis.
Recommendation 1-D: The Governor and Legislature should
amend the electricity restructuring act of 1996 to assign to the
Energy Commission responsibility for enforcing safety and
reliability standards concerning the transmission grid.
The Legislature correctly realized the important role in a competitive
market of making sure that a reliable system is maintained. It is unclear
at this time how much of that responsibility will rest with federal
authorities. To the extent that the State can playa significant role in
system reliability., that function should be consolidated with other market
oriented oversight responsibilities. One potential model would rely on the
Independent System Operator to make recommendations to the Energy
Commission regarding standards, notify the Energy Commission of
potential violations and investigate system failures. The legal authority,
however for setting and enforcing standards should be vested in the
I
Energy Commission.
vi
Executive Summary
F
inding 2: The Energy Commission's dual responsibilities as an
energy regulator and an advocate for alternative energy
solutions are not compatible with its new mission of encouraging
competition and consumer choice.
Emerging competition requires that the linkage between regulatory and
advocacy functions be reconsidered, along w·ith the long-term need for
advocacy programs. In competitive markets government cannot pick the
market solution and it must be careful in how it tries to influence the
decisions that producers and consumers make.
Recommendation 2-A: The Governor and the Legislature
should transfer from the Energy Commission to the Department
of Conservation the public purpose programs concerning
transportation fuel research, business development, public
education and market transformation programs, including the
setting and implementation ofb uilding and appliance efficiency
standards.
Placing these functions in a department will make two significant
reforms: It will separate advocacy from oversight and it will enable more
significant changes in how the programs operate to reflect new funding
and market needs. At the same time, the move would preserve the
important functions that have saved Californians considerable amounts
of money and facilitated the advancement of other energy-related public
policies, including clean air and responsible use of other resources.
Recommendation 2-B: The Governor and the Legislature
should amend the electricity restructuring act of 1996 to
consolidate the administration of energy research and
development programs in the Department ofC onservation. The
department should establish a broad-based advisory panel to set
funding priorities, review applications and advise the
department director on allocations.
The advisory panel should include key legislators, representatives of
environmental and consumer groups, and the home building and
manufacturing industries. The director of the department should be
instructed to explore other institutional arrangements for managing the
research program, including a joint powers agreement involving energy
policy officials and representatives from public and private universities.
vii
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
F
inding 3: The PUC, while it wilJ play a transitional role in
nurturing competition, could jeopardize the success of the
energy restructuring plans if it were to assume oversight of the
competitive aspects of energy markets.
The PUC will continue to have critical tasks in the transition to
competitive energy markets, in redefining rate regulation of remnant
monopolies and in facilitating the evolution of distribution services. How
the PUC performs those tasks will greatly influence the success of
competition. And how competition unfolds will, in turn, shape the
ultimate structure of the State's energy oversight agency.
Recommendation 3-A: The Governor and the Legislature
should enact legislation establishing benchmarks and a time
line for delineating when and how the PUC will eliminate
economic regulation of competitive aspects of the market and
when and how it will encourage competition for distribution
related services. .
While the Legislature should expeditiously divest the PUC of functions
that will be obsolete with the advent of competition, other regulatory
functions will become obsolete over time. Thresholds should be
established in statute ahead of time determining when the PUC will cease
regulating in a given arena. The benchmarks also will serve to better
coordinate activities between the Energy Commission and the PUC.
Recommendation 3-B: After the transition --after all customers
have access to competitive electricity providers and
performance-based rate-making is instituted for distribution
monopolies -- the Governor and the Legislature should transfer
the PUC's remaining energy-related functions to the Energy
Commission.
The goal of the State should be a single agency with energy oversight
authority. But the State should pursue this goal in a way that does not
jeopardize emerging markets or compromise consumer protection. The
first step is to consolidate those new functions over the expanding
competitive market into a single agency. The second step is to
consolidate the regulation of remnant monopolies at the Energy
Commission. The precise timing and scope of the government
restructuring will depend upon market developments.
F
inding 4: The State has a fractured and confused process for
setting energy-related policies that results in conflicting pu blie
efforts with no clear ven ue for resolving the conflicts.
viii
Executive Summary
Energy is so integral to the economy and a number of environmental and
resource issues -- from transportation to air and water protection -- that
more than one public agency always will impact the formation and
implementation of energy policy. Many of the legendary conflicts
between the Energy Commission and the PUC will end as the two
agencies stop the regulatory activities that attempted to make the supply
and demand decisions of the marketplace. Beyond the functions of these
agencies, the advent of competition provides the State with both the
opportunity and the need to establish a more effective and more
accountable policy-making framework.
Recommendation 4-A: The Governor and Legislature should
enact legislation requiring the Energy Commission to annually
appear before the Legislature to review the agency's
performance toward meeting established policy goals and set
specific goals for the Commission to pursue over the next year.
This process would allow the Legislature to better monitor and more
timely influence the direction of the oversight commission, provide an
opportunity for better relationships to develop and discourage venue
shopping.
Recommendation 4-B: The Governor and the Legislature
should enact legislation requiring the director of the
Department of Conservation to biennially prepare an
assessment of the department's existing energy-related
programs and propose changes to eliminate obsolete programs,
improve existing programs or create new programs.
The document should be submitted to the Governor for approval and
forwarded to the Legislature for consideration as statutory amendments
or budget reallocations. The document should specify what actions
would need to be taken by the department to accomplish the policy
changes. It should also specify what actions other departments would
have to take, if any to make the policy recommendations work.
I
Recommendation 4-C: The Governor and the Legislature
should enact legislation requiring the Secretary of the
Resources Agency to participate as a non-voting advisor in
Public Utilities Commission proceedings concerning energy
related issues.
A significant failing of the current policy making framework is the gap
between the Energy Commission, the Public Utilities Commission and the
State's executive. Providing for a member of the Governor's cabinet who
ix
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
also oversees the Energy Commission to take part in the PUC's energy
related proceedings would bridge that gap. This arrangement will only be
needed as long as the PUC retains jurisdiction over energy utilities.
Telecommunications
F
inding 5: The fast-paced dynamics of the telecommunications
industry, with its importance to the California economy and the
complexity of new public policy issues, is not being adequately
overseen by a commission that regulates numerous other essential
business sectors.
The trends in the rapidly changing telecommunications industry create
complex policy choices involving conflicting public interests.
Implementing these policy choices may be just as challenging -- given the
need to infuse competition into monopolies in ways that are economically
sound, legally correct and satisfying to a demanding public. Because
PUC decisions will influence the economic health of the market, the
timeliness and quality of its decision-making is paramount.
Recommendation 5: The Governor and the Legislature should
enact Legislation directing the PUC -- after the development of
competitive energy generation markets -- to focus its attention
solely on the development of competitive telecommunications
markets hy monitoring for possihle market power abuses,
overseeing telecommunications public policy programs such as
universal service and identifying unfair business practices.
A number of policy reviews in recent years have found that the PUC has
too many responsibilities to adequately fulfill them all. Changes in
technologies and emerging competitive utility markets have increased the
Commission's workload. Successful oversight of the telecommunications
revolution will rest in farge part on the time and focus the PUC can bring
to the job.
F
inding 6: As new telecommunications technologies and services
emerge, the State does not have a systematic way for
determining areas of public interest or the extent of government
oversight that is necessary.
Telecommunications has not changed overnight from a monopolistic
service into a fully competitive market. Rather, competition has come
gradually to different parts of the telecommunications network at
different times. In the past, the PUC's role has been to use regulation to
x
Executive Summary
perform price setting and other market functions in the absence of a
competitive market. The competitive market raises the question of what
regulations if any the PUC should impose. While the PUC has conducted
numerous proceedings in an attempt to fairly usher competition into the
market, even its supporters do not believe the PUC has done enough to
predetermine when it will stop regulating.
Recommendation 6-A: The Governor and the Legislature
should enact legislation declaring clear standards for when
telecommunications services are fully competitive, when they
are vulnerable to possible market power abuse or when they are
so affected by the public interest that government intervention
in warranted.
The PUC should be required to use those standards to establish the scope
of its activities and routinely review the consequences of those activities.
The standards should include a time line and the PUC should report to the
Legislature on its progress. The goal is consistent and accountable
progress toward aligning regulation with the markets.
Recommendation 6-B: Beginning in the year 2000 and every
five years after that, the Public Utilities Commission should
undergo a sunset review to determine ift he PUC is still needed.
The sunset review will provide at least two benefits. The first would be
to make sure that any basic function, or the PUC itself, has not outlived
it usefulness and is no longer providing significant benefit to Californians.
The second benefit would be to provide the Legislature with the
opportunity to reassess the State's role in telecommunications and the
best way to fulfill those roles,
F
inding 7: The State's practice of setting telecommunications
policies on a case-by-case basis encourages market players to
seek the same cbanges from the Legislature and the Public Utilities
Commission. This venue shopping spurs occasional conflicts and
confusion among government entities that could prove costly to
nascent competitive markets.
In telecommunications, as in energy, it has not always been clear when
the Legislature will be the venue for establishing a policy, and when the
Public Utilities Commission is the appropriate policy maker. While there
is some public benefit to this tension, there is evidence that in
telecommunications policy the relationship between Public Utilities
xi
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
Commission and the Legislature has devolved. The rapidly changing
telecommunications industry and its customers will be better served by
some agreement in how major and minor policies will be set.
Recommendation 7: The Governor and the Legislature should
enact legislation requiring the Public Utilities Commission, as
a precursor to the annual review and approval of its budget, to
collaborate with the Legislature to review telecommunications
policy directions and past performance and establish specific
goals that the Commission will pursue in the coming year.
While the PUC was intended to be insulated from day-to-day politics, it
cannot operate in a vacuum. Over the long term, the legitimacy of
fourth-branch commissions to chart significant policy changes is
enhanced by routine reality checks from directly elected legislators.
Similarly, while given the authority to make tough decisions day in and
day out, the PUC's legitimacy will be enhanced by an annual public
accounting of its progress.
Transportation
F
inding 8: Some of the PUC's transportation regulatory
activities are remnants from an era when industry asked for
government intervention as a shield against the rigors of
competition. Those regulations, disguised as consumer protection,
can have the effect of raising prices without a commensurate
benefit to the public.
The PUC is now pre-empted by federal law from regulating rates for
railroads and trucks, but has yet to abandon rate setting for other
carriers. Beginning in the 1930s, when the trucking industry asked for
government protection against cutthroat competition, the PUC has
gradually come to confuse protecting the industry with guarding the
public interest. A number of the Commission's requirements discourage
new market entrants and can lead to higher consumer prices.
Recommendation 8: The PUC should cease all transportation
related activities.
Policy makers at the federal and the state level have determined that
competition, not regulators, should set prices for transportation providers.
Preserving remnants of economic regulation -- such as issuing certificates
of public convenience and necessity for new providers, posting tariffs and
requiring detailed financial reports -- can reduce competition and increase
consumer prices without providing significant consumer benefits.
xii
Executive Summary
F
inding 9: The PUC's transportation safety and insurance
functions overlap with the duties of the California Higbway
Patrol and the Department of Motor Vehicles. The overlap results
in unnecessary regulation and contributes to gaps in safety.
As the PUC's role in economic regulation has been pre-empted at the
federal level, it is no longer logical for the Commission to be responsible
for imposing licensing and safety regulations on passenger carriers,
household movers, railroads and other common carriers.
Recommendation 9-A: The Legislature and the Governor
should enact legislation transferring the safety and liability
regulation ofa ll commercial highway carriers to the California
Highway Patrol and the Department ofM otor Vehicles.
Primary responsibility for transportation in California has long been vested
in the Business and Transportation Agency, and departments within that
agency are responsible for licensing drivers and enforcing safety laws.
Common sense and economic realities prompted the Legislature in 1996
to move safety and licensing of truckers to the CHP and the DMV.
Common sense dictates that the same functions for other transportation
providers be transferred to those agencies as well.
Recommendation 9-B: The Legislature and the Governor
should enact legislation putting minivans that are used to carry
passengers commercially under the same safety oversight as
larger passenger vehicles.
Shuttle vans provide an opportunity for economics and convenience to
actually work in favor of the State's policies of discouraging single
occupancy vehicles. The State should take advantage of this trend by
providing shuttle passengers the same level of safety as those of other
commercial passenger carriers.
Recommendation 9-C: The Governor and the Legislature
should enact legislation moving the PUC's consumer protection
functions concerning household movers to the Department of
Consumer Affairs. A sunset review should be performed to
determine if there is a continuing need for this specialized
oversight.
The State has an enduring interest in making sure its citizens are not
cheated or victimized by thieves. The State pursues this interest daily
with generalized law enforcement and consu.mer protection agencies and
xiii
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
that protection may prove to be adequate In the case of household
movers.
F
inding 10: As the PUC's role as a rate setter for railroads has
been eliminated, it is left with railroad safety functions that are
more related to the core competencies of transportation planners
and accident investigators than to those of an economic regulator.
The PUC has retained some jurisdiction over safety for both heavy rail
and rail transit systems, even though the federal government has virtually
pre-empted the states from creating their own safety programs. The
public interest demands a continued state role in rail safety, but how the
State can best fill that safety role is influenced by the place of rail in the
State's overall transportation scheme.
Recommendation 10: The Governor and the Legislature should
transfer the PUC's rail planning and safety functions to the
Business, Transportation and Housing Agency.
The precise form the new consolidated program will take should be based
on a thorough review of how to"best link rail safety with statewide rail
planning and how to best coordinate funding of safety projects within
Caltrans to avoid the conflicts that have slowed projects in the past.
Water
F
inding 11: While the rates charged by private monopoly water
providers still need government scrutiny, the greater public
interest lies in ensuring adequate and safe drinking water supplies -
challenges that fall outside the PUC's expertise of thwarting
monopoly abuse.
Water companies in California face the dual challenges of meeting federal
water quality standards and conserving water supplies to provide future
customers. The PUC's focus on protecting customers by keeping rates
as low as possible impedes companies from fulfilling these needs. These
issues -- along with dramatic changes underway in the energy and
telecommunications industries -- provide the opportunity to reconsider the
State's choices for economic regulation of private water suppliers.
Recommendation Il-A: The Governor and the Legislature
should enact legislation transferring the economic regulation
oft he private water suppliersfrom the PUC to the State Water
" Resources Control Board.
xiv
Executive Summary
The State has more choices today for assigning the economic regulation
of private water companies than it did at the dawn of the century when
utilities shared the commonality of monopoly status. The State Water
Resources Control Board has the procedural experience and the water
expertise needed to address the primary concern facing California's water
suppliers and their customers a safe and adequate supply over the long
term.
Recommendation Il-B: The State Water Resources Control
Board should investigate and implement incentives for
consolidating small water companies and for financing water
quality and efficiency improvements to water systems.
The State Water Board is the agency best suited to bring about these
changes, but the opportunity provided by federal loans and the
willingness of some larger systems to take over small, under-financed
companies should be pursued by whatever agency has responsibility for
regulating the private water industry.
Consumer Protection
F
inding 12: In competitive markets, as public decisions may be
diffused, residential and small business customers may not be
well-represented in a number of regulatory, legislative,
administrative and judicial venues.
The original purpose of the PUC was to protect consumers in the absence
of a functioning market. The State's new strategy is to facilitate the
market wherever possible -- policing those industries as it does others for
antitrust behavior and consumer fraud. As utility services become
competitive, the role of the PUC will shrink -- requiring other agencies,
most notably the Attorney General, to playa larger role in consumer
protection.
Recommendation 12: The Governor and the Legislature should
create within the Attorney General's Consumer Law Section an
office of utility consumer protection. The office should
represent consumer interests in legislative, administrative and
judicial proceedings.
The Attorney General in the past has relied more on the full-service
regulatory strategy of the PUC to protect utility consumers; As the
monopolies give way to the market, the Attorney Generalis role in this
arena will naturally increase. To encourage cooperation, prevent
xv
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
duplication and provide effective consumer protection, resources and
expertise should be shifted over time to enable the Attorney General's
Consumer Law Section to better fill this role. The legislation should
specify that the unit will employ a combination of attorneys, engineers,
economists and policy analysts and will be funded by reallocating a
portion of the existing user fees assessed to fund the Public Utilities
Commission and the California Energy Commission.
Process and Management
F
inding 13: The PUC's procedures, even as amended by the
Legislature in 1996, provide the least accountability to the
public and the fewest assurances that decisions will be based on the
factual record in precisely those cases where the greatest profits and
the greatest public interests are at stake.
As the PUC participates in the development of competitive utility markets
and its jurisdiction is curtailed to focus solely on telecommunications, the
credibility of its decision-making procedures will be critical. The PUC
envisions spending less time in the judge-and-jury role of a full-time
regulator and more time setting policy defining the public interest and
shaping the rules that market players and consumers will live by.
Commissioners have asserted that policy making is legislative in nature,
and when acting as legislators they should be given freedom to meet
privately with stakeholders and among themselves. The Commissioners
also asserted that they should retain freedom from expanded judicial
review, effectively making their decisions final. Freedom, however, must
be commensurate with accountability. It should not be granted in a way
that erodes confidence in public decision making.
Recommendation 13-A: The Governor and the Legislature
should amend the Public Utilities Code to limit ex parte contacts
after a proposed decision is issued in rule-making proceedings
to meetings in which all the parties are invited to attend. All
private meetings and discussions between Commissioners and
parties with a matter pending before the Commission should be
noticed and summarized/or the public record.
The Legislature in S9 960 made significant improvements in the PUC's
decision-making process. That effort could be further advanced by
increasing the accountability in policy-making proceedings, as well. The
greatest conflict between the need for Commissioners to discuss issues
with individual parties and the need to preserve the integrity of a fact-
xvi
Executive Summary
based process from political lobbying comes after proposed decisions are
issued. The integrity of the process will be further enhanced if the
notification procedures are expanded to include substantive policy
discussions between Commissioners and parties -- even if they are not
based on the particulars of a pending case.
Recommendation 13-B: As the workload oft he PUC is reduced
- and as some of its functions are transferred to agencies more
suitable to perform them -- the Legislature and the Governor
should enact legislation requiring Commissioners to rely solely
on open meetings to gather information and make public
decisions.
Even when acting in a policy-making capacity, Commissioners differ
fundamentally from legislators: They are not elected and so are never
held directly accountable to the public. And with a membership of only
five, the effects of special interest lobbying are significantly more
concentrated than in a 1 20-member legislature. As the number of market
players increases, the importance of giving everyone a chance to speak -
and to listen to the arguments made by their adversaries -- will increase
in importance. As its caseload is diminished by transferring some
responsibilities to agencies better able to perform them, it will be more
possible for the PUC to rely on an open decision-making process.
Recommendation 13-C: The Governor and the Legislature
should grant parties a right to appeal all PUC decisions, or the
decisions of its successor agencies, to the court of appeal.
Experience in other states suggests that the accountability provided by
broader judicial review can be achieved without significant delays in the
public process. To encourage uniformity of decisions and subject
expertise, appeals should be restricted to the court located in the same
city as the Commission, now the First District Court of Appe~1 in San
Francisco. The standard of review should include a review of the facts
to determine whether they support the Commission's decision.
F
inding 14: The Commission's reputation for hiring and
promoting the best and tbe brightest is being undermined by
the rigidity of civil service rules.
The civil service system rigidly prescribes how managers will make
decisions concerning job assignments, rewards and punishments.
Keeping the PUC's energy focused on serving the public interest as it
transforms itself for a post-monopoly future, will require the Commission
to be able to tap the deep skills and full creativity of its staff.
xvii
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
Recommendation 14: The PUC should apply to the State
Personnel Board for permission to initiate a demonstration
project. The project should allow for the creation of broader
classifications and pay for performance. The Commission
should initiate a labor-management council for anticipating,
assessing and resolving labor-related problems that will result
from the near-constant change facing the Commission.
As the PUC's role radically shrinks, it is in a unique position to benefit
from the flexibility that the Legislature already has granted to state
agencies facing considerable changes and looking for ways to forge a
partnership between management and labor that transcends the rigidity
of the civil service rules. While the Energy Commission has a reputation
for involving employees in changes, it also might benefit from the
flexibility of a civil service, demonstration project as it goes about
redefining its mission to meet the needs of competition.
xviii
PUC & Energy: An Evolution ofR esponsibilities
Energy Resources
Public Utilities Commission Conservation and
Development Commission
x
x'
PUC in transition
Energy Commission
in transition
Sets rates for energy
distribution monopolies.
Assumes oversight duties for
all competitive energy
Oversees telecom
markets.
munications evolution.
I
State Water I Business Trans. California Energy
Public Utilities Attorney General Dept. of
Resources & Housing Commission (Existing agency) Commission Conservation
Control Board (Existing agency) (Existing agency)
(Existing agency) {Existing agency}
(Existing agency)
Expands antitrust,
I Assumes PUC' s Monitors markets,
Oversees telecom- consumer I Assumes public
Assumes PUC's I transportation sets rates for dist-
munications. protection role. good programs.
water rate-setting. functions. ribution utilities.
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
xx
Introduction
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
2
Introduction
Introduction
P
ublic agencies often are solidly built on the political landscape of
the day. But over time, technological possibilities, economic
realities and changing public preferences erode the reasoning upon
which the agencies were constructed. As change occurs, agencies
scramble to stay effective, even relevant. Organizational structures
created to protect the public interest develop overlaps and gaps.
Such is the case in the regulation of public utilities and other essential
services. Federal policy reforms, technological advances and increasing
inefficiencies associated with monopolistic utilities are radically changing
these industries. Common sense dictates that government keep pace
with the governed.
The Little Hoover Commission began its review by examining the roles
of the Public Utilities Commission and the California Energy Resources
Conservation and Development Commission two agencies that once
worked well on behalf of Californians, but in more recent years have
struggled to collaboratively develop and implement cogent energy
policies.
In order to comprehensively deal with utility oversight, the Little Hoover
Commission then reviewed the PUC's responsibilities concerning
telecommunications, transportation and investor-owned water services.
Throughout, this study was guided by two fundamental questions:
Given the changes that are occurring in these industries, what is the role
of the State? And, second, what agency existing or new -- is best
suited to fill that role?
3
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energv
Once future functions were defined, the Little Hoover Commission
considered the appropriate structure for grouping those functions. It
then reviewed the general procedures those agencies should use and
how those agencies should relate to each other and the Legislature.
The analysis revealed that there are no perfect answers to these
questions. And a widely held concern is that as events unfold new
issues will emerge and the State will have to adjust its policies.
The Little Hoover Commission believes its recommendations represent
a technically sound and realistic approach that resolves long-standing
problems, provides for the needs of market-based utilities, and allows for
the State to adapt as challenges arise that are unpredictable today.
Moreover, in an era of uncertainty the recommendations strive to
I
preserve the public interest as the lodestar for State actions.
The Little Hoover Commission has examined these issues three times in
the past: in 1974, when the Energy Commission was newly created and
its architects were interested in how it would relate with the PUC; in
1984, when tension developed between the PUC and the Energy
Commission; and, in 1995, when the Little Hoover Commission fulfilled
a statutory obligation to review a Governor's Reorganization Plan of the
Energy Commission.
To assist in this study, the Commission assembled two advisory
committees one on energy issues and the other on
telecommunications, transportation and water issues. Each committee
included more than 50 public officials, academic experts industry,
J
environmental and consumer advocates. (The names of advisory
committee members are contained in Appendix A.) Combined, the
committees met more than a dozen times to provide the Commission
with insight into the history and trends of the marketplace and the state
agencies being reviewed.
The Little Hoover Commission conducted five days of public hearings in
San Francisco and Sacramento -- receiving testimony from 45 witnesses.
(The names of witnesses are contained in Appendix B.) It examined the
transcripts and reports generated by years of discussion concerning the
existing government structure, reviewed the academic and trade
literature and interviewed experts throughout the nation.
The Commission's conclusions are documented in this report, which
begins with a Transmittal letter, an Executive Summary and this
Introduction. The following sections include a Background and six
chapters -- Energy, Telecommunications, Transportation, Water,
Consumer Protection and Process and Management. The report ends
with a Conclusion, Appendices and Endnotes.
4
Background
.:. PUC-regulated industries were stahle until
the 1970s, when the energy crisis,
stagflation and a distrust ofg overnment
forced the PUC to change its methods.
•: . The Energy Commission's charge to
advance long-term policy goals such as
efficiency and resource management has
conflictedfrequently with the PUC's short
term goal of keeping down utility rates .
•: . A number of technological advances,
economic realities and political choices
have allowed competitive pressures to
erode away the monopolistic nature of
puhlic utilities and essential services.
•: . While puhlic policies have sought to
eliminate economic regulation of most
utilities, private water services remain
monopoly providers.
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
6
Background
Background
A
s the 21 st century approaches, energy and telecommunications
are evolving from stable utilities into dynamic enterprises,
redefining economies and lifestyles. Where corporate monoliths
once controlled the field, a rush of entrepreneurs and investors are
seeking to provide goods and services competitively. Where government
regulators once stood sentry over the public interest, policy makers are
re-examining the nature of that interest and the best way to protect it.
The definition and defense of the public interest has never been
stagnant. The Public Utilities Commission has matured over the last
century to balance the needs of corporate monopolies, captive
customers and the larger public good. Over the last 20 years, the
California Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission
has integrated environmental planning, energy efficiency and technology
development to reduce air and water pollution, meet swelling energy
needs economically and avoid the hardships of shortages.
This regulatory strategy has produced huge successes and notorious
failures and it has prompted California to become a pioneer in the
restructuring of essential service industries. By aggressively pursuing
market trends and implementing federal policy reforms, California IS
trying to replace government regulation of energy with competition and
consumer choice. Similar pressures require the State to rethink its role
in three other industries regulated as public utilities and common carriers
-- telecommunications, transportation and investor-owned water service.
This Background describes the present energy regulatory structure and
important events that have challenged its effectiveness. It reviews the
evolution of telecommunications and transportation regulation, and
describes the challenges of the investor-owned water service industry.
7
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
The Regulators
W
hile a score of government agencies have a hand in how energy
is produced and consumed in the State, two agencies are the
central authorities: the California Public Utilities Commission (PUC or
CPUC) and the California Energy Resources Conservation and
Development Commission, better known as the Energy Commission. In
the case of telecommunications, the PUC is the State's primary agent.
And in the case of transportation and privately owned water systems,
the PUC is only one of several agencies with oversight responsibility.
The PUC is the product of a century-long evolution. In California, the
railroads were the first among the nascent modern-day utilities to abuse
their control of the market to exact unfair rates and discriminate against
captive customers.
The Legislature responded by creating a State Board of Transportation
Commissioners. By 1879, the agency had become an elected Railroad
Commission, was embedded in the Constitution and charged with ending
corruption and market abuses. The Commission, however, was impotent
against the railroad robber barons. The problem, as described by one
present day PUC Commissioner, was the lack of "a judicial capacity to
maintain a sustained disciplinary presence" over an industry with
mUltiple and changing public interests:
What was a reformer to do? How was one to gain the advantage
of a sustained presence of a nonpolitical authority which could
develop expertise in understanding the dynamics and economies
of business affected with the public interest? The answer was
to invent the regulatory commission.
1
As part of the Progressive Era reforms, the Railroad Commission in 1 9 11
was established in the California Constitution as a five-member panel
appointed by the Governor and confirmed by the Senate to staggered
six-year terms. Commissioners were forbidden specific conflicts of
interest and could only be removed for incompetence, corruption or
neglect of duty as determined by a two-thirds vote of the Legislature.2
That same year, the Legislature adopted the Public Utilities Act,
assigning the Commission regulatory authority over a range of private
companies, many of them with overwhelming shares of the market and
engaged in businesses so critical to the community welfare that the U.S.
Supreme Court had found them to be "clothed with a public interest."3
In 1946 the Legislature changed the Commission's name to the Public
Uti lities Commission in recognition of the agency's broad reach over
everything from power, heat and light to wharfages and telegraphs. The
constitutional roots are often cited as the foundation for the
Commission's independence. But its greatest legal powers have been
granted by the Legislature, most notably in Section 701 of the Public
8
Background
Utilities Code: liThe Commission may supervIse and regulate every
public utility in the State and may do all things, whether specifically
designated in this part or in addition thereto. which are necessary and
convenient in the exercise of such power and jurisdiction.
fI
While some of the Commission's regulatory authority has been pre
empted by federal law, the PUC in 1995
established rates for $50 billion worth of
commerce -- scrutinizing the bottom line "The Commission may supervise and
of 655 privately owned natural gas,
regulate every public utility in the State
electric, telephone, water and sewer and
tlntl may do all things, whether
pipeline companies, while overseeing
54,000 truck, bus, railroad, light rail, specifically designated in this part or in
ferry and other transportation addition thereto, which are necessary
companies.4 Despite this breadth, the
and convenient in the exercise ofs uch
PUC and the industries it regulates were
power and jurisdiction. "
relatively stable for the middle decades
of the century. In some respects, the job Public Utilities Code 70 J
of Commissioners became routine with
time -- as technological advances and the
economies of scale resulting from the
State's growth combined to keep utility rates steady, and often declining
In real terms.
During this time, the relationship between consumers, the PUC and the
utilities became represented by an unwritten "regulatory compact" in
which the utilities agreed to price- and service-related regulation in
exchange for the exclusive right to serve a specific area and a
guaranteed rate of return on investment.
The stability ended with the energy, economic and environmental crises
of the 1970s and early 1980s. In those years, Commissioners struggled
to help the capital-intensive utilities ride out periods of high inflation and
rising fuel costs. They simultaneously tried to respond to consumer
advocates, who wanted to mute rapidly increasing rates, and
environmentalists, who wanted to reduce the public costs of pollution
and meet growing energy demands through efficiency.
An overall distrust of government increased the pressure for public input
and open decision-making procedures. And as federal law gradually
pushed for more competition in both energy and telecommunications,
new market players gained a stake In PUC proceedings -- creating still
more Interests that needed to be balanced. 5
The growing number of participants was accompanied by a growing
number of statutory mandates: to administer conservation programs,
monitor contracts between independent energy producers and utilities
and enact subSidies for low-income consumers. Even some of the PUC's
traditional duties became more complicated as utilities requested rate
hikes to cover the costs of overdue and over-budget nuclear power
plants.
9
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
The consequence of these developments was that the PUC abandoned
its passive role of assessing utility proposals for fairness and efficiency,
and began to scrutinize and manipulate utility decision-making. A former
high-ranking PUC staff member, in a book analyzing these trends,
concluded:
I argue that contemporary regulation is interventionist meaning
that there has come to be considerable regulatory involvement in
decisions that were previously made entirely by utility managers
or approved by regulators after minimal review. This recent
regulatory strategy has generally had two related motivations: to
minimize cost (and thus rate) increases and to minimize impacts
of these increases on utility customers. 6
The political and economic trends also made obvious two large
deficiencies in the Commission's approach: First, by giving companies
a guaranteed rate of return on expenses, the utilities were encouraged
to build more plants, hire more people and focus on the short-term
horizon between rate cases -- which contributed to reliability but put
constant upward pressure on prices. Second, while the PUC controlled
the investor-owned energy
utilities, it had little sway over the
broader policies that determined PUC & Energy Personnel
how energy was produced and
consumed.7 1200
1000
The Energy Commission was
formed in 1974 to counter those
800
regulatory failures. Its duties
went beyond the electricity and BOD
natural gas delivered by
J
monopolies to understanding and 400 II
influencing all of the State's
energy uses. But while the PUC's 200 l Energy Commission
I
control is nearly absolute over the • PUC
o L<
monopolies, the Energy
Commission's regulatory authority 88-89 90-91 92-93 94-95 96-97
is limited: It sets building and 87-88 89-90 91-92 93-94 95-96
appliance efficiency standards to Source. Governor's Budgets Fiscal years
reduce energy consumption, and ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
it approves site applications for The PUC1s ranks have declined in recent years, while the
new large thermal power plants. Energy Commission IS numbers have held steady or increased.
The Energy Commission also was
vested with a number of public purpose programs intended to promote
development of cleaner, renewable and other alternative energy
sources. B
At its Inception, the Energy Commission's facility siting authority was its
greatest. The RAND Corporation in the 1970s warned the Legislature
that to meet the State's 7 percent annual increase In electricity
demands, a series of nuclear plants would have to be built.9
10
Background
The ensuing debate galvanized competing concerns -- that nuclear
reactor domes would be riveted every 20 miles to the California coast
and, alternatively, that public protests would prevent any new generators
from being built.
The solution was to assign to the
Energy Commission the duty of PUC & Energy Budgets
gatekeeper, letting through only
those new electricity generating 100
sources that mitigated
environmental impacts and were
80
~
needed after efforts were made
~
to reduce electricity demands -0
"0 60
through efficiency improvements.
0
Cf}
c:
With some initial controversies .Q 40
.-
and midcourse corrections, the E
Energy Commission is widely E: 20 Energy CommiSSion
acknowledged for succeeding in PUC
that charge -- enabling the State 0
to accommodate a rapidly 88-89 90-91 92-93 94-95 96-97
growing population and economy 87-88 89-90 91-92 93-94 95-96
with investments in demand~ Fiscal years
Source: Governor's budgets
management technologies.
The PUC's budget derived from industry fees, has declined
Unlike the constitutionally based
slightly as deregulation has accelerated. The Energy Com
PUC/ the Energy Commission is a mission's budget contains significant one-time money for
creature of statute: Five grant and loan programs that wax and wane with funding.
commissioners are appointed by
the Governor and confirmed by
the Senate to five-year staggered terms. One commissioner is required
to have a background in engineering or physical science, one in law, one
in environmental protection, one in natural resources economics, and one
represents the public at large.
Both commissions are characteristic of Jlfourth branch" agencies that
have been created in this century to deal with complex public policy
issues. They were granted policy making and adjudicatory authorities so
they could efficiently regulate or promote public interests in the
marketplace. The tradeoff for that efficiency has been a diminished
accountability inherent in typical executive-branch departments and a
muting of the checks and balances intended between the executive,
legislative and judicial branches.
As the State rethinks its role in the market/ it will need to reconsider
whether the tradeoffs made in creating fourth-branch agencies are still
appropriate or if they need to be redefined. But an even more important
consideration will be to create a structure that avoids the notorious
conflicts that developed between the Energy Commission and the PUC.
11
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
From the inception of the Energy
Commission, the two agencies have at "California has paid a high price for the
best displayed the behavior of rival
conflict hetween the two agencies. ..
siblings. The PUC was the only state
intertlgenLJ' tur.r hattles; forum shopping
agency that urged the Governor to veto
the Warren-Alquist Act -- arguing that on the part of interest groups; and
(l
either it or another existing agency could resulting energy policy that is neither
perform all of the duties that were to be
focused, implemented efficiently, nor
assigned the new commission.10 More
friendly to the State's citizens or its
important than any overlap, however,
were the conflicts that developed business conlmunity.
H
between the PUC, and its short-term
interests in keeping energy costs low
over the three-year horizon of a rate
decision, and the Energy Commission's long-term interest in efficiency
and resource protection. The consequences were described by a public
manager with experience in both agencies:
California has paid a high price for the conflict between the two
agencies. The price has come in the form of arcane, interagency
turf battles; forum shopping on the part of interest groups; and
a resulting energy policy that is neither focused, implemented
efficientlyl' nor friendly to the State's citizens or its business
community.
11
The conflicts have severely tarnished the otherwise significant
achievements the State has made in energy poliCY. And of greater
importance today, despite assertions by both agencies that diplomacy
guides their actions, both agencies see their duties expanding to include
state overSight of competitive markets, raising the likelihood that the
conflicts will resume.
Reguliltors: Pre~\'L\'UreS to Change
O
ver the last decades, the tensions and disputes between the Energy
Commission and the Public Utilities Commission increased to a
point that required recurring attention from lawmakers. But despite
conslderaoie efforts, wholesale reforms have been elusive.
The Legislature has created joint committees, formed working groups,
established task forces and attempted political negotiations in its efforts
to identify the key problems and legislate solutions. In one such effort,
Senate Concurrent Resolution No.7 of 1989, lawmakers declared at the
outset that the existing system "has resulted in significant
fragmentation, duplication, overlap and confusion in the formulation and
execution of state energy related functions. Over the next two years,
11
a special joint committee held hearings, hired consultants and issued
recommendations for coordinating energy programs and merging many
of the functions of the PUC and Energy CommiSSion into a single
agency. Few reforms were enacted into law.
12
Background
The controversy escalated
A Generation of Attempted Reforms
between 1992 and 1994, when
the legislative leadership and the
administration took divergent 1974 Little Hoover Commission recommended ways to
paths toward organizational improve PUC planning and decision-making
reform. The administration procedures.
looked at structural changes as a
way of reducing government 1979 Legislature's JOint Committee on Energy Policy
and Implementation called for separating Energy
expenses, while the legislative
Commission's regulatory and program duties.
leadership pursued reforms
intended to reduce policy
1984 Little Hoover Commtssion recommended ways to
disputes. During 1992 budget
integrate planning and resolve disputes between
debates, which were burdened by
PUC and the Energy CommisSIOn.
the recession-spawned revenue
crisis, Assembly Republicans
1984 Consultants Touche Ross identified 28 state
urged that the Energy
energy-related agencies -- raising concerns about
Commission be eliminated to save
the roles of the PUC and Energy Commission.
money.
1989 Joint Committee on Energy Regulation and the
The proposal failed, but that
Environment launched a two-year study that
winter a team of senior legislative concluded many PUC and Energy Commission
staffers were assigned to functions could be merged into a single agency.
examine the issue. The group
identified overlaps between the 1992 During recession-spawned budget battle,
two agencies in the areas of Assembly Republicans urged eliminatIon of the
conservation, research and Energy Commission to save money.
development and advocacy for
cleaner and more efficient 1993 The Governor proposed eliminating the Energy
technologies. Increasingly, Commission. Legislative committees considered
however, the group focused on reforms to PUC procedures and to el~minate
overlaps between PUC and Energy Commission.
criticisms aimed at the decision
making procedures employed by
1994 Lawmakers nixed administration's bills to gIve
the Public Utilities Commission.
Energy Commission duties to the Department of
Conservation and create a facility siting board.
In January of 1993 the
1
Governor's budget summary
1995 The administration proposed its 1994 plan as an
proposed eliminating the Energy
administrative reorganization. The Little Hoover
Commission. And in the spring of
Commission, with some dissenting votes,
1993, 58 141 (Alquist) and 58
endorsed the plan. The Senate rejected the plan.
142 (Rosenthal) were introduced
to address duplication identified
by the legislative working group.
The administration did not take a position on the bills.
That summer, language was added to the 1993-94 budget bill requiring
the administration to develop a reorganization plan by December 1 1993
J
-- otherwise the budgets of both Commissions would automatically be
cut by 7.5 percent for the rest of that fiscal year. On December 1,
1993, the Governor proposed abolishing the Energy Commission lito
reduce the size and scope of governmentai activity in an arena which is
increasingly dominated by competition and market forces.
1112
13
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
The plan also would have eliminated the State Lands Commission,
transferred the functions of both agencies to the Department of
Conservation and created a Facility Siting Board to provide consolidated
reviews of all new energy facilities.13
In the spring of 1994, S8 2048
Beyond Regulation: How to Remain Relevant
(Leonard) and AB 2468 (Conroy}
were introduced embodying the
administration's plan. The Senate The PUC's desire to remake Itself and preserve for
and Assembly policy committees, itself a role in the restructured market -- is being played
however, became increasingly out In utility commissions across the nation. A 1996
report prepareci for the National Association of
focused on reforming the PUC.
Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) described
Eventually negotiations between
ways that commissions could survive deregulation of the
the legislative staff and the
industries they were created to regulate:
administration broke off. The
administration's bills died after
Regulatory commissions remain relevant and in
environmental groups and the control of their environments by creating effective
utilities opposed them. organizations/ applying effective methods of
regulation and convincing others of their worth.
In January 1995, the Failure to adequately adapt to changing circum
administration proposed making stances can cause them to lose control of their
those same changes under its environments.
authority to administratively
The report, Transforming Public Utility Commissions in
reorganize executive agencies.
the New Regulatory Environment: Some Issues and Ideas
The Little Hoover Commission
for Managing Change, was prepared by the National
reviewed the plan as required by
Regulatory Research Institute, NARUC's research arm.
statute and a majority of
commissioners endorsed it with
some recommended changes.
The Senate, however, voted down the plan.
By 1996, the drive to reorganize the state energy-related agencies had
acquired an added impetus. The dramatic restructuring of the energy
industry itself would eliminate the vertical monopolies that are the
foundation of PUC regulation and eliminate government planning for
electrical generation that the Energy Commission was created to
perform. In addition to its landmark work restructuring the energy
industry, the PUC launched an internal review to rethink its mission in a
competitive era. The projectJ called Vision 2000, invited utilities and
interest groups that participate in commission proceedingsJ as well as
the commission staff, to critique the PUC's internal workings and help
to identify solutions.
The Vision 2000 document recognized that the industries were changing
in different ways and at different paces, that old regulations did not
work and there was a need for "new regulatory techniques which rely on
well-structured incentives supplemented by strong enforcement
programs to protect against market abuses.'; Based on that process, the
PUC in the summer of 1 996 adopted a pian that replaced an internal
structure based on the role staff played -- advocacy, advisory and
compliance, consumer protection, safety enforcement to one based on
14
Background
the industries the Public Utilities Commission regulates
telecommunications, energy, rail safety, carriers and water. The plan
was widely criticized by the PUC staff, the utilities, small businesses and
special interest groups for dealing with structure before process, and
especially for its attempt to blend the advocacy and advisory staff within
the PUC.
The Commissioners saw Vision 2000 as a pivotal opportunity for the
PUC to remake itself in the image of the new markets, and especially
before the Legislature remade the agency. One Commissioner said the
situation reminded him of a quote from a Harvard University president,
which he paraphrased:
He declared to the senate of the university that the last phase of
an organization in a death throe is that it shifts its focus from
serving an external societal purpose to an overriding concern with
conserving the state of its constituent members.
14
The issues of restructuring the energy industry and reforming the PUC
converged in the summer of 1 996 with the passage of a bill on electrical
restructuring and two bills that dealt with PUC procedures.
• Electrical restructuring. AB 1890 (Brulte) authorized the
collection of transition costs to reimburse the utilities for
investments that will be worth less in competitive markets,
created an Independent System Operator to govern the
transmission network and effect trades, continued funding for
research and development, reaffirmed the State's commitment to
commercialize renewable resources and staked out the PUC's
responsibilities to protect consumers from overaggressive
marketing.
• PUC procedural reform. 5B 960 (Leonard) recreated a
ratepayer advocacy unit in the PUC, required commissioners to
be more involved in the fact-gathering processes, and created
three classes of procedures quasi-judicial, quasi-legislative and
rate-making.
• Judicial review. 5B 1 533 (Calderon) allowed for PUC decisions
in adjudicatory cases to be appealed to the appellate court and
for the court to determine if decisions are based on the evidence
in the case.
The bills substantially dealt with some of the most pressing issues before
the Legislature, particularly those associated with the PUC's plan to
restructure electricity service. But other issues prompted by rapidly
changing utilities were not resolved. Among the remaining issues are the
government functions that will be needed In the future, the best
structure for accomplishing those functions and the procedures and
pOlicy making paths those agencies should follow.
15
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
Energy
T
hree forms of energy -- electricity,
Total Energy Costs
natural gas and transportation fuels
comprise 85 percent of the developed
energy consumed in the State. These
three forms also define the majority of
energy-related policy issues -- debates
that involve a combination of economic
forces, technological developments and
political preferences.
N ev a d a ~r--~.,,_illf,""_."~,,_~,}m~illfu~~1lTh~~iii~11iil~1li~U1l
Texas !,~;;;, L"~;'c;,, i,':"';";! -
The United States spends nearly $500
Orego n r~ln~['i':;:-:~~C;ITt1~C£%F.:m
billion on energy each yearJ and
United States
Californians are responsible for about a
dime out of every dollar spent. The o 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500
typical California resident served by an Dollars
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration
investor-owned utility spends $65 a
month on electricity and $32 a month on
Energy costs are influenced by transportation factors,
natural gas.15 climate, and fuel sources, as well as electricity rates.
Electricity. Electricity accounts for only 10 percent of the energy
consumed in California, but that fact understates its value in the energy
mix. Electricity accounts for nearly 50 cents out of every dollar spent
on energy, and for most uses it is a commodity with no practical
substitute. The State's network for providing electricity is elaborate:
19,000 power plants, 2,500 substations, 40,000 miles of transmission
lines. In California, five investor-owned utilities, 26 municipal utilities,
four irrigation districts and five rural electric cooperatives provide power.
But 75 percent of the electricity is provided by the three largest investor
owned suppliers. Pacific Gas and Electric Company, headquartered in
San Francisco, with a service area roughly from the Oregon border to the
Tehachapi Mountains, is the largest investor-owned power utility in the
nation with electricity revenue in 1995 of $9.6 billion. Southern
California Edison Company headquartered in Rosemead, is the nation's
I
second largest investor-owned electricity provider with 1995 revenues
of $8.4 billion. And San Diego Gas and Electric Company had 1995
electricity revenues of $1.5 billion.
Equally important are the State's government-owned electricity suppliers.
These government agencies vary greatly in size from the Los Angeles
Department of Water and Power, which generates and sells electricity,
to communities like Anaheim that distribute power purchased from
federal authorities and private generators. The government-owned
utilities were created as an alternative to private monopolies and
generally operate under the rules established for government agencies:
elected officials, open meetings and public referendum of decisions.
They are not regulated by the PUC.
16
Background
The large investor-owned and municipal electricity providers are vertical
monopolies, owning and controlling the generation, transmission and
local distribution of electricity.
For more than a decade, the generation aspects of the industry have
become increasingly competitive. New technologies have emerged that
can produce electricity cheaper than the technology of older and larger
power stations. Federal laws have passed requiring utilities to purchase
power from Independent producers. And more recent federal reforms
have effectively required the owners of transmission facilities to become
common earners, opening wider the market for wholesale electricity
transactions.
Encouraging more competition among generators and allowing for retail
trades will require placing the transmission system into the hands of an
independent dispatch entity called the Independent System Operator.
Most industry, academic and government experts see the distribution
system remaining a monopoly for the near term.
Natural gas. Natural gas is
Bulking Up For Competition
provided by a network of
pipelines that deliver the gas from
producing regions, such as In October 1996, two of California's large investor
Canada and the southwestern owned energy utilities announced that they would
United States, to areas where it is attempt to merge their operations in anticipation of
used. The largest distributors of competitive energy markets.
natural gas in California are
Enova Corp., the parent company of San Diego Gas and
Pacific Gas and Electric Company,
Electric Company; and Pacific Enterprises, the parent
With annual gas revenues of $1 .1
company of Southern California Gas Company, said the
billion, Southern California Gas
merger would better position them to compete for energy
Company with annual revenues of
customers throughout the southern part of the State. It
$ 2.6 billion, and San Diego Gas would immediately create a company with $4.25 billion
and Electric Company with $ 310 in annual sales.
million in annual gas revenues.
The merger will require approval of the PUC, the Federal
Federal regulation of interstate Energy Regulatory Commission, the Nuclear Regulatory
gas transactions has largely Commission and the shareholders of both companies.
shaped industry trends. In the
In 1991, a proposed merger of Southern California
mld-19705, strict regulation of
Edison Company and San Diego Gas and Electric
the pricing of interstate gas
Company failed after critics argued the proposal was
discouraged exploration and
anti-competitive.
production, resulting in winter
time shortages and higher prices
than consumers would have paid
under relaxed regulation. In 1978 Congress passed the Natural Gas
Policy Act, which deregulated the price of newly discovered natural gas
and eliminated the distinction between interstate and intrastate gas.
While simple in concept, the process of turning pipelines Into common
carners has been criticized for its complex and lengthy Implementation.
The PUC's rate-making role has largely been to regulate the investments
17
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
and pricing of the distribution facilities operated by the investor-owned
monopolies. In California, the result has been competition among
producers to serve the largest clients and an ongoing debate in
regulatory arenas about how to prevent small consumers from picking up
an inordinate share of the fixed costs.
While the utilities see a gradual trend of increasing competition, nearly
all homeowners and small businesses still have one logical choice for gas
service -- the historic monopoly provider. The result is a bifurcated
market of JJcorell and "non-corell customers. Non-core customers are
businesses that use so much gas that providers will compete for their
business, while core customers are those relying on historic providers.
Transportation fuels. About Gasoline Expenditures
half of the energy consumed in
the State is used to move people 20.000
and goods. Californians consume
nearly 1 billion gallons of gasoline
a month. On a global scale, 15,000
California is the third largest
consumer of gasoline, after only
~
the United States as a whole and
~ 10.000
Russia. 0
0
Gasoline and diesel account for
5,000
_I
most of the transportation fuel.
--
California's consumption allows I ..
JI
both consumers and policy LI ., ~
0
makers to exert significant
influence on the market and California Mass. New '(ork Texas
natjon~1 policies, such as the Arizona Florida Nevada Oregon
reformulation of transportation Source: u.s, Energy Information Administration
fuels to pollutants. The market Gas expenditures make up much of the transportation costs,
for transportation fuel is for the and large states make up much of the market.
most part competitive, but
inventories and transactions are closely monitored to assess pricing and
supply trends that could impact other sectors of the economy.
In the future, the market for electricity, natural gas and transportation
fuels are expected to increasingly overlap -- as more natural gas is used
to generate electricity and as more electricity is used for transportation.
Currently about one-third of the State's electricity is generated from
natural gas.
Energy: Endowments, Decisions
The trends toward competitive utility services and the Increasing inter
relationships between fuel sources are common among large industrial
states. But individual circumstances influence how states and regions
meet energy needs.
18
Background
The choices policy makers face are a
The Price of Power
product of what the University of
California's Energy Institute refers to as Average electric rates per kilowatthour
endowments and decisions.16
Arizona
Endowments are the natural resources, Florida····.···
California •••••••••••
geography, demographics and other
factors that shape the landscape of a
region's energy needs and options for Massachusetts ••••••••••••
Nevada·······
meeting those needs. The decisions New YOrk ••••••••••••
reflect the choices, based on oregon·····
endowments, that are made by market Texas·······
players and policy makers. Two facts
capture the success and failure of those
choices: California's electricity rates are
o 2 4 6 a 10 12
among the highest in the nation, but Source US Energy Information Admirllstrallon
California's electric bills are among the
lowest. Among California's energy Electric rates are a product of available resources~
regulatory policies and utility decisions.
endowments:
• California is an enormous energy market. While California's per
capita energy use is among the lowest in the nation, the market
is by far the largest in the nation for electricity, natural gas and
transportation fuels. From a policy standpoint, the size of the
California market means that state policies -- such as the electric
vehicle mandate have the ability to shape market factors in the
region and nation. Conversely, federal policies -- such as the
push toward competitive energy markets -- can have a more
profound effect in California.
• California's energy demands are growing. Because of population
and economic growth, peak demand for electricity is expected to
increase over the next 20 years by 40 percent and overall energy
use is expected to increase by 29 percent. About three-quarters
of the higher demand should be satisfied with energy efficiency,
but the balance will have to come from increased generation.17
• Air pollution heavily influences energy policies. Pollution control
efforts have allowed many urban areas to see air quality
improvements despite rapid growth. But major metropolitan
areas still have some of the dirtiest air in the nation and efforts
to reduce the public health threats without hampering the
economy increasingly require coordination among energy,
transportation and air pollution agencies.
• California lacks cheap fuel sources. Unlike other states with large
fossil fuel reserves or hydroelectric generators, most of
California's energy has to be imported. This fact contributes to
the State's high electricity rates and is among the reasons the
State has encouraged solar, wind and other locally derived
renewable resources.
19
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
• California's mild climate. The temperate climate of coastal cities
minimizes the energy used to keep warm in the winter and cool
in the summer. While this results in lower energy consumption
per household, it requires utilities to recover fixed costs, such as
distribution lines and billing, over fewer energy sales.
Given these endowments, utility managers and policy makers have made
decisions about how energy needs can be met while satisfying other
economic and environmental policy goals. Among the decisions made
in California that have contributed to the State's low electricity bills and
high electricity rates are the following:
•
High-cost nuclear power. Nuclear power plants were encouraged
and constructed -- ultimately at greater costs than were
anticipated and with higher operational costs than fossil fuel
plants. For instance, Diablo Canyon, originally estimated to cost
$500 million, cost $5 billion to construct.
•
Independent power purchases. The PUC in the early 1980s
required utilities to purchase independently produced power ~~
most of it from gas-fired cogeneration plants located at
manufacturing facilities -- at fixed prices. As oil and gas prices
fell. these fixed contracts required the utilities to continue buying
power far above market rates. Even
without restructuring, these costs would
dramatically decline over the next five
Behind the Higher Rates
years as the fixed contracts expire. More
recently negotiated contracts allow prices
A review by a private consultant of rates
to be adjusted to reflect the current
charged by San Diego Gas and Electric
market costs.
Company concluded that two factors are
• to blame for the utility's rates historically
Inefficient regulation. The PUC, like
being more than 40 percent above the
some of its peers nationwide, continued
national average. The largest factor -
to use inefficient cost-plus or rate-of
responsible for more than half of the
return rate-making that encourages above-average rates ~- was the region's
higher costs and rewards inefficiency. mild climate, which forces the company
The regulations became even more to recover its fixed costs across lower
complicated as the PUC tried to than average sales. The second largest
compensate for those shortcomings, factor -~ responsible for about one-sixth
usually by layering on additional of the over-average rates was the
physical inability of the utility to tap the
proceedings. One former PUC staff
cheapest available sources of electricity.
member called it a "regulatory hydra of
well-intentioned proceedings.
//18
•
Efficiency investments. California, more than other states,
required utilities to invest in research and development and
conservation. These costs are responsible for 3 percent of the
average electric bill. 19 Program supporters assert the lower bills
resulting from efficiency gains more than compensate for the
higher rates resulting from additional investment. Per capita
energy consumption has decreased by 15 percent since 1978.
20
Background
Some of the factors contributing to the high rates are already easing,
primarily as above-market contracts expire over the next five years, In
addition, the threat of competition has encouraged the monopolies to
find ways to cut costs, and those savings are reflected in lower rates.
The largest electricity consumers, however, especially manufacturing
facilities sought after by competing states, have not benefited from the
efficiency improvements and must endure the higher rates associated
with nuclear and other uneconomic generating decisions. The concern
over rates paid by the large consumers has provided much of the political
impetus to use competition to drive down generation costs. It also has
driven the debate toward opening retail sales to competition -- allowing
customers to negotiate contracts directly with power producers.
Energy: Electricity Competition
T
he genesis of competition in
How Technology Slew Monopolies
the electricity industry rests
in the energy crises of the 1970s.
Congress responded to oil FERC described how technology undermined the
shortages, rising electricity costs, rationale for monopoly power utilities in its 1995 rule
and the decreasing efficiencies of promoting wholesale competition among generators:
large utility-owned generating
In addition to economic changes in the industry,
stations by enacting in 1 978 the
significant technological changes in both generation
Public Utility Regulatory Policies
and transmission have occurred since 1935. Through
Act (PURPA), The law required
the 1960s, bigger was cheaper in the generation
utilities to purchase power from
sector and the industry was able to capitalize on
"Qualifying Facilities," or JlQFs.
II economies of scale to produce power at lower per
To qualify, the facilities had to unit costs from larger and larger plants, .. , Scale
use alternative sources of energy economies encouraged power generation by large
or IIcogenerate" the electricity as vertically integrated utility companies that also
part of another use of fossil fuels, transmitted and distributed power.
such as a steam generator at a
food processing plant. The law Beginning in the 1970s, however, additional
economies of scale in generation were no longer
required utilities to purchase the
being achieved. A significant factor was that larger
power at the avoided cost" -
lI generation units were found to need relatively greater
that is, the cost the utility would
maintenance and experience longer down times ....
have paid for the next unit of
Bigger was no longer better. Further dictating against
power from a new generator.
larger generation units were advances in technologies
The law effectively created
that aI/owed scale economies to be exploited by
competition among independent smaller size units, thereby allowing smaller new plants
and utility generators. to be brought on line at costs below those of the
large plants of the 1970s,
The efforts by state regulators to
implement PURPA were fraught
with controversy and are partly to blame for the State's above-average
rates. Despite controversies over prices, the policy proved that
electricity generation was not a natural monopoly. Many companies
using many fuels and technologies can generate electricity provided
there is a market in which to sell it. The result: California utilities have
more than 600 contracts with independent producers. QFs produce
21
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
nearly 20 percent of the electricity sold by investor·owned utilities in
California. They account for more than half of the generation capacity
added to the grid since 1982. Even utilities have gotten into the OF
business -- selling "independent power" to other utilities and themselves.
As competition percolated
The Race for Competition and Lower Price.r;;
through the brick and mortar
represented by the monopolies
and regulating commissions, the The federal Energy Act of 1992 was the starting gun for
California's race toward competitive electricity markets.
economic foundation and the
social compact that was built
February 1993. The PUC published California's Electric
upon it began to erode. In 1992,
Services Industry: Perspectives on the Past Strategies
Congress pushed the industry
for the Future, more commonly called the "Yellow Book,"
closer to full-scale competition by
in which it conceded the failure of cost-plus regulation
enacting the Energy Policy Act.
and the need to replace regulation with competition.
The act promoted greater
wholesale competition by
April 1994. The PUC released its Order Instituting
lowering the threshold for new
Rulemaking and Investigation on the Commission's
producers to enter the market and
Proposed Policies Governing Restructuring California's
allowing greater access to the Electrical Services Industry and Reforming Regulation,
transmission lines owned by more commonly known as the "Blue Book." The order
monopoly utilities. The 1992 act proposed creation of a competitive wholesale market
also amended the Public Utility modeled after the British pool system and a direct access
Holding Company Act, enabling a market so large customers could directly chose among
generators. The distribution system, which will remain
new class of wholesale
monopolistic, would be governed by performance-based
generators to compete for
rate-making that would reward utilities for cutting costs.
business by exempting them from
regulation by the Securities and
May 1995. The PUC issued two competing proposals:
Exchange Commission.
One plan called for generators to sell power into a pool,
delivering to utility customers the cheapest available
The 1~92 act prohibited the power. The other allowed customers to buy directly
Federal Energy Regulatory from generators. The proposals generated more
Commission from ordering retail controversy than consensus over how to proceed.
competition, but allowed states to
create a market where individual June 1995. A memorandum of understanding was
customers could buy power from negotiated with the help of legislators and the Governor
independent producers. and signed by most of the major parties supporting a
wholesale market with phased-in retail competition.
The PUC, recognizing the failure
of regulation to deliver low rates, December 1995. The PUC voted 3-2 to back a plan
pursued competitive markets at a based on the June deal, with minority members offering
pace unparalleled in the nation. an alternate plan to accelerate retail competition. One
Commissioner said the vote was not a disagreement on
The decision to move quickly was
how to restructure, but rather: "One plan says go fast
inspired in part by the experience
and the other plan says go faster."
of natural gas in which gradual
deregulation delayed the benefits
of competition without reducing
the unavoidable costs associated With such a transition. The PUC
adopted a plan in December 1995 that called on the large investor
owned utilities to petition FERC for permission to create a competitive
system. The utilities filed those petitions in April 1996. In August
22
Background
1996, the Legislature endorsed and refined key aspects of the plan by
enacting AS 1890 (Brulte). The legislation set the stage for realigning
the State1s energy-related organizations.
Telecommunications
E
lectricity and natural gas service share with telecommunications a
history of monopoly providers and government regulation that has
come under increasing competitive pressures. Energy and
telecommunications utilities, however, are different in some essential
ways: Telecommunications services do not have the same environmental
impacts as energy services. And energy issues go far beyond the
services of investor-owned utilities to include municipal providers,
transportation issues, and concerns over energy imports. While
telecommunications has become more complex as technology has
allowed for competition and new services, the PUC has remained the
State's central regulatory forum. The PUC's roles in telecom
munications, however, are similar to those in monopoly energy markets:
• The PUC sets rates. After reviewing and analyzing the
expenses and other business decisions of monopoly providers,
the PUC sets rates that are fair and reasonable for consumers
while providing for a return on utility investment.
• The PUC implements public goods programs. The PUC
developed funding and other mechanisms to satisfy such public
policy goals as universal service, which ensures that all segments
of society have access to affordable phone services. Similarly,
the PUC administers programs that provide hearing-impaired
people with devices allowing them to communicate by phone.
• The PUC resolves customer complaints. While utility
customers can try to work out problems directly with the utility
I
the PUC has informal and formal procedures for settling disputes
between the captive customer and the monopoly. The PUC has
expanded this role to take in disputes between consumers and
competitive service providers within PUC jurisdiction.
The historic focus of the PUC's telecommunications regulation has been
22 local exchange companies that have had exclusive franchises to
provide basic service -- dial tone local calls and access to other services.
l
Pacific 8ell, the former affiliate of AT&T, IS by far the largest company
of the 22 iocal exchanges. General Telephone of California (GTE) is the
second largest provider. There are three "mid-sized" companies -
Citizens, Contel and Roseville, and 1 7 small companies that serve
Californians in such communities as Foresthill. Calaveras, Ducor and
Volcano. GTE is in the process of acquiring Conte!. When that merger
is complete, Pac Bell and GTE will account for 98.6 percent of the
access lines In the State.
23
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
Besides the 22 local exchanges the PUC regulates a rapidly growing
t
number of other companies that offer other telecommunications
technologies or specialize in services that were once part of the vertical
monopolies. Just 15 years ago, the PUC had jurisdiction over 75
telecommunication companies. Today, more than 400 companies fall
within the Commission's purview, and competition IS just beginning at
the local level. Most of the new companies reflect the emergence of
wireless technology and long-distance resellers.20
Telecommunications: Deregulation
L
ike energy utilities, the telecommunicatIons industry is regulated at
both the federal and state level. And like energy, the pressure to
allow competition in telecommunications was initiated at the federal
level. In the 1950s, the Federal Communications Commission began
wrestling with applications from companies that wanted to use new
microwave technologies to create private communication systems. The
applications sparked a debate over whether the telecommunications
companies were still natural monopolies, whether the public interest
would be served by competition and whether that competition
threatened national security by challenging the financial integrity of the
nation's (AT&T's) network. In 1969, the FCC finally gave MCI
permission to construct a point-to-point microwave link that it could sell
to individual users -- providing the first real test of the theory that at
least some telephone services were not natural monopolies.
While the FCC dealt with the permit applications and Congress debated
the possibility of statutory reforms, the Department of Justice developed
an antitrust case and took AT & T to court, arguing that the monopoly had
taken illegal steps to thwart emerging competition in aspects of the
network that were not true monopolies -- historically in the telephone
equipment market and, as MCI was proving, in long-distance services.
In a 1984 consent decreet U.S. District Court Judge Harold Greene
ordered that AT&T be divested of its 22 regional affiliates known as
Jlbaby bellsll and allowed for competition in the long-distance market.
The decree left the regulation -- and deregulation -- of local companies
to the states. But it also restricted the regional companies from entering
the long distance and equipment manufacturing businesses.
The California PUC, following the federal model, has pushed piecemeal
toward competition. First regional phone companies were required to
allow long-distance companies to access their customers. This required
the PUC to determine costs and set access prices for the individual
components of the local network, a process known as unbundling. Next
the PUC required the local exchange companies to allow competitors to
hook their equipment to that of the local telephone companies,
In 1993, the Commission issued a report, Enhancing California's
Competitive Strength: A StraTegy for Telecommunications
24
Background
Infrastructure. The report signaled the PUC's intent to open the balance
of the telephone network to competition. The Legislature responded that
year with AS 3606 (MooreL which refined and accelerated the
Commission's plan to increase competition.
The PUC has attempted to induce
Congress Embraces Competition
competition by requiring existing
telephone companies to sell
services at discounted prices to The Telecommunications Act of 1996 made four basIc
wholesale companies that "resell" changes affecting the regulated aspects of the
those services in competitIOn telecommunications network:
with the local companies. At the
• Requires local competition. The law overrules
same time! the PUC replaced its
any state laws that limit competition of local
traditional cost-of-service rate
phone service. California already had both a
making with price caps requiring
statute and a regulatory strategy for allowing
the largest local exchange
local phone competition by January 1996, to
companies to share with
allow for resale competition by March 1996 and
customers profits exceeding
to open all telecommunications markets by
established levels. From the January 1997. The markets, however are not
1
consumer standpoint, this fully competitive and the PUC plans to continue
evolution allowed for choice - to regulate local companies because they
first in long distance service, then maintain considerable market power.
in regional toll calls and soon In
local telephone services. • Allows regional bells to compete. The law
allows affiliates of the regional bell companies to
enter the telecommunications equipment
In February 1996, Congress
manufacturing business. It also allows affiliates
passed the Telecommunications
of the regional bells to enter into the long
Act of 1 996, which addressed
distance market once they remove barriers to
policy issues beyond the scope of
competition in the local market.
the consent decree. I n the first
comprehensive revision of federal • Allows for cable-phone crossover. The law
law since the 1934 allows for cable television companies to enter
telecommunications act, into the telephone business and telephone
Congress cleared a path for companies to enter the cable business. It relaxes
competition at virtually every rate regulation, particularly where "crossover"
level of the telecommunications competition exists.
network.
•
Eases ownership rules. The law relaxes FCC
rules that restricted the ownership concentration
The PUC maintains that the
of loca! television stations, national networks and
telecommunications industry
cable systems.
provides a preview of how the
Commission will function in
competitive markets: The intense
scrutiny of rate regulation has given way to performance-based rate
caps, while its role as a referee among market players and as a protector
of the public against unfair business practices has increased.
The PUC also has dealt with new problems: In setting rates, it has tried
to sort out which capital expenditures were needed by monopolies to
maintain service and which \AJere intended to help the companies enter
other markets or fend off potential competitors. It has dealt with privacy
25
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energv
issues in implementing Caller 10 and has conducted antitrust
investigations concerning cellular telephone companies.
At the local level, the PUC must
Assessing Competition: Work in Progress
resolve a number of technical,
legal and financial issues before
competitors can enter some While 1996 federal legislation paves the way for
markets. Among the legal issues competition throughout telecommunications, the long
it must solve are those involving distance market has been open long enough for some
assessment. Critics assert that the benefits have been
the sale and resale of telephone
reaped by the largest customers in the largest markets
services that will be the first
and that AT&T continues to dominate the market.
wave toward local competition.
Among the technical issues are
Three companies -- AT&T, MCI and Sprint -- account for
how to provide equal access to
85 percent of the long distance business. A T& T
switching equipment and how to
maintains about a 60 percent market share, just below
assign new phone numbers. the level of market concentration that historically
While the PUC has tried to prompted government intervention.
establish new area codes in
ways that do not hamper And for the most part, rates have stayed near rate caps,
competition, it will soon need to suggesting that competition is placing little downward
pressure on prices. The experience suggests that
devise an entirely new numbering
competition does not occur by government fiat, and
system because there are not
market rules like those set forth in the
enough area codes to satisfy the
telecommunications act, may need frequent revision to
demand for new numbers.
reduce barriers to market entry.
None of these proceedings
resemble the PUC's traditional
rate cases, in which the monopolies' accountants and lawyers debated
expenses with the PUC's accountants and lawyers. Instead, these
proceedings involve dozens of parties -- large and small consumer
interests; potential competitors and other government agencies. In many
proceedings, billions of dollars in potential sales are at stake -- along with
the chances for competition to take root and for consumers to benefit
from the lower prices that result when competition guides the market.
A large challenge for the PUC is to keep pace with the changing
technology and to devise strategies quickly for meeting the policy goals
of service reliability and encouraging competition. The technical changes
are mirrored by changes in the industry that the PUC must assess for
their impacts on competition -- such as GTE's purchase of Contel and the
proposed merger of Southwestern Bell Communications and Pacific Bell.
While it oversees the birth of competition in previously monopolistic
sectors of the industry, the future role of the PUC is being debated: Do
consumers who have long been protected from the price abuses of a
single telecommunications provider need the same kind of protection in
a market where companies are scrambling for their business? Do
competitors need a venue for resolving their disputes? When does
potential market power abuse end and competition really begin?
26
Background
Transportation
T
he puc has jurisdiction over seven types of public transportation
providers. An eighth and largest type -- freight trucks -- will move
out of the PUC's jurisdiction in
January of 1997 as a result of
legislation in 1 996. PUC-Regulated Transportation Providers
Currently, the PUC requires each
1. Household goods movers. About 1,200 household
carrier to obtain a PUC permit, goods carriers operate in the State. The PUC sets tariffs,
and as a condition of the permit which include maximum rates, rules for estimating the
they must carry liability insurance cost of moves, losses, damage claims and carrier
and comply with safety conduct. Movers set prices in compliance with the tariff.
requirements. Also in each case,
the PUC arbitrates consumer 2. Passenger motor carriers. There are 200 privately
owned passenger stage carriers (buses) with scheduled
complaints and can take
services and individual fares; 2,227 charter bus
administrative enforcement action
companies; about 12 limousine companies; and hundreds
against operators who violate the
of shuttle companies (mostly airport shuttles). Municipal
conditions of their permit.
buses are not under PUC jurisdiction. Companies with
set schedules and routes file tariffs specifying per-person
The PUC was created when
rates. Companies can make small rate changes without
railroads had a de facto monopoly approval, but apply to the PUC to make large changes.
on transportation and the public The PUC approves most requests for rate changes, but
demanded that it be protected only after determining whether competition exists.
from the abuses and corruption
that stymied industry and 3. Freight and passenger rail safety. The PUC Inspects
heavy rail systems, such as Union Pacific and Santa Fe
commerce. The railroad
rail companies, for compliance with state and federal
monopoly was eroded with the
standards concerning tracks, equipment, operations,
development of trucking,
signals and hazardous materials. PUC inspectors are
passenger buses and airlines. But
trained and certified by the Federal Railroad
rate regulation continued until the
Administration. Under state law, the PUC identifies sites
federal government pre-empted
vulnerable to accidents. It oversees rail worker safety
states from economic regulation and investigates accidents. The PUC reviews and makes
in the interests of interstate recommendations on rail mergers and track
commerce. abandonments to the U.S. Surface Transportation Board.
Trucking rate regulation, on the 4. Transit system safety. The PUC reviews the safety
other hand, was established at programs of transit systems, including the San Francisco,
BART, Metro Rail, San Diego, Santa Clara and
the behest of the trucking
Sacramento light rail systems.
industry. Intense competition
during the Depression of the
5. Water vessels. Operators carrying passengers or
1930s was driving firms out of
goods for-hire, such as the Santa Catalina Island ferry,
business and government rate
must obtain PUC permits and may have to file tariffs.
setting eased those pressures at
a time when stability in the 6. Airlines. Airlines must file evidence of liability
marketplace was valued over insurance, but the PUC takes no other action.
efficiency.
7. Hot air balloons. Operators must obtain a PUC permit
Deregulation of transportation and comply with safety and consumer protection rules.
began at the federal level and
27
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
was the first large industry in which Congress became convinced that
government regulation of prices was a poor substitute for competition.
But while the deregulation effort is more than two decades old, the PUC
maintains rate regulation over household goods movers and passenger
carriers. And as its economic regulation has diminished, the PUC has
increased its role in licensing companies, enforcing insurance
requirements, setting and enforcing safety standards and resolving
consumer complaints.
Transportation: Legislation
I
n 1980, Congress deregulated interstate trucking. In 1994 Congress
took the next step by pre-empting state regulation of intrastate "rates,
routes and service" of motor and air carriers, except for movers of
household goods. The 1994 act left safety regulation of trucking with
the states, but did not define what regulatory activities qualify as safety
related.
Many states claim safety is tied to economic considerations, allowing
them to require proof of insurance and examine a company's economic
viability. Federal policy makers are considering a national liability
insurance data base for intrastate and interstate trucking that would pre
empt state authority to require proof of insurance as an operating
condition. That data base could become a reality within the next two
years.
In California, the Governor responded to the 1994 federal law by
appointing a 'iDeregulation Task Force" to determine how the State
could best perform the remaining insurance and safety-related functions.
The task force was made up of state officials and industry
representatives and chaired by the Secretary of the Business,
Transportation and Housing Agency.
The task force had difficulty reaching agreement. The PUC proposed a
"one-stop" solution that would consolidate the administrative duties at
the PUC. The California Trucking Association wanted all of the functions
consolidated at the California Highway Patrol (CHP). And the CHP, while
willing to perform the safety functions, wanted the Department of Motor
Vehicles (DMV) to do the administrative paperwork related to licensing.
In the end, the task force report recommended giving the safety and
licensing duties over all segments of the motor carrier industry, except
for household goods movers and passenger carriers, to the CHP. It also
recommended the State establish a Statewide Motor Carrier Advisory
Committee to deal with long-term plans for improving the safety
program.
Among the specific tasks the report assigned to the committee was to
expand the new CHP registration program to cover all motor carriers,
Including those trucks and buses still under PUC authority.
28
Background
In dissenting comments, the PUC concluded that the only consensus
was among the departments within the Business, Transportation and
Housing Agency: "The disagreement appears to be a turf battle."
Whatever consensus existed when the task force put pen to paper
evaporated when the legislation was drafted. At that point, the agency
changed its position and supported the concept of splitting the duties
between the DMV and the CHP.
In 1996, the Legislature passed AS 1683 (Conroy), which will take
licensing authority over intrastate freight motor carriers away from the
PUC and give it to the DMV; safety enforcement will transfer to the
CHP. During an initial one-year period, the DMV would contract the
registration function back to the PUC. The DMV estimates it will need
70 additional positions to handle this responsibility and will give
preference for those positions to current PUC staff.
Proponents argued that the measure moves PUC functions to other state
agencies that are better suited to carry them out. The CHP already has
a terminal inspection program that determines whether freight companies
have adequate vehicle safety and driver safety programs. The CHP also
believes that an estimated 30,000 truckers who are not enrolled with the
PUC will have a harder time avoiding a program administered by the
DMV and CHP.
The trucking industry pushed the bill primarily because of the PUC's
practice of using trucking fees to regulate other industries. For-hire
carriers have paid the PUC a fee amounting to 0.5 percent of the
companies' gross profits. Private carriers paid somewhat less. Under
the legislation, for-hire carriers will pay significantly less and private
carriers will pay slightly more. The PUC has been collecting $20 million
annually in transportation fees, but has been unable to show that it
spends any more than $9 million regulating the industry.
The passage of AB 1 683 eased the controversies over trucking
regulation. But it also raises new questions about the wisdom of
regulating safety and liability of some transportation carriers at the PUC
while the same functions are being done by other state agencies for the
trucking industry.
Investor-Owned Water Companies
T
he management of water supplies and water quality embodies a
complex set of policy concerns in California. The PUC's jurisdiction
is limited to the rates charged by investor-owned water companies.
Most of the water delivered to cities and farms in California is supplied
by federal, state or local government agencies.
More than 80 percent of the water consumed in California is used on
farms. Of the less than 20 percent of the water that is consumed in
cities, about one-fifth is provided by investor-owned water companies.
29
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
The PUC regulates the rates charged by these companies.
Three other state agencies play significant roles in providing water and
protecting the public's interest:
• Department of Water Resources. The department, which is
part of the Resources Agency, has two missions. It is the central
water planner for the State, periodically estimating needs and
articulating options for meeting those needs. In that capacity,
the department encourages water conservation technologies and
management practices. Most of the department's resources,
however, go to its second mission -- operating the State Water
Project, which is second only to the federal government in the
amount of water it delivers to local suppliers.
• State Water Resources Control Board. The water board,
which is part of the California Environmental Protection Agency,
is comprised of five gubernatorial appointees. The board has
quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial authorities that it uses to
establish water rights and enforce pollution control laws. It is
required by law to protect water quality, balance all of the
competing needs for water and ensure water is used reasonably.
• Department of Health Services. The Department's Office of
Drinking Water and Environmental Management enforces federally
established health standards, whether the service is provided by
a pUbilc or an Investor-owned supplier.
The State's public and investor-owned water suppliers must comply with
the standards and rules issued by each of the three agencies. In
addition, the private water companies must comply with the PUC's
economic regulations. In setting rates, the PUC breaks down the
companies based on their size and applies different procedures to the
different classes:
• Class A -- more than 10,000 customers. There are 13 Class
A companies and each company has several service areas or
districts where it provides water service. The three largest water
companies are the California Water Service Company, with
330,000 customers, Southern California Water Company, with
250,000 customers and San Jose Water Company, with 200,000
customers. Class A companies undergo cost-of-service rate
proceedings, but the PUC may establish performance-based rates.
• Class B -- 2,000 to 10,000 customers. There are seven
Class B companies. Like Class A companies, they can seek a
rate Increase every three years through a general rate case
application, or they can receive approval for rate increases
through a less formal process called an advice letter.
30
Background
• Class C -- 500 to 2,000 customers. There are 32 Class C
companies. They can receive nearly automatic rate hikes tied to
the Consumer Price Index, or they can apply for larger increases.
• Class D -- fewer than 500 customers. There are 143 Class D
companies. They too, can receive virtually automatic rate
I
increases tied to the Consumer Price Index or can file requests for
larger increases.
The investor-owned water companies are not undergoing the competitive
forces that are affecting all of the other industries within the PUC's
jurisdiction. But they are under pressure to improve the management of
the water they supply.
Water Utilities: Pressures to Improve
A
ll domestic water providers, whether public or private, face two
challenges in California. The first is to meet the requirements of
ever-increasing health standards and the second is to comply with
conservation efforts. The health standards are compulsory. As
technology makes it possible to identify smaller concentrations of
contaminants in water -- and as research links those contaminants to
health problems -- water providers are required to meet tougher
standards. Typically that means suppliers must invest in more
sophisticated treatment works.
Water suppliers in California also are under increasing pressure to adopt
strategies that discourage waste in all years and limit water use to the
most essential uses in times of short supply. While the State Water
Resources Control Board has the ability to set strict standards for water
use, the State relies on a set of best management practices that
encourage voluntary compliance with conservation measures. Both
strategies, however, create costs for water suppliers that must be
incorporated in rates. And to the extent that conservation measures
work, water suppliers often must raise rates to cover fixed costs that are
then spread out over a lower volume of sales.
The investor-owned companies have voiced frustration that the PUC
does not fully understand the requirements being placed on them by
other government agencies. They also have complained that the PUC -
preoccupied by the complications of energy and telecommunications
regulations -- has not paid enough attention to their cases and concerns.
Some of the biggest problems rest with the smallest companies. Some
small companies are adjuncts to rural land developments -- where
property owners set up water companies to serve new neighborhoods far
from existing urban services.
Over time, some of the systems are poorly maintained and the owners
do not seek rate increases because they do not want to go through the
31
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
PUC's procedures. As a result, when water quality or conservation
standards require additional investments, some companies are not
financially capable of making the needed improvements.
An additional concern for future regulators is the possibility that cash
short local governments may opt to privatize publicly owned water
systems or to contract out the operational aspects of those systems.
The Association of California Water Agencies has noted that privatization
could limit customer recourse for resolving complaints against public
water providers.
Summary
T
he market for each of these utilities and common carriers -- energy,
telecommunications, transportation and private water suppliers -- is
shaped largely by economic and regulatory forces. The economics are
influenced most heavily by the technology that determines the services
that can be offered and the potential for more than one provider. The
regulations represent politically expressed preferences that constantly
refine the overriding public interest. While each of these utilities
historically had much in common, the changing economic and regulatory
factors are eroding the once-solid common ground.
32
Energy
.:. Competition among electric generator.fi and
the creation of an Independent System
Operator will make some state functions
obsolete, while the State will need to take
on new roles to nurture healthy markets.
•: . Energy-related public goods progran'cfi will
continue in competitive energy markets,
but the State will need more efficient and
adaptable management of those programs.
•: . As economic regulation diminishes and
performance-based rate-nlaking is refined,
the State can consolidate oversight dutie,f)
and end years ofi nter-agency turf wars .
•: . A stronger state energy policy will be
forged if involved seek
agencie~' routine(~'
legislative approval for changes lind are
held accountable annually for progress
toward established goals.
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
34
Energy
For Competition's Sake
Finding 1: As presently constituted, neither the Public Utilities Commission
nor the California Energy Commission is well-designed to perform the State
functions needed by competitive energy markets.
T
he need and political consensus to reform the State's energy
regulatory structure is increasing as energy markets undergo
fundamental change. The sentiment is well-represented by the
testimony of Southern California Edison Company:
Restructuring the industry without reforming the regulatory
process is a recipe for failure, and would represent a decision
only half completed. Without regulatory reform, Californians
simply will not reap the benefits of restructuring they deserve and
have come to expect. In essence" electric restructuring will
produce 'stranded regulators' if the State does not reform both
the CPUC and the Energy Commission. 21
Because of the physical nature of electricity and natural gas and because
of their importance to the economy and public welfare, state oversight
of a competitive energy industry will be essential. The nature of the
oversight agency is framed by two key characteristics -- function and
culture. What will the agency do? And how will it respond to inevitable
conflicts and unforeseeable issues?
Reforming the State's oversight role requires separating eXisting
functions that will not be needed from functions that will be needed and
assessing the competencies and cultures of existing agencies to
determine which is best suited to perform the needed tasks.
35
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
Obsolete Functions
T
he physical network that provides electricity is composed of three
sectors: Generation facilities that generate electricity using nuclear,
fossil-fuel, solar, geothermal, wind and other sources; transmission lines
that transmit electricity from where it is generated to where it is needed;
and distribution substations and wires that distribute the electricity to
consumers.
The PUC has regulated closely the capital and operational expenses of
investor-owned monopolies in all three sectors. The PUC has strived for
reliable and safe service to be delivered to customers at fair and
reasonable rates and with minimal environmental harm.
The Energy Commission's expertise and responsibilities have focused on
generation: calculating the need for additional generation, reducing the
need for generation through efficiency gains, encouraging generation
technologies that are less polluting and renewable, and reviewing
applications for thermal generating plants larger than 50 megawatts.
The plan for restructuring the
The Government as Market
electrical services industry calls
for increasing competition among
generators -- some of which are The PUC's first experience in competitive generation
now owned by the investor markets came when it implemented the Public Utilities
owned utilities, some by Regulatory Policies Act of 1978.
municipal utilities and some by
To encourage the development of independent power
Independent power producers.
producers as provided for by the act, the PUC negotiated
and eventually required the investor-owned utilities to
The transmission system, which
sign contracts with independent producers.
is largely owned by the investor
owned utilities and is regulated
The contracts provided the upstart producers with the
primarily by the Federal Energy certainty they needed to obtain low-cost financing by
Regulatory Commission, would fixing the price the utilities would pay for power for the
become a common carrier of the first 10 years of 30-year contracts.
electricity and be managed by a
new Independent System As a further inducement, the contracts were "front
Operator (ISO). loaded" by fixing the price for electricity on the Energy
Commission's 1982 estimate for the price of oil in 1993
-- $100 a barrel.
The local distribution system is
expected to remain a monopoly in
The contracts successfully induced new generators into
the near term and be provided by
the market. But the scheme proved to be fatally flawed
the traditional utilities, although
as oil prices in late 1985 dropped and stayed low for the
there may be competition to rest of the decade -- leaving ratepayers committed to
provide some distribution-related paying for above-market-price electricIty.
serVices.
One goal of competitive generation markets IS to
The emergence of a competitive elimmate the government's role in making market-like
generation market and the break deciSIOns that concentrate risks onto ratepayers.
up of the mvestor-owned utilities
36
Energy
will render some State regulatory functions obsolete immediately. Other
functions will become obsolete over time.
In testimony and other evidence provided to the Little Hoover
Commission, six general State functions were identified as unnecessary
once competitive forces begin to control the price of electricity supplied
by generators:
1. PUC Generation Responsibilities. The PUC's detailed economic
regulation of the generation sector can be eliminated because the
expenses and revenues associated with those facilities will be governed
by market forces. Any new facilities proposed by investor-owned
utilities would be subjected to market pricing and will not be added to
the rate base of the utility distribution companies. As a result, the PUC
will not have to issue "Certificates of Public Convenience and Necessity"
or conduct environmental reviews for new generation plants. The PUC
will not have to determine the need for new generation through its
Biennial Resource Planning Update or repeat its controversial bidding
process for independent generators. Rate cases will not have to include
the costs of operating and maintaining generation facilities, or ongoing
energy cost reviews. One PUC Commissioner testified that this type of
generation-related planning by the State is best referred to in the "past
tense" -- leaving it to market signals to determine timing and dimension
of generating stations.22
2. PUC Transmission Responsibilities. While the precise
responsibilities associated with the transmission system have not been
resolved, the investor-owned utilities are not expected to propose and
construct new transmission facilities as in the past. The economic
aspects of operating, maintaining or expanding the transmission network
are most likely to fall within the realm of the Independent System
Operator, with continuing authority of the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission.23
3. PUC Electricity Safety and Reliability Responsibilities. The
PUC's safety and reliability oversight of investor-owned utility generation
and transmission facilities can be scaled back and ultimately eliminated
as the ISO assumes its duties and as more generation is provided by
plants not within PUC control. It will be important for the State to
consolidate and coordinate safety and reliability responsibilities,
particularly for generation and transmission facilities, to reduce
duplication and treat similar market players alike.24
4. Energy Commission's "'Load Management" Responsibilities.
The Commission reviews the generation and transmission operations of
investor-owned utilities to ensure they are efficiently making use of the
electricity grid. This efficiency will be achieved without this oversight
as the ISO takes control over transmission operations and competitive
pressures push market players to seek every opportunity to lower costs.
37
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energv
5. Energy Commission's Informational Reports. The Commission's
electricity, energy efficiency, energy technologYI fuels and biennial
reports as currently defined by law, will be of little use in a competitive
l
market. These reports were intended to guide government
determinations of how much electricity was needed and to explore the
alternatives to constructing new generating facilities. That analysis was
to provide a basis for the PUC to consider facilities proposed by the
investor-owned utilities and for the Energy Commission to perform a
JJneeds analysis" as projects came to it for siting review. Some of the
information in those reports will be needed by market players and policy
makers. But the types of analysis and the forms for distribution should
be geared to the needs of the market and policy venues rather than to
the central planning function that the reports previously served.n •
6. The Energy Commission's Public Adviser. The Commission
envisions the public adviser becoming a consumer advocate and
complaint resolver, functions more appropriately housed elsewhere. The
traditional function of helping the public in the process duplicates the
Energy Commission's public information efforts and are unneeded if the
procedures themselves are streamlined and understandable.
Needs of a Competitive Market
T
he promise of competitive markets is to deliver lower prices than
those produced by government-regulated monopolies. Competitive
markets, however, are complex by nature. Oversight agencies will need
real time knowledge of market events and be able to explam trends in
response to public and industry concerns. They will need to act quickly,
confidently and with a sense of neutrality.
The challenges are large. Today the major utilities make 200 electricity
I
trades a day. In a competitive market, 1.5 million transactions a day will
take place.
In addition to the constant flurry of transactions, the energy market will
still be subject to long-term trends of supply and demand. Between
1990 and 2011 the State is expected to gain 4 million new households,
increasing energy needs by 29 percent. The demand for peaking
electricity -- the power needed for those bnef periods of high energy use
-- is expected to grow even faster by 40 percent over the next 18
years. Accommodating this growth, and replacing older inefficient
generators with new efficient ones, will require more generation and
transmission facilities to be sited.
The blackouts of the summer of 1 996 raised significant concerns about
system reliability even before the strains of competition are applied. The
costs of blackouts can be enormous and the potential for more in a
competitive market has policy makers and consumer groups concerned.
The electricity restructuring legislation enacted in 1996 recognized the
need to ensure reliability and provided for the creation of standards and
38
Energy
better interstate protocols to improve reliability.
From testimony and other evidence gathered by the Little Hoover
Commission, six State functions were identified as needed for
competitive energy markets to function well.
1. Consolidated Generation and Transmission Facility Siting.
Energy officials have predicted that because of population growth, the
early retirement of nuclear plants, the advent of electric cars and a
market-demand for cheaper power, California may experience in the near
future the first real surge in new generation facilities in two decades.26
A consolidated and streamlined siting authority is essential to
encouraging the investment in
new generation that is expected
to produce lower-priced power. Meeting Electricity Demands
While the Energy Commission has In gigawatt-hours
an established siting program, the 500,000
approval process for new
400,000
transmission lines has been
fractured and confused.
300,000
Transmission facilities are now 200,000
reviewed by the PUC if they are
100,000
proposed by investor-owned
utilities. Municipal utility districts
o
can approve their own 1992 2011
transmission additions, even if the
lines are outside of their service Other sources •• Conservation
LJ
territory. The Energy Commission Pac Northwest Southwest
reviews transmission lines ~ California
Source: California Energy Commission
associated with new power plants
within its jurisdiction. And there
Growth is expected to push up demand for electricity. Some
is no clear process for licensing
of the new demand will be met with imports and efficiency.
non-utility transmission facilities
should any be proposed.
Recognizing the potential problem nationwide, the Keystone Center, a
non-profit policy institute, recently completed a model state transmission
siting law that closely resembles the Energy Commission's CEQA-like
process for siting power plants. The model law was created because of
concerns that transmission projects were bogged down in review
procedures, adding to costs and creating uncertainty for project planners.
If this process was not improved before the advent of competition, the
group concluded, customers may not be able to capture the benefits of
the market.27
The Little Hoover Commission found significant agreement that the
advent of competition provided the State an opportunity to consolidate
the siting approval processes for generation and transmission. The
39
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
sentiment is well represented by the Energy Commission's testimony;
Consolidation of licensing authority for generation and
transmission facilities in California is one of the most important
steps the Legislature should take to provide evenhanded, fair and
effective land use and environmental regulation of a competitive
generation industry, thereby enhancing regulatory certainty and
process streamlining for all competitors. 28
One PUC Commissioner testified that the siting of generation and
transmIssion facilities should be done by the same agency. But another
Commissioner testified that the PUC saw itself doing environmental
reviews of new transmission facilities as part of its oversight of
distribution monopolies.29
In addition to efficiency in process, consolidating these authorities would
provide a consistent mechanism for the State to apply eminent domain
authority, particularly when it is needed to acquire routes for new
transmission facilities. Historically, transmission facilities were planned
and constructed by investor-owned utilities, which have eminent domain
power granted in the Public Utilities Code. Utilities are not expected to
play that same role in the future. And if utilities were to initiate
transmission additions, eminent domain authority would give them an
unfair advantage over competitors lacking that authority.
The siting of transmission and generation facilities will not require the
same economic thresholds of past government reviews. But proposals
will need to be analyzed to ensure that new facilities are enhancing
competition and not discouraging it, and that new facilities are not
diminish)ng the physical reliability of the grid.30 For those reasons,
consolidating the State' s siting review with the agency responsible for
market power monitoring and system reliability would provide additional
efficiency.
The restructuring prompted by deregulation provides the Legislature the
chance to achieve a policy goal first set in the Warren-Alquist Act: to
consolidate responsibility for regulating electrical generating and related
transmission facilities.31 The siting authority also will continue to be the
best place for the State to coordinate the goals of environmental
protection and economic development as was envisioned by the act.
Similarly, the Governor's 1995 energy reorganization plan envisioned
consolidating the PUC's and Energy Commission's siting authority into
a single agency, which also would have effectively consolidated the
authority to site most generation and transmission facilities. That plan,
however, was designed without consideration of the other oversight
functions that a competitive generation market would need. As a result,
It proposed creating a new facility siting board with no other
responsibilities to perform that function.
40
Energy
2. Consolidated Safety and Reliability Oversight of Generation. In
a competitive market, the State will need to consolidate the safety and
environmental compliance oversight of generating plants to assure that
market players receive equal treatment and that public health and safety
goals are met. The Little Hoover Commission was told that federal.
state and local agencies now competently perform these tasks, and even
appear to coordinate their efforts to reduce overlap and conflicts. The
PUC, for instance, establishes safety standards for investor-owned
facilities and conducts reviews to ensure that utilities are in compliance.
The Energy Commission places conditions on the approval of plants, and
then makes sure those requirements are met. Smaller facilities are
inspected by county authorities and all facilities must comply with
federal and state worker safety laws. While this system may work well
now, the agencies and the utilities will change significantly in the future,
providing the need and the opportunity to realign these functions. In
addition, federal authorities may take on a larger role in this area,
preventing the State from performing this function.
In a competitive market, the costs associated with facilities dropping off
line will be borne more directly by the investors, creating an incentive for
generators to increase their reliability. But there also is increasing
concern that the desire to reduce costs will diminish the overall reliability
of the system. The Energy Commission already has a Transmission
System Evaluation Program and a Generation System Efficiency Program.
Where possible the State will want to consolidate this authority, and
where the function cannot be consolidated it must be coordinated.
3. Market Power Monitoring. The PUC's electricity restructuring plan
attempts to minimize the market power of existing monopoly utilities by
turning transmission facilities over to an ISO and encouraging the utilities
to divest some generating plants. But experts also believe continuous
and detailed monitoring for potential market power abuses will be
required for competitive forces to take and keep control of prices. The
problem, defined by a Harvard researcher, has been detected in a number
of industries where competition has slowly found its way into markets
previously controlled by a limited number of suppliers:
As a basic matter~ market power signifies an ability to affect the
terms of trade in the market. More importantly ~ however~ for the
economists' case regarding the damage to society caused by the
absence of competition, market power translates into an ability
to earn supracompetitive returns~ to maintain excess productive
capacity~ to in vest in superfluous advertising and/or to engage in
other forms of waste.
32
A study of Britain's competitive markets found that the current duopoly
is not delivering the prices that would be expected in a more competitive
market. However, the existence of a market power watchdog was by
itself enough to reduce potential market power abuses.33 Economists
have had a similar experience in telecommunications where the
41
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
constant eye of federal regulators has appeared to reduce market power
abuse even when competition is not vigorous enough to sustain
downward pressure on prices.
Monitoring for market power in the electricity services industry will
require detailed and constant analysis of transactions, and will require a
knowledge of the economic and physical properties that determine the
flow of electrons and the flow of dollars. The appropriate response to
market power abuse will be varied. In some cases, the solution may be
for the Energy Commission to accelerate the applications for new
generators or new transmission facilities in order to encourage
competition. In other cases, antitrust action may be the best solution.
As in other competitive markets, the responsibility for responding to
these problems will be shared among different entities, such as the U.S.
Department of Justice and the State Attorney General, which both have
authority to bring antitrust and related actions against market players
4. Gathering and Analyzing Market Information. I nvestors and
consumers agree that gathering, analyzing and distributing technical
market data by a government agency is critical to market players raising
capital and developing competitive strategies and to consumers seeking
to make informed consumer decisions. Antitrust laws prevent market
players from sharing some critical information, and market data released
by individual competitors is always suspect. The testimony from the
National Conference of State Legislatures summarized the argument
made by many others:
Companies grow and survive on good information in a
competitive market. This role will be even more important jf the
generation sector operates in a less regulated market. The ability
to acquire information about the demand, supply and the ability
to distribute or transmit electricity will determine how successful
the new competitors to todayls utilities can be.34
5. Representing California in Out-of-State Forums. A competitive
market will increase the role of the State in government and industry
venues outside of the State' s borders -- advocating policy reforms in
Congress, before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and in the
courts. Since California is the largest consumer in the nation, its
effectiveness in those venues will be critical to creating and protecting
competitive conditions. Historically, the Energy Commission and the PUC
have both tried to fill this role, occasionally taking different positions on
the same issue. The State' s effectiveness in these venues will require
a consistent and unified voice, best provided by a single source.
6. Registering New Entrants. Competitive markets are likely to create
a number of new distribution-related players, such as marketers and
aggregators. A simple and straightforward registration process is needed
to discourage fraud and police unfair business practices. The State's
electricity restructuring act of 1996 established this function at the PUC.
42
Energy
Core Competencies and Cultures
T
he Little Hoover Commission, as it explored the State functions
needed in competitive energy markets, was advised by a number of
experts to consider how closely the needed functions relate to an
agency's historic competencies, as well as an agency's cultural
attributes for determining and defending the public interest.
Public Utilities Commission. The PUC's core competencies center on
the detailed economic regulation of monopolies and the protection of
consumers through the design of nondiscriminatory rates. It also
establishes and enforces safety and reliability standards to protect
workers and citizens in the production and delivery of inherently
dangerous commodities. As new issues have arisen, it has developed
new regulatory schemes to meet the needs of monopoly investors and
ratepayers. For instance, the PUC has infused conservation alternatives
into plans for meeting growing energy demands, included research and
development programs in the rate base, and established subsidy
programs for low-income residents.
While this evolution has required the PUC to develop new skills, it also
has created a culture of intense intervention at the PUC. The
intervention was done in the name of both the ratepayers and the
shareholders, and carried out through a complex and detailed court-like
process that built a factual record for Commission decision-making.
Inherent in the Commission's push for competitive markets is a strongly
held belief on the part of the PUC's leadership that well-functioning
markets will deliver products more cost-effectively than tightly regulated
markets.
Specifically, the PUC's culture raises three concerns with potential
market competitors: The first is that the PUC will be biased toward
intervention into the market. Second, that the PUC will be biased in
favor of the former monopolies that it has protected from financial risks.
And third, that because of the PUC's large workload and the inability of
Commissioners to be involved in the fact-gathering stages of a case, the
PUC cannot quickly assess issues and make decisions.
Energy Commission. Like the PUC, the Energy Commission was
created in response to market failure -- an under-investment in alternative
and cleaner energy sources and in efficiency technology. It also was
created to clarify State energy policies and consolidate approval of
electricity generating plants.
Over the last decade, the Energy Commission has displayed a maturing
ability to use market forces to increase energy choices and lower prtces,
while advancing publicly held environmental goals.
In the mid-1980s, the Energy Commission pushed -- over the PUC's
43
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
objections -- for new natural gas pipelines into the State that are
expected to save consumers $5.8 billion over 25 years. More recently -
during the gasoline price spike in the spring of 1996 the Energy
Commission correctly and quickly identified the causes of the price
hikes, reducing political pressure for the State to intervene in the market
or ease air pollution requirements that the gasoline industry incorrectly
blamed as the reason for the increase.
The Energy Commission has advocated that the decision of whether to
intervene in markets be left to the Legislature and the Governor. To
counter potential market power abuses the Energy Commission believes
the first response should be traditional antitrust laws, with other priority
remedies including a lowering of market barriers or State support of
transmission additions to increase competition.35
The Energy Commission in its
When Infornl11tion Is Policy Enough
1995 Electricity Report
transformed the uneeds analysis
II
it conducts when new generation One difficult dilemma for free market democracies is
facilities are proposed to conclude knowing when the government should intervene in
that if a plant is financed markets and when it should forgo intervention.
completely at the investors' risk
The 1996 gas pnce spike demonstrated the value of
and complies with environmental
understanding the complexities of the market before
laws it is automatically needed to
intervening in the market. In the first four months of
promote competition.
1996, retail gasoline prices rose from an average of
$1.15 a gallon to nearly $1.50 a gallon. Oil companies
The Energy Commission's fuels
blamed California regulations that required them to
technology branch helped to
upgrade refineries.
develop alternatives to gasoline
that prompted gas suppliers to Some lawmakers advocated increasing taxes to capture
develop cleaner burning fuels. the higher profits being reaped by the oil companies
The Commission participated in while other lawmakers proposed easing clean air
programs that spurred private regulations or reducing fuel taxes to deliver lower prices.
sector research in home appliance
The Energy CommiSSion's nearly Instantaneous analysis
efficiency. And anticipating a
showed that a number of factors contributed to the
competitive electricity market, the
rising prices -- everything from negotiations over Iraqi oil
Commission is looking for ways
sales to normal seasonal demand increases. It found
to nurture an "energy services"
that only 6 to 7 cents of the increase was the result of
industry as a substitute for
California clean air requirements.
government conservation
programs. By correctly predicting the market would correct itself,
the Commission convinced lawmakers to take no action.
Like the PUC, the Commission
relies on public hearings and
plural body decision-making to set policy. But because of a smaller and
more focused workload, Commissioners are directly involved in the
hearings as well as the deliberations and decision-making.
44
Energy
Competitive Market Oversight
V
irtually every state energy reorganization effort of the last 20 years
has struggled with the central problem of how to align the
regulatory authorities associated with the energy monopolies with those
associated with the broader energy markets. The move to competitive
markets completely reframes this debate. The issue before policy
makers now is how to efficiently oversee energy markets that will
become increasingly competitive.
Industry, environmental and consumer groups believe a commission
rather than a department should provide oversight of competitive energy
markets -- to avoid the capriciousness of a department director, to
capture the wisdom of a multi-disciplined decision-making body and to
create the political stability that markets favor.
The core function of that commission will be gathering the detailed
market-related information that is needed for investors and generators
to compete, for consumers to make wise decisions, and for law
enforcement authorities and policy makers to be confident that
competition and not market power abuse or collusion is controlling
prices. Most of the regulatory functions will relate to the environmental
and technical issues involved in siting and operating generation facilities.
Culturally the oversight commission will be required to be a neutral
J
decision-maker / treating all market players fairly. Culturally, the
oversight commission will be needed to make quick decisions and be
focused on the industry. And culturally, the oversight commission will
have to be biased against intervention, relying whenever possible on
market players to respond to fluctuations in supply and price.
Of the State's two energy agencies, the Energy Commission has more
of the core competencies needed to facilitate competition: the ability to
gather data on markets trends, its one-stop siting process and its
technical energy expertise. The Energy Commission also understands
the relationships among energy sources that are becoming more
important as electric cars come to market and more electricity is
produced from natural gas. And the Commission has demonstrated an
understanding of how policies can influence market forces to increase
consumer choice and lower prices.
The various interests are as concerned about how the state reorganizes
itself as they are about the ultimate shape the state government takes.
Some are concerned about dIstracting the agencies With reorganizing the
government when they should remain focused on a restructuring
industry. Others are concerned about the government losing expertise
or prematurely ending needed regulation.
The PUC's former director of strategic planning, among many others,
warned that merging the PUC and the Energy Commission in their
45
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
present form would perpetuate the cultural problems of the two
agencies. Rather, she urged that the functions of the existing agencies
be realigned to reflect the needs of a restructured Industry and the core
competencies of the existing agencies, and suggested a new structure
would emerge from that analysis. 36
In other words, both commissions need to do what they can do best
during the transition to competitive energy markets. After adapting to
the new economic landscape, additional consolidation could take place.
Recommendations
Recommendlltion J-A: During the transition, the Governor and the Legislature
should divest the PUC of the obsolete regulatory functions governing generlltion
lind transmission facilities.
The PUC's economic regulation of generation and transmission facilities
will not be needed when competition begins and the transmission system
is managed by the Independent System Operator, which is now slated
for January 1 988. The PUC will no longer need to conduct
environmental reviews of new generation and transmission facilities, and
will not be in a position to monitor safety and reliability of generation and
transmission facilities.
Recommendation I-B: During the transition to competitive
electricity markets, the Governor and the Legislature should
{livest the Energy Commission of obsolete regulatory and
planning functions.
The obsolete functions known at this time are economic forecasting and
needs analysis associated with approving most generating facilities, its
load management responsibilities and the periodic informational reports.
As competitive markets develop, additional functions may prove to be
unneeded, as well. While it is important for the public to have
knowledge and access concerning decision-making procedures, there is
no need to continue or expand the role of the public adviser to take on
additional duties.
Recommendation I-C: During the transition to competition, the Governor and the
Legislature should assign to the California Energy Commission the new functions
needed to make competitive energy markets operate.
In a competitive electricity generation market, the State will need a
consolidated siting, environmental review and safety compliance
authority for generation and transmission facilities. The market also will
46
Energy
need refined variations of functions already performed by the Energy
Commission -- in particular, the gathering and disseminating of detailed
market information, monitoring for possible market power abuses and
representing the State in regional, national and international regulatory
venues. The Energy Commission also should be given the ability to grant
facility applicants the power of eminent domain on a case-by-case basis.
Recommendation J-D: The Governor and Legislature should amend the
electricity restructuring act of 1996 to assign to the Energy Commission
responsibility for enforcing safety and reliability standards concerning the
transmission grid.
The Legislature correctly realized the important role in a competitive
market of making sure that a reliable system is maintained. It is unclear
at this time how much of that responsibility will rest with federal
authorities. To the extent that the State can playa significant role in
system reliability, that function should be consolidated with other
market-oriented oversight responsibilities. One potential model would
rely on the Independent System Operator to make recommendations to
the Energy Commission regarding standards, have the ISO notify the
Energy Commission of potential violations and have the ISO investigate
system failures. The legal authority for setting and enforcing standards,
however, would be vested in the Energy Commission.
47
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
48
Energy
A Place for Advocacy
Finding 2: The Energy Commission's dual responsibilities as an energy
regulator and an advocate for alternative energy solutions are not compatible
with its new mission of encouraging competition and consumer choice.
A
t the time the Energy Commission was created, linking
regulatory authority with advocacy programs was seen as the
most effective way to influence a highly regulated but highly
inefficient market. In more recent years, the Energy Commission's
advocacy and regulatory roles have been debated as part of the efforts
to defuse turf wars between the Energy Commission and the PUC.
Emerging competition requires that the linkage between regulatory and
advocacy functions be reconsidered, along with the long-term need for
advocacy programs.
In competitive markets government cannot pick the market solution. It
also must be careful about trying to influence the decisions that
producers and consumers make.
The PUC describes one of the State's roles In a competitive market as
a referee. Some market players have adapted as a mantra that
government's role in a competitive utility market is to create a level
playing field.
While there is much skepticism about the need for a specialized utility
referee -- and concern that one company's level playing field is another
company's obstacle course -- the common Interest is that the State be
neutral in its actions.
49
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energv
The Purpose of Dual Responsibilities
T
he Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission
was a product of its times. In the early 1970s, environmentally
minded policy makers became concerned about the environmental and
fiscal fallout of plans to build dozens of nuclear power plants to meet
growing electricity needs. At the same time, development-minded policy
makers became concerned about increasing delays in approving new
generation facilities -- the consequence of 30 different local, state and
federal permits required of new facilities.
After several attempts, the Legislature in 1973 passed a bill to create an
Energy Commission that would forecast energy demands, assess efforts
to reduce that demand through efficiency and provide a consolidated
approval process for generating facilities. For environmentalists, the
Commission's approval process would provide the energy-based needs
test that the PUC's rate-related review of new projects had failed to
provide. For project supporters, the plan offered consolidated permitting.
The bill was vetoed.
Within months, however, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries, in response to the United States' political policies in the
Middle East, cut their shipments of crude oil to the West. Energy prices
skyrocketed and shortages spread. At the request of the Governor, a
nearly identical bill to the one that had been vetoed was passed by the
Legislature. In May 1974 the Warren-Alquist Act was signed into law.
In giving the Energy Commission authority to approve new power plants,
the Legislature expected the agency to consider those projects in light
of anticipated energy demands, the ability of efficiency efforts to reduce
demands, the environmental consequences of new plants and less
damaging alternatives. Just as the Public Utilities Commission had been
created in response to the failure of the market to economically provide
competitive utility services, the Energy Commission was created in
response to the failure of the PUC to consider these other policy
concerns when approving new plants by the investor-owned utilities.
The Legislature also gave the Energy Commission a range of public
purpose programs intended to spur the market to develop those less
damaging alternatives -- ones that were less polluting, less reliant on
imported fuels and less consuming of existing energy supplies. The
Warren-Alquist Act specifically established four mandates that are the
basis for the Commission's organizational divisions:
1. Energy Forecasting and Planning. These functions were
intended to produce a State energy policy that was established
through an open process of determining trends, making
projections and assessing options for meeting anticipated energy
needs. A natural byproduct of this planning is the creation of a
state contingency plan for responding to energy emergencies.
50
Energy
While most of these activities were similar to those often
assigned to departments, the Commission has relied on its quasl
judicial authority to develop the policy documents and forecasts.
2. Technology Development. This function was largely
intended to compensate for the market's failure to invest in
research, development and demonstration of technologies that
would use alternative and cleaner energy sources particularly
in the area of transportation fuels. This function is similar to
ones often assigned to departments.
3. Energy Efficiency and Conservation. This function was a
hybrid of grant and loan programs for making improvements to
hospitals, schools and public buildings, research programs and
public education programs, and the establishment of building and
appliance efficiency standards, which the Commission adopted
through its process of public hearings and deliberations.
4. Facility Siting and Environmental Protection. This
function most heavily relied upon the Commission's quasi-judicial
procedures to establish a record for making decisions that
satisfied a number of environmental, public health and due
process laws.
As the Commission has matured, the value of its independent
components has become clear -- saving residents money, generating jobs
and encouraging the technological innovation that could help solve a
variety of expensive policy problems. Some of these accomplishments
are also the product of the Public Utilities Commission, which has
administered rate-based surcharges for research and development, over
time eliminated disincentives to conservation and created incentives for
the utilities to invest in efficiency measures.
Efficiency investments, for instance, have saved businesses and
residents billions of dollars. From 1976 to 1993, the State's economy
grew by 60 percent while energy use grew by only 23 percent. The
Energy Commission estimates that the various efficiency efforts have
saved the State $27 billion in the last 20 years. Because of the State's
appliance standards, refrigerators now use only one-third the electricity
of those built a generation ago. Building efficiency standards alone have
prevented the need to build an additional 13 power plants at a cost of
$11.6 billion. Those savings are expected to nearly double during the
next 13 years, and could compound even qUicker If the standards are
revised to include recently developed construction techniques.37
Technology programs have made California a capital of innovation. The
Energy Commission reports that 30,000 Jobs are associated with the
$6.9 billion alternative energy industry. Many of these businesses are
pioneering innovations that have strong export potential, adding to the
State's position as a global trader.
51
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
And alternative energy programs are making it easier to meet other
environmental goals. The research, development and commercialization
of alternative fuels and renewable energy sources have helped the State
to meet energy needs in cleaner ways, reducing the health costs of air
pollution and avoiding the costs of stricter air pollution controls.
Technological advances continue to bring renewable sources closer to
market rates. Wind power, for example, has dropped from 25 cents a
kilowatt-hour to between 4 and 5 cents a kilowatt-hour -- nearly the
price of the cheapest fossil-fueled generator.38
Some policy experts believe the
success of these programs is in More Opportunities
part the result of Commission
oversight. The Energy While significant improvements have been made to
Commission is thought to be able increase the efficiency of homes, publicly funded
to more vigorously defend these research and development is still finding opportunities to
programs during tight budget save large amounts of money.
times and to insulate them from
Recent research by the California Institute for Energy
radical changes in policy in the
Efficiency shows that residential heating ducts "leak like
wake of an election. Other policy
sieves," an associate director of the institute reported in
analysts, however, argue that
testimony to the Little Hoover Commission:
these types of programs could be
better managed as part of a Typically about one-third of the energy that flows
department, without the time through residential ducts is lost through leaks. We
consuming procedures and estimate that this costs Californians more than $600
conflicting priorities expressed by million a year.
plural body governance.
Efforts are now underway to develop technological fixes.
As early as 1979, policy analysts
recognized the problem created
by the" Energy Commission's
combination of regulatory authorities and program responsibilities. The
report to the Joint Committee on Energy Policy and Implementation
concluded the regulatory process was compromised by placing
Commissioners in charge of "line-item" programs often performed by
departments. The report said: "The Warren-Alquist Act has placed the
same Individual In the impossible dual role of judge and advocate." In
addition, the law -- while requiring the Commission to generate electricity
forecasts for Its plant approval process -- did not give the Commission
authority to require applicants to use different fuels or technologies.39
The analysis recommended separating the department functions -- such
as promotional and educational efforts research and development
t
programs and proposing efficiency standards -- into a department. It
recommended preserving the Commission to perform the pure regulatory
functions associated with facility siting and enacting regulations.
In the Interim, the Energy Commission} s dual responsibilities have been
successfully defended as essential to influencing heavily regulated
energy markets. As those markets are restructured, the drawbacks
associated with the structure become more significant.
52
Energy
Separating Programs from Oversight
S
ince the Energy Commission was formed, energy-related markets
have undergone significant changes: Oil prices have dropped and
remained low. Electric cars have advanced as a possible alternative to
gasoline-powered fuels. Market forces and regulatory reform have
encouraged natural gas exploration and development. Technology is
encouraging smaller and more efficient electricity generating stations.
These and other changes raise four issues about the validity of the
Energy Commission maintaining its advocacy responsibilities while
assuming oversight of the competitive market.
1. Linkage Encourages Intervention. The Energy Commission cannot
be a light-handed effective oversight agency if it also is responsible for
programs intended to influence market choices. The value of a remade
Energy Commission will be the ability to -- reliably and without bias
aggregate confidential market data, administer a one-stop siting process
and identify areas where prices are not set by competition. In other
government arenas, policy makers have recognized the importance of
separating regulatory roles from promotional roles. The Nuclear
Regulatory Commission was created to separate the federal regulatory
and promotional roles concerning the nuclear power industry. The
Federal Aviation Administration is under fire today for putting its
promotional duties ahead of its regulatory duties in airline safety.
2. The Original Rationale is Diminished. The fundamental purpose
of linking a siting authority's needs analysis" and development of
lI
alternative technologies will be obsolete in a competitive generation
market. The Energy Commission already has recognized that its siting
process should not include the classic needs analysis, eroding the
original rationale for linking the siting authority with the advocacy
function.
3. Federal Funding is Declining. The funding for many of the Energy
Commission's grant and loan programs came from the federal Petroleum
Violation Escrow Account, comprised of fines assessed oil companies
that overcharged customers during the energy crises. Those funds are
declining, requiring a reassessment of state programs funded by them.
4. Need for Programs May Change. Competitive markets will likely
yield different lifailures" than regulated ones, maybe even fewer ones
changing and maybe reducing the need for the Energy Commission's
public purpose programs. No one knows for sure what market failures
will exist in a competitive market -- whether private research will hold
out the same rewards as it does in the computer business, or whether
consumers will be willing to pay more for Jlgreen" power. A remade
Energy Commission will play the critical role of identifying market failures
as well as market abuses. But the task of responding to those failures
should in most cases be left to others such as the Attorney General In
53
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
antitrust matters, the Governor and Legislature when new policy issues
arise, or a department when research and development might spawn a
market solution.
As competitive utility markets develop, policy experts are concerned
about the need for the state to maintain funding levels for research into
efficiency and alternative fuel technologies. The Energy Commission
testified that given the limited rewards of research and development for
private companies in competitive markets, the State should rethink its
role:
Consumers will clearly lose in the long-term if government does
not find a way to ensure that "public goods research and
U
development in a collective and coordinated fashion replaces the
utility-sponsored research and development that has done so
much to advance electric industry technology over the past
several decades. 40
The electricity restructuring act of 1 996 continues the surcharges placed
on investor-owned utility bills for research that has been conducted
under PUC oversight. The act
will generate $62.5 million a year
Mergers that Missed the Mark
through 2001. The funding for
projects related to transmission
and distribution will be allocated While previous reformers have suggested merging the
by the PUC. Funding for projects Energy Commission and the Public Utilities Commission,
the National Conference on State Legislatures (NCSL)
related to generation will be
reports that two states that recently merged the two
allotted by the Energy
functions, Michigan and Minnesota, have experienced
Commission.
negative results.
Two-thirds of the Energy
In the case of Minnesota, an energy office of 150 people
Commission's budget already was first merged with the economic development agency
represents pass-through funds - and then moved to the State's Public Service
money from state or federal Commission. The long-term view stressed by energy
sources that the Energy planners has lost out to the short-term concern of
Commission passes through to controlling costs. The energy office staff was reassigned
other agencies, nonprofit groups to rate cases and laid off to balance budgets. NCSL
concluded: liThe long-term voice on energy policy was
or private companies that qualify
effectively silenced."
for loan and grant programs.
Advocates of a department
The experience in Michigan was Similar, and according to
structure have raised convincing
NCSL the office is being moved back to the Department
arguments that the ministerial
of Commerce where it was before. NCSL concluded:
duties associated with these
programs can be more efficiently In general, the emphasis of Public Service
performed by a department.41 Commission activities -- the rate case at hand is
much greater than long-term energy planning.
Those concerns, along with the
advent of competition and the
need to reorganize the Energy Commission and the PUC, provides the
State with an opportunity to reassess the governance, scope and goals
of the State's public purpose energy programs.
54
Energy
Other states, responding primarily to the decline in federal funding, are
consolidating energy programs into other departments that administer
grants and loans or encourage business development. According to the
National Conference of State Legislatures and the California Research
Bureau: 11 states have the energy-related programs in economic
development offices and nine have them in the resources department.
Seven states have stand-alone energy offices. not including California,
which is the only state with a stand-alone commission. Seven other
states have their energy office in the housing agency. Five states have
the energy function combined with the PUC.
According to a 1995 survey, 56 percent of the state energy offices
expected their budgets to shrink over the next five years.42 Some
offices already have shuttered their doors, including New York's, which
was replaced with a research and development financing authority.
Public Purpose Programs in the Marketplace
T
he role of government in the energy industry is premised on the need
to protect environmental values, particularly those related to air
pollution and public health and safety, and the need to guard against
marketplace abuses of collusion and other unfair business practices in
the provision of an essential service. When a large portion of the energy
industry, the utility sector, was dominated by monopolies and their
regulators, the level of government intervention in the market was high.
Little distinction was made between State's regulatory and advocacy
roles"
In a competitive market, the distinction takes on greater importance.
The director of the University of California Energy Institute described the
values of and distinctions between -- effective public goods programs,
such as investment in new technologies, and the need for effective
government oversight.
There is a clear argument for government supporting research and
developmen t of technologies and energy sources due to the
public good value of the knowledge that such research produces.
The argument for direct government intervention in the
generation market, however, has not been made convincingly.
Certainly society should be concerned that alternative generation
technologies will be available as the supply of fossil fuels declines
and their prices rise. Like nearly everyone, I would welcome a
low-cost, non-polluting, renewable energy source. Yet I think
there is a reason for concern that direct intervention in the
generation market will result in subsidies for technologies that
will be obsolete before they are needed. 43
Consumer groups approach this issue from a different perspective, but
have similar concerns. They favor efficiency investments provided they
55
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
yield cost-effective benefits to customers. But they also are suspicious
of continuing the same institutional arrangements when the market
structures dramatically change. The consumer group Toward Utility Rate
Normalization (TURN) testified:
One area that may be ripe for a reduced utility and regulatory role
is demand-side management, including energy conservation and
related services. The funding and administration of these
programs should be removed from the utilities and vested in an
independent administrator that would award ratepayer-derived
funds on a competitive bid basis to service providers. 44
Prior to the legislative action in 1996, a PUC-sponsored working group
was exploring a new governance structure for administering research
money: the California Energy Research Institute would be sponsored by
the University of California and governed by a board made up of
academic experts, public officials and representatives of customer
groups. Supported by a small staff the Institute would solicit
J
applications for research proposals and award grants.
After the legislative action, the
University of California proposed Advocacy vs. Neutrality
creating a Joint Powers Authority
involving the university and the
The Energy Commission in recent years illustrated the
two commissions to coordinate value of having a government agency playing a research
the allocation of research money. and advocacy role. Through a variety of technology
The unIversity believes the plan development and demonstration programs, the
would provide accountability and Commission proved that methanol was an acceptable
flexibility. alternative to gasoline as a transportation fuel. First it
showed it was technically feasible, then economically
comparable, and then in terms of air pollution,
Likewise, the Energy Commission
environmentally superior.
believes that in a competitive
market the State will want to
The Energy Commission's work allowed the Air
reconsider the organizational
Resources Board to establish clean air regulations based
structure for collecting and
on the performance characteristics of methanol. The
allocating research dollars. The regulations required the gasoline producers to develop
Energy Commission advocates a formulas that were at least as clean as methanol -- which
structure that would capitalize on they at first maintained was impossible, but ultimately
the accountability of a public achieved for less than 8 cents a gallon.
organization and the flexibility of
a prIvate one. The Energy Commission, however I came under
increasing fire for advocating methanol in violation of its
official policy of being Jlfuel neutral."
The Governor's energy
reorganization plan reviewed by
The events demonstrate the value of government
the Little Hoover Commission in
research in pushing industries toward the greater public
1995 was designed to
interest, and the importance of separating that advocacy
consolidate energy-related role from the neutral regulatory role.
programs In a department
framework. The department, it
was argued, was a better venue for modifying these programs as funding
and other conditions change. The assessment that those functions
56
Energy
would be better managed by a department are still sound. The designers
of that plan, however, did not have the benefit of knowing which
oversight responsibilities would be required in a competitive market and
which agency should be responsible for those functions.
Rather than creating a new government agency, which takes
considerable time and resources, the evolution of an existing agency to
fill this role is more appropriate. The Department of Conservation is
vested with a broad range of environmentally and energy-related
responsibilities, including the regulation of oil, gas and geothermal wells,
and other mineral extraction activities. It implements the surface Mining
and Reclamation Act, does geological hazard assessment, administers
farmland and other resource conservation. The department would be a
logical venue for the Energy Commission's public purpose programs.
The task of a remade Energy Commission will be to facilitate the market:
by handling siting applications uniformly and efficiently, providing
technical information to all market plavers and monitoring for market
abuses. Its goal is a market that puts a constant downward pressure on
prices.
It is still in the State's best interest to maintain the Commission's other
functions that have induced investment in alternative fuels, new
technologies and conservation measures. These programs have kept a
constant upward pressure on efficiency and diversity.
Recommendations
Recommendation 2-A: The Governor and the Legislature should tran.*'fer from
the Energy Commission to the Department oj' Conservation the public purpose
programs concerning transportation fuel research, business development, public
education lini/ltlllrket transformation programs, including the setting and
implementation of building and appliance efficiency standards.
Placmg these functions in a department will make two significant
reforms: It will separate advocacy from oversight and it will enable more
significant changes in how the programs operate to reflect new funding
and market needs. At the same time, the move would preserve the
Important functions that have saved Californians conSiderable amounts
of money and facilitated the advancement of other energy-related public
policies, including clean air and responsible use of other resources.
Recommendation 2-B: The GOl'ernor and the Legislature should amenll the
electricity restructuring act (~r J 996 to consolidate the administration of' energy
research and developl11ent progrtll11s in the Department of Conservation. The
department should establish a broad-ba.,"etltldvisory panel to set funding
priorities, review applications lind advise the department llirector on tl/locations.
57
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
The advisory panel should include key legislators, representatives of
environmental and consumer groups, the home building and
manufacturing industries. The director of the department should be
instructed to explore other institutional arrangements for managing the
research program, including a joint powers agreement involving energy
policy officials and representatives from public and private universities.
58
Energy
PUC's Diminishing Role
Finding 3: The PUC, while it will pJay a transitionaJ role in nurturing
competition, could jeopardize the success of the energy restructuring plans if it
were to assume oversight of the competitive aspects of energy markets.
T
he Public Utilities Commission envisions itself continuing its rate
regulation of monopolies, performing a variety of tasks essential
to developing competitive markets and taking on the state
functions associated with a competitive market.
The PUC vision was based in part on an assessment of what functions
would be required of the State as the investor-owned monopolies were
broken apart and competition was induced among generators. The PUC
saw itself as the natural heir to these functions -- following the
monopolies into the marketplace.
The State functions required by more competitive energy markets -- and
the Little Hoover Commission's conclusions that the redefined Energy
Commission is best suited to assume those duties -- are described in
previous findings. Assuming those recommendations were followed, the
PUC would continue to have critical tasks -- in the transition to
competitive energy markets, in redefining rate regulation of remnant
monopolies and in facilitating the evolution of distribution services.
How well those challenges are met will greatly influence the success of
the policy choice to replace regulation with competition. How that
competition unfolds will, in turn, shape the ultimate structure of the
State's energy oversight agency.
59
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
The PUC Vision
T
he Public Utilities Commission has sought to establish its own role
in future markets through its electricity restructuring policy decisions
and its Vision 2000 process. In both efforts, the PUC did not seriously
consider the role of any other state agency in facilitating competition,
providing market oversight or protecting consumers from unfair business
practices. The PUC also did not seriously consider any significant
changes that should be made to the Public Utilities Code or other
statutes.
Commissioners have stated that they see the PUC playing a smaller
regulatory role in future energy markets. They acknowledge that much
of the PUC's economic regulation will have to be transformed, simplified
or eliminated to match the needs of a competitive market.
But the PUC also sees itself taking on competition-related functions,
such as monitoring for possible market power abuses in the generation
market. And it sees its mission of protecting captive customers from
monopoly abuses naturally evolving into protecting consumers from Ihe
perils of aggressive marketing.
The PUC -- in its Vision 2000 plan, its industry restructuring policy
decisions and in testimony to the Little Hoover Commission -- described
the functions it plans to perform during the transition to competitive
markets, in the long-term distribution market and in the long-term
competitive market. Among them:
In the Transition ...
T puc
he will collect and administer the Competition Transition Charge
used to reimburse utilities for investments that will be rendered
uneconomic by the advent of competition. Because of the PUC's
extensive involvement in regulating the expenditures of the investor
owned utilities, it is well equipped to accelerate reimbursement for those
investments through the transition charge fashioned under its
restructuring decision and refined by the Legislature in the electricity
restructuring act of 1 996.
The PUC also will work with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) and others to create the Independent System Operator and the
Power Exchange -- two new institutions that will handle the financial and
electric transactions of the new market. Some of the most important
regulatory decisions on the path to competitive electricity markets are
being made by FERC, based on applications by the investor-owned
utilities, at the behest of the PUC. The PUC, in its policy decisions, and
the Legislature in its restructuring bill, established parameters for those
new institutions.
60
En erg V
In the Long-term Distribution Market ...
T
he puc is establishing and refining performance-based rate-making
procedures for the distribution monopolies. California is following
a national trend by seeking to replace inefficient rate-of-return regulatIOn
with a system of incentives intended to hold down utility expenditures
while meeting minimum service standards. The goal is to create a rate
making structure that provides incentives for utility managers to improve
service and hold down expenses rather than trying to justify expenses
to increase revenue.
The PUC also will be registering new entrants. The electricity
restructuring act of 1 996 refined the PUC's plans to register marketers
and other new service providers as a way of protecting consumers from
fly-by-night companies.
Similarly, the PUC will protect consumers from over-aggressive
marketing. The PUC, using its experience in telecommunications
competition as its guide, envisions overzealous marketers tricking
customers into switching service providers. As in telecommunications,
the PUC is preparing to enforce marketing standards.
In the Long-term Competitive Market ...
T
he puc envisions itself remaining a dominant venue for making state
energy policies. The PUC has correctly recognized that its
restructuring and similar decisions radically shape state energy policy
and certainly more than the policy recommendations made by the Energy
Commission or the funding decisions made by the Legislature. The PUC
sees its role in situational policy making continuing as monopoly markets
yield to competitive markets.
The PUC sees itself as a watchdog against market abuses. The PUC -
in concert with federal authorities -- plans to monitor the incumbent
utilities, which they regulate, and new independent producers, which
they do not regulate, to make sure they are not manipulating the market.
The PUC also envisions a continuing role in serving as the State's
ambassador and negotiator in venues outside of the State. The PUC
believes it will need to work with the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, the Congress, and a variety of regional forums to protect
the State's interests in generation and transmission matters that will
influence the competitive market.
The PUC sees a need for the State to resolve disputes between market
players and it believes it is best suited for that role. The PUC believes
that to facilitate competition it should take on a role as a referee among
competitors to resolve disputes that otherwise might end up in court.
61
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
The PUC's Critical, But Diminishing Role
S
ome of the functions the PUC plans to perform are essential to
establishing competitive markets. The PUC, for instance, has
pioneered the policy debate and brokered the specific plan with the
investor-owned utilities to break up the monopolies and create the
institutional framework for making electricity transactions. The
Legislature, other state agencies and the market players all see the PUC
as uniquely suited for implementing that strategy.
In assessing the long-term role for the Public Utilities Commission,
however, policy experts, market players and consumer advocates have
differing views on the PUC's appropriate role particularly its role in the
competitive aspects of the market. Among their concerns:
• PUC's Bias Toward Intervention. A number of market players
testified that the PUC lacks the restraint to forbear from
intervening in the market. And while consumer interests have
legitimate concerns about the PUC prematurely ceding control
over remnant monopolies, the experience in telecommunications
and transportation supports the view that the PUC will continue
regulation after it is in the best interest of consumers. This
concern is supported by the PUC's broad definition of market
power abuse as any "unfair treatment of consumers by any of
the firms operating in a competitive market."
• PUC's Bias Toward Investor-owned Utilities. Independent
energy producers and municipal utility districts, which have never
been regulated by the PUC, fear that the PUC will continue to
protect the economic viability of the former monopolies when
resolving disputes between competitors. That fear was bolstered
in part by the PUC's position that investor-owned utilities should
be reimbursed for 100 percent of their investments that will be
stranded by the switch to competition. 45
• PUC1s Slow Decision-making. The PUC's overwhelming
workload will make it difficult to swiftly respond to issues. As
the issues before the Commission have taken on the complexities
of competitive markets, the PUC has not been able to decide
cases quickly enough for new entrants.
These issues raise significant concerns about the PUC's ability to evolve
from a heavy handed, interventionist economic regulator into a nurturing
and neutral parent of competitive markets -- particularly when there is no
agreement that any state agency should take on some of the functions
the PUC plans to assume. Pacific Gas and ElectriC Company testified:
Although under certain circumstances; the CPUC now has an
obligation to oversee the maturing of the competitive electricity
market, we question whether this is the proper role for the PUC.
62
Energy
While certainly it is important to ensure that all participants in the
market are able to compete on an equal footing it is not clear
l
that the CPUC has an expertise to regulate the competitive arena,
nor is it clear that the CPUC has the authority to effect any
remedies for violations which have been deemed to have
occurred On balance, we believe that the CPUC may not be the
proper place to house this market referee function,
46
Rather than assuming the market will fail and providing the PUC with the
tools for rapid intervention, the utility advocated a structure that would
minimize government intervention of any kind to when the market
"clearly fails."
The PUC is well suited to retain and refine some critical functions, at
least in the near term -- all of them revolving around the break up of the
vertical monopolies and the evolution of the distribution market where
a horizontal monopoly is expected to remain.47 But how well the PUC
executes these functions will depend in part on whether the PUC tries
to take on new functions, or tries to hold onto functions that are no
longer needed or could be better performed by another agency. Among
the challenges facing the Public Utilities Commission:
Performance-based rate-making: Between 30 and 40 percent of a
customer's bill pays for distribution-related services -- nearly twice the
costs associated with generating the electricity in the first place. As a
result, the ability to control distribution costs will have a large impact on
energy prices. The PUC's plan to control those costs with performance
based rate-making (PBR)' however, may be more complicated than
expected.
The PUC in August 1994 adopted a performance-based rate for San
Diego Gas and Electric Company that critics say worked out better for
the utility than for ratepayers. In the plan's first year, critics say San
Diego Gas and Electric achieved $55 million in before-tax cost savings -
$ 32 million in additional after-tax profits. The utility received $ 7 million
for improving its quality of services, while ratepayers benefited by $1. 1
million.48
The consumer group Toward Utility Rate Normalization (TURN) believes
the PUC will have to make significant revisions to its performance-based
regulations before they simultaneously will protect consumers and
shareholders. TURN testified:
PBR represents far more untested theory than successful
practice. Many of the experiments with PBR that have been
conducted to date have turned out to be unmitigated disasters
from the consumer perspective. ... TURN submits that it is far too
early to assume that the traditional regulatory role will somehow
be dramatically reduced through the magic of PBR.49
63
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
Unbundled distribution services. One task of the distribution
oversight agency will be to "unbundle" the distribution-related services
to encourage the development of competition and further reduce the
inefficiency of monopoly regulations.
Real-time metering might allow some customers to capture savings from
off-peak energy use, and create a niche market for companies that will
help consumers achieve this savings. New associations are expected to
emerge to aggregate the energy demands from a number of customers
and give them more leverage to seek lower rates.
New technologies are expected to expand the opportunity for self
generators, who might then sell power and buy it, and companies will
form to facilitate those transactions. Low-income assistance programs
now performed by the utilities could be done by government agencies or
nonprofit community groups.
The California Energy Institute testified that the State will need to take
an active role in encouraging the technologies needed for customers to
reap the benefits of competition that may occur at the generation level,
but will be experienced by consumers at the distribution end.5
1)
One Energy Commissioner asserted it will take an "extensive government
effort" if the distribution system is going to evolve from one where a
regulated monopoly provides all of the distribution-related services to one
where private companies or community groups compete for all energy
and social services but for maintaining the line delivering electrons.51
Resolving complaints. The Legislature in 1996 affirmed the PUC's plan
to take on the role of registering new entrants into competitive electricity
market'S and resolving consumer complaints that the PUC expects to
arise from over-aggressive marketers.
But the Legislature acted after considerable debate about whether the
function is needed, and whether it is needed over the long term. The
consumer group TURN, in advocating that the PUC take on the role,
recognized the harm that could come if in the name of protecting
consumers, the PUC regulated too much. TURN testified:
The objective should not be to create barriers to entry into the
business; but rather to assure that consumers who are used to
purchasing solely from a regulated monopoly are not abused by
unscrupulous operators in the newly opening marketplace. 52
Eventually, however, consumers will be used to selecting energy
suppliers. And unless the unscrupulous operators are more prevalent in
energy than in other businesses, the State will be able to rely on existing
law enforcement mechanisms. In addition to these known challenges,
complex and unpredicted issues will likely emerge and require resolution.
64
Energy
The Complications of Uncertainty
I
n looking to see how these issues will play out before the PUC,
investor-owned energy utilities have examined how the Commission
resolved similar issues in opening telecommunications markets to
competition. That history concerns them.
Their overriding anxiety is that/ left in a position to regulate, the PUC will
regulate. More specifically, they are concerned that the slower and more
ad hoc the deregulation process, the more revenue will be earned or lost
in the regulatory venue rather than the market place. San Diego Gas and
Electric Company testified:
If the history of telecommunications deregulation provides us
with any perspective of where energy regulation is headed in
California, we should all have cause for concern. Despite the
past decade of so-called telecommunications deregulation, there
is not now, nor will there be in the foreseeable future, real or fair
competition among suppliers. Instead new entrants are using the
regulatory process to their competitive advantage. 53
On the same issue, TURN has the exact opposite concern: that
deregulation will happen faster than competition and that
organizational restructuring will happen before the interested parties
understand and can agree upon the role of the government:
As long as the distribution utility remains the only readily
available source of electricity for most small consumers, there
will be little opportunity for reducing or eliminating the role of the
regulator in this portion of the market. 54
No one can say for sure how the market will develop for average
consumers. While marketers may be as aggressive as in the long
distance business, the retail market at the residential level may develop
slowly.
In the case of natural gas, most smaller users have seen the benefits of
competition at the wholesale level without having the experience of retail
competition. The PUC's role has been to fashion rules that allow for
retail competition for large consumers, to ensure that smaller consumers
are not stuck with an unfair amount of the fixed costs, and to develop
performance-based rate-making to reduce the inefficiencies of regulation.
While retail competition is legal for all classes of customers, and may be
percolating down to smaller consumers, the transition to competition has
been slow.
Southern California Gas, which has undergone a slow and lurching march
toward competition, articulated the need for a more strategic regulatory
retreat on the part of the PUC in all of these markets:
65
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
In order to fully capture the benefits of restructuring, the
regulator must actively measure competition in the various energy
market segments and determine when adequate competition
exists. The agency should issue a rule-making order with general
guidelines for judging utility markets to be "competitive," then
work with parties on a case-by-case basis to further refine the
definitions. Once a finding of full competition is made, oversight
and audit of utilities management decisions relative to serve
I
those markets should be discontinued. 55
One of the most difficult chores facing the PUC will be to determine
when it should stop doing what it was created to do. One of the best
ways to accomplish that will be to establish rules to determine when
competition exists and eliminate regulation as that occurs. And as the
regulator retreats, the prevailing public interest can be re-examined and
the government's role can be reassessed.
One former PUC Commissioner warned that it will be too easy for the
PUC to take on a different role in the market rather than a smaller role:
The key is to design even more aggressively for the future by
setting out specific milestones for specific regulatory withdrawal,
and accepting the fact that there is no such thing as perfect
regulation, just as there is no such thing as perfect competition. 56
Great attention has been paid to the actions government will need to
take in the transition to competitive markets and the role of government
after competition arrives. The difficulty is knowing specifically when the
sun will set on the monopolies and rise on a new market. One consumer
advocate quips that the transition is the foreseeable future and the long
term is the unforeseeable future.
The local distribution services provided by investor-owned monopolies
are expected to remain fundamentally monopolistic for the foreseeable
future. In that sense, the need to regulate rates charged by these
companies is the only direct descendent of the PUC's current authorities.
It is tempting to immediately consolidate all energy-related regulatory
functions in one agency. But to do so would jeopardize potential market
efficiencies worth billions in return for potential government efficiencies
worth millions. It will take an extraordinary effort by the PUC to
administer the competition transition charge, oversee the divestiture of
generation by the investor-owned utilities, institute performance-based
rate-making and unbundle the distribution monopoly to invite competition
into that sector.
Moving those responsibilities to a new agency in the middle of
implementation would jeopardize the success of those efforts, And to
make firm decisions now on the State; s ~ong-term role in the distribution
sector would invite error.
66
Energy
However, it appears that after the PUC implements new regulatory
strategies and after market forces have been brought to bear on
distribution services, oversight of that sector could be transferred to the
same agency overseeing the generation and transmission aspects of the
industry. Similarly, oversight of natural gas would be more portable once
performance-based rate-making procedures are refined.
Recommendations
Recommendation 3-A: The Governor and the Legislature should enact
lel:islation establishing benchmarks and a time line for delineating when and
how the PUC will eliminate economic regulation of competitive aspects of the
nlarket and when and how it will encourage competition for distribution-related
servIces.
While the Legislature should expeditiously dives! the PUC of functions
that will be obsolete with the advent of competition. other regulatory
functions will become obsolete over time. Thresholds should be
established in statute ahead of time determining when the PUC will
cease regulating in a given arena. The benchmarks also will serve to
better coordinate activities between the Energy Commission and the
PUC.
Recommendation 3-B: After the tran.\'ition -- after all customers have access to
competitive electricity providers and performance-based rate-making is
instituted for distribution monopolies -- the Governor and the Legislature
should transfer the PUC's remaining energy-related functions to the Energy
Commission.
The goal of the State should be a single agency with energy oversight
authority. But the State should pursue this goal in a way that does not
jeopardize emerging markets or compromise consumer protection. The
first step is to consolidate those new functions over the expanding
competitive market into a single agency. The second step is to
consolidate the regulation of remnant energy monopolies at the Energy
Commission. The precise timing and scope of the government
restructuring will depend upon market developments. But the transfer
will be smoother after performance-based rate-making has been refined
and it becomes more clear which aspects of the distribution market will
remain monopolistic, In any event, establishing rates for the distribution
market should be a simple and limited task compared to the PUC's
historic role In regulating every aspect of a monopoly power provider.
67
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
68
Energy
Coherent Policy Making
Finding 4: The State has a fractured and confused process for setting energy
related policies that results in conflicting public efforts with no clear venue
for resolving the conflicts.
T
he legendary conflicts between the Energy Commission and the
PUC are a consequence of competing venues, competing
missions, and an unnatural segregation between policy making in
the abstract and policy making in everyday decisions of governance.
Many conflicts of the past will not be repeated as the Energy
Commission and the PUC stop the regulatory proceedings that attempted
to make the supply-and-demand decisions of the market place. But both
agencies continue to have different goals for the State and different
views for their own future. Not surprisingly, the two conflict.
The first three findings and resulting recommendations of this report
would clarify the roles these agencies will play in the future, reassign
functions based on developed expertise and contemporary needs and
prevent unnecessary conflicts between the two.
Beyond the history of the two agencies, energy is so integral to the
economy and a number of environmental and resource issues -- from
transportation to air and water protection -- more than one public agency
always will impact the formation and implementation of energy policy.
As a result, the State has both the opportunity and the need to establish
a policy-making framework that is more accountable and effective, and
that provides a clear and timely response to public concerns.
69
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
A Fractured Process
F
ew places in the statutes of California has the Legislature created
such a specific policy-making process as in energy, and in few
subject areas has there been as much conflict and confusion about who
should set policies.
In its authorizing legislation, the Energy Commission was instructed to
prepare every two years what the law calls the i'Biennial Report.
/I
Beginning with Section 25309 of the Resources Code, the law provides
specific instructions for preparing the report. The core of the document
is the Energy Commission's projection of the State's energy needs over
the next 20 years, the alternatives for meeting those needs, and the
Energy Commission's recommendations for how those needs should be
met. The law provides for the report to be submitted to the Governor.
The Governor is required to review the plan and forward it, along with
his critique, to the Legislature. In that transmittal, the document is
deemed "the official statement of energy policy."
In addition to the jJofficial" policy, the Energy Commission, the Public
Utilities Commission, the Air Resources Board, the State Water
Resources Control Board, the Department of General Services and a
number of small agencies make decisions that effectively set energy
related policies. These situational policies have been particularly
important in the case of the PUC which in setting rates, approving
utility expansion plans and establishing public programs dramatically
shapes how the State's energy needs will be met. The Secretary of the
Resources Agency described the problem in a legislative hearing as poor
coordination:
While all of the people who work at these different specialty
agencies recognize that their set of problems are not the only
problems the State must address, they have no mandate to work
together within a common policy and regulatory structure to
identify and achieve a ulow-cost solution" that simultaneously
does the best job possible on each of the problems while aI/owing
consumers and businesses to have reliable low cost energy
supplies that they need to thrive. 57
While the current discussion of energy agency restructuring is fueled by
market competition, the political debate has historically been charged by
competition between the Energy Commission and the PUC.
In 1 974, when the Energy Commission was newly born, the Little
Hoover Commission recognized the potential for conflict and urged the
coordination of policy making and policy implementation. In 1984, the
Little Hoover Commission recommended ways to solve what by then had
become a significant problem for the State.58
While critics and reformers over the years have placed the blame for
70
Energy
these problems at the doors of different agencies, an assessment
prepared in 1994 by the Assembly Natural Resources Committee staff
captures the protracted and serious nature of the problem:
One of the fundamental issues driving the debate over energy
agency reorganization for the past 15 years has been the
overlapping responsibilities and conflicting approaches of the CEC
and the CPUC. Many observers believe that CPUC/CEC
competition and conflict, as well as CPUC's al/eged overweening
deference to proter:tion of the status quo, have given California
a confused and, at times, self-defeating energy policy. Many
observers believe that any reorganization proposal should
alleviate this problem, first and foremost. 59
Shortcomings and Consequences
S
everal analyses have identified the weaknesses in the current policy
making process. Some of the problems are not unique to energy
policy and can be expected to persist even in a restructured energy
I
market. Among the shortcomings and their consequences:
• The Official Policy is Not Binding on Other Agencies. While
the Biennial Report is official -- and may be of the highest
technical caliber the policy document bears little legal or
political weight. The document is not binding on other state
agencies and the Energy Commission has no authority to take
actions against agencies that do not comply with the document.
Even the tone of the document is more advisory than compulsory.
• No Mechanism for Legislative Approval. While the policy is
forwarded to the Legislature, the Legislature does not approve
the document, and there is no direct connection between the
report and specific statutory amendments or budget priorities that
should be considered by the Legislature.
• Energy Commission Policies Require PUC implementation.
In the case of both the Biennial Report, the electricity forecast
and other policy documents prepared by the Energy Commission,
implementation often has rested with the PUC. This arrangement
invites frustration. And given the turf battles between these two
agencies, that arrangement has been a source of great conflict -
creating uncertainty for market players and inflaming cynicism
among the public.
Some inefficiencies are inherent in democratic policy making particularly
l
because of the intentional division of power between legislative;
executive and judicial branches. But the inefficiencies are compounded
l
and the consequences increase, when fourth-branch agencies -
substantially independent commissions with policy making and
adjudicatory authority -- are allowed to battle out policy differences.
71
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
Ironically the problems between the Energy Commission and the PUC
1
began to escalate when federal policies encouraged the beginnings of
competition in the generation sector and left to the states the task of
creating market-like mechanisms for integrating independent producers
into the monopoly paradigm. The result in California was what a former
public manager with experience in both agencies referred to in testimony
to the Little Hoover Commission as an ever-escalating cold war:
The California Public Utilities Commission and the Energy
Commission have acted as superpowers in that conflict, each
with its satellite constituency groups, but while the superpowers
of the nuclear Cold War resided on opposite sides of the Iron
Curtain, the superpowers in California's's Cold War over energy
policy both reside in the executive branch.
60
The Berlin Wall in this dispute was a 15-year battle over the Biennial
Resource Planning Update -- a process that was intended to last two
years and determine how much additional electricity generation the State
would need and the best way to acquire it. In the course of the dispute,
the PUC refused to accept the
Energy Commission's analysis of
future energy needs and a bidding The War to End all Resource Planning
process intended to yield low
priced providers turned into a
Testimony from Southern California Edison revealed the
regulatory free-for-all. expense and frustration that both the public and private
sector endured when the PUC and the Energy
The experience provided ample Commission were at odds over the best policy course:
evidence of the need to
coordinate efforts, consolidate The war beTween the CEC and the CPUC in the
Biennial Resource Plan Update proceeding was a
oversight authority when possible
classic illustration of regulatory excess engendered by
and pr-Ovide quicker ways to
a terribly flawed process and a command and control
resolve inevitable disputes
mentality. There, the PUC rejected and relitigated the
between agencies with different
CEC's electricity report forecasts. Overly complex
missions. The Legislature is the
procedures and duplicated planning efforts severely
traditional venue for establishing
exacerbated the regulatory war. The lengthy and
major policies and resolving expensive battle between the two agencies wasted
disputes over major policies. But resources for over a decade. It ended when FERC
almost routinely, interest groups declared the result of the entire process invalid.
that are unsatisfied by the
outcomes from the regulatory
process have appealed to the Legislature. The Legislature, as a result,
finds itself in a position of trying to sift through detailed regulatory
decisions to resolve major policy issues, or tinkering with the details to
satisfy the interest groups.
PUC commissioners, meanwhile have taken the position that unless the
Legislature takes action, they are free to do as they please. In
characterizing the "plenary power" granted to the Legislature by the
Constitution over the Commission, the PUC's former president testified
that the Commission does not have the authority to ilhold to a course
which the Legislature deems antithetical to the public interest":
72
Energy
Yet it is equally clear that unless the Legislature elects to act, we
have created in California the fullest expression of a tool for
quickly and decisively defending the public interest, and we have
vested that tool with a combmation of legislative and judicial
function and powers. 67
The legislative debate and reworking of the PUC's electrical restructuring
plan is evidence of the policy-making dysfunction. The enormous policy
decision to pursue competitive electricity markets and the general
parameters of that transition -- is a decision that should be made by
officials directly responsible to
the people. At the same time, it
Focus and Coordination
may not be reasonable to expect
legislators to fashion the specifics
of a plan that must accommodate The PUC's former director of strategic planning
complicated engineering and recommended two "guiding principles" for reform of the
two commissions:
economic analysis.
First, California should bring focus, coordination and
In this instance, however, the
accountability to the way in which the State develops
PUC proceeded to make both
energy policy.
large and small decisions without
formal involvement of the Second, California should improve the efficiency with
Legislature or even a public plan which California implements its energy policy by re
for involving the Legislature. inventing the structure and functions of government
Lawmakers responded by passing so that each of the State's energy-related agencies
Assembly Concurrent Resolution and departments is responsible for that portion of
143, which required the PUC to energy policy that a) best reflects its core business,
and b) best matches its core expertise, or
assess certain issues, solicit
competency.
public opinions, and report to the
Legislature on those issues before
further developing the plan to
unravel monopoly electrical service. Even then, lawmakers complained
that PUC officials responded to the Legislature requirements as if the
lawmakers were unnecessarily meddling into the Commission's
regulatory arena. The Chairman of the Assembly Joint Oversight
Committee on Lowering the Cost of E!ectric Service, told PUC officials
in a public hearing that a better policy making framework was needed:
We are on a merry-go-round here. The Commission issues a
Bluebook in the spring of 1994 laying out certain dramatic
proposals for restructuring the electric services industry in
California and moving away from traditional ratemaking
procedures as well as traditional ways in which electric services
have been delivered to consumers with an indications they are
going to move very quickly in doing this.
The Legislature, to try to become involved in what we consider
an appropriate way, rushes to adopt a resolution which sets up
this committee and sets certain dates so that we can get into the
game. Now the Commission rushes to set up these evidentiary
hearings which they think are a bad thing to do and wasteful of
73
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
time and energy in response to A CR 143. I'm looking for a way
to get off the merry-go-round and do it in a way that's more
rational and cost-effective for the Legislature and for the
Commission.
62
Two years later policy makers, consumers and industry representatives
l
again found themselves negotiating the same details of the restructuring
plan simultaneously in regulatory and legislative arenas -- months after
the State's utilities had petitioned federal officials to allow competition.
Just as the problems between the PUC and the Legislature will not go
away with restructuring, these problems between the PUC and the
Energy Commission will persist after competition. In responses to the
Little Hoover Commission, both agencies described themselves as the
major venue for setting energy policies -- with the PUC focusing on the
effects that policies have on energy prices, and the Energy Commission
on its statutory obligation to set the State's energy course.
Even if one of these agencies were to be abolished, the problem would
persist because of the need to coordinate energy policies between air
and water pollution agencies and with other states and the federal
government. Those realities point reformers toward a combination of
structural and procedural remedies.
Clarifying Policy Roles
P
olicy analysts frequently debate how much policy-making
responsibility should rest in the Legislature and how much should be
delegated to departments and commissions. To the extent that major
policy decisions are left to appointed commissions, the system is
vulnerable to criticism that policy is being set by officials who are not
directly accountable to the public. History also shows that interest
groups who are unhappy with a regulatory outcome will seek redress in
the Legislature, luring lawmakers into umicro-managing/J the
commissions.
For generations, political scientists and government reformers have
considered policy making models that can efficiently yield "good"
decisions. Most of those models can accommodate some, but not all of
the human weaknesses responsible for many policy failures:
overwhelming special interests, competing political views, insufficient
information and human error. As a result, California should rely on the
Legislature to do what it does best and let the Commission do what it
can do best.
The Joint Committee on Energy Regulation and the Environment in 1991
developed recommendations that attempted to solve the problem. Some
of the solutions were structural -- such as merging the energy functions
of the PUC and the Energy Commission into a single agency. But the
committee's research also recognized that consolidation -- while perhaps
74
Energy
essential in the long term -- would only go so far, given the dynamics of
energy policy. Policy making is an ongoing process that requires the
technical skills of expert agencies and the political direction of elected
leaders. Among the Committee's recommendations:
The Legislature and the Governor should provide energy agencies
and energy-related environmental agencies with clear and uniform
policy direction and goals in their enabling statutes. And the
Legislature and the Governor should provide mechanisms for the
ongoing development and articulation of State energy policies,
concrete goals, plans and implementation programs of the
Governor and his administration energy agencies.
63
That recommendation is consistent with a recommendation long
advocated by the Chairman of the Energy Commission. The Chairman
believes that the current policy making
process articulated in the Warren Alquist
Four Hurdles/or Decision Makers
Act should be amended to include
legislative approval of the policy. As a
result the Legislature would then be Researchers describe four inherent problems that
policy-making venues must account for in order
expected to convince or compel other
to improve decisions:
state agencies to comply with the policy.
1. OppDrtunism. Controlling power to be
One solution would be for the Legislature
certain it is used only in the public interest, given
to annually establish policy goals for the
the limited number of saints available for
commissions and for the commissions to
government service.
then use their technical expertise to
pursue those goals. That process would 2. Differing political values. Defining the
allow the Legislature to do what it does public interest on issues for which any decision
best -- express the desires of the voting helps some people and hurts others and for
public. It also would allow the which there are different political views among
commissions to do what they do best - those who are not personally affected by the
gather the detailed information and issue.
provide the careful deliberations that are
3. Insufficient information. Providing
essential to making new policies work in
adequate information to make rational decisions
the realities of the marketplace.
when critically important information is either
missing altogether or controlled by individuals or
This process is similar to performance
firms that have an incentive to misrepresent it.
based budgeting. That process is geared
toward making line agencies more
4. Bounded rationality. Guarding against errors
productive and accountable by focusing
caused by the policy maker's lack of expertise or
them on outcomes rather than inputs. inability to fully utilize the available information to
Rather than assessing budget proposals devise policies that accomplish given policy
based on personnel years, for example/ goals.
they are assessed on how many children
will be educated. A byproduct of
performance-based budgeting can be a better relationship between the
Legislature and the agencies. Legislators can make the policy-oriented
chOIces they want without having to manipulate budgets. The agencies,
In turn, get clear direction on what is expected of them in the next year
and can be held accountable to those goals at the end of that year.
75
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
To fully adopt performance-based budgeting is an involved process that
would be too much to expect of the agencies guiding dramatic
restructuring in utility markets. But adapting elements of performance
based budgeting that could clarify policy-making duties would be easier
than debating broad and detailed policy issues befor~ both the oversight
commissions and the Legislature.
Recommendations
Recommendation 4-A: The Governor and Legislature should enact legislation
requiring the Energy Commission to annually appear before the Legislature to
review the agency's performance toward meeting established policy goals and to
set specific goals for the Commb,sion to pursue over the next year.
This process would allow the Legislature to better monitor and more
timely influence the direction of the oversight commission, provide an
opportunity for better relationships to develop and discourage venue
shopping.
Recommendation 4-B: The Governor and the Legislature should enact
legislation requiring the director of the Department of Conservation to
biennially prepare an assessment of the department's existing energy-related
programs and propose changes to eliminate obsolete programs, improve existing
programs or create new programs.
The dqcument should be submitted to the Governor for approval and
forwarded to the Legislature for consideration as statutory amendments
or budget reallocations. The document should specify what actions
would need to be taken by other departments to accomplish the policy
changes. It should also specify what actions other departments would
have to take/ if any, to make the policy recommendations work.
Recommendation 4-C: The Governor and the Legislature should enact
legislation requiring the Secretary of the Resources Agency to participate as a
non-voting advisor in Public Utilities Commission proceedings concerning
energy-related issues.
A significant failing of the current policy making framework is the gap
between the Energy Commission, the Public Utilities Commission and the
State's executive. Providing for a member of the Governor's cabinet
who also oversees the Energy Commission to take part in the PUC's
energy-related proceedings would bridge that gap. This arrangement
would only be needed as long as the PUC retains jurisdiction over energy
utilities.
76
Telecommunications
.:. The task of easing competition into the
telecommunications market is extremely
difficult, requiring the PUC to predict both
technological and economic futures and to
constantly assess the results of its decisions
to remedy unwanted consequences.
•: . The PUC's "road map" for how it will
define the telecommunications market
place has provided needed certainty to
market players, but competitors and
consumer interests need a detailed plan for
how state regulation will be reduced as
competition takes hold.
•: . The emergence of new technologies and
the maturation of competition will require
an evolution ofpolicy choices that should
be collaboratively derived between the PUC
lind the Legislature.
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
78
Telecommunications
Keeping the Market's Pace
Finding 5: The fast-paced dynamics of the telecommunications industry, with
its importance to the California economy and the complexity of new public
policy issues, is not being adequately overseen by a commission that regulates
numerous other essential business sectors.
T
he telecommunications revolution is changing the way
Californians Jive, work and play. New services, new technologies
and competition for the traditional basic services are progressing
at a stunning pace.
These trends create complex policy choIces about evolving and dueling
public interests. Once made, implementing policy choices can be just as
challenging -- given the need to infuse competition into monopolies in
ways that are economically sound, legally correct and that satisfy a
demanding public.
Because these changes are fast-paced, timeliness is a critical concern.
Because the PUC's decisions will influence the economic health of the
market, the quality of its decision-making is paramount.
And because of the uncertainties of a nascent market, the stability that
can be provided by a sound deregulation strategy is important to
potential investors. A fundamental prereqUisite to achieving this criteria
is the time and focus that the Public Utilities Commission can apply to
these Issues.
79
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
Restructuring as Norm
F
or more than a decade, the PUC has been in the process of infusing
competition into some aspect of the traditional telephone monopoly.
Simultaneously, it has seen the birth of new telecommunications
services that were never monopolies, and the PUC instituted economic
regulation as a means of encouraging competition. The PUC, in its
Vision 2000 process described these evolutionary trends:
The traditional monopoly of telephone companies has now been
breached by competing firms in virtually all aspects of that
industry. Through a combination of rapid decline in the cost of
providing basic telecommunications services and the emergence
of markets for high-value new services; virtually all of the natural
monopoly aspects of telephony are evaporating.
64
These trends are challenging the PUC's traditional regulatory framework
in three ways:
1. Expanding Markets. Traditional and technological distinctions
between services are rapidly eroding. As a result of digital and fiber
optic technologies. the commonalities between telephone, cable and
home PC/Internet services are increasingly strong. The PUC has
traditionally not had jurisdiction over all of these market players and its
role in regulating new industries spawned under the color of competition
is unclear. The number of market players is rapidly increasing, as well.
In the last 1 5 years the telecommunications companies within the PUC's
jurisdiction have increased from 75 to more than 400, competition has
not even begun for local telephone service and cable companies are still
gearing.,up for entry into the telecommunications market.
2. Mixed Markets. The PUC has struggled to fairly regulate traditional
monopoly providers, while gradually opening markets to competition and
providing some oversight of new entrants. Pacific Bell, like regional bell
companies across the country, has complained that state regulators have
not even-handedly accomplished this task. The result is essentially a
dual regulatory scheme that is vulnerable to criticism that competitors
are treated unevenly.
3. Regulatory Manipulation. The PUC's rules and the timing of
market changes can significantly influence which companies will succeed
and which will fail. As a result, the PUC's proceedings have become the
venue for fierce competition among market players, each seeking to use
the process to advance its strategy or hinder the competition. In a
recent cost study analysis, the new competitors alleged that Pacific Bell
was gaming the analysis in order to give itself advantage. After
laborious review, the PUC decided that for the most part Pacific Bell had
assigned costs correctly -- but that the Incumbent did make errors In Its
favor equal to several hundred million dollars in potential revenue
80
T elecommunica tions
Congress formally acknowledged the evolution of technologies and the
need for regulatory change with the passage of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996. The act, asserting that more competition was the solution
to existing market power, allows for cable television, long distance,
cellular and local telephone companies to enter all other aspects of the
market. AT&T, in its testimony to the Little Hoover Commission, said
the law requires the PUC to take a leadership role to encourage a well
functioning market:
Rather than waltmg for techn%gical change to eliminate
observed market power, the CommissIon, in concert with the
Federal Communications Commission and the U. S. Departmen t
of Justice, must design and implement new regulatory structures
intended to introduce competition to the last market still
oppressed by market power, the local exchange market. .. These
are critical responsibilities. Get it wrong and the existing benefits
of competition in the long distance market will be lost if the local
companies enter the long distance market before competition
controls their market power. The commission must be active in
its new roles and it must rely on its institutional expertise. The
Commission cannot accept a reduced role, not sit on the
sidelines. 65
The Federal Communications
Telecom Proceedings
Commission (FCC) in the summer
of 1996 released a 700-page
ruling to guide the state utility
commissions through this
250
transition to competition.
200
But even before the federal act
was passed, the PUC was 150
responding to these trends with
complicated proceedings intended 100
to create an economic and
50
regulatory foundation for
competition whenever technology
o
allowed more than one provider
and consumer choice. At the 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95
same time, it established II
Hearing Days Decisions
regulations intended to control
Source: PUC
the potential market power
abuses of incumbent players and
After a decline in activity, the PUC has seen an increase in
prevent portions of the network telecommunications cases in recent years.
from returning to monopoly
status. Beyond the restructuring
of monopolies, the overall market trends ha\Je impacted virtually all of
the PUC's telecommunications work -- complicating even routine issues,
such as creating new area codes. In its recent desIgnations of new area
codes in the Bay Area, Southern CalIfornia and Sacramento Valley
largely in response to demand created tor new numbers by tax machines,
81
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
cellular telephones and modems -
the PUC traded convenience to Demonopolizing Telecommunications
existing phone companies for a
level playing field for future The PUC has conducted a number of proceedings
competitors.66 designed to open the technical network and the market
to competition.
In the new regulatory world, old
New Regulatory Framework. With this proceeding,
issues have to be revisited. The
the PUC replaced rate-of-return rate-makmg for the large
State has a long-standing policy
local exchange carriers with incentive-based or pay-for
to subsidize rural areas and the
performance rate-making" It also attempted to
most basic telephone services so
differentiate between a company's monopolistic services
all residents can have access to
and those it provides In a competitive market.
telephones. But maintaining that
policy in competitive markets - Open Access Network Architecture Development.
and expanding access to high With this proceeding, the PUC is intending to resolve the
technology uses, as required by. technical issues that will otherwise prevent new market
the 1996 federal law will entrants from offering services as easily or of the same
require periodically recrafting the quality as the incumbent providers. The goal IS to offer
seamless connections that would encourage consumers
mechanisms for achieving those
to shop and require competitors to invest in new services
policies and rebalancing
or lower prices as a way to capture market share.
competing public interests.
Similarly, the State has a long
Implementation Rate Design. With this proceeding,
held policy to protect the privacy
the PUC created the rules that allowed for competition
of telephone users, but the
for regional toll calls. The proceedmg required a
development of Caller ID and combination of technical and pricing issues to be
other services requires resolved and provided for the first major incursion into
reconsidering those policies. the domain of the local exchange carriers.
PUC managers in a variety of roles Total Service Long Run Incremental Cost Studies.
advisory and compliance, With this proceeding, the PUC has attempted to
ratepayer advocacy, safety and determme the capital and operational costs for every
aspect of the network, so that new entrants can pay for
enforcement and administrative
that portion of the system they use.
law judges -- all said that their
workload has increased
significantly dunng this protracted
transition, as they attempted to design and implement new rules, deal
with more participants, and respond to new consumer complaints. As
technically complicated or politically difficult as some of these deciSions
can be, the long-term economic Importance of tImely, correct and
consistent decisions are obvious to all of the participants -- and concern
that the PUC cannot satisfy those needs without some changes is
growing among many of them. GTE, a local phone monopoly
aggressively pursuing those other services, characterized the concern:
The timely availability of state-of-the-art telecommunications
services is a key element in the attractiveness of the State as a
place to retain existing jobs as well as locate new jobs. Absent
dramaTic change, current regularory process, defined when
markets were not competitive, can slow delivery of new services
and negatively impact the competitiveness of business in the
State, especially as the utility markets become competitive,
67
82
Telecommunica tions
The Need for Dramatic Change
T
he regulatory issues before the PUC are complex and there is often
more than one right answer. However, testimony to the Little
Hoover Commission and analysis conducted in academic and other
research forums indicate that the PUC needs to improve the timeliness
with which it makes decisions and more fully assess the consequences
of decisions once it makes them.
Timeliness. The single greatest complaint made against the PUC by
telecommunications interests is that it takes too long to gather
information, deliberate on the options and make a decision.
This is not surprising, given the complexities involved and put in the
context of the PUC's traditional workload. Telecommunications
comprises only about one quarter of the proceedings before the PUC.
And as complicated as the telecommunications issues can be, the PUC
has dedicated much of the last three years to pioneering electricity
restructuring and remaking its own internal organization. Testimony
from Pacific Bell described the consequence this workload has on other
industries regulated by the PUC:
Commissioners must divide their focus among a daunting range
of oversight responsibilities and workload for five disparate
industries. Some of the industries are further along the
progression toward open markets and ultimately deregulation
than others. The divided attention may inadvertently slow
progress. 68
The Public Utilities Commission takes so long to decide these cases that
one telephone provider proposed that the PUC be held to a two-year
statutory deadline for making decisions. Two years, in the eyes of this
long-time PUC regulatee, would be considered major progress.
One cellular telephone provider complained it took the Public Utilities
Commission 16 months to review the construction standards that were
designed to effectively get the PUC out of the business of reviewing and
approving every cellular tower site. The Open Network Architecture
Proceeding was opened in 1993 and is not expected to be completed for
the large companies until 1997.
Roseville Telephone, a small company that serves a Sacramento suburb
and is fearful of losing customers to AT&T, GTE, Pacific Bell and other
giants, said it took the Public Utilities Commission more than a year to
review its request to establish a holding company that the company
needed to prepare for competition.
Pacific Bell testified that the Public Utilities Commission takes months to
make decisions that market players need answers to qUickly: "New
product introductions and changes to our tartffs take months of
83
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
regulatory approval with processes that also allow competitors to
needlessly delay approvals."
The Legislature, in the PUC
"Extraordinarily Slow" Decision-making
reform bill enacted in 1996,
responded to these complaints by
declaring its intent that the PUC Roseville Telephone described the PUC's decIsion makIng
decide cases within 18 months of as "extraordinarily slow and awkward." It cited as an
being opened. It placed a example the 14 months the PUC took to review
Roseville's application to create a holding company
statutory deadline of 1 2 months I
which the utility wanted to better compete against the
for the resolution of adjudicatory
largest phone companies in the nation.
cases. The law also requires the
PUC to make a final decision
The issues raised by Roseville's holding company
within 60 days of a proposed
application have already been considered in other
decision being released -- allowing Commission proceedings and were in no way ul7lque.
for the Commission to extend The fact that it requires more than a year to obtain
that deadline in JJextraordinary Commission approval for a change in corporate
circumstances. structure ... illustrates how the current regulatory
U
environment is ill-suited to the needs of partIcipants 117
During the legislative debate, PUC a competitive market place.
officials argued that a deadline of
any sort would tie their hands in
making the best decision possible. And in other cases where the
Legislature has imposed decision-making deadlines, such as the Permit
Streamlining Act, the restrictions have not proven to result in high
quality and timely decisions. Still, the deadline provides a constant
reminder of the importance of making timely decIsions.
Quality of decision making. There is also evidence that in the PUC's
sincere efforts to make timely decisions, it often either makes
fundamental errors or lacks the focus or resources to assess its decisions
and modify its regulatory strategy when it is not having desirable effects.
One of the best examples of this problem is the controversy that erupted
over the Implementation Rate Design proceeding. In that case, the
Public Utilities Commission was setting rules for competition for toll calls
within local calling areas. After months of hearings and the development
of an exhaustive factual record, overburdened Commissioners turned to
one of the market players to draft an alternative order. This breach of
procedures and public faith created an enormous outcry among
consumer and industry groups, fueled criticism that the Public Utilities
Commission is too close to the incumbent utilities and delayed for more
than a year a critical decision in the path to competition.69
The procedural failings in other decisions are not as blatant. And to be
fair to the Public Utilities Commission, deciSions of such contentious
issues will always have their critics. Still, there is a pattern of evidence
that indicates that more attention could yield decisions that more
accurately reflected or surgically accomplished what the Public Utilities
Commission has set out to do.
84
Telecommunica tions
For example, the PUC's New Regulatory Framework calls for keeping
separate expenses associated with monopolistic services and those for
competitive services. But critics are concerned that the PUC has been
too willing to let ratepayers pay for investments that will enable the
incumbents to get an even larger head start on potential competitors
expenses that should be paid for by shareholders, who will benefit from
the profits earned in a contested market.
I n addition to the effect on rates, the CritiCS argue, the PUC is
undermining its own goals by allowing the monopolies to enhance their
Incumbent position to preserve their market share. The Center for Public
Interest Law testified:
The PUC has exacerbated these problems by moving from
traditional Jlfair rate of return" maximum ra te regulation to an
allegedly i'incentive" based system. Translated, it allows the
monopoly power sector to earn above fair market rates of return
based on formulae which may, or may not, have anything to do
with enhanced efficiency. The failure to police excessive profits
from the monopoly side only exacerbates inevitable abuses
flo wing from the cross subsidies, subtle tie-ins, and 0 ther
traditional anti-trust violative practices. 70
Some market players believe the PUC has done a good job of making
consistent decisions in an uncertain market -- making California a good
place for expanding companies and investors to put their talents and
treasures. At the same time, they are concerned about the PUC's ability
to sustam that record as competition in all utilities accelerates.
Finding the Time and Focus
O
ver the last two decades, the Public
PUC Decisions
Utilities Commission has been faced
with Increasingly complex policy issues
that have made it virtually impossible for
the five appointed commissioners to be
Integrally involved m all of the important
deCisions before the Commission. The
energy economic and environmental
I
crises of the 1970s and early 1980s
greatly complicated the task of regulating
utilities. The gradual push toward
deregulation of the transportation
Industry and competition among the
II
utility providers has further burdened the Telecom Energy
PUC. Water • Transportation
Overlap issues
The accumulated consequence of these Source: Public Utilities Commission
trends has been an enormous workload The PUC's caseload in fiscal year 1994-95 refiects its
that has required an increasing delegation his toric multi-indus try responsibilities.
85
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
of duties and increasing reliance on staff to make policy-level decisions.
In cases where the staff has worked effectively, the Public Utilities
Commission has been vulnerable to criticism that unaccountable civil
servants have been making decisions that should be made by politically
appointed commissioners. In cases where the decision-making process
has not worked smoothly, the Commissioners have been criticized for
not following the record, or not providing equal access to all parties or
not acting swiftly enough.
In reviewing PUC procedures for the Legislature, an advisory group in
1994 recommended ways the Commission could better manage its
caseload.71 But one former PUC Commissioner on the Advisory Group
concluded "the problem confronting the Commission is jurisdictional
overload ... too much to do, too little time to do it." The former
Commissioner said the dilemma will worsen as long as the PUC tries to
arbitrate competition -- a function it was not designed to perform:
Regulating during a time of transitional competition is tough under
any circumstances, but may become almost impossible to do
,uright" without rethinking the extent of the PUC's agenda.... In
my opinion reform without jurisdictional modification will not be
enough in the long run.
72
During the PUC's Vision 2000 process, Commissioners and their staff
struggled with how to perform all of the functions the PUC wants to
perform and at the same time comply with pleas from participants for
greater commissioner involvement in proceedings. One Commissioner,
during public deliberations of the dilemma, described the pressures:
I am frightened beyond belief that someone thinks that I'm going
to sit through every evidentiary hearing, sit through every
workshop, sit through every prehearing conference, that me or
my adviser is going to sit down and draft a report or proposed
decision or what. I simply don't understand the process, but I
have tried to participate in prehearing conferences and every
commissioner here can double in spades my experience that it's
impossible when three are scheduled at the same time in different
hearing rooms. You just can't do it. ." I measured today my
written materials that I owe the parties an obligation to read. The
folder for the last three days was somewhere between six inches
and a foot thick. I'm not telling anybody news when I tell them
that I don't read every word. No one reads every word.
73
The Legislature addressed this problem In 1996 by enacting S8 960.
Lawmakers said their intent was "to ensure that members of the Public
Utilities Commission shall be integrally and directly involved in and
accountable for the Commission's decisions," and as a result improve
"the Quality and timeliness of Commission decisions.
II
In the case of legislative-like decisions -- the ones In which competition
related issues are addressed -- the law reqUires that assigned
86
Telecommunica tions
Commissioners be present in every formal hearing and prepare the
proposed decision. But the present workload will make that requirement
difficult if not impossible to meet.
The incumbent telecommunication providers and some of their potential
competitors testified that a paramount concern was keeping the PUC
focused on regulatory decisions
needed to allow for vigorous and
The Energy and Telecommunications Link
fair competition -- and not distracted
by major organizational changes.
They were also concerned that An important issue in the debate over jurisdiction of
unless some significant changes California's future utilities is the relationship between
were made, the PUC could not energy and telecommunications. One alternative
recommended to the Little Hoover Commission was to
make hard decisions in a timely
merge the PUC and Energy Commission's energy and
manner, let alone assess
telecommunications functions and transfer the PUC's
decisions after implementation
water and transportation functions elsewhere.
has began and make any needed
modifications.
That plan would keep in place the expertise needed to
oversee issues in common between the two industries -
Pacific 8ell, for instance testified principally their history of monopolies, the emergence of
that there may be some saving in competition, and the potential for some companies to get
having one commission oversee into the energy and telecommunications markets.
multiple industries: primarily the
efficiency and flexibility that But this alternative has some Important disadvantages:
The agency would have an enormous workload trying
comes with a consolidation of
to restructure both industries simultaneously and develop
resources. The telephone utility
new skills to oversee competitive markets. Many
also cited disadvantages to
competitive energy market players did not want to be
keeping multi-industry oversight
within the PUC's jUrisdiction. And while some
Intact -- including the possibility
companIes may seek to capitalize on existing right of
that the PUC's workload may ways to offer multiple services, the regulatory issues
slow the restructuring process in concerning telecommunications and energy are likely to
energy and telecommunications. grow further apart as the two industries leave behind
their greatest commonality a history as monopolies.
That does not leave the State or
the PUC many options. No other
state agency has the expertise to effect the regulatory changes required,
and the only way to allow the Public Utilities Commission to concentrate
on telecommunications is to focus its attention on those issues.
Recommendations
Rec()mmendation 5: The Governor and the Legislature should enact Legislation
directing the PUC -- after the development of competitive energy markets -- to
focus its attention solely on the development ()f competitive telecommunications
markets by monitoring for possible market power abuses, overseeing
telecommunications public policy programs such as universal service and
identifYing unfair business practices.
87
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
A number of policy reviews in recent years have found that the PUC has
too many responsibilities to adequately fulfill them all. Changes in
technologies and emerging competitive utility markets have increased the
workload. Successful oversight of the telecommunications revolution
will rest in large part on the time and focus the PUC can bring to the job.
88
Telecommunications
Redefining Public Interest
Finding 6: As new telecommunications technologies and services emerge, the
State does not have a systematic way for determining areas of public interest
or the extent of government oversight that is necessary.
P
ut most simply, the PUC/s role has been to use regulation to
perform price setting and other market, functions in the absence
of a competitive market. The fundamental issue is: In a
competitive market, what regulations if any should the PUC Impose?
Complicating this simple version of reality is that telecommunications
has not changed from a monopolistic service one day Into a fully
competitive market the next.
Competition has come slowly/to different aspects of the network at
different times. Upstart providers have had to gain momentum in order
to compete against the incumbents, who are strong from decades of
monopoly operation. Incumbent utilities are simultaneously competitive
enterprises and monopolies -- creating an enormous task for the regulator
of sorting one out from the other.
In new technologies, such as cellular / the PUC's regulatory objectives
have been even more confused. The PUC maintained for years that it
had rate-setting authority and so established tariff rules, while at the
same time asserting that it was relying on the market to set prices.
While the PUC has conducted numerous proceedings in an attempt to
fairly usher competition into the market, even its supporters do not
believe the Commission has done enough to predetermine when it will
stop regulating.
89
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
When to Act
T
puc
he has set out to bring competition into the telecommunications
industry, and has expressed an intent to replace government
regulation with consumer choice. The PUC is complimented, especially
by new entrants, for sticking to its plans to dismantle the monopoly
structure that prevents alternative providers from entering the market.
The concern arises over the PUC's long-term role and its ability to
develop and stick to plans to eliminate regulation when the consumers
have choice.
The Public Utilities Commission has taken a two-track approach to the
trends: The first are those proceedings, previously described, to usher
competition into the telephone network or regulate new services. The
second involves the PUC's Vision 2000 process, in which it has
attempted to define its role in competitive markets and adapt its internal
structure to match its new role. The plan makes two changes directly
related to the regulation of telecommunications:
• Creates a Telecommunications Division. As with the other
industry-based divisions created by the plan, Vision 2000
consolidates the telecommunications experts into a single office
responsible for monitoring the industry, assisting in the
development of rules and implementing regulations.
• Creates a Customer Services Division. The PUC's efforts to
thwart over-aggressive marketing by long-distance companies
helped to convince Commissioners that the PUC will playa major
role in policing the markets for unfair business practices and
representing customers in disputes against companies.
As part of the Vision 2000 process the Public Utilities Commission
prepared "business plans" for each of the industries it regulates. The
plans describe long-term market trends and the PUC's attempts to align
regulation to the changing industries. The strategies list a number of
priorities for PUC action -- including the streamlining of regulations to
accelerate the pace of innovation in telecommunications.
The Vision 2000 plan describes what the PUC sees as its role in
competitive markets: facilitating the transition by changing regulations
to promote competition, acting as a referee between industry
participants; and developing rules to create a "level playing field" among
competing carriers. Looking ahead to the year 2000, the Public Utilities
Commission described its role in telecommunications as "protecting
consumers and those with special needs, safety and environmental
issues, establishing rules for and monitoring competition./l
Missing from the document IS a deSCription ot when the PUC will cease
to reguiate participants because competition has developed.
90
Telecommunica tions
When Not to Act
I
n the eyes of incumbents, upstarts and consumer groups,. it is not
clear when the PUC will regulate and when it will not. Without an
articulated strategy for forbearance consumer groups and potential
competitors are constantly concerned that the Public Utilities
Commission will pull back too quickly, allowing incumbents to use their
market power to take advantage of customers and fend off competitors.
Similarly, incumbents and entrepreneurs venturing into brand-new
markets are concerned that the Public Utilities Commission will not let
go of its role as an economic regulator.
These are not easy issues. The lesson from deregulation so far is that
the presence of more than one provider does not necessarily mean that
competition will keep sustained downward pressure on prices. In some
cases, the former monopoly may exert market power to keep prices high.
But more commonly, the dominant provider maintains higher prices.
Rather than try to gain market share by lowering prices, the new
entrants are satisfied with the super profits that come by charging just
below the dominant provider.
Studies by Harvard and Yale economists both show that the price cap
regulation of AT&T has not provided sufficient incentives to hold down
costs and lower prices, and the competition from competitors is not
enough to force AT&T to lower prlces.74 Similarly studies done by
I
RAND and others have shown the ineffectiveness of those controls.
But economists and other policy experts differ on the appropriate
government response in these situations. One economist summarized
the dilemma:
One of the greatest challenges confronting regulation todav is to
know when not to regulate. As competitive forces strengthen,
prices should be determined in the marketplace. But at just what
point competitive forces are strong enough to permit the end of
pervasive regulation is vet to be determined. 75
Regulators faced a similar problem after the airline industry was
deregulated. Dominant carriers charged prices far above costs until a
number of low-priced carriers "broke" from the Incumbents and offered
low fares on heavily traveled routes. Experience in that aspect of airline
deregulation, at least, has shown that government forbearance from
regulation eventually allowed for the desirable result -- intense
competition that has driven down prices and allowed millions more
people to travel by air.
While competition is still emerging at the local level! there is evidence
that the PUC still may be regulatIng too much. An analysis published by
the Brookings Institution showed that regulators -- Including the
California PUC -- have been reluctant to separate out those aspects of
91
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
the market that are competitive to let competition set price. Instead, the
regulators impose restrictions with the intent of controlling market power
at the expense of delaying or deferring the development of competition.
The analysis concluded that incumbent monopolies usually benefit the
most from lihalf-hearted" reforms: liThe regulator should be left to
specify interconnection rules, unbundling, an accounting separation
between wholesale and retail functions for firms with bottleneck
monopoly, and nondiscriminatory pricing for such integrated
monopolists."76
The PUC faces nearly identical issues when determining its role in new
markets where there is no history of regulation and where there is not
a monopoly provider -- but there may be concerns about inflated profits.
The PUC has asserted that all new telephone companies are utilities
under Public Utilities Code
Section 216. Some companies
have challenged this in PUC When Regulation Meant Higher Prices
proceedings, but so far not in
court. The cost of imposing too much regulation on new
services that were never monopolies was, in at least one
case, higher consumer prices. A 1995 analysis by MIT
When the first cellular telephone
professor Jerry Hausman showed that regions where
licenses were issued in 1983, the
cellular telephones were regulated (including San
FCC issued two licenses in every
Francisco and Los Angeles) had significantly higher
market. The "duopoly"
prices and lower penetrations than regions with no or
arrangement was thought to
little regulation.
provide enough competition to
thwart the need for government The study found that the regulation -- even passive rate
price regulation. regulation such as tariff posting requirements -- allowed
competitors to know each other's prices before they
Airtoucfl however, was ready to went into effect. As a result, competitors could either
l
offer services in its first market match the price or come in only slightly under it. The
postings also allowed competitors the opportunity to
before its competitor. As a
protest the prices to the PUC.
result, the PUC imposed
regulations similar to those it had
The study, which was highly critical of the PUC's cellular
adopted for monopolies, and
regulation, shows that the PUC needs better standards
retained many of the rules even
for determining when it will regulate these new and
after the duopoly developed. changing services and when it will forbear from
regulation. Individual regulatory decisions then need to
A number of other states also be reassessed to determine if they comply with the
initiated some form of economic standards.
regulation. California' s, however,
was considered to be among the Testifying betore Congress in October 1995, Hausman
most rigorous in the nation. said:
While the PUC maintained it
State regulators assume (as a matter of faith) that
would let the market determine
their regulation is better than a situation of
the prices. it dampened market
imperfect competition. No economic theory nor
forces In a number of ways: It
wide-ranging empirical study supports this
reqUired companies to post tariffs
assumption. Cellular telephone proves it to be false
and limited changes that could be
in this particular industry.
made In the tariffs, whIch
92
Telecommunications
encouraged cooperation among competitors. It required a minimum
mark-up on services to encourage resellers to enter the market. And it
prevented cellular service companies from selling equipment.
The result of these regulations, according to an MIT researcher, was
higher prices and fewer people being served by the companies.77
In 1993, Congress prohibited states from regulating cellular rates, unless
they could show a compelling reason to do so. Eight states, including
California, argued their case before the FCC. In 1995 the FCC concluded
that California did not have a valid reason for its cellular regulations.
And in 1996, to eliminate concerns by PUC Commissioners that the
Public Utilities Code compelled them to regulate cellular phones, the
Legislature passed a bill specifically exempting cellular phones from PUC
rate control.
The dangers lurking behind the PUC's case-by-case strategy for
determining when it should intervene depends upon one's perspective.
New entrants and consumers are concerned that market power abuses -
and higher prices for consumers -- will be tolerated in the name of
encouraging competition. The incumbent monopolies are concerned that
the PUC will tie their hands -- letting competitors capture too much of
their market before they are truly free to compete. These concerns will
heighten as competition is ushered into the local phone business and as
more market players -- many of them veterans of the regulatory arena -
use each proceeding to try to gain a competitive advantage.
This problem is as old as modern
From Rates to Prices
day deregulation efforts. By the
mid-1980s, the FCC and some
state commissions were setting A 1995 analysis published by the Brookings Institution,
standards for when they would Talk is Cheap: The Promise of Regulatory Reform in
stop regulating. So the good North American Telecommunications, found that many
states struggled with trying to partially deregulate
news is that California does not
telephone markets. The researchers concluded that
have to stumble down a darkened
market players were better off in states with "well_
path.
defmed ground rulesJl and consumers were better off in
states when regulators are more willing to let the market
The recommended solutions
work:
depend on one's perspective, as
well. Pacific Bell believes the Our analysis showed that halfhearted reforms such as
PUC should quickly concede its partially flexible pricing do not necessarily move rates
regulatory role and the Legislature in the right direction. Nor does it benefit anyone
should eliminate a number of other than the incumbent firm to partially deregulate
"obsolete" statutes, including the without allowing full competition.
PUC's ability to set rates for
PacifIC Bell.78 Other service
providers describe a need to eliminate JJregulatory underbrush" that
complicates proceedings or biases the Commission's decision making in
one direction or another. 79
For Roseville Telephone, the solution was easy: Proposals to lower rates
93
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energv
should be approved immediately. As it now stands, the company must
submit promotional and advertising material to the PUC before it can
receive permission to offer a promotional rate for new services to its
customers.
In some cases there are fundamental gaps between where the PUC/s
decisions are headed and what the law requires of the PUC. Most
notably the code requires the Commission to set fair and
I
nondiscriminatory rates. Not only will the Commission not set rates in
the future, but market strategies begin with companies establishing
discriminatory rates to capture specific groups of customers. BO
In other cases, the PUC has chosen to simply ignore regulations or
statutes that are no longer meaningful. Among those rules that Pacific
Bell complains are obsolete is one for regulating advertising rates in
telephone directory yellow pages -- but the PUC has not used that
authority in years and it is hardly a roadblock to competition.
The Legislature/s PUC Reform Conference Committee struggled with
some of these concerns and made some progress toward realigning the
Commission's statutory and regulatory framework with the needs of a
competitive market. S8 960 requires:
• The PUC to provide the Legislature by March 1 997 with
'/recommendations for changes to regulations or statutes that
may be required as a consequence of the changing competitive
environment in which regulated and unregulated entities are
competitors.1/
• The PUC, in consultation with the Law Revision Commission, to
submit to the Legislature by June 30, 1997, a report on revisions
to the Public Utilities Code that are needed as a result of the
restructuring of the electricity, gas, transportation and
telecommunications industries.
Sounding Regulatory Retreat
T
he Legislature's first requirement focuses on one of the most
Immediate concerns -- the regulations and statutes that might distort
the position of competitors in a market that is partly monopolistic and
partly competitive. Its second requirement provides a process for a more
comprehensive review of the statutes that may minimize the gaming of
various competitors, and the Legislature did not leave the task solely to
the Commission.
But the heart of the issue is when and how the PUC will intervene in the
market, whether it will make those decisions consistently and whether
I
it will have the self-discipline to let the market function. It will be
necessary to allow unique circumstances to Influence decision making.
But some principles for gUiding decision making could benefit the market
94
Telecommunications
players, consumers, the PUC and the Legislature, which is often called
on to provide relief to whichever participant is unhappy with a regulatory
decision.
Standards or guidelines, especially ones crafted by the PUC and
approved by the Legislature, could diminish concerns that the State will
not back away quickly enough to let competition flourish and reassure
those who believe the Commission will retreat before competitive
pressures can hold down price in the absence of regulation.
GTE, an incumbent local
The Federal Checklist
exchange carrier that also is
aggressively seeking to compete
in areas where it was previously The Telecommunications Act of 1996 set benchmarks
that predetermine when regional bell telephone
restricted, believes the
companies, previously prohibited from entering the long
Commission should establish a
distance and equipment markets, should be allowed to
benchmark for regulatory retreat.
compete in those sectors. The benchmarks were
Specifically, it believes the PUC
intended to encourage competition by providing certainty
should forbear from regulating any
to potential market players.
time that customers can truly
chose among service providers. The checklist included a number of requirements
The benchmarks would "assist in intended to ensure that the regional bells were facing
assuring that regulation in competition in the local exchanges before they tried to
California was relevant and at the capture customers in other markets including the
same time assure the standards availability of interconnection, the unbundling of local
that customers should expect.081 services, number portability and resale provisions.
Similar to GTE's recommendation
is Southern California Gas Company's call for a PUC rule-making order
to define when competition is deemed to be adequate -- allowing for
case-by-case determinations, but sending a clear signal when the
regulator will stop regulating.
It may be that more than one benchmark is appropriate. While the PUC
may want to forbear from most regulation when more than one provider
eXists, it may want to retain a certain degree of regulation until the
quality of those consumer choices reaches a predetermined standard.
Since most of these benchmarks would require the commission to stop
doing something that it is required by statute to dOl GTE believes it
would be appropriate for the standards to be approved by the
Legislature.
Even more so than with energy, many market players and policy experts
see a day when all aspects of the telecommunications industry are truly
competitive, economic regulation can cease, and the State will be left
with a few basic functions: public safety and network reliability;
administering programs for the deaf and disabled or to subsidize
connections to rural areas or low-income residents~ registering entrants
and monitOring the market to determine when and where competition IS
failing to control prices.
95
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
The PUC envisions itself doing these functions, along with the more
activist roles of resolving disputes among market players, resolving
disputes between providers and consumers, enforcing unfair business
practices and antitrust actions.
In the process of establishing principles or benchmarks for when it will
intervene and when it will forbear from intervening, the Commission
would necessarily have to detail its ultimate role in a competitive market.
The Legislature, in its role of determining what functions state agencies
should perform, may not agree that all of those functions are appropriate
for the State, or they may find that those functions may be more
appropriately done by another state agency.
Recommendations
Recolnmendation 6-A: The Governor and the Legislature should enact
legislation declaring clear standards for when telecommunications services are
fully conlpetitive, when they are vulnerable to possible nlarket power abuse or
when they are so affected by the public interest that government intervention in
warranted.
The PUC should be required to use those standards to establish the
scope of its activities and routinely review the consequences of those
activities. The standards should include a time line and the PUC should
report to the Legislature on the progress or variations from the time line.
The goal is to maintain consistent progress in an accountable way
toward regulation In line with markets.
Reconlnlcndation 6-B: Beginning in the year 2000 (lnd evel)' five years after
1/111/, the Public ~Ttilitie.~ Commission should undergo a sunset review to
tleternline if the PUC is still needed.
The sunset review will provide at least two benefits. The first would be
to make sure that any basic function, such as monitoring for potential
market power abuses or registering new entrants, has not outlived its
usefulness and those functions or the PUC itself is no longer providing
Significant value to Californians. The second benefit would be to provide
the Legislature With the opportunity to reassess the State's role in
telecommunications and the best way to fulfil those roles.
96
Telecommunica tions
Setting Policy
Finding 7: The State's practice of setting telecommunications policies on a
case-by-case basis encourages market players to seek the same changes from
the Legislature and the Public Utilities Commission. This venue shopping
spurs occasional conflicts and confusion among government entities that
could prove costly to nascent com petitive markets.
J
ust as in energy, it has not always been clear when the Legislature
will be the venue for establishing a policy, and when the Public
Utilities Commission is the appropriate venue. This tension is
predictable, given the broad policy making or legislative-like functions
that the Commission performs.
The tension also provides some public benefit -- and under the current
structure is one of the few ways to bring political or legal pressures to
bear on the PUC.
And the tension will never fully be resolved, because a tenet of American
democracy is the ability to challenge the actions of the government, and
if that fails to challenge the laws that permitted the government to take
the offending action.
Stilt there is evidence that in telecommunications policy the relationship
between the Public Utilities Commission and the Legislature has
devolved. The rapidly changing telecommunications Industry and its
customers will be better served by some agreement in how major and
minor policies will be set.
97
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
Delegation vs. Accountability
H
istorically, the Legislature has granted significant authority to the
PUC to set both broad and detailed policy for the industries within
its jurisdiction. Among the purposes of this arrangement was to insulate
from day-to-day politics the establishment of regulations that would
result in private concerns earning millions of dollars. It also left the task
of creating those regulations in the hands of full-time experts in the field.
In creating the PUC during the Progressive Era, California helped to
develop the model for that fourth-branch form of government that was
widely replicated during the New Deal Era. At the time of the Great
Depression, a plethora of federal regulatory commissions were developed
for the expressed purpose of making swift and expert decisions affecting
the marketplace with the hope of spurring an economic recovery in a
number of developing markets.
By intentionally consolidating the legislative and judicial functions of
government into single agencies, reformers hoped to increase the
efficiency and quality of decision making. The values of fourth-branch
agencies are:
• Efficiency. By vesting the PUC with quasi-legislative and quasi
judicial decision making, the Commission was expected to
establish regulations quicker than the Legislature could enact
laws and enforce those regulations with more consistency and
alacrity than the courts.
• Integrity. By appointing Commissioners to six-year terms,
prohibiting them from conflicts of interest and insulating them
from removal for political reasons, the Public Utilities Commission
was expected to make decisions free from corrupting influences
and with an impartiality toward those with actions before it.
• Quality. By giving the Commission a focused task and an expert
staff, the Commission was expected to make technically sound
and legally correct decisions, with the public interest as its
lodestar.
One acknowledged cost for this arrangement is reduced accountability
on the part of the PUC to the Governor, who appoints the
Commissioners but does not have the authority to remove them, and on
the part of the PUC to the Legislature, which as the venue for making
laws is the primary navigator for state policies.
In the case of the PUC, that accountability was further reduced by
severe restrictions on the rights to appeal Commission decisions to the
courts -- a measure of independence that government reformers have
granted few other fourth-branch commissions.
98
Telecommunica tions
Insulation vs. Isolation
M
ore recently, the Legislature has not been satisfied either with the
decisions the PUC has made or with how those decisions have
been made. In a number of instances, the Legislature has initiated on its
own or been asked by PUC participants to statutorily establish a policy
that the PUC believed was its prerogative to decide. In other cases, PUC
participants -- dissatisfied with the PUC's procedures and the extremely
limited ability to appeal decisions to the courts -- have appealed to the
Legislature for reconsideration of an issue "litigated" at the PUC.
Many of the complaints have resulted from the Public Utilities
Commission's procedures how it goes about making decisions, how it
relies on staff and how Commissioners are involved in the policy-setting
process. Other complaints have centered on the decisions themselves -
for instance, the Commission's insistence on regulating cellular
telephones and its reluctance to give up control over paging services.
The conflicts are almost inevitable as the PUC seeks to adapt itself to
industries that are rapidly changing without having sought statutory
clarification of the role that lawmakers would prefer it to fill.
These conflicts also are well
Policies Before Rules
illustrated by an instance when
the problem was averted. In
1993, the Governor in his State In AB 3606, the Legislature was able to express a
of-the-State address requested number of policy preferences before the PUC crafted
the PUC to develop a road map rules for opening local telephone service to competition.
for determining the feasibility of
It declared that competitive markets would yield better
competition in all tele
prices and services to most Californians than regulated
communications markets.
markets, but that the State still had a role in ensuring
"that certain societal goals are met," including universal
The Commission's investigation
service.
resulted in its report Competitive
Strength: A Strategy for It declared that local telephone companies should be able
Telecommunications Infra to enter into the cable television business, but their local
structure. That report resulted in networks also should be unbundled to encourage
a legislative debate in 1994 and competition.
the passage of AS 3606 (Moore)
and AB 3720 (Costa) calling for
competition at the local telephone market, allowing incumbent
monopolies to compete for services they had been restricted from
offering and streamlining PUC regulations to encourage competition.
One PUC Commissioner described this policy evolution an "an excellent
example of useful synergy between policy initiative and implementation.
II
This process allowed for the Governor and the Legislature to express a
policy preference -- and to sign off on the details of the ultimate policy -
while allowing for the PUC to utilize its expertise to develop the details
99
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
of the plan and its regulatory authority to implement it. The process
helped to restore the accountability for decision making between the
Legislature and the PUC, allowing each to play the appropriate role at the
appropriate time. But that case is the exception, not the rule.
Routine Accountability
S
everal provisions in 58 960 are intended to make the PUC more
accountable for the decisions it makes, and begin to establish a
better relationship between the Legislature and the PUC.
Beginning in January 1999, the PUC will be required to make an annual
statement to the Legislature on the number of cases the PUC took longer
to resolve than it said it would when the case began. This provision is
intended to push the PUC toward making timely decisions, and to be
accountable to the Legislature when it does not.
Also, in March 1997, the PUC is required to submit a report to the
Legislature on recommendations about regulations and statutes that
should be changed as a result of competition -- an attempt to eliminate
the statute-by-statute revisions that are now requested often after a long
battle before the PUC/ the FCC or in the courts.
These efforts could be expanded -- and the success of AB 3606
repeated -- by establishing an annual reporting and goal-setting process
between the Legislature and the PUC. As described for energy policy in
Finding 4, the PUC and the Legislature could create an annual ritual of
reviewing the PUC's accomplishments of the last year and setting goals
for the next year.
J
GTE advocates that the PUC and the Legislature set goals on an annual
basis -- for new policies the PUC would pursue and old programs it
would drop. The following year, the Commission's efforts would be
assessed based on outcome-oriented measurements: How did the efforts
affect consumer prices and services? Based on that assessment, the
Legislature and the Commission would set goals for the next year -
developing over time a constructive relationship that is better able to
withstand individual special interest pressures.
Such a process should enhance the characteristics that Californians
expect from fourth branch commissions -- efficiency, integrity, and
quality -- while restoring the accountability that some critics believe has
been lost, The process also could provide predictable procedures for
setting policies concerning a dynamic industry -- discouraging market
players from venue shopping between the PUC and the Legislature and
encouraging consistent policy making favored by investors.
100
Telecommunications
Recommendations
Recommendation 7: The Governor and the Legislature should enact legislation
requiring the Public Utilities Commission, as a precursor to the annual review
lind approval of its budget, to collaborate with the Legislature to review
telecommunications policy directions and past performance and establish
specific goals that the Commission will pursue in the coming year.
While the PUC was intended to be insulated from day~to-day politics, it
cannot operate in a vacuum. Over the long term, the legitimacy of
fourth-branch commissions to chart significant policy changes will be
enhanced by routine reality checks from elected legislators. Similarly
I
while the PUC is given the authority to make tough decisions day in and
day out, the legitimacy of those decisions will be enhanced by an annual
public accounting of PUC's policy choices.
101
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energv
102
Transportation
.:. While federal policies have virtually
eliminated economic regulation of
competitive transportation providers, the
State maintains vestiges of rate-setting that
are known to increase consumer prices.
•: . Safety and licensing are the prevailing
State functions concerning transportation
providers, and those duties are shared by
the PUC and the State's transportation
agencIes.
•: . Rail safety and rail planning are closely
related issues, but those duties are split
between different State agencies, and in
some cases are duplicated.
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
104
Transporta tion
In Whose Interest?
Finding 8: Some of the PUC's transportation regulatory activities are
remnants from an era when industry asked for government intervention as a
shield against the rigors of competition. Those regulations, disguised as
consumer protection, can have the effect of raising prices without a
commensurate benefit to the public.
T
puc
he has been regulating the rates of transportation providers
for more than a century. In the beginning the PUC's clear
purpose was to guard the public against the abuses of the
powerful railroad interests. But priorities shifted with the Depression
when the trucking industry asked for rate regulation to protect
companies from cutthroat competition, and government. with an eye
toward stabilizing the national economy, responded.
As a consequence, the Public Utilities Commission, like commissions
nationwide, strove to fulfill dual and conflicting mandates to protect
the public and at the same time to protect regulated companies. With
this contradictory mission the PUC has at times put the interests of
carriers first -- redefining the public interest through the lens of what is
good for industry. As a result, many of the companies under the PUC's
regulatory umbrella have come to see the agency's main task as
preserving industry well-being.
The PUC is now pre-empted by federal law from regulating rates for
railroads and trucks. But the PUC has yet to abandon rate setting for
other carriers, and it has a number of other requirements that discourage
new entrants and can lead to higher consumer prices.
105
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
A Decade of Deregulation
D
eregulation of transportation carriers was not driven by industry,
but by consumers. Consumer advocates fought for deregulation
before Congress because they believed that consumers stood to benefit
from open competition among transportation providers. They convinced
policy makers that when government set rates in markets where
competition existed or was possible, the effect was to raise prices and
limit services. And they
convinced policy makers that just
as trucking had eroded the
For Example, Airline Deregulation
monopoly of the railroads, in other
transportation markets
consumers increasingly also had The Director of the University of San Diego Center for
Public Interest Law, writing in the Spring/Summer 1992
choices among buses, trains,
issue of the California Regulatory La w Reporter,
airplanes, taxi-cabs. limousines
explained how deregulation of the airline industry has
and shuttle buses.
had uneven benefits for consumers:
One lesson from transportation
Let's take an example. On March 6, 1990, it cost
deregulation is that consumer
$480 to fly round-trip from San Diego to Sacramento.
welfare can be diminished as One could fly to Europe for less than it cost to go
much by too much regulation, as from California's second largest city to its capital.
by too little -- and sometimes The market was a tight oligopoly with US Air as price
simultaneously within the same leader. South west Airlines was virtually the only
industry. When deregulation is competitor Hon the make" and wHling to price
independently. But Southwest did not then serve San
complete but some providers
Diego-Sacramento. A lack of airport gates in
maintain market power, prices
Sacramento was one impediment. But in markets
can rise. When deregulation is
where Southwest offers competition to these same
incomplete and competitors are
carriers, fares are one-fourth to one-third the per
hindered by government rules,
passenger mile rate of the $480 San Diego
prices can also rise.
Sacramento charge.
Airline deregulation illustrates the
first type of failure. In prohibiting
all rate regulation regardless of the level of competition! the federal
government erred on the side of the market -- hoping that new market
players would enter routes where prices were too high. That policy has
subjected customers in under-served markets at least temporarily, to
l
high prices charged by sole providers. The benefits of deregulation have
been reaped by air travelers between major destinations where
competition is fierce. In effect, the capTive customers of sole providers
have subsidized the lower prices available to air passengers in high
traffic areas. Where this kind of rate inequity exists in California, the
PUC is prevented by federal deregulation of air transportation from
mtervening on behalf of captive customers.
The second failure of transportation deregulation the failure to
completely deregulate rates when open competition might lower prices
can have the effect of limiting new entrants and encouraging market
players to charge the same price. In the wake of price deregulation, and
106
Transportation
in trying to balance the interests of industry and consumers, the PUC has
retained three requirements from its economic regulations of years past:
1. Passive Rate Regulation. The PUC still keeps a hand on rates
charged by household goods movers and some passenger carriers. The
Commission sets the maximum rates movers can charge for a menu of
specified services. Under legislation enacted in 1995, the maximum
rates are adjusted annually. The PUC also requires scheduled bus lines
and shuttle services to file tariffs specifying rates. The Public Utilities
Commission allows passenger carriers to make small rate changes
within a "zone of rate freedom," but approves significant changes in
rates only if it first determines that the carrier faces adequate
competition.
2. Financial Reports. The Commission requires carriers to file two kinds
of financial reports. New carriers must file information to prove they
have the financial wherewithal to provide a proposed service. And
existing carriers must file detailed financial reports every year -- solely to
determine the fee the company must pay to the PUC.
3. Certificates of Public Convenience and Necessity. Every passenger
carrier who wants to enter a market under the Commission's jurisdiction
must apply for a certificate of public convenience and necessity. In
order to obtain a certificate, applicants must show the PUC that they will
not adversely affect other carriers in the area. They also must notify any
carriers already operating in the market of their proposed entry,
effectively inviting protests against the potential competition. The Public
Utilities Code calls for the PUC to grant certificates only if it finds that
carriers already serving the area are not providing satisfactory service.
While the PUC is moving toward an "open entryU policy for new service
providers, it still retains the public convenience and necessity filing
requirements that allow incumbent providers to challenge the
applications of potential competitors.82
From the Consumer's Perspective
R
epresentatives of some companies regulated by the PUC argue that
maximum rate setting is necessary to give consumers a way of
comparing the cost of services from one company to another. But a
number of studies in various industries have shown that in competitive
markets, passive rate setting and other kinds of economic regulation lead
to higher prices.83 The PUC's passive rate setting, financial reporting
and public convenience and necessity rules are vulnerable to this charge:
Passive Rate Setting. Researchers have found that setting maximum
rates undermines competitive pricing by encouraging companies to
charge similar amounts for like services. Passive rate setting takes a
number of forms across the country. Several states exempt the moving
Industry from antitrust laws and allow moving companies to specify
rates as a group.
107
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
At the federal level, interstate movers are allowed to define maximum
rates for designated services through the Household Goods Carriers
Bureau, a "rate bureau" made up of moving companies. The bureau
publishes the rates in a tariff and petitions every year for usually
automatic approval from the Surface Transportation Board.
In California the PUC sets
maximum rates movers may The Role of the Regulator
charge. Until recently the moving
industry had to apply to the PUC
The PUC's role of protecting both the consumer and the
and go through a hearing process
transportation industry has caused confusion at times
whenever it wanted to raise
about which role takes precedence -- and even requires
rates. But in 1995 the moving
the occasional reminder that both roles exist. The
industry, complaining to the confusion is reflected in this comment from the owner of
Legislature that this process was Fleetwood Limousine Company to the Governor's
too protracted, managed to have Deregulation Task Force:
the law changed.
Whatever program is selected, the agency responsible
Under legislation sponsored by must be concerned with protecting the public, as well
as the limousine operator.
movers and effective in January
1996 (AB 877, Conroy), the
maximum rate will be adjusted
automatically every year according to an industry productivity index,
II II
yet to be defined. A former PUC Transportation Division Chief explained
the rationale:
The industry productivity factor will be adopted to allow industry
as a whole to get an increase. The more efficient you are, the
more you'// be making. It's like incentive rate making. 84
Said th~ president of the California Moving and Storage Association,
which represents household goods movers: liThe automatic rate review
is a slam dunk for us. It takes only an few hours.1I85
California moving industry representatives maintain that the rates movers
charge are typically 10 to 20 percent below the maximum rates.
Nonetheless -- and by whatever mechanism it is carried out -- maximum
rate setting encourages competitors to charge similar prices, reducing
the market's downward pressure on rates.
Customers may indeed be able to compare prices for similar services
from company to company, but they are likely to find that the rates are
all the same, and that they are all high. The Director of the University
of San Diego Center for Public Interest Law told the Little Hoover
Commission:
Where truckers are allowed to set rates in concert, and where
public filing of rares prior to or at the time of effectIve charge is
allowed, the state creates a ready-made mechanism for private
price fixing .... The fact of common gain through price increases
becomes a part of the price setting fabric. 96
108
Transportation
Researchers have found the same principle in telecommunications where
l
early price competition among long distance competitors was replaced
by nearly uniform rates across the industry,B7 Because rate changes and
discount schemes have to be approved by the Federal Communications
Commission, competitors are signaled in advance to changes and can
respond by raising or lowering their own prices. One pair of researchers
described the dynamic from the business perspective:
Adam Smith suggested that businessmen rarely meet but to fix
prices. A modern Adam Smith might suggest that businessmen
prefer the regulatory market over true competition since the
regulator has the power to affect the market outcome without
exposing the firm to the risk of antitrust prosecution. 88
The PUC/s rate restrictions on passenger carriers similarly has little
benefit to consumers. The requirement that rate tariffs be filed and that
only minor rate changes be allowed assumes in advance the need for
rate regulation. The PUC looks for competition only after the fact. A
better approach might be to determine where competition exists and
cease all economic regulation in those areas. If residents in a remote or
under-served area remain captive customers of a sole provider, the PUC
might then be justified in overseeing rates.
Financial Reporting. Requiring new companies to prove they have the
financial resources to provide a proposed service is another remnant of
the PUC's economic regulation of monopolies. The requirement may
have some value in preventing customers from being victimized by a
company's inadequacy, but there is little evidence that protection is
needed in bus, shuttle or moving services more than any other industry.
There also is little evidence that the PUC's test of financial fitness is
effective at keeping under-financed companies from operating, One
reason is that the financial fitness test conflicts with the PUC's open
entry policy for new providers. Representatives of limousine and airport
shuttle services said that too often the open entry policy hurts the
industry by licensing companies that soon go out of business.
Requiring incumbent companies to file extensive annual financial reports
for the sole purpose of assessing PUC fees based on company revenues
began when the PUC had a heavy hand in determining those revenues.
The financial reporting requirement adds to the costs ultimately borne by
consumers while adding little value to the services provided.
One company president said it takes her company 30 hours each year to
assemble the data requested to determine the fee. She questioned how
much of the information is really needed:
It is my experience that hardly anyone looks at these reports nor
even knows if they are submitted. (A recent experience by a
colleague brought to light a company who had not f/Jed an annual
report since 19921) If the CPUC needs figures to validate a
109
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
transportation company's worthiness to stay in business, one
only has to require an annual reporting of their financial
statements and a copy of their corporare structure.
89
Certifying Public Convenience. The PUC has required Public
Convenience and Necessity Certificates in nearly all of the industries it
regulates. The most common reason for the certificates has been to
determine whether the capital expansion proposed by a monopoly would
provide enough benefit to warrant the additional expenses imposed on
captive customers. When the application was from a potential
competitor, the PUC used the
certificate process to determine
The Industry View: One Example
whether a new applicant would
undermine the economic position
of the incumbent, which was The president of the Marin Alrporter Company, an airport
seen as counter to the public shuttle service, complained in testimony to the Little
Hoover Commission that she had to spend $50,000
interest.
fighting a competitor's application for a certificate of
public convenience and necessity.
In today's transportation climate,
the certificate serves principally
Her specific complaint was that the effort failed and the
to protect incumbents from
competitor was allowed to operate, but that the new
competition and is inconsistent
company went out of busmess five years later.
with the goal of encouraging new
market entrants. Not surprisingly, It is difficult to know how that battle affected the ability
licensed carriers favor this of the new provider to survive, and whether the
requirement. But the public does consumers m that market would be better off today If
not benefit from limiting the they had two providers to choose from.
number of carners offering
services in a given market simpiy
to avoid harming incumbents.
In a competitive market, the entry of virtually any new provider should
be assumed to be in the interest of public convenience and necessity
because competition leads to lower costs and improved service.
To promote competition in electriCity generation, the PUC has advocated
that new power plants not have to pass any kind of needs test and that
new market players be held to minimal entry standards.90 But at the
same time the PUC maintains an antiquated entry requirement for
companies that want to drive passengers to the airport.
Besides being anti-competitive, there are indications that the PUC's
economic regulation of carriers also may be ineffective, in that many
upstart companies operate "illegally." Household movers, limousine
companies and others complain that the PUC does not track down
unlicensed operators and that competition from illegal operators hurts
business. One limousine company owner complained to the Commission
that there was "too much competition" in his industry and that the PUC
should do something about it.91
110
Transporta tion
An example of how the PUC's handling of carriers can work against the
public interest is in the regulation of airport shuttle vans -- Ironically one
of the most competitive areas of passenger service. Airport operators,
usually county officials, are
frustrated because terminals are
jammed with large numbers of In the Case of Sacramento Airport
vans and limousines jockeying to
pick up customers. The PUC, At Sacramento International Airport, county officials
trying to pursue pro-competition were concerned about traffic congestion and barraged by
policies, is reluctant to help by consumer complaints about price gouging and poor
limiting market participants. shuttle service. They responded by requesting potentla~
competitors to submit proposals to provide services that
met minimum rate and service standards. When only
Some airports have tried to solve
one company met the specifications, it was granted
the problem by contracting with
preference in serving the airport. The PUC -- objecting
selected companies to provide the
because airport customers now would be served by a
passenger shuttle services. State
monopoly provider -- then stripped the company of its
law specifically allows airports to
"zone of freedom" right to make minor rate changes
enter into exclusive contracts without PUC approval, even though the county airport
with shuttle companies, even if officials had found the rates acceptable.
the contracts limit competition.
By law, the airport can define the
services expected and otherwise control shuttles operating on airport
property. But the PUC, with its jurisdiction over passenger carriers, can
step in to render the contracts meaningless.
The Commission reserves the right to judge a company/s rates and
"fitnessJ to serve the public. If the company fails the PUC's test, the
'
PUC can assert control over the rates or revoke the company's authority
to operate.
Creating New Standards
I
n the transportation market, taxi-cabs, limousines, chartered buses.
scheduled bus lines and shuttle vans are all vying for the same
1
customers, but operating under different regulatory schemes -- with taxi
cabs licensed by cities and other carriers under varying requirements of
the PUC as well as the California Highway Patrol and other agencies.
It is difficult to see what value the PUCls filing requirements and passive
rate setting add to the health of this market. Eliminating these
regulations would allow customers to more fully benefit from competition
by encouraging new entrants and requiring market players to more
aggreSSively price their services.
111
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
Recommendations
Recommendation 8: The PUC should cease all transportation
related activities.
Policy makers at the federal and the state level have determined that
competition, not regulators, should set prices for transportation
providers. Preserving remnants of economic regulation -- such as issuing
certificates of public convenience and necessity for new providers,
posting tariffs and requiring detailed financial reports -- can reduce
competition and increase consumer prices without providing significant
consumer benefits.
112
Transportation
Safety Regulation
Finding 9: The PUC's transportation safety and insurance functions overlap
with the duties of the CaJifornia Highway Patro] and the Department of
Motor Vehicles. The overlap results in unnecessary regulation and
contributes to gaps in safety.
A
s rate setter and consumer watchdog as well as industry
guardian -- for virtually the entire transportation sector, the PUC
was a logical place to consolidate most of the State's regulation
of buses, trucks, rail and other common carriers in the early days of the
century.
The PUC's historic rate regulation of transportation providers also put it
in a strong position to impose licensing and safety regulations to serve
the customers of both common carriers and others sharing the State's
roadways. Its judicial authorities were swift mechanisms for dealing
with violators.
But since the PUC's role in economic regulation has been pre-empted at
the federal level, it is appropriate to reassess the agency's remaining
roles in licensing and safety.
The State has an agency whose primary function is transportation. And
within that agency, there are departments whose primary duties are
jlcenslng drivers and enforcing safety laws. While it is possible to
carefully define responsibilities to avoid technical overlaps, that effort
often avoids placing functions with the agency most capable of
performing them.
113
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
Gaps and Overlaps
T
wo aspects of the PUC's comprehensive regulation -- liability and
safety have enduring public benefits and have survived beyond
rate deregulation. The PUC uses Its licensing authority to require
companies to have driver and vehicle safety programs and to ensure that
operators carry liability insurance.
The PUC maintains that these functions require its expertise. But many
of the PUC's activities duplicate functions of departments in the
Business and Transportation Agency particularly those of the California
Highway Patrol (CHP) and the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV).
The PUC's liability program requires
moving vans, buses, limousines and For all of its authority over vehicle
shuttle buses to maintain adequate
safety, the PUC has no vehicle inspectors
liability insurance as a condition of
and does not inspect vehicles.
operating in the State. Until January 1,
1997 that requirement also applies to
commercial trucks. Legislation effective
that date will end PUC jurisdiction over trucking companies.
The PUC also requires intrastate carriers (but not private companies
carrying their own goods) to have workers' compensation insurance.
Insurance companies are required to notify the PUC when a company's
insurance is about to lapse, and the PUC can suspend or revoke a
company's operating license if it fails to maintain its insurance or safety
programs. The PUC's safety program consists of requiring companies
to have a preventive vehicle maintenance program in place and to
subscribe to the Department of Motor Vehicles driver pull-notice
II
program," which gives companies access to drivers' records.
Because the PUC has an enforcement staff of only 34 in its six field
offices statewide, it relies on industry informants to enforce these
requirements and to make sure that all carriers operating are licensed.
When the PUC certifies a company as having met the insurance and
safety requirements, it issues a IICal Tn number for the company to
display on its vehicles. Licensed companies, anxious to eliminate
"illegal" operators that might be charging lower rates, report companies
that appear to lack a Cal-T number.
The California Highway Patrol, meanwhile, has its own safety programs.
The CHP conducts regular inspections of bus and truck terminals in
which it checks driver logs, makes sure the company has adequate
vehicle maintenance and driver training programs, checks accident rates
and inspects vehicles for safety.
The CHP also conducts routine roadside inspections of all trucks
operating on California highways requiring every truck over 10,000
114
Transporta tion
pounds to be inspected once every three months and inspects buses
in occasional highway "strike force" operations. The CHP (with some
exceptions) has no jurisdiction over vehicles with fewer than 11 seats,
which takes in nearly all limousines and airport shuttle buses. The CHP
also does not have access to the PUC's
insurance records for checking either at
terminal inspections or roadside stops.
The jurisdictional divide leaves at least
For all of its authority over vehicle one serious public safety gap. Shuttle
safety, the PUC has no vehicle
Vllns -- which transport between 8
inspectors and does not inspect vehicles.
million and J 2 million pllssengers a year
Occasionally the PUC accompanies the
CHP on "surprise inspections" at places in California -- may never be inspected.
where buses and shuttles congregate -
at airports, national parks and Disneyland
on Prom Night. In these instances, the CHP inspects the vehicles while
the PUC provides the jurisdictional authority for the inspection. The CHP
conducts similar surprise inspections at airports, in those instances using
the jurisdictional authority of airport police.
The CHP and the PUC maintain that there are no overlaps in their safety
efforts -- because the CHP deals with actual vehicles and drivers and the
PUC deals with companies. At best, however, the present system has
the PUC, CHP and DMV performing parallel functions and requires the
various agencies to coordinate efforts to avoid overlaps and gaps.
And even with all three agencies involved, the jurisdictional divide
leaves at least one serious public safety gap. Because the CHP has no
jurisdiction over vehicles carrying fewer than 11 passengers and because
the PUC does not inspect vehicles on its own, one large class of
commercial vehicles may never be inspected at all.
Shuttle vans -- which the PUC estimates transport between 8 million and
12 million passengers a year in California -- are not included in the CHP's
terminal and roadside inspections. As a result, they may never be
inspected unless they are examined by airport police or caught in a
surprise joint inspection. As a practical matter. many shuttles are able
to elude even these inspections by leaving airport grounds whenever
inspectors appear.
To further complicate matters, local police agencies, DMV, the State
Board of Equalization, and Department of Transportation all have some
role in regulating commercial vehicles. The Commissioner of the
Highway Patrol testified that while cooperation among agencies is good,
the system could be better:
Some minor overlaps inevitably occur, but the system generally
has worked out the kinks and each agency understands and
carries out its responsibilities. Industry would echo that
conclusion we thmk with the possible footnote that the PUC has
been characterized as lacking responslveness.92
115
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
One additional factor soon may affect the State's safety oversight of
transportation carriers. A proposal now under debate at the federal level
would incorporate insurance records for both interstate and intrastate
transportation carriers into a centralized national database. Once the
database is in place, the trucking industry is expected to propose that
the authority of states to prevent uninsured carriers from operating be
removed. If the move is successful, state oversight of carrier liability
insurance could end by 1999.93
Legislative Changes
A
fter Congress deregulated intrastate trucking in 1 994, ending state
control over rates, the Governor's Deregulation Task Force was
convened to decide how the State should respond. The Task Force,
which was made up of industry and state agency representatives,
concluded that the PUC's licensing and insurance authority over all
commercial vehicles except for household goods movers and passenger
carriers, should be transferred to the California Highway Patrol. The
Task Force further recommended that a Motor Carrier Advisory
Committee be set up to look at more long-range issues, including
transferring all trucks and passenger carriers remaining under PUC
oversight to the CHP.94
Representatives from the trucking industry followed up by sponsoring
legislation. The truckers were motivated partly by the fact that the fees
they were paying to the PUC exceeded what the PUC was spending to
regulate the industry. Legislative hearings on the issue revealed that in
1995 the PUC collected $ 20 million in fees from trucking companies, but
spent only $9 million on transportation issues.95
The legislation that resulted AS 1683 (Conroy), which will become
effective in January 1997 differed from the task force
recommendations in two ways.
First, instead of consolidating the PUC's licensing and safety functions
at the CHP as the task force recommended, the new law divides those
responsibilities between the CHP and the DMV. Under AS 1683, the
CHP will take over the PUC's function of checking trucks for liability and
workers compensation insurance} adding those requirements to its truck
terminal inspections. The DMV will enter the insurance information into
a database to which the CHP will have access. The DMV will issue
companies a motor carrier permit, which will be the equivalent of the
PUC's license to operate a commercial vehicle.
Second, instead of following the long-term recommendation of the task
force that both trucking and passenger carriers eventually be moved out
of the PUC, the bill transferred only trucking carriers. According to the
executive vice president of the California Trucking Association, the
exclusion of passenger carriers was strategic:
116
Transportation
This was a tough bill, a consensus-building bill. As it was it took
us two years to get the bill through. The {federal} pre-emptive
legislation dealt only with freight transportation and we made a
decision to stick close to the federal deregulation guidelines. If
the bill had included passenger carriers it would have taken four
years to get it passed. 96
Household goods movers. who were not included in trucking
deregulation at the federal level, also opted to exclude themselves from
AB 1 683. According to the president of the California Moving & Storage
Association, the reason is that the moving industry needs the consumer
protection oversight of the PUC because consumers are unsophisticated
about using household moving services and moving is stressful. But
here again the public interest is confused with protecting industry:
Movers want to stay with the PUC because the PUC knows how
to regulate. They go after the unlicensed movers who take
business away from licensed movers. They understand the
vulnerability of the moving industry to consumer complaints.
97
Realigning Responsibilities
The State has at least three options for realigning the PUC's safety,
liability and consumer protection functions:
1. Change the CHp1s Jurisdictional Threshold. One solution would
be to expand the CHP's jurisdiction from the present 11-passenger limit
to all commercially operated passenger vehicles except taxi cabs, which
are under local authority. This would leave the PUC with authority to
check for liability insurance and other safety programs and to issue an
operating license. However it would bring shuttle buses into the CHP's
terminal inspection program and also allow the CHP to inspect these
vehicles on its own authority at airports, in roadside stops and at other
locations without PUC involvement. Even without putting shuttle buses
under CHP jurisdiction, the PUC role in inspecting shuttle buses adds
little value since airport police have authority to inspect these vehicles
on their own and to prevent vehicles that fail inspections from operating
on airport grounds.
2. Shift Passenger Carrier Jurisdiction. A broader solution to
eliminating both gaps and duplication would be to follow the
recommendation of the Governor's deregulation task force and build on
the model of AB 1683 by transferring passenger carrier oversight to the
CHP and the DMV. That move would allow the CHP to include shuttle
vans in its terminal and vehicle inspection programs, take over the PUC's
function of checking for insurance and carry out enforcement through
the courts or by instructing the DMV to revoke a company's motor
carner permit. The PUC argues that its authorltv over passenger carriers
is necessary because it is the only state entity with the power to revoke
an operating license. But this authority could be replicated at OM V, as
117
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
trucking companies under AB 1683 -- particularly sInce DMV Issues
licenses and maintains records for drivers.
3. Consumer Protection. Providing a method for resolving consumer
complaints also serves a genuine public need, but there is no reason this
need must be met by the PUC. Despite moving industry claims that the
public needs special protection from unethical moving companies, there
is no persuasive evidence that the problems of customers of moving
companies or passenger buses -- could not be addressed by another
governmental entity or by the same remedies afforded in any other
business transaction. The president of the California Moving and
Storage Association (CMSAL acknowledged in a letter to the Little
Hoover Commission that consumer protection related to the moving
industry could be provided by another agency:
Another agency, a restructured CPUC and/or a combination of the
above could possibly perform the necessary regulatory functions.
However, CMSA would strongly suggest that nothing less than
the existing level of expertise be utilized. 98
Transportation deregulation offers the State the opportunity to realign its
regulatory programs to provide the greatest possible benefit to the public
interest and safety. Seven other states provide a model. All of these
states rely on transportation agencies outside their public utilities
commissions to perform the transportation oversight responsibilities
assigned in California to the Public Utilities Commission.99
Recommendations
Recommendation 9-A: The Legislature and the Governor should
enact legislation transferring the safety and liability regulation
of all commercial highway to the California High'way
carrier.~
Patrol and the Departnlent oj'Jllotor Vehicles.
Common sense and economic realities prompted the Legislature in 1996
to move safety and licensing of truckers to the CHP and the DMV.
Common sense dictates that the same functions for other transportation
providers be transferred to those agencies as well.
Recommendation 9-B: The Legislature and the Governor should
enact legislation putting 1I1inivans that are used to carry
passengers conunercially under the ,\'alne sa.fety ol'ersight as
larger passenger vehicles.
Shuttle vans represent an area where economics and convenience
actually work in favor of the State's policies of discouraging single
occupancy vehicles. The State should take advantage of thiS trend by
118
Transportation
providing shuttle passengers the same level of safety as In other
commercial passenger carriers.
Recommendation 9-C: The Governor and the Legislature
should enact legislation moving the PUC's consumer protection
jUllctions concerning household movers to the Department of
Consumer Affairs. A sunset review should be performed to
if
determine there is a continuing need for this specialized
oversight.
The State has an enduring interest in making sure its citizens are not
cheated or victimized by thieves. The State pursues this interest daily
with generalized law enforcement and consumer protection agencies,
There is nothing to indicate that a similar level of state involvement on
household moving issues will prove inadequate.
119
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
120
Transporta tion
Rail Safety
Finding 10: As the PUC's role as a rate setter for railroads has been
eliminated, it is left with railroad safety functions that are more related to
the core competencies of transportation planners and accident investigators
than to those of an economic regulator.
T
he federal government has pre-empted the states from economic
regulation of railroads and has virtually pre-empted the states in
safety regulation as well. Nevertheless, the PUC retains some
jurisdiction over safety for both heavy rail and rail transit systems.
Disasters like the 1991 Southern Pacific derailment into the Sacramento
River at Dunsmuir have galvanized interest in maintaining a state role in
safety. But at issue is how the State can best fill that safety role.
While the freight rail industry is experiencing rapid consolidation,
passenger rail service is experiencing a resurgence.
Essentially all of the new passenger providers, however, are public
agencies that require different kinds of oversight than private providers
and are already working closely with state and federal transportation
agencies to plan, build and operate safe and efficient systems.
And finally the PUC continues to playa role in rail crossing safety a role
I I
that transportation providers also fill -- providing opportunities for
realigning functions.
121
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
The PUC's Oversight ofR ailroads
T
he Public Utilities Commission was initiated as a mUlti-purpose
regulator of railroads at a time when railroads held a monopoly on
cargo and passenger transportation. The PUC set rates, policed for
discriminatory fares and set and enforced safety standards. Other
modes of transportation have long ago eroded the railroad monopoly and
the ability of railroads to take advantage of captive consumers. Today,
the federal government has primacy on nearly all matters concerning
non-government railroads. The PUC retains four rail-related functions:
1. Freight and Passenger Rail Safety. The PUC is responsible for
inspecting heavy rail systems using inspectors trained and certified by
the Federal Railroad Administration to make sure tracks, equipment,
signals and operations meet federal standards. The Commission also
investigates rail accidents. Under state law passed after the Dunsmuir
spill, it identifies sections of track vulnerable to accidents and applies
local rules concerning reconstruction and operations on those sections.
2. Transit System Safety. The PUC is responsible for reviewing the
safety programs of the State's six rail transit systems: the San
Francisco, BART, Metro Rail, San Diego, Santa Clara and Sacramento
light rail systems.
3. Grade Crossing Safety. The PUC makes sure that rail-highway
crossing and crossing warning devices are operated and maintained
safely and it conducts engineering reviews of new or modified rail
highway crossings. In conjunction with the California Department of
Transportation, the PUC sets a priority list for grade crossing
improvement projects to be completed with federal funds.
4. Mergers and Abandonments. The PUC retains a minor advisory role
in economic oversight by making recommendations to the federal
Surface Transportation Board in response to railroad mergers and track
abandonments.
Overlapping Roles
T
he State's role in rail safety IS complicated by the overlapping
responsibilities of the PUC and Caltrans. This is particularly true in
funding safety upgrades for the State's 9/700 public highway-rail
crossings.
Most of these projects are paid for by "Section 130" funds -- federal
money provided by the Highway Safety Act of 1973. The PUC takes
the lead in establishing the priority list for crossing upgrades to be
funded. To create the list, the PUC consults with railroad officials and
local communities.
122
Transportation
Caltrans -- after talking to railroad officials and local communities
independently -- reviews the PUC's list and recommends modifications.
After the list is finalized, Caltrans prepares a service contract with the
railroad to have the work done.
The two agencies use a similar process for determining which crossings
should be closed to accommodate high speed trains, and for projects to
separate rail crossings from highways.
The need for the two agencies to
coordinate activities and agree on In 1994 and 1995 the State managed to
Section 130 projects can slow the
complete only about 30 frail cro.fiising
process to a stand-still. Nearly 1,400
upgrade} projects a year while the PUC
crossings were upgraded under the
program between 1973 and 1993 - and Caltrans wrestled over who had final
about 70 a year. But according to
say over project priority.
Caltrans officials, in 1994 and 1995 the
State managed to complete only about
30 projects a year -- while the PUC and
Caltrans wrestled over who had final say over project Priority. The
problem was further complicated by a turf battle within Caltrans.
Not only can such inter-agency disputes delay projects, but the need for
the two agencies to coordinate efforts can compromise safety where
duties are divided and coordination falls short. One Federal Highway
Administration offiCial told the Little Hoover Commission:
In an ideal world there would be only one agency to handle the
program. (Having two agencies) can be a big problem in places
like Oakland where there are a lot of railroad crossings over local
streets. The PUC interfaces with the railroads while Caltrans
interfaces with cities and counties. Traffic lights are not the
PUC's bailiwick.
JOO
Other states avoid the problem by giving one agency responsibility for
handling the crossing upgrade program. In Texas, for example, the
Department of Transportation prepares the priority list for federal rail
crossing upgrade Section 130 funds using a simple state formula based
on such factors as the number of vehicles per day / the number of trains
in a 24-hour period, average speed of the trams and the number of train
accidents at the location in the past five years.
The Texas Railroad Commission whose safety functions are similar to
those of the California PUC -- has no role in funding rail-highway crossing
upgrades. Texas officials further speed the upgrade funding process by
providing the 10 percent matching funds required of local communities.
By this method, Texas is able to funnel $14.6 million in crossing upgrade
funds and to complete between 150 and 175 prOjects each year,101
North Carolina operates a similar system, with the State Department of
Transportation using a federal formula to prepare the priority list with no
123
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
involvement by the public utilities commission. That state completes
betvlleen 75 and 80 crossing safety upgrade projects a year. 102
In contrast, because of the disagreements between the PUC and
Caltrans, officials from the Commission's Rail Division say they have
decided to limit the PUC's list of eligible projects to the 30 crossings
they deem most needed. As a result, California can now complete no
more than 30 projects a year, even though, according to the PUC, 1,020
public rail-highway crossings in the State presently need upgrading to
federal standards and local matching funds have already been authorized
for 740 of those crossings.1 0 3
Coordinating Rail Safety with Rail Planning
T
he growing interest in rail and the
State's interest in better "Railr(Jad warning signals that 'meet the
incorporating rail transport into
standards' f(Jr rail might not
in~pect(Jrs
statewide transportation raises the issue
adequately c(Jnsider the demands (Jf
of how the State can best align its
planning and safety goals. Most often highway traffic, and traffic signals that
the public interest is best served when seem adequate t(J highway engineers
those functions are closely coordinated.
might p(Jse problen1s f(Jr rail (Jperati(Jns."
In addition, most new rail services are
being provided by other government
u.s.
agencies -- increasing the need for Department (Jf Transportlltion
coordinating efforts among state,
regional and local authorities.
The PUC's role in rail planning. The only voice the PUC has in rail
plannin~ is its minor advisory role in rail mergers and track
abandonments. Responsibility for statewide transportation planning for
both freight and passenger rail rests with the Caltrans. Although the
department's involvement in private freight rail planning is limited, the
department nonetheless is charged with coordinating the statewide
transportation system. The department is required by federal law to
participate in cooperative passenger rail planning efforts with the fifteen
regIOnal planning bodies in California and to assess the impact of
proposed projects on state transportation.
Legislation signed into law in 1996 grants local jurisdictions the authority
to enter into joint power agreements to operate intercity rail systems.
But most local jurisdictions have shown little interest in taking on that
responsibility fearing that the new law requires local governments to
I
make up any future funding shortages. In any case, Caltrans is expected
to have a continuing oversight role for passenger rail in the State's three
intercity passenger corridors.
A 1996 U.S. Department of Transportation report entitled Accidents
II
That Shouldn't Happen," underscores the need for rail safety
considerations to be incorporated into planning. The report said its
124
Transportation
investigation pointed to the need for Jlcoordination of warning signal
inspections, track and highway maintenance," and better coordination
in setting standards and designing highway-rail crossings. The report
pointed out:
Railroad warning signals that Nmeet the standards" for rail
inspectors might not adequately consider the demands of
highway traffic; and traffic signals that seem adequate to
highway engineers might pose problems for rail operations. 704
On the larger scale, it makes sense for safety to be integrated Into
planning for both passenger and freight rail systems/ particularly with the
need to improve connections statewide among buses, trucks,
automobiles and rail and to increase capacity at major freight rail hubs.
A June 1996 report prepared for
Planning Prevents Accidents
Caltrans by a steering committee
made up of government and
industry representatives, including A U.S. Department of Transportation Grade Crossing
representatives from the PUC, came Safety Task Force, in its March 1996 report. II Accidents
ThaI Shouldn't Happen. pointed to the implications for
to a similar conclusion. That report, U
safety when coordination fails. That report prompted by
the IlCalifornia Trade and Goods
the collision of a commuter train and a school bus
Movement Study, pointed to
If transporting 35 high school students in Fox River Grove,
"duplicative, confusing, and
Illinois, noted:
overlapping regulations and
procedures" among government The principal finding of this report ... is improved
agencies as a principal impediment highway-rail grade crossing safety depends on better
to moving freight efficiently in cooperation communication, and education among
l
California. Noting that 107 million responsible parties if accidents and fatalities are to be
tons of treight were transported by reduced significantly.
rail within and through California in
1992, the committee called for a
consolidated transportation planning process and streamlined state
regulations. The task force cited traffic congestion as a key problem
limiting access to seaports, airports and intermodal facilities, and
hampering delivery of time-sensitive shipments. It called for improved
corridor management resulting in better connections among
transportation modes.105
The federal Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act, which has
set aside $155 billion to upgrade the nation's surface transportation
systemt also stresses improved links among highwayst rail, air and
maritime facilities. Passenger rail planning raises similar issues, with the
need to coordinate passenger travel among intercity and commuter rail,
automobiles, buses and airports.106
From an industry perspective, the best place to house safety and
piannlng responsibility for rail IS in an agency that understands how
railroads operate what IS needed to move freight so it can connect
efficiently With truckst ships and air cargo facilities and generate profit,
125
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
The Business, Transportation and
Housing Agency and the PUC have From an industry perspective, the best
discussed transferring the Commission's place to house safety and planning
rail safety activities to the agency. The
for rail is in an agency that
resp{)n,~ibility
discussions were prompted by the
unl/erstands how railroads operate -
Governor's lfCalifornia Competes
11
initiative to consolidate duplicative what is needed to move freighl,~O it can
regulatory functions. The connect efficiently with trucks, ships tlnd
Undersecretary of the Business
air cargo facilities and generate profit.
Transportation and Housing Agency
concluded that:
The rail safety divisions of the [PUC] would be more appropriately
located under the BT&H Agency. ... Rail safety could be improved
by the consolidation of [PUC} rail safety activities with the
Department of Transportation's Rail Division through increased
coordination and communication of rail engineers and safety
inspectors .... Transferring the [PUC] rail safety divisions to the
BT&H Agency will improve policy coordination with other
transportation issues statewide. 707
The Undersecretary went so far as to identify a home for the PUC's rail
related employees in Caltrans' Oakland office.108
For the PUC, the value of such a change would be to reduce workload,
free up the time of staff and Commissioners and enable the PUC to
concentrate on the single discipline of overseeing the dynamic
competitive telecommunications industry.
Recommendations
Recommendation 10.· The Governor and the Legislature should transfer the
PUC's rail planning and safety functions to the Business, Transportation and
Housing Agency.
The precise form the new consolidated program will take should be
based on a thorough review of how to best link rail safety with
statewide rail planning and how to best coordinate funding of safety
projects within Caltrans to avoid the conflicts that have slowed project
completion in the past.
126
Water
.:. Private water suppliers are required to
meet increasingly stringent water quality
standards and are expected to stretch
existing supplies with efficiency
technologies --public policies that require
additional investment and accommodating
rate-setting regulations.
•: . Small water companies -- some of whom
do not participate in PUC proceedings -
have a particularly difficult time raising
the revenue to make needed investments
and the State has not developed an
adequate strategy for helping those captive
consumers.
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
128
Water
Finding the Right Venue
Finding 11: While the rates charged by private monopoly water providers
still need government scrutiny., the greater public interest lies in ensuring
adequate and safe drinking water supplies -- challenges that fall outside the
PUC's expertise of thwarting monopoly abuse.
W
ater companies in California face two increasing challenges:
meeting stringent federal water quality standards that may
require additional treatment devIces to be installed and
Implementing water conservation improvements aimed at stretching
water supplies.
The Public Utilities Commission, with its focus on protecting customers
by keeping rates as low as possible makes it difficult for companies to
l
pay for conservation and water quality improvements, putting water
suppliers in the middle of competing policy demands and potentially
leavmg some water customers without sate drinking water.
Water companies also complain that the PUC is too preoccupied with the
evolving energy and telecommunications markets to deal effectively with
the problems of the water industrYI and that PUC filing reqUIrements are
too burdensome for small companies.
These issues -- along with the dramatic changes underway in other
industries regulated by the PUC provides the opportunity '[0 reconsider
the State's choices for economic regulation of private water suppliers.
That reassessment IS essential to ensuring that all of the public's
interests are adequately served.
129
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
The PUC's Regulation oft he Water Industry
T
puc
he has jurisdiction over California's 195 investor-owned water
companies, which together supply 20 percent of the State's
domestic water customers. The Commission's oversight of these
companies is confined to rate-setting.
Although the three largest companies under the PUC's jurisdiction serve
a total of 780,000 customers, most of the companies are small. Only
1 3 serve more than 10,000 customers and 143 serve fewer than 500
customers each. The PUC has no authority over the State's several
hundred municipal water companies, county water districts and special
water districts,
The Commission acknowledges that many more small private water
companies may be operating in the state, but says that it makes no
effort to find them. Said one PUC official:
The only time we get involved with a company is when it wants
to raise its rates or if a customer complains. We don't go out
and inspect or go out looking for companies operating without
our knowledge. If customers are happy, F'd rather not know
about it.
109
Ironically, private water suppliers may be the last remaining monopoly
utilities of the sort the PUC was set up to regulate. Unaffected by the
kind of technological changes that have eroded the natural monopolies
in electricity generation and telecommunications, domestic water
providers are expected to remain monopolies for the foreseeable future.
The Public Utilities Commission establishes rates for water companies
through its standard quasi-judicial proceedings as well as through
administrative procedures.
Companies in the Class A category -- the 1 3 largest -- are required by
the PUC to go through a general rate case proceeding to raise rates.
Class A companies, which are organized into many water "districts"
serving different geographical areas, can apply for a rate increase for
each district once every three years. That means a company typically
applies for rate increases every year for one-third of its districts. The
PUC rules on the rate increase after examining the company's projected
revenues, investments, expenditures and reasonable return on equity.
At the PUC's urging, some large companies are combining districts to
simplify record keeping and rate-making.
All of the 182 remaining companies (Classes B, C and 0) are allowed to
raise rates through a less formal process. Because these smaller
companies have complained that the PUC's procedures impose a difficult
burden on their limited resources, the PUC lets these companies raise
rates using a simplified administrative process.
130
Water
Class B companies -- those serving between 2,000 and 10,000
customers -- have the choice of asking for rate increases through a
general rate case, a court-like proceeding, or through an administrative
advice letter procedure. The smaller Class C and D companies can
receive virtually automatic rate increases tied to the Consumer Price
Index or can file requests for larger increases. The classifications and
the related procedures are summarized in the following table:
Water Company Classifications
CLASS NUMBER OF NUMBER OF RATE-MAKING
CUSTOMERS COMPANIES IN PROCESS
CLASS
Class A More than 10,000 13 General rate case
Class B 2,000 - 10,000 7 Choice of general rate
case or advice letter
Class C 500 - 2,000 32 Choice of automatic
rate increase tied to
Consumer Price Index
or general rate case
Class D fewer than 500 143 Choice of automatic
rate increase tied to
Consumer Price Index
or general rate case
As the table shows, much of the rate setting for water companies is
accomplished administratively. In addition, rate setting for the water
industry is far less complicated than for the large and rapidly changing
energy and telecommunications industries. As a result, regulating water
companies comprises a comparatively small part of the Commission's
overall workload. One indicator of the proportion of PUC resources
dedicated to water companies is the number of JJhearing days needed
11
to resolve cases. In fiscal year 1994-95, out of a total of 574 hearing
days, the Commission devoted 68 hearing days to water -- with 42 of
those days spent on rate-making. During the same period the
Commission spent 114 hearing days on telecommunications and 288
days on energy cases
.110
Gauging how much time individual Commissioners spend on water
matters is more difficult. One possible measure, however, is the
comparative number of ex parte contacts -- private meetings with
industry representatives outside hearing rooms. The ex parte records
also show that water is a minor part of the Commission's agenda. In the
first seven months of 1995, for example, Commissioners held 1,147 ex
parte meetings on gas, electricity and telecommunications matters.
During that period Commissioners met 13 times with interested parties
to discuss water cases.l11
131
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
Regulations Affecting Water Companies
P
rivate water companies, like their public-sector counterparts, are
expected to ensure an adequate water supply for future customers
and must meet stringent federal standards for drinking water. These
standards can require companies to invest in water efficiency devices
and programs for conserving water, and to monitor water quality and
install treatment equipment where needed to protect human health.
Water conservation. The 30 largest investor-owned water systems
under PUC authority those with 3,000 or more service connections,
representing between 10 and 15 percent of the State's urban water use
-- are all required by the Urban Water
Management Planning Act of 1983 to
submit conservation plans to the State Reducing demand is one of the State '.ft
Department of Water Resources prime strategies for meeting long-term
(DWR).112
needs -- and in most cases is the cheapest
way for individual companies to supp(v
The purpose of the plans is to encourage
water providers to consider conservation future customers.
measures -- such as low-flow toilets and
landscape irrigation timers -- in planning
for future water supplies. While
companies are not penalized for failing to conserve, companies that do
not take measures to save water may be hard-pressed to supply future
customers.113
With the State's population expected to surge from 33 million to 49
million in the next 25 years and with no new large dams expected, state
water ~anners say California faces a projected annual water supply
shortage of between 1 million and 3 million acre-feet of water by 2020
even if all reasonable conservation efforts are made.114 That gap is
enough to furnish between 2 million and 6 million California households
with water for one year. Reducing demand is one of the State's prime
strategies for meeting long-term needs and in most cases is the
115 --
cheapest way for individual companies to supply future customers.
In recognition of this fact, 150 water interests and agencies in the state,
including the PUC and most of the largest water companies under PUC
jurisdiction, in 1991 signed a memorandum of understanding on urban
water conservation. The agreement spelled out 16 "best management
practices, all of which by definition had been found to be cost-effective
II
ways to make efficient use of available water supplies.
The agreement commits the signatories to phase-in the conservation
measures through the year 2001,116 In projecting future water needs,
state water planners are counting on annual urban water demand
dropping by 1.3 million acre-feet per year by 2020 as a result of water
providers following these best management practices.117
132
Water
Water quality requirements. All domestic water systems -- including
those regulated by the PUC -- must comply with federal Safe Drinking
Water Act standards. First passed in 1974, the act was reauthorized in
1986 and again in 1996. The
1 986 reauthorization required
The Milwaukee Crisis
water system operators to check
for many more contaminants and
added requirements for treating Federal Safe Drinking Water Act standards are aimed at
surface water. preventing the kind of contamination that hit Milwaukee
in March 1993. That city's water supply was
The standards require companies contaminated with an intestinal parasite that left
to monitor water quality and to 800,000 people without drinkable water for a week.
More than 400,000 became ill and more than 40 people
install filtration and disinfection
died. OffiCials believe the parasite came from animal or
equipment where needed to
human feces in Lake Michigan.
reduce chemical contaminants
and eliminate disease-causing
Numerous other contamination incidents have affected
micro-organisms. The expense of
tens of thousands in New York, Washington, Texas,
upgrading facilities to meet the
Oregon, Missouri, Wisconsin and Georgia. In a June
standards means that many 1991 study published in The American Journal of Public
companies must raise rates. Health, researchers estImated that J/35 percent of the
reported gastrointestinal illnesses ... were water-related
When the act was reauthorized in and preventable
,/I
1996, Congress lessened the
The federal standards also seek to reduce lead
burden of compliance for small
contamination, which is especially harmful to small
companies by including money for
children. Lead in water can affect a child's developing
grants and loans. But that money
nervous system, reduce intelligence and cause other
may not become available in
serious health problems. According to the EPA Journal,
California until 1998.
In 1993 the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
found that tap water in more than 800 cities exceeded
In California the federal standards safe lead levels established by the Safe Drinking Water
are enforced by the State Act.
Department of Health Services
(DHS). The department is
responsible for overseeing the State's 8,500 water systems, including
those under PUC jurisdiction. DHS delegates oversight of the 4,940
smallest systems -- those serving fewer than 200 people to county
health departments.
For those systems under its direct oversight, DHS conducts inspections,
reviews monitOring reports, and issues orders or citations when systems
are out of compliance. The Department helps systems correct problems
by lining up funding, doing design work, setting up a schedule for work
to be completed and tracking progress. The company can continue to
supply water while it is out of compliance, but must notify customers
that the water may not be safe, leaving customers with the choice of
risking health by using the substandard water or turning to bottled
water. A citation is issued if the company fails to comply.
In an average year, the Department of Health Services issues some 800
citations and compliance orders to water systems under its direct
Jurisdiction for failure to meet federal standards.
133
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
For the systems under county oversight, DHS provides engineering
reports and other technical assistance and furnishes written evaluations
of the county health department's work to the board of supervisors.
Counties use less formal procedures to brrng water systems up to
standards, typically inviting company owners In for 'Joffice hearings" to
work out solutions. As a result, statistics on the number of water
systems under county jurisdiction that fail to meet federal standards at
any given time are less reliable. These are precisely the small companies
most likely to violate standards.
PUC Policies Hamper Water Companies
T
he pUC's heavy workload and its overriding interest in keeping down
costs to customers create problems for the water companies, their
customers and for the State as a whole. These problems are played out
in four ways:
1. PUC rules discourage conservation. In looking at company
expenditures to evaluate proposed rate increases, the PUC adheres to a
traditional rate-of-return philosophy that encourages companies to sell as
much water as possible. And in looking at proposed expenditures for
conservation, the PUC is reluctant to allow companies to recover costs
from ratepayers unless the program can be shown to be cost-effective
within three years even though a 10- to 15-year horizon is needed to
realize the benefits of water efficiency investment and to take into
account the cost of future water supplies.
As a result, according to the director of the Department of Water
Resources, privately owned water utilities are closed off from the water
management tools available to publicly owned water suppliers:
Current CPUC policies and practices inhibit conservation-oriented
pricing and investment among investor-owned utilities .... The
traditional rate structures, which are the only ones acceptable to
the CPUC, do not achieve the efficiencies required to meet the
water demands of the next century.
! 18
Ironically, PUC energy rate policies long ago were modified to reflect the
diminishing nature of fossil fuels and the economic value of efficiently
using resources. Asked why the Commission has not adopted demand
side management for water, the program manager for the PUC's Water
Division explained "we haven't had pressure to do that like in energy."
The reason, he said, is that "water is not a diminishing resource.'/119
2. The PUC does not cooperate with state conservation efforts at
a policy level. Even though the PUC signed the urban water
management agreement, PUC Commissioners now disagree among
themselves about whether that signing means the PUC has agreed to
automatically accept the best management practices as cost-effective
when applied to individual companJes.120
134
Water
The California Water Conservation Council, made up of more than 180
signatories to the urban water conservation agreement -- including 112
public and private water agencies, 17 public Interest groups and 43
municipal utility districts, cities, counties, state agencies and other
interested parties has been
working hard since 1991 to
Implement the best management Low-Flow Toilets -- An Untapped Resource
practices.121
Low-flow toilets are expensive in the near term, but yield
Together, the urban water big savings by stretching existing water supplies.
suppliers participating in the
Council serve 90 percent of the According to the Department of Water Resources, a
State's urban population. The rebate program to replace old toilets with new low-flow
Council meets regularly to refine technology COSTS a company $100 per toilet and the cost
of the water saved by the toilets works out to $300 an
the best management practices
acre-foot. By comparison, the Metropolitan Water
and to design a conservation
District of Southern California sells water for $450 an
based rate structure. The PUC is
acre foot. By 1998 state planners project that water will
a member of the Council. But
be selling for between $600 and $ 700 an acre foot.
according to the Commission's
Water from a new reservoir would cost $1,200 an acre
Water Branch Chief, the PUC has
foot. and water from a desalinization plant could cost
limited its participation to sending between $1 ,500 and $1 /900 an acre-foot.
a staff member to Council
meetings as an observer. 122 Gradually replacing the State's 20 million toilets with
low-flow technology is seen as one way to economically
The Department of Water meet the State's growing demands. Replacing 60
Resources -- which is counting on percent of the State IS old toilets over 20 years would
save between 400,000 and 800,000 acre-feet of water
conservation to help satisfy
a year more than twice the water that could be
growing water needs has tried
supplied by a large reservoir. So far only about 1 .5
to get the PUC to actively 1
million old tOilets in the State have been replaced.
participate in the California Water
Conservation Council meetings
and m other conservation
endeavors. It has been largely frustrated in its efforts. In 1992 the PUC
set up a water management committee with utility representatives and
DWR staff to help utilities begin conservation efforts. But the committee
fell apart because the Commission's staff was unwilling to consider a
statewide conservation policy or to discuss issues involving specific
companies outside of general rate case proceedings.123 The director of
DWR subsequently wrote two letters to the PUC president in 1994
urging cooperation in conservation matters. One of the letters read:
Being very candid, the department and local water utility staffs
throughout urban California seem to have a fundamental
difference of viewpoint with the CPUC staff concerning water
conservation. It appears to many in the water industry that
current CPUC practices inadvertently result in disincentives for
water utilities to implement demand management programs .
... We have struggled to understand why it has been so difficult
to find common ground with the CPUC staff on this issue.
Certainly, some of the difficulty comes from the view of the
135
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
CPUC staff that a very rigorous analysis must be made of any
utility investment, including conservation, in order to protect the
ratepayer. While this is a laudable goal In an abstract sense, we
believe it does not give enough conSIderation to (the) realities of
California's water situation.
124
According to DWR officials, the PUC did not respond to either letter.
The PUC maintains that it considers conservation measures in the
context of specific rate cases. But water company representatives told
the Little Hoover Commission that when they have asked the PUC to
approve rate increases for conservation programs they nearly always
have been turned down.
In what was widely regarded as a major coup for the industry Southern
I
California Water Company in 1995 persuaded the PUC to approve cost
recovery to replace a modest 1,000 toilets within its 250,000 customer
service area, but such victories are rare. Indeed, when asked to give the
best example of its support of conservation programs, the PUC pointed
to this one case. A vice president of Southern California Water
Company said the company was able to get approval for the low-flow
toilets only by partnering with a water district outside PUC jurisdiction
to share the cost and by appealing to a PUC Commissioner after the
program was first turned down:
In past years, 1991, 1992, 1993, all water companies got
no where with the PUC in getting cost recovery for any kind of
conservation programs. In 1994 we proposed a partnership
program with Metropolitan Water District, where our company
would put up 25 cents and MWD and one of its subsidiaries
would put up $ 1.00. We filed in January of 1994 and it took a
year and a half for the PUC to approve it. The [PUC's}
administrative law judge denied the program, so we frankly
lobbied the assigned Commissioner. We said, Uthis is really
dumb; if you can't approve this, what can you approve? We're
getting $1.00 for every 25 cents we put in." In June of 1995
the Commissioner finally approved it.
1)5
Other companies, he said, had not been so fortunate:
We're very encouraged, but here's the downside: we1re the only
company they've allowed to do this. The PUC has implied that
the payback period should be low and to do that you may need
a partner. But it shouldn't take partnering. In some areas of the
state, companies don't have agenCIes to partner with. Some of
the companies just gave up, to be perfectly frank. How many
times do you hear "No" before you quit?l.n
A vice-president of Santa Clarita Water Company, which serves 19,500
customers, confirmed the Industry's frustration with the PUC:
136
Water
Because of all the problems other people were having, we
haven't filed for cost recovery for any conservation programs.
The PUC was denying a lot of the programs. People would
propose conservation programs based on State Water Plan figures
and the PUC would just disregard the figures. We have done
things like conservation kits, sent out mailers on how to save
water and hired a conservation coordinator, but we just never fHe
for recovery.
127
One problem, according to the vice president of Southern California
Water Company is that liThe PUC doesn't do anything on a policy level.
It's all ad hOC."128
The PUC maintains, however, that it has done all it should do to advance
water conservation. One PUC official said:
We work hand-in-glove with our sister agencies. But staff won't
accept carte blanche what the utility may propose in conservation
if it's not cost effective.
129
3. PUC policies are not aligned with water quality goals. To comply
with federal drinking water standards, many water companies must
upgrade facilities. It is particularly
difficult for small companies to meet the
standards. Some 143 of the water
Of the 900 small surface water systems
companies under PUC jurisdiction serve
in the state under direct DBS
fewer than 500 customers each. Many
of these are businesses operating the jurisdiction -- all of them serving fewer
water service as a tangent to other
than 1,000 customers -- some 150, or 16
activities or to supply a housing
percent, are out of compliance with safe
development far from existing municipal
services. drinking water standards at any given
time.
These small companies are typically
underfinanced, unable to pay for system
upgrades and leery of participating in the
PUC's complex proceedings to obtain rate increases. As a result, these
companies -- particularly those in remote rural area -- account for many
of the water systems that fail to comply with drinking water standards.
Of the 900 small surface water systems in the state under direct DHS
jUrisdiction -- all of them serving fewer than 1 ,000 customers -- some
150, or 16 percent, are out of compliance with safe drinking water
standards at any given time. Often systems go in and out of compliance
because deteriorating infrastructures lead to breaks in mains and
subsequent contamination or because the company lacks the staff or the
management inclination to monitor water quality. 130
Rectifying problems by disinfecting water or investing in filtration
equipment and passing costs on to ratepayers IS much more difficult for
137
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
small systems than for large systems. The PUC allows companies to
recover all "reasonable" expenses through rate increases and the
Commission says it considers expenses necessary to comply with water
quality mandates to automatically satisfy the /Jreasonable" test. That
works fine for large companies that can afford to pay for needed
improvements up front and recover costs up to a year later through a
rate increase. But small companies often lack the money to invest in
advance, and have a smaller customer base to absorb the cost over time.
Meeting the standards also has a much great impact on rates for small
companies than it does for large companies. While large companies
typically need to increase rates only about 5 percent to comply with the
federal standards, companies serving fewer than 1,000 customers may
have to raise rates as much as 100 to 200 percent.'31 As a result
while the expense of complying with the federal standards costs the
average household nationwide only $1 2 a year -- the average cost for
customers of small companies comes to $145 a year .132
The PUC has tried to address the problems of underfinanced companies
by making it easier for companies with fewer than 10,000 service
connections to file for rate increases to recover costs. But those
procedures do not help companies that lack the funds to pay for
upgrades in the first place. Nor do they solve the problem of companies
that lack the management or the resources to properly monitor water
quality.
Whether the improvements are funded with loans or through higher rates
charged to water customers, resolving impediments to making upgrades
requires the PUC and DHS to work together at a policy level.
Recognizing the need for cooperation in water quality matters, the PUC
in 1 987 signed another memorandum of understanding this one with
the Department of Health Services. That agreement spells out the intent
of the two agencies to keep one another informed of actions involving
water companies under their common jurisdiction and to meet at least
semi-annually to review water quality efforts and resolve problems. But
the two agencies have not met since the agreement was signed, and
when the agreement was updated in 1996, the meeting requirement was
drop ped. 1 33
4. PUC does not devote adequate resources to water oversight.
The private water companies complain that with all its other
responsibilities, and with only 27 staff people to oversee more than 200
companies, the PUC does not give the water industry enough attention.
The most recent accounting found that the PUC is collecting $8.3 million
In fees each year from the private water companies under its authority 1
but spending only $6 million to regulate the industry.134
The PUC's disinterest In locating water companies operating without its
knowledge Isolates these companies even more than others from
possible financing mechanisms and leaves customers without a ready
forum for resolving disputes.
138
Water
The water companies say they want to remain under the purview of the
PUC, preferring to "stay with the devil you know." But they have urged
the PUC to speed up the rate-making process and to have at least one
Commissioner present in contested proceedings.
They also want the PUC to set up a water policy board made up of
health and water and PUC officials to ensure Commission decisions are
consistent with the policies of the other regulating agencies. The PUC
has had a water policy board in the past -- but the board has been made
up solely of the PUC's own water and ratepayer advocacy staff.
What's Needed
T
o ensure that customers of private water systems are provided with
safe and adequate water supplies, water companies need two
ingredients: competent management and enough funds to keep
infrastructure sound and to make any needed investments in treatment
and conservation.
In the past DHS has been able to help small water companies upgrade
systems with loans from a state revolving fund. The fund provided
$425 million over 15 years and funded 533 such projects between 1 976
and 1991. But the program ended when the last state bond measure
authorizing water quality upgrade funds failed in 1992.135
Some companies have tried turning to the private sector to finance
system improvements. But PUC policies stand In the way. Water
industry representatives told the Little Hoover Commission that the
PUC's rigid rate-of-return policies and after-the-fact review of allowable
expenses makes small companies unattractive to lenders. The director
of the California Water Association, which represents investor-owned
water companies, explained:
A lender looks at how stable a company is to see whether it can
repay the loan, If the earnings are all over the place ... a lender
won ~t look at them. The Commission allows a certain level of
expenses, but if something comes up like having to do another
set of testing for the Department of Health Services, it can
double their expense budget in one year. A more consistent
treatment of rate of return would aI/ow lenders to have a little
more confidence in the small companies.
136
With state and private loans out of reach, many companies simply
remain out of compliance. PUC officials and industry representatives
said some small water companies when faced with large bills,
regulatory hurdles and violation notices -- abandon the system, and the
customers, altogether.
139
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
Two Potential Remedies
California has two possible remedies to the problems of small, under
financed water companies: federal funds provided by Congress when it
reauthorized the Safe Drinking Water Act in 1996, and the possibility of
consolidating small water companies with larger, more financially sound
systems.
Federal funds. The 1 996 amendments to the federal Safe Drinking
Water Act provided funds to help improve systems that lack the
resources to meet safe drinking water standards. Altogether California
is expected to receive $60 million over each of the next five years to
improve the state's water systems.
The amendments established a revolving fund to give companies grants
and low-interest loans to fund upgrades and bring contaminants to within
specified levels. As the loans are repaid, the money will be loaned again
to other water suppliers -- a strategy the State effectively used in the
1970s and 1980s to finance construction of sewage treatment works.
The amendments also require states to provide more technical assistance
to small water systems, work to eliminate hazards to groundwater,
assess the workability of new water systems and encourage
consolidation of small water systems.
In addition the amendments increased the grant money states get to
enforce federal Safe Drinking Water Act requirements. California's
grant share for that purpose will increase from $4.8 million to $ 5.6
million. The enforcement money will go to the Department of Health
Services, which was the agency designated by the U.S. Environmental
Protect(on Agency in 1977 to carry out the State's federal Safe Drinking
Water Act responsibilities.137
It has not been determined which state agency would manage the
revolving fund. The State Water Resources Control Board has
administered the revolving loan program for sewage treatment plant
improvements. But the Department of Health Services administered the
State's former revolving fund for upgrading water systems.
Two hurdles must be cleared before the federal grant and loan money is
available. First, Congress must take additional procedural steps to free
the money from sewage treatment accounts. And perhaps the higher
hurdle, California will have to provide 20 percent matching funds. Health
officials say the Governor and the LegiSlature probably will have to
consider a bond measure -- ;]nd likely have to go to voters for approval -
to generate the state match.
Consolidation. Another possible answer is to facilitate the sale of small
water systems to larger companies or local governments. An industry
wide trend toward consolidation of small companies is already underway.
140
Water
According to the PUC, the number of small companies in California has
shrunk 25 percent in the past five years, from 243 to 182 as small
companies are absorbed by other companies and districts partly as a
l
result of the increased costs arising from federal water quality standards.
With cooperation from government, many more small companies could
be consolidated or folded into larger companies according to industry
l
officials. But those officials say PUC policies create a barrier by
restricting the purchasing company s return on the investment and
I
making it difficult for large companies to purchase companies that show
inconsistent earnings. The California Water AssociaTion testified:
Right now, if we were to buy a sma/! company, the Commission
would allow us to earn strictly on what they determine to be the
rate base of that company regardless of what it may be worth on
the open market or not worth on the open market. 138
The California Water Association has asked the PUC to provide
Incentives for large companies to purchase smaller financially ailing
l
systems. In other states, such as New York, utility regulators have
provided financial incentives by granting the large companies a slightly
higher rate of return if they take over troubled water systems.
The PUC is considering these and other policies to encourage
consolidation, but has not given the issue priority or initiated an
tnvestigation into changing its rate-of-return poliCies. Partly as a result,
In the past year only four water companies in the State have
consolidated.
The 1996 federal Safe Drinking Water Act amendments provide
mechanisms to help make it economically feasible for large companies
to take on the physical or managerial control of smaller systems. In the
meantime, with few resources to help companies meet water quality
standards, DHS is allowing water systems to remain out of compliance
with the hope that federal money will be freed up in 1998.
Whatever the outcome with the federal funds, it is clear that the
Commission's policies by themselves do not achieve the overriding policy
goals -- to quickly and efficiently bring about the improvements needed
to ensure that customers of small water companies have adequate
amounts of water and that the water meets safe drinking water
standards.
Changing Regulatory Options
O
n a broader scale, the challenges of both large and small water
companies in meeting federal water quality standards and
undertaking conservation measures shoUld be addressed by a
government entity equipped with the resources. capabilities and culture
necessary to effectively meet that need. With water quality and water
141
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
efficiency regulations driving rate issues, the economic regulation of
private water companies will be better conducted by an agency with
both a broad-based understanding of water issues and the technical skills
to conduct rate proceedings.
The State of Texas -- which is confronting similar policy issues and
which has a market profile nearly identical to California's -- has taken
precisely that action, moving rate regulation of private water companies
to a water resources board with duties similar to those of the California
State Water Resources Control Board. The Texas water board was
subsequently merged with other resource-related boards into a large
environmental resources commission,
The Texas Natural Resources
Conservation Commission.139 As a
Now more than ever before, the issues of
result, most rate cases are settled
water quality and water supply are
administratively, with the health and rate
regulators working together in the same linked. ... Neel/ed in addre.fising these
office. concerns is a comprehensive
understanding of the State's water
In California, the State has more options
system and a close working together on
for assigning regulatory authority for
private water companies than it did when the part of all the agencies involved.
the PUC's predecessor took on the
function at the dawn of the century.
Even if policy makers had been
concerned about water quality and dwindling water supplies at that time,
no other appropriate agency then existed to address those issues.
In 1969, recognizing that need to coordinate water quality and water
supply oversight, the Legislature enacted the Porter-Cologne Water
Quality Control Act. The Act gave primary responsibility for balancing
beneficial uses of water and controlling water quality to the State Water
Resources Control Board, assisted by nine regional boards. The State
Water Resources Control Board consists of five full-time salaried
members, each with a designated specialty, who are appointed to four
year terms by the Governor and confirmed by the Senate.
The Board has broad authority to allocate rights to the use of surface
water, to prevent the waste or unreasonable use of water and to protect
the State's water quality. Where the Department of Health Services
protects water quality at the tap, the State Board guards water quality
at the source -- groundwater aquifers, lakes and rivers. It issues permits
for the diversion of water from streams and rivers, taking into account
water availability and other beneficial uses. Through the regional boards
it develops water quality plans and issues and enforces waste discharge
permits, specifying conditions required to protect water quality.
The Board exercises its authority through both quasI-Judicial and quasl
legislative proceedings and IS subject to general open meetmg law
requirements. Members also operate under SHlct conflict of Interest and
ex parte meeting rules.
142
Water
Now more than ever before, the issues of water quality and water supply
are linked. Strict water quality standards to protect human health,
wetlands, endangered species and the environment at large draw from
the water supplies available to farms and cities. Disinfection byproducts
resulting from new, more rigorous disinfection requirements for drinking
water can add to water quality problems downstream. Needed in
addressing these concerns is a comprehensive understanding of the
State's water system and a close working relationship on the part of all
the agencies involved. Some experts say that effective leadership and
only modest changes in the state's water use could completely close the
gap between projected state water demand and supplies by 2020.
With responsibility for both water quality and water supply, the State
Water Resources Control Board has the statutory framework and
organizationai culture to regulate water companies in a way that takes
into account all policy imperatives. The board's oversight of industrial
facilities discharging wastewater, with the need to evaluate the financial
integrity of waste discharge permit holders, involves functions similar to
the PUC's oversight of private companies providing water to customers.
The Secretary of the California Resources Agency believes serious
consideration should be given to transferring the water-related rate
setting functions from the PUC to the State Water Resources Control
board .
.... Streamlining procedures within the current regulatory
framework, case-by-case negotiated rate settlements and
creation of policy oversight committees may improve coordination
of the various regulatory purposes at best and add another layer
of government bureaucracy at worst. Unfortunately, we fear
such band-aids may do very little to ensure that innovations in
conservation of water or improvements in water treatment
technology to meet health standards will be encouraged or
rewarded.
.... The Little Hoover Commission has the potential to craft a
solutIOn that would achieve two important goals: to improve the
quality of state programs and services while containing the costs
of delivering them and to improve the delivery of economically
stable, safe, healthv and environmentally sound water to
California's consumers.
140
Recommendations
Recomlnendation II-A: The Governor and the Legislature should enact
legislation transferring the economic regulation of the private water suppliers
from the PUC to the State Water Resources Control Board.
143
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
The State has more choices today for assigning the economic regulation
of private water companies than it did at the dawn of the century when
utilities shared the commonality of monopoly status. The State Water
Resources Control Board has the procedural experience and the water
expertise needed to address the primary concern facing California's
water suppliers and their customers -. a safe and adequate supply over
the long term.
Recommendation 11-B: The State Water Resources Control Board should
investigate and implement incentives for consolidating small water companies and
for financing water quality and efficiency improvements to water systems.
The State Water Board is the agency best suited to bring about these
changes, but the opportunity provided by federal loans and the
willingness of some larger systems to take over small, under-financed
companies should be pursued by whatever agency has responsibility for
regulating the private water industry. The State Board should work to
facilitate the funding of water quality and conservation improvements for
small companies and should coordinate with the Legislature and counties
to encourage the sale of these companies to responsible entities.
144
Consumer
Protection
.:. In monopoly and other economically
regulated markets, the PUC was
considered a one-stop shop for consumer
protection -- guartling against price abuse,
implementing social policies and resolving
ratepayer complaints.
•: . As more utility services are provided by
competitive markets the PUC will be
unable to protect con,fiumer interests in the
variety of legislative, administrative and
judicial arenas where they will he defined.
•: . In competitive utili(l' markets, the State will
need to ensure that consumer interests are
expertly represented in the various venues
where those interests are at stake.
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
146
Consumer Protection
Consumer Protection
Finding 12: In competitive markets, as public decisions may be diffused,
residential and small business customers may not be well-represented in a
number of regulatory, legislative, administrative and judicial venues.
S
tripped to its core, the original purpose of the PUC was to protect
consumers in the absence of a functioning market. The State's
new strategy is to facilitate the market wherever possible --
policing those industries as it does others for antitrust behavior and
consumer fraud. Where remnant monopolies remain, regulations should
be maintained.
The transition from monopoly to market has sparked considerable debate
about how to best protect consumers. A significant portion of the
debate has focused on how consumers are represented In policy venues
-- and in particular the role of ratepayer advocacy at the PUC and
whether that function should be placed outside the Commission or
whether it should continue at all.
Another aspect of consumer protection comes in the form of government
actions. As competitive utility markets develop, the PUC intends to
transform itself from regulator to marketplace guardian.
That strategy has raised questions of whether the Commission has the
JUrisdictional authority, the cultural understanding and the expertise to
meet the new challenges. That decision also neglects the role already
performed by other state agencies/ most notably the Attorney General.
147
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
The PUC as Consumer Guardian
T
he Public Utilities Commission divides its consumer protection duties
into three categories customer services, to help customers resolve
complaints against regulated utilities; public advising, to help members
of the public who want to intervene in Commission proceedings; and
ratepayer advocacy, to argue the interests of ratepayers in Commission
proceedings.
Of the three functions, ratepayer advocacy has been the most
controversial. Created in the mid-1980s at the behest of the Legislature,
the PUC's Office of Ratepayer Advocates -- known until 1 996 as the
Division of Ratepayer Advocates -- has a national reputation for its ability
to scrutinize utility expenditures and ferret out billions of dollars in costs
that the Commission ultimately found should not be paid by utility
business and residential customers: $6 billion in the Diablo Canyon
settlement and $1 billion in the San Onofre settlement. The Division's
work also led to a $250 million penalty against Southern California
Edison for overpaying independent energy producers belonging to Edison
subsidiaries.141
The assertiveness of the PUC's ratepayer advocacy unit has generated
criticism from some of the regulated utilities -- who believe the
advocates were too antagonistic toward the companies and carried that
antagonism with them as they were promoted to key management and
advisory positions. The Commissioners responded to those complaints
in their Vision 2000 reorganization plan by proposing to abolish the
advocacy unit and dispersing that function into the PUC's new industry
based divisions .
./'
The proposal was controversial among consumer groups, who feared the
unit's critical voice would be lost. It was similarly controversial among
regulated industries, which were concerned that the Commission's staff
analyses would become tainted with consumer advocacy.
The debate yielded considerable support for creating an independent
consumer advocate -- perhaps in the Attorney General's Office. While
some consumer groups preferred to keep the advocacy staff within the
PUC, they were afraid that Commissioners would limit its resources and
role in Commission proceedings. The Utility Consumers' Action Network
(UCAN) described the concern: "This is a division that once worked well
and no longer does. It is understaffed, overworked, depleted of talent
and devoid of leadership. The utilities, meanwhile supported the idea
11142
of shifting the function outside the PUC to clearly delineate advocacy
before the Commission from advisory to the PUC.
The Legislature responded to the debate in its 1996 Commission reform
measure. S8 960 (Leonard) re-establlshed the advocacy function within
the PUC as a separate divIsion, with a budget to be separately
determined by the Legislature and with a director apPOinted by the
148
Consumer Protection
Governor and confirmed by the Senate.
Consumer protection has a second facet beyond advocating the
consumer cause in proceedings: to actively resolving consumer-related
issues. The PUC, to a large degree, has done both over the decades that
utility services have been provided by monopolies, While its advisory
and advocacy units provided information, the Commissioners used their
authority to set and enforce regulations intended to balance the
economic needs of captive customers and sole producers.
As competitors have entered the markets, the PUC has expanded that
role to police unfair business practices. The Commission, for example,
has aided thousands of customers who have been victimized by
"slamming" -- tricked into changing long-distance telephone service -
and subjected to other aggressive marketing ploys. Similar tactics can
be expected as competition gets underway in the electricity market.
The impact is reflected in the statistics recounted in the PUC's annual
reports, In 1993-94, the Commission responded to 48,340 complaints
and required $531,072 to be refunded to customers. In 1994-95, it
responded to 60,127 complaints and refunded $2.1 million. Most of
that increase can be attributed to the telecommunications industry,
The Commission believes it has responded swiftly and assertively to
close the door on abuses. But consumer representatives, such as UCAN,
are concerned that the PUC lacks the resources to respond to complaints
and enforce rules while at the same time setting policies and scrutinizing
the crush of applications to provide service. The PUC in 1996 had 10
employees to respond to consumer complaints -- down from 19 people
in 1992, according to UCAN. The consumer group said the Department
of Insurance's Consumer Complaint Bureau has 43 people answering
telephones. During 1995, UCAN said, the PUC installed an automated
telephone answer system that "precludes all but the most ingenious
customers from talking to a real person.11143
The Legislature, in addition to reconstituting a ratepayer advocacy unit,
affirmed that at least in the near term the Commission will have a
significant role in consumer protection. It provided for the PUC to
regIster new entrants into energy markets and established procedures to
prevent overaggressive marketers from switching a consumer's
electricity service without consent. But the Legislature recognized that
aggrieved consumers also have the ability to file civil actions directly
against the offending company.
The debate over how to best provide consumer advocacy and protection
did not begin with the emergence of competitive energy market. And
the experience of other states is helpful in rethinking California's long
term strategy for meeting these needs.
149
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
The Model of Other States
C
alifornia is not unique in having established a voice for ratepayers.
Virtually every state has a utility consumer advocate to represent
that class of ratepayers who combined have a huge interest in the
outcome of proceedings, but individually have such a small interest that
it is not worth their time to participate.
But California stands almost alone in housing the ratepayer advocate
within the Public Utilities Commission. In 47 other states, advocates for
utility customers are outside of the agency regulating utilities. In 1 7 of
those states, the advocate is part of the State Attorney General's office;
in 1 6 states the advocate is a separate government entity and the rest
are situated in a consumer affairs office or a related agency. The
California Research Bureau reports that in states having this structure
various administrative arrangements are made to prevent conflicts of
interest among the attorney general's clients.
The separate agencies are routinely funded by the same fee that public
utility commissions use to fund their activities. Many of the offices rely
on a multi-disciplinary team of analysts, economists and attorneys to
review proposed policies, regulations and utility applications and
determine the consequences those actions will have on consumers.
Records from the National Association of State Utility Consumer
Advocates (NASUCA} show that of 44 states with separate consumer
advocates, 39 employed attorneys, 19 employed economists, 18
employed financial analysts and 17 employed rate analysts.
The PUC's ratepayer advocates unit, incidently, has not been able to join
NASUCA, which provides a monthly exchange on the problems
experienced in other states and the solutions being employed. The
association requires members to be separate from the regulatory
commission. California consumers are represented in this forum instead
by California-based nonprofit organizations.
Maintaining an advocacy unit inside the Commission provides the staff
with the opportunity to be privy to information developed by the
advisory staff and enhances the ability of advocates to build a
relationship with Commissioners. But the advocates also suffer from
limits on how aggressively they can pursue particular positions and have
no standing to represent consumers outside the Commission.
The PUC's ratepayer advocates had no voice, for example, in the
legislative hearings on the Commission's plan to restructure the
electricity industry even though that plan determined how billions of
dollars in utility expenses would be passed on to the public. The
advocates Similarly had no vOice when the Legislature took on reform of
the Commission itself. In both of those Instances, the interests of
California's 33 million consumers virtually all of whom will be affected
by those events were represented by nonprofit organizations that were
150
Consumer Protection
outnumbered and out-financed by the market players.
The benefit of a utility consumer voice outside the regulating commission
was demonstrated in the Pennsylvania easel Duquesne Light Co. vs.
Barasch. In Duquesne, the U.S. Supreme Court found that excluding the
costs of a canceled plant from the utility! s rate base did not constitute
a taking by the regulatory commission even though the commission had
originally approved the plant and found the costs reasonable. The case,
brought by Pennsylvania} s independent consumer advocate, effectively
struck down the unwritten regulatory compact between the commission
and the utility that committed ratepayers to paying 100 percent of the
costs incurred by a utility -- whether that investment was lost because
of bad management or IIstranded" by the advent of competition. The
case challenged the assumption of that state's public utilities
commission and the assumption of other commissions across the
country -- that utilities were entitled to recover all costs regardless of the
reason for the expense.
Such a case could not have been brought in California in recent years,
because here the consumer advocate has had no authority to act outside
Commission proceedings.
In the rapidly unfolding telecommunications and electricity markets,
these limitations will become an increasing impediment to representing
consumer interests wherever and however they need representation.
Consumer Needs in Competitive Markets
C
onsumer protection in a monopoly market requires scrutinizing utility
expenses and decisions to make sure that ratepayers are getting a
good deal. But in a competitive market} government intervention often
results in higher! not lower prices. Consumer protection is just as
important -- but rather than focusing on the quality of service or the
price, the concern is whether companies are engaging in consumer fraud
or antitrust behavior.
The desired outcomes also are different: In a monopolistic market,
where companies receive a franchise for exclusive service in exchange
for regulation, the public has an interest in the company! s long-term
health. But in an open market, the public benefits from suppliers
competing to offer the best services at the lowest prices -- regardless of
the effect on existing companies.
The debate over consumer protection has revealed that Californians will
need government to play both roles for some time: Where competition
is emerging, the government can best protect consumers by policing the
market to prevent fraud or market abuse. Where remnant monopolies
remain, so must monopoly regulation.
During the transition! consumer advocates maintain that extra diligence
151
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
will be required to ensure that incumbent companies segregate their
monopoly services from their market-based enterprises. A former
director of the PUC's Division of Ratepayer Advocacy warned: "Utilities
have and still strive mightily to transfer costs from competitive services
to captive customers."144
In competitive markets. consumer protection will begin with solid
information that allows consumers to make wise decisions and avoid
problems. When problems occur, consumers will need a place to take
their complaints. These functions do not naturally follow the
Commission's expertise of economic regulation. A former PUC division
chief testified:
Protecting consumers from fraud and abuse in a competitive
market matches neither the PUC~s core business nor its core
competency. Increasingly faced with the sort of consumer
protection issues common to competitive markets~ but unfamiliar
to an agency grounded in traditional monopoly regulation, the
PUC finds itself forced to resort to ad hoc measures~ cobbling
together resources and engaging in regulatory triage.
145
Similarly, the Center for Public Interest Law at the University of San
Diego warned that Californians should expect to see an a "panoply of
abuse" by competitors engaging in price discrimination, price fixing and
predatory practices. And try as the PUC might, the Center was
unconvinced the Commission could adequately respond to the new
challenges.
The PUC has little record as an effective detector or prosecutor
of competitive sector antitrust violations. It has a good record in
detecting sales deceptions, service failures and related monopoly
power abuses. But the two are very different kinds of
offenses. 146
As competition in the telecommunications industry unfolds, with new
technologies, new services, billions of dollars at stake and hundreds of
new market players -- most of them not under the PUC's regulatory
authority -- the needs of consumers will be rapidly spinning beyond the
Commission's expertise and its jurisdictional reach.
A diversity of actions in a variety of venues will need be taken -- to
counter unfair marketing practices by seeking administrative or judicial
remedies, to recognize potential market power abuses and initiate
antitrust actions; to keep abreast of new technologies; to keep the
Legislature informed about needed policy changes, and to educate
consumers about market developments and potential fraud so they can
make informed purchasmg decisions.
Many of these functions are already being earned out by the Attorney
General in a number of arenas.
152
Consumer Protection
California's Attorney General has broad authority to protect the public
interest in antitrust and market power issues and to act against
companies that engage in unfair business practices and collect civil
penalties.147
The Senior Assistant Attorney General for Consumer Law testified: "The
Attorney General's office has a long history of cooperating with other
agencies to solve consumer problems." It works with county district
attorneys, city attorneys and the attorneys general in other states. It
works with state agencies -- including the PUC and the Department of
Consumer Affairs -- to collect information and take action through the
appropriate venue.148
The Attorney General's Consumer Law Section already has been
involved in utility-related disputes. It has filed actions against cellular
phone sellers, inter-exchange carriers, aggregators, resellers and other
telecommunications companies for a range of unfair and unlawful
practices including slamming, false billing, fraud and unfair collections
methods. Similarly, the Attorney General's Antitrust Section already has
investigated independent power producers and has advised the PUC on
the laws governing the marketplace. It has assessed proposed utility
company mergers for their potential effects on competition. The Senior
Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust section said the role of the
Attorney General naturally expands as market forces replace monopolies:
An important goal of regulation is to cause the utility to act as if
it were constrained by competitive forces. In contrast the goal
of antitrust is to induce competitive behavior in markets where
such behavior is feasible. 149
But this broad experience and reach also has a critical shortcoming. The
Attorney General's existing consumer-related staff is comprised largely
of generalists, juggling competing priorities to police the actions of
various industries.
The utility consumer advocate for Nevada -- one of 17 states where that
function is housed in the Attorney General's office -- said that as the
markets transition, the advocacy staff will work more closely with the
Attorney General's market-oriented enforcement units, providing them
with the expertise to watch for potential market power abuses.
Similarly, California's consumer advocates -- and the State's larger role
in consumer protection -- will need to be effective in both monopoly and
competitive arenas. The success of the State's policy to give the market
the chance to work will depend in part on effectively gauging when and
where consumer interests are best protected. An environmental and
renewable energy advocate described the balance this way:
Market power is a terrible thing to waste. And if you fali to
remove it in the beginning, you will need to intervene. You may
not want to micro-manage the market, but you have to make the
153
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
market responsive to public and environmental considerations .. "
Where customers are hurt is where they don't have a choice and
some customers won't get it in electricity for a long time. The
more competition, the less regulation. But saying you have
competition isn't the same thing as having it. 150
The California Attorney General has maintained that regulatory advocacy
should remain at the Public Utilities Commission, with the Attorney
General's office fulfilling a complementary role. The Legislature followed
that model in its S8 960 reform legislation, by reconstituting advocacy
within the PUC.
But the ability of the PUC's advocacy unit will increasingly shrink while
the Attorney General/s complementary role already is growing. This
transition will be smoother if the resources and expertise that once were
dedicated within the PUC were gradually shifted to the Attorney General.
Recommendations
Recommendation 12: The Governor and the Legislature should create within
the Attorney General's Consumer Law Section an office of utility consumer
protection. The office should represent consumer interests in legislative,
lldministrlltive and judicial proceedings.
The Attorney General already has the standing to fill this role but in the
l
past has relied more on the full-service regulatory strategy of the PUC to
protect utility consumers. And as the monopolies give way to the
market, the Attorney General's role would naturally increase in this
arena. To encourage cooperation, prevent duplication, and provide
effective consumer protection, resources and expertise should be shifted
over time to enable the Consumer Law Section to better fill this role.
The legislation should specify that the unit will employ a combination of
attorneys, engineers, economists and policy analysts and will be funded
by reallocating a portion of the existing user fees assessed to fund the
Public Utilities Commission and the California Energy Commission.
154
Process &
Management
.:. Potential competitors and consumer
interests are concerned about PUC
Commissioners making ''policy'' decisions
based on closed-door discussions with
investor-owned utilities, particularly since
those decisions cannot be reviewed by a
court to determine if they were hased on
the factual record.
•: . The significant organizational changes
facing the PUC require that a partnership
be established between labor and
management that could best he nurtured if
the PUC were relieved of some civil service
regulations.
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
156
Process and Managemen t
Procedural Accountability
Finding 13: The PUC's procedures, even as amended by the Legislature in
1996, provide the least accountability to the public and the fewest assurances
that decisions will be based on the factual record in precisely those cases
\vhere the greatest profits and the greatest public interests are at stake.
A
s the PUC participates in the development of competitive utility
markets and its jurisdiction is curtailed to focus solely on
telecommunications, the credibility of its decision-making
procedures will be critical. The PUC envisions itself taking on a larger
policy making role in the future. That will require spending less time in
the judge-and-jury role of a full-time regulator and more time defining the
rules that market players and consumers will live by and redefining the
public interest.
This distinction between the PUC's quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative
roles was the source of significant debate during the recent legislative
reform efforts because it goes to the long-standing controversies about
how the PUC makes decisions, the roles of individual Commissioners
themselves and the finality of those decisions.
Commissioners assert that policy making is legislative in nature, and
when acting as legislators they should be given freedom to meet
privately with stakeholders and among themselves. The Commissioners
also asserted that they should retain freedom from expanded judicial
review effectively making their decisions final.
I
Freedom, however, cannot be expanded incommensurately with
accountability, or granted in a wav that erodes confidence in public
decision making, The process the Commission uses to make policy
decisions needs further refinements to bring these values into balance.
157
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
A Policy of Process
W
hile complex in the detail, the PUC's procedures are simple in their
intent. The PUC establishes rules for how it will function and
then uses those rules to process hundreds of individual cases a year.
Through hearings and written filings, the PUC gathers evidence, ideas
and feedback from parties and the public. With the assistance of
analytical staff and hearing officers known as Administrative Law Judges
(ALJs), Commissioners craft proposed decisions and consider public
comments on those proposals. After ruling, the Commissioners weigh
any requests for reconsideration before making the decision final.
Of greatest concern in recent years has been the role of the individual
Commissioners. With more than 900 active cases at anyone time and
more than 600 hearing days calendared each year, Commissioners rely
extensively on their staff to develop and analyze the record and craft
proposed decisions.
In addition to the case work, the Commissioners spend considerable
amounts of time attending national and international conferences and
meeting with other public officials in the State, the region and in
Washington, D.C. Without judging the value of those trips, any effort
to make Commissioners more involved in individual cases must consider
the role Commissioners have taken in representing the State in other
venues.
The dynamics of this controversy are framed by two factors that have
significant impacts on the decision-making process -- the ability to lobby
Commissioners in private meetings before a decision is made, and the
right to seek a court review of those decisions after the fact.
Private Meetings. As a result of the heavy case load and their other
duties Commissioners concede that they are unable to sit through
many of the hearings in which facts are gathered for their consideration.
Similarly, they do not have the time to read all of the written submittals.
The decisions themselves often run in the dozens of pages, making that
task alone burdensome given the hundreds of cases before the
Commission.
To compensate, Commissioners have relied on private and individual
meetings with participants in the proceedings} known as "ex parte"
contacts. During these meetings the issues are IItelescoped" and
Commissioners have the opportunity to ask questions directly that might
be indirectly addressed in hundreds of pages of testimony. A review of
the Commissioners' calendars show that some Commissioners spend a
considerable amount of time in private discussions -- usually at the
request of the party rather than the Commissioner.
The Commissioners have been free to set their own ex parte rules -- and
for years they had no ex parte restrictions of any kind. After
158
Process and Management
considerable controversy in the late 1980s, the Commission developed
rules that required contacts to be noticed" after the fact and a summary
Jl
provided by the party making the contact, along with any written
materials used In the discussion.
It is up to other parties to monitor the ex parte log if they are concerned
about what another is saying in the private meetings. The rules covered
rate cases and adjudicatory issues. Notification was not required for
meetings to discuss rule-making or policy-making cases before the
Commission, or for social engagements.
Commissioners have been criticized by consumer groups, small
businesses and its own advocacy staff for the heavy reliance on ex parte
contacts. The concern is that Commissioners are persuaded to alter
proposed decisions based on those private conversations -- potentially
making decisions inconsistent with the factual record or without benefit
of having heard the rest of the arguments. The consumer group Toward
Utility Rate Normalization (TURN) testified:
Such last-minute changes to proposed decisions nearly always
shift the outcome in a manner more favorable to the regulated
entity, and less favorable to consumer and competitor interests.
To say that such a process breeds cynicism toward government
would be an understatement.
151
The owner of Zond Energy Systems, an independent wind power
producer, said the lobbying rules are biased in favor of investor-owned
utilities and against small companies:
Probably the most frustrating aspect of working at the CPUC is
participating in the time-consuming and expensive process of a
litigated proceeding before an administrative law judge, receiving
a decision you believe is favorable then having that decision
changed materially to your detriment by an assigned
commissioner?s ruling.
The failure of the Commission to issue a decision based upon the
evidence or hearing record is a gross abuse of process. This
failure of process occurs because that Commissioner has been
effectively lobbied by the (investor-owned utility) lobbyist who
maintains offices next door to the PUC and expends ratepayer
funds in support of those efforts. 152
The concern is heightened by the fact that the vast majority of private
meetings are conducted with representatives of regulated utilities. A
review of ex parte records for a 16-month period in 1995 and 1996
showed that for every private discussion held with a consumer interest,
Commissioners met four times with a utility representative.
A review of CommiSSion calenders also showed that some
Commissioners have social, casual and other contacts with the same
159
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
utility officials. But those meetings are not reported as ex parte contacts
-- presumably because the conversation did not involve a specific issue
before the Commission or it involved a IIpolicy-making" case, which does
not have to be noticed.
While consumer groups have long been troubled by the social contacts,
it also is a concern of new market players who do not have the benefit
of years long relationships with Commissioners. Representatives of the
cable television industry -- which has not been regulated by the PUC, but
will be as they offer telecommunications services -- believe that social
contacts should be noticed: "The contact is influence in itself. "153
For the most part, the large utilities do not favor tight ex parte rules,
particularly for quasi-legislative or policy making cases. The
Commission's proceedings to restructure the electrical industry is an
example of such a proceeding: The Commission held workshops and
hearings and private meetings before crafting and adopting a policy.
While such policies are more general than a specific rate increase
application, they can significantly influence how much consumers pay.
In the case of the electrical restructuring policy, the Commission decision
provided the utilities an opportunity to be repaid by ratepayers for billions
of dollars worth of investments that were made in a regulated era that
will be worthless in a competitive market.
The utilities, however, are more open to the idea of increasing judicial
review giving them greater opportunity to appeal Commission
decisions that are less to their liking.
Judicial, Review. Some practitioners maintain there is a relationship
between the latitude that Commissioners are given in the decision-
making process and an independent review of those decisions by the
courts. If the PUC faced more meaningful judicial review to determine
if decisions are supported by the facts, then Commissioners should have
latitude in how they collect information and balance competing interests.
Under the current arrangement, Commissioners are lobbied by parties
before making decisions and decisions cannot be appealed to determine
if they were made based on the evidence. Rather, cases can only be
reviewed to determine if constitutional rights were violated and they can
be reviewed only by the California Supreme Court.
Other fourth branch agencies -- in California, other states and at the
federal level -- often have elevated thresholds for judicial review, usually
to a court of appeal. The commissions are granted that elevated
threshold on the theory that their own quasi-judicial proceedings are the
functional equivalent of a trial court, and the public is willing to trade
some of the normal checks and balances of the three-branch system of
government for the efficient decision making provided by fourth-branch
agencies.
160
Process and Management
All states except California, New Mexico and West Virginia provide for
appeal of all PUC decisions to an intermediate court and New Mexico
and West Virginia both provide more opportunities for appeals to be
heard than does California. As a result, California has had the highest
threshold in the nation for judicial review of PUC decisions. Appeals
could only be made to the State Supreme Court. The court is free to
review only cases it wants to and it only reviews cases to determine if
the Commission violated the law.
This threshold was lowered slightly by S8 1322 (Calderon) enacted in
1996, which allows for appellate court review of the PUC's adjudicatory
cases and allows for the appellate court to review those decisions to
determine if they are supported by the evidence.
The State Supreme Court has historically turned down 90 percent of
appeals without any review. In the last 10 years, the Supreme Court
has issued 10 decisions on appeals made from the PUC. That is 10 out
of more than 7/000 decisions that the Commission made during that
period. The PUC cites those facts to assert that judicial review exists;
critics cite the numbers to show how few cases receive judicial review.
Ironically, the decisions of federal energy and telecommunications
agencies are subject to federal appellate review and the PUC has
frequently exercised that opportunity to challenge rulings by those
agencies.
What the Legislature Started
T
he Legislature has tried to reconcile these issues by turning to the
legislative decision-making model: Elected offiCials are given great
freedom in how they make decisions. Those decisions can be challenged
in Superior Court, but usually the only test is whether a statute violates
the Constitution. The Legislature also looked at the judicial decision
making model: Appointed jurists remain detached from the participants
to preserve the integrity of the records established in open meetings, and
rulings can be appealed to a higher court.
The idea was to tailor procedures after the court model when the
Commissioners act as judges, such as in enforcement actions, and tailor
procedures after the legislative model when Commissioners set policy.
But the approach was burdened by the hybrid nature of the PUC:
Appointed Commissioners make decisions based on a factual record and
influenced by casual discussions with extremely limited judicial reVJew.
l
Complicating the debate is the fact that Commissioners use a "quasi
judicial process" to reach Nquasi-Iegislative outcomes," that is, to set
policy. And the greatest concern is Commissioners drifting from the
record in rate-making cases. Rate cases are among the most litigated
Issues before the PUC, but are legally "quasi-legislative" because rate
making sets policy for how utilities will recover costs.
161
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
S8 960 (Leonard), the PUC reform bill of 1996, addressed these issues
by establishing three procedural tracks: quasi-judicial, rate-making and
quasi-legislative. In the judicial cases, there would be no ex parte
contact, and as provided in separate legislation, 58 1322 (Calderon),
some judicial review. In rate-making cases, ex parte contacts would be
restricted. And in quasi-legislative cases, ex parte contact would be
unrestricted.
In the future, the Commission will be conducting far fewer rate cases.
As a greater portion of utility bills are
determined by competitive services, the
PUC's rate-setting process will determine HTURN believes that an effective threat
an increasingly smaller portion of utility
ofj udicial review, perhaps as much
lUi
bills.
the reality of the review itself, will restore
Commission proceedings, at least a sense of self-discipline to the agency
through the transition to competitive that ",ost observers agree is sadly
markets, will continue to have enormous
lacking today."
consequences for company profits and
ultimately consumer prices. But many of
those issues will be resolved in policy
making or quasi-legislative proceedings -- not rate-making or quasi-
judicial cases.
In the quasi-legislative cases, there are no restrictions on ex parte
contacts and the same level of judicial review that was set by the
Legislature in 191 2 remains in effect.
Proponents of greater judicial review believe that a reasonable
opportunity to appeal by itself will encourage Commissioners to rely only
on the record to make decisions and increase the Commission's
motivation to ensure due process.
The experience in other states shows that more opportunity for judicial
review does not result in a rush of costly litigation. Florida and Texas,
two large states with a lower threshold for judicial review and the
highest number of appeals in the nation, average a dozen appeals a
year. 154 Most participants are deterred from filing frivolous appeals
because they have a number of other cases pending before the
commissions and are reluctant to formally challenge rulings in the hope
of getting a better result in the courts.
The consumer group TURN said more than anything else, judicial review
would infuse a reality check into the PUC's process:
The absence of effective judicial oversight is now well known to
the CPUC itself, as well as to the parties. Such knowledge
naturally creates a sense of omnipotence in the agency that
breeds arbitrary and sometimes even careless decision-making.
TURN believes that an effective threat of judicial review, perhaps
as much as the reality of the review itself, will restore a sense of
162
Process and Management
self-discipline to the agency that most observers agree is sadly
lacking today.
155
Similarly, consumer advocates in other states with greater judicial review
say their standing in the regulatory arena is enhanced by the regulator
knowing that a decision can be appealed. 156
Most of the participants in PUC proceedings believe there should be
more opportunity for judicial review, and virtually all believe that the
concern over excessive litigation can be eased by some common
restraints. The most widely supported way to efficiently deal with
appeals is to restrict cases to a single intermediate court, so that a group
of jurists could develop some expertise, be able to respond to appeals
quickly, and be more likely to write consistent decisions.
It was suggested during legislative deliberations that the appropriate
appeal for legislative-like decisions should be to the Legislature. But it
seems inappropriate, costly and destructive to an efficient market to
encourage competitors and consumers to go through the PUC process,
and then "appeal" to the open-ended legislative process.
The legislative process has proven itself most productive in those case
where its sets policy goals and allows oversight agencies to implement
them. If the policy choices turn out to be wrong or are rendered
obsolete by time, the Legislature should revisit them. If during policy
implementation, a participant believes the public process was unfair or
rights were denied, the most appropriate place to test those complaints
against the standards and precedents of the land is in the judiciary.
While people often complain about the time it takes courts to review
issues, there is widely held confidence that the courts will act -- and will
act consistently. The Legislature, however, is under no formal obligation
to respond to appeals, or to respond in a timely matter to make decisions
based on the facts of a case or with regard to precedents.
NextSteps
C
reating the accountability within the PUC that consumer groups,
businesses and policy makers need is a multi-faceted task. Some
of those other facets are described in other portions of this report: The
Commission, in cooperation with the Legislature needs to set annual
goals and be assessed to see if those goals are met. Commissioners
need to have a realistic workload so they are not expected to do the
undoable. Commissioners also should put a priority on being part of the
fact gathering process -- and not just the final decision maker.
But there is another critical element: Because they are not elected
officials, yet are charged with fashioning and enforcing rules that affect
essential services and determine mountains of profits -- they must make
decisions, even policy decisions, based on a factual record.
163
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
There are two tried-and-true mechanisms that we know will help make
this happen. The first is public debate and public decision making. And
the second is the opportunity for a separate authority -- the courts -- to
review appeals based on the assertion that the facts were disregarded
in the process.
The Commissioners' rationale for ex parte meetings is their need to have
complex cases telescoped for them -- because they are too busy to
attend any of the hearings or review all of the written material and
they need the opportunity to ask questions. In the future, if the Little
Hoover Commission recommendations are followed, they would have a
significantly reduced workload and be able to concentrate on the
specifics of cases by attending more of the public hearings. In addition,
since the law now allows for summary arguments before the
Commission, each Commissioner should have the opportunity to ask
questions of participants.
A large difference between the PUC and the Legislature is that legislators
are elected directly by the people. In addition, with many more
legislators and many more issues, the impact of individual contacts is
diluted. And of equal importance, even when setting policy, the
Commissioners are expected to make legally and factually supported
decisions based on the record established in the case -- something that
IS undermined in perception if not reality by ex parte contact and could
be assured with greater judicial review.
Recommendations
Reconimendation 13-A: The Governor lind the Lef?islature should amend the
Public Utilities Code to limit ex parte contacts after proposed decision is issued
(I
in rule-making proceedings to ",eetings in which all the parties are inviteti to
attend. All private and l/iscussions hetween and
meeting.~ Commi~·.~ioners
parties with a matter pen{ling hefore the should be noticed and
COl1l1nis~'ion
summarized for the public record.
The Legislature in 58 960 made significant improvements in the PUC/s
decision-making process. That effort could be further advanced by
increasing the accountability in policy-making proceedings, as well. The
greatest conflict between the need for Commissioners to discuss issues
with individual parties and to preserve the integrity of a fact-based
process from political lobbying is after proposed deCIsions are issued.
The Integrity of the process will be further enhanced if the notification
procedures are expanded to include substantive policy discussions
between Commissioners and parties -- even if they are not based on the
particulars of a pending case.
164
Process and Managemen t
Recommendation /3-8.' As the worklolld of the PUC is reduced -- and as some
of its functions are transferred tf) agencies more suitable to perform them
-- the Legislature anti the Governor should enact legi.slation requiring
Commissioners to re(v solely on open meetings to gather information and make
public decisions.
Even when acting in a policy-making capacity, Commissioners differ
fundamentally from legislators: They are not elected and so are never
held directly accountable to the public. And with a membership of only
five, the effects of special interest lobbying are significantly more
concentrated than in a 120-member legislature. As the number of
market players increases, the importance of giving everyone a chance to
speak and listen to the arguments made by their adversaries -- will
increase in importance. As its caseload is diminished by transferring
some responsibilities to agencies better able to perform them, relying on
an open decision-making process will be pOSSible.
Recommendation J3-C: The Governor and the Legislature should grant parties
a right to appeal all PUC decision.s, or the decisions of its successor agencies, to
the court of appeal.
The experience in other states is that the accountability provided by
broader judicial review can be achieved without Significant delays in the
public process. To encourage uniformity of deCisions and subject
expertise, the appeals should be restricted to the court located in the
same city as the Commission, now the First District Court of Appeal in
San Francisco. The standard of review should include a review of the
facts to determine if they support the Commission's decision.
165
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
166
Process and Management
Flexible Work Force
Finding 14: The PUC's reputation for hiring and promoting the best and the
brightest is being undermined by the rigidity of civil service rules.
T
he civil service system rigidly prescribes how managers will make
decisions concerning job assignment, rewards and punishments.
Those are all factors that will heavily influence how well the
Public Utilities Commission is able to remake itself for the post-monopoly
future.
How successfully the PUC manages to transform itself may well depend
on the ability of Commissioners and senior management to enlist the full
support and tap the deep creativity of its staff. The PUC staff is known
throughout the civil service for its commitment and its expertise.
But the same independence that the staff brings to the job it applies to
its workplace relationships. Keeping that energy focused on serving the
publiC interest will require great skill, all of the tools available to modern
managers, and a commitment to create a partnership between
management, supervisors and rank and file employees.
Fortunately there are some opportunities to experiment in ways that can
give managers more flexibility and restore the Commission as a good
place for bright minds to work, without sacrificmg the protections
agamst favoritism or worker rights.
167
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
The Civil Service
T
he civil service system was designed to prevent patronage in
government employment and to foster a permanent core of public
employees. The amalgam of rules and procedures crafted to achieve
those ends values stability: A stable work force comprised of employees
who work their way up through the ranks to more senior positions.
Stable job assignments and functions that allow organizations to perform
routinely as personnel changes. Stable resources that allow individuals
and organizations to go about their work uninterrupted. Several
elements characterize the system:
• Examination and selection. To ensure that employees are hired
based on merit rather than politics, all qualified applicants must
take examinations and selection is limited to those who score
highest on the exams. However, the process often leads to high
costs and time consuming procedures and often does not result
in finding the best person for the job. Many of the best
prospective applicants are discouraged by the process, or find
suitable employment before the state process is complete. And
the process does not give enough flexibility to managers to find
the right person for a critical position.
• Classifications and job assignment. To prevent management
abuses, workers are hired into fixed classifications that have
precise qualifications and job assignments. In order to avoid the
burdens of the selection process, organizations often create
unique classifications that then limit how those workers can be
reassigned. Promotions, reassignments and changes to
classifications have to be approved by at least one, and often
two, central personnel agencies.
• Compensation. Compensation is restricted by the classification.
While public employees are often motivated by a desire to serve
the public, the restrictions on compensation make it virtually
impossible for managers to reward workers who have taken on
additional or temporary challenges -- putting out extra effort and
putting in extra time. Similarly, the rules make it difficult for
managers to link raises provided for within classifications to
employee performance.
• Lay-Off provisions. Restrictions on lay offs make it difficult to
reduce the work force when necessary, and even more difficult
to surgically reduce the work force to keep the best workers in
the right jobs. The lay-off provisions also complicate the hiring
process by requiring state agencies to review as part of the
selection process all employees who are faCing layoff in other
agencies.
168
Process and Managemen t
How Civil Service Rules Hamper the PUC
T
he puc has had difficulties with its personnel management even
before it started to address the organizational changes demanded by
an evolving mission and the pressures to reduce its workload.
After months of negotiations, the Commission in 1995 settled a
complaint brought by the federal Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission that the PUC had discriminated against older workers in
promotions to senior positions. The Commission is now operating under
a consent decree that requires it to take certain steps in the examination
and promotion process to eliminate any bias based on age.
The PUC also has had running disagreements with the Department of
Personnel Administration over high-paying classifications that have been
created to attract employees to difficult, but temporary tasks. The
personnel authority is concerned that the classifications lock the
Commission into permanently paying high salaries to employees after the
task is completed. The PUC maintains the specialized classifications are
needed to retain highly competent workers to fill highly stressful
positions when they are being courted away by the companies the PUC
regulates.
As the Commission has come under scrutiny for its continuing role over
deregulated industries, the PUC's staff has shrunk and key management
positions have gone unfilled for months at a time. More recently, the
Commission has requested an increase in the number of authorized
positions -- at time when the expectation is for the Commission to get
by with fewer resources.
These issues existed before the Commission began to formally recognize
that its size, mission and procedures will have to be reformed to reflect
trends within the industries it regulates. Those changes will create even
more challenges for personnel managers and labor representatives to
create an environment that satisfies fairness concerns, protects the
established rights of workers, meets the needs for managers, wisely
uses public resources and sustains the Commission's nationwide
reputation as an outstanding venue for public-minded professionals to
serve the public. Already, the limitations on work schedules, reward
systems and job assignments are making it difficult for the Commission
to retain its best workers.
Ironically, among those concerned that the Commission is not hiring,
promoting, managing and rewarding its staff are the regulated industries
-- particularly telecommunications companies -- that are luring away
some of the Commission's best and brightest. While those companies
want the expertise of former PUC employees to help them gain an
advantage in the regulatory venue, they also want the PUC to be staffed
with people who can competently and creatively resolve issues.
169
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
One of the hardest hit divisions within the Commission is Ratepayer
Advocates. With 205 authorized positions, the division in the summer
of 1996 was down to 150 employees. The division's
telecommunications branch devolved in two years from a staff of 55 to
a staff of 34. Most of the employees went to work for the businesses
they once scrutinized.
The Commission's Vision 2000 process also demonstrated that many of
the cultural attributes that guide the PUC's regulatory procedures also
shape the internal machinations. Employees were amazingly frank with
their superiors during the very public process to identify organizational
failures, and felt free to criticize proposals once they were formulated by
CommissIOners. In response to a plan to break up the Division of
Ratepayer Advocates and place those workers throughout the
organizatIon, a 10-page memoradum was crafted and signed by more
than 90 members of the division, including key staff involved in the
VIsion 2000 process.
Creating Flexibility
T
he CommissIon! in its Vision 2000 process! identified as a problem
the large number of specialized classifications that will make it
difficult to reassign workers as the Commission's functions change. The
report's recommendations included creating incentives to reward hard
work and creativity implementing a newly crafted appraisal system,
1
broadening classifications, and seeking relief from civil service
restrictions.
The Little Hoover Commission's 1995 civil service reform report, Too
Many Agencies Too Many Ru/es identified an under-used mechanism
J J
for state agencies to cooperate with labor unions and receive relief from
the statutory obligations that discourage innovation in personnel
management. Government Code section 19600 allows for departments
to apply to the State Personnel Board for permission to establish
demonstration projects for civil service reform.
Demonstration projects have been used by federal agencies and
departments In other states to create partnerships between rank and file
workers and managers that helped to get past old problems and address
new challenges. The demonstration projects have proved particularly
fruitful In agencies that needed to reorganize how they would fulfill their
mission with fewer resources.
As a demonstration project, the PUC could gain flexibility in how it
established qualification requirements, recruited and appointed
employees; how it classified and compensated employees; how it
reaSSigned and promoted employees; how it provided incentives and
disciplined employees; how it involved labor organizations in personnel
decisions and made reductions in staff.
170
Process and Management
Recommendations
Recommendation 14: The Commission should apply to the State Personnel
Board for permission to initiate a demonstration project. The project should
allow for the creation of broader classifications and pay for performance. The
Commission should initiate a labor-management council for anticipating,
assessing and resolving labor-related problems that will result from the near
constant change facing the Commission.
As the PUC's role radically shrinks, it is in a unique position to benefit
from the flexibility that the Legislature already has granted to state
agencies facing considerable changes and looking for ways to forge a
partnership between management and labor that transcends the rigidity
of the civil service rules.
171
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
172
Conclusion
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
174
ConclusIOn
Conclusion
In 1876 the Supreme Court of the United States heard the appeal of
Scott & Munn, owners of a Chicago grain elevator firm that had been
fined $100 for not obtaining a license to operate. The businessmen
made no excuse for their actions. Rather they insisted the Constitution
of the State of Illinois violated their rights by regulating warehouses such
as theirs. The court ruled that by storing the grain harvested in the
western states and loading it into eastbound ships and rail cars, Scott &
Munn had crossed the line defining strictly private concerns. As a result,
they could be subjected to government rules intended to protect the
community's interest.
"Property," the majority opined, "does become clothed with a public
interest when used in a manner to make it of public consequence, and
affect the community at large.
"157
That ruling has been a touchstone for a century of utility regulators, who
acted on behalf of the community at large to guard whatever interest
individuals could not ensure on their own. When the utility service was
provided by a monopoly company, the regulation was nearly absolute
controlling not just price but the thousands of decisions and factors that
comprised the delivery of an essential service.
In the 1 20 years since Munn vs. IlIinois~ a social and technological
evolution has occurred simultaneously affirming the court's wisdom
while requiring its application to be reconsidered strand by strand.
As never before, electricity and telecommunications weave individuals
into the social and economic fabric. Similarly. water and transportation
175
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
services -- with their effect on the health and safety of individuals and
entire communities -- is enmeshed with the public interest. The
relationship between these products and the public welfare does not rest
on whether these products are provided by one supplier or a thousand
suppliers.
However, dramatic changes in technologies and the marketplace has
altered the nature of the public interests that need protection, and the
ways and means that government should attempt to guard those
interests.
Policy makers have decided -- first in regards to transportation, then
telecommunications and natural gas, and now electricity -- that
competition is viable in these industries and that competition will
produce better services at lower costs than tightly regulated markets
with limited suppliers.
As a result, the public does not need agencies commissioned to make
marketplace decisions. Rather the public -- both consumers and
producers -- need government agencies that allow them to make
decisions with confidence: that environmental and public health concerns
will be addressed efficiently, that anticompetitive behavior will be
policed, that the physical system will operate reliably, that social
programs will be administered effectively.
In short, the public interest is being redefined, and government agencies
must be realigned to that new public interest.
The challenge facing government is well described by the chairman of
the Alliance for Competitive Communications, a coalition of the regional
bell companies. The chairman" warned the National Association of State
Utility Consumer Advocates that no shelter would protect regulators
from the same market forces buffeting the telecommunications industry:
Your situation, in fact, is ironically similar to mine, as a Bell
company executive. We're used to doing things for many
reasons other than competitive demands. Both of our mandates
have been based on the explicit separation of competitive
markets from non-competitive, or monopoly markets. We work
in a world that is so dominated by complex regulatory formulas
and subsidies that no one laughs if someone says that when you
increase competition, prices go up.
Well, the distant thing you hear is the storm of competition
getting ready to rage in our industry. And it's going to require
that you all make some changes in your approach to your jobs or
its going to blow you away as surely as we telephone companies
will be blown away if we don't change. And lesson number one,
is that in the real world, real competition makes prices go down,
not up.
176
Conclusion
You can make the promised benefits of competition -- lower
rates, increased choice, greater availability of advanced new
services -- realities in the areas you serve. That means not
looking backward to the old way of doing thmgs and struggling
to protect pockets of the industry from the gale of competition -
but looking forward to the opportunities that real competition can
bring to consumers in all areas of communications today.
158
In charting this future course, the State should remember where it has
stumbled before.
Among the lessons that have been learned is that fourth-branch
commissions are not effective when their workload is so large that
commissioners must delegate policy making authority to their staff or
rely on private meetings to make up for the hours of public debate that
they missed.
The State has learned that giving two commissions overlapping duties
is better at stopping events from happening than making desired
outcomes a reality. Dueling commissions are particularly good at
frustrating progress when those commissions are left to pursue newly
plotted policy directions without the guidance of elected lawmakers and
the State's executive.
The State also has learned intervention is a hard habit to break.
Agencies, such as the PUC were born to regulate and are genetically
t
programed to intervene in the marketplace: Every statute, every
regulation, every procedure is premised on a need of the agency to make
a decision that consumers and producers would otherwise make.
The recommendations in this report were fashioned with these and other
lessons in mind: single commission oversight of essential industries; a
statutory mandate biasing government in favor of market solutions;
policy making collaboration between fourth-branch commissions and the
Legislature and Governor; accountable public decision making and
effective consumer protection.
Given the choice already made by policy makers to open utility markets
to as much competition as the market will generate requires that the
State develop a structure that matches the new market.
Consumer groups and some market players are concerned about the
pace of government's reformation. While they trust the marketplace,
they do not trust the historic monopolies. Those concerns are valid. But
the storm now on the horizon has been approaching for years and
government has been slow to respond. The recommendations of the
Little Hoover Commission were crafted to make the government
transition as smooth as possible. But the pace should be dictated by the
needs of the governed, not the convenience of government.
177
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
178
Appendices
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
180
Appendices
APPENDIX A
Little Hoover Commission PUC & Energy Advisory Committees
The following people served on the advisory committees for the PUC & Energy study. Under
the Little Hoover Commission's process, advisory committee members provide expertise and
information bu tdo not vote on the final product.
Energy Advisory Committee
Barbara Barkovich Larry Goldzband
Barkovich & Yap, Inc. Regulatory Affairs Director
San Drego Gas & Electric Co.
Martin Biles
Senate Office of Research James Greene
Regional Vice President
Jeanette E. Bunch Southern California Gas Company
Government Affairs Representative
San Diego Gas and Electric Co. Elizabeth Hill
Legislative Analyst
Ralph Cavanagh
Co-Director, Energy Program Charles Imbrecht
Natural Resources Defense Council Chairman
California Energy Commission
Representative for
Assemblyman Mickey Conroy Fred John, Sr.
Chair, Utilities and Commerce Committee Vice President, Public Policy
Pacific Enterprises
Roger Dunstan
Assistant Director Gerald L. Jordan
California Research Bureau Executive Director
California Municipal Utilities Association
Henry M. Duque
Commissioner Bnan Kelly
Public Utilities Commission Advisor, Senator William Lockyer
Patricia Eckert Elisabeth Kersten
Deloitte & Touche Consulting Director
Senate Office of Research
Karen Edson
Edson and Modisette Jessie J. Knight, Jr.
Commissioner
Mike Florio Public Utilities Commission
Senior Attorney
Toward Utility Rate Normalization Steve Larson
Staff Director
Wes Franklin Senate Budget and
Executive Director Fiscal Review CommIttee
Public Utilities Commission
181
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energv
Elin D. Miller Director D.J. Smith
1
Department of Conservation California Large Energy Consumers Assn.
Sara Steck Myers Jan Smutny-Jones, Executive Director
Attorney at Law Independent Energy Producers
Representative for Senator Steve Peace Yolanda Solari
Chair, Energy, Utilities President
& Communications Committee California State Employees Assn.
Stephen E. Pickett Mark Timmerman
Southern California Edison Vice President, Government Relations
California Manufacturers Assn.
Stephen Rhoads
Executive Director Emilio Varanini
California Energy Commission Marron Reed & Sheehy
Dan Richard Douglas Wheeler
Morse, Richard, Weisenmiller & Assoc. Secretary of the Resources Agency
Michael Shames, Executive Director V. John White
Utility Consumers Action Network V. John White Associates
Jananne Sharpless Tom Willoughby
Commissioner Manager, Government Relations
California Energy Commission Pacific Gas and Electric Co.
Assemblyman Byron Sher Stuart E. Wilson
Chair Natural Resources Committee Californta Municipal Utilities Assn.
I
182
Appendices
Water Telecommunications and
I
Transportation Advisory Committee
Linda Ackley Roger Dunstan
California Department of Water Resources Assistant Director
California Research Bureau
Lee Adler
Executive Director Henry Duque
Taxicab Paratransit Assn. Of California Commissioner
Public Utilities Commission
Joel Anderson
Executive Vice President Dan Eisentrager
California Trucking Assn. President
California Bus Association
Tony Armstrong
Director, Richard Esposto
Governmental Affairs Executive Director
GTE California Sacramento Metropolitan
Cable Television Assn.
DeAnne Baker
California State Assn. Of Counties Francis Ferraro
Vice President
Lynn T. Carew California Water Service Company
Chief Administrative Law Judge
Public Utilities Commission Mike Florio
Senior Attorney
Stephen Carlson Executive Director Toward Utility Rate Normalization
l
Cellular Carriers Assn. Of California
Wes Franklin
Assemblyman Mickey Conroy Executive Director
Chair, Utilities and Commerce Committee Public Utilities Commission
Larry Df Addio General Manager Alan J. Gardner
J
Citizens Utilities Company of California California Cable Television Assn.
Ronald F. Del Principe Phil Guidotti
Pacific Telesis Group President
Armstrong Valley Water Company
Gerald Desmond, Jr.
California Association. Of Long Distance Stephen Hall
Telephone Companies Executive Director
Association of California Water Agencies
Randy Deutsch
Vice President Carol Harris
Law and Government Affairs Assistant General Counsel
AT&T Southern Pacific Transportation Co.
183
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
Commissioner D. O. Helmick James Martens
California Highway Patrol Executive General Manager
California Dump Truck Owners Assn.
Dave Higdon
California Moving and Storage Assn. Sara Steck Myers
Attorney-at-Law
Elizabeth Hill
Legislative Analyst Richard Nelson
Director of State Regulatory Affairs
Douglas Hill AirTouch Communications, Inc.
President
California Moving and Storage Assn. Gerald O'Hara
Calif. Teamsters Public Affairs Council
Nettie Hoge,
Executive Director Representative for Senator Steve Peace
Toward Utility Rate Normalization Chair, Energy, Utilities and
Communications Committee
Wayne Horiuchi, Special Representative
Union Pacific Railroad Joel Perlstein
Public Utilities Commission
Spencer Kaitz
President and General Counsel Sally Reed
California Cable Television Assn. Director
Department of Motor Vehicles
W.L. Kelley
Deputy Commissioner Barry Ross
California Highway Patrol Executive Vice President
California Telephone Assn.
Elisabeth Kersten
Director Bill Schweitzer
Senate Office of Research President
Yellow Cab Company
Jessie Knight
Commissioner Richard Severy
Public Utilities Commission Director
Government and Regulatory Affairs
Dennis LeBlanc MCI Communications
State Relations Vice President
Pacific Telesis Group Michael Shames, Executive Director
Utility Consumers Action Network
Steve Larson
Staff Director Alan Shanedling
Senate Budget & Fiscal Review Fleetwood Limousine Company
Committee
Cliff Sharpe
Don Mahnke Branch Chief
President Division of Drinking Water and
California Limousine Assn. Environmental Management
Department of Health Services
184
Appendices
Ed Snyder Mary Vanderpan
Interim Deputy Director Pacific Bell
Industry Operations
Department of Motor Vehicles Douglas Wheeler
Secretary
Yolanda Solari California Resources Agency
President
California State Employees Assn. Craig Wilson
Assistant Chief Counsel
Brian Strom, President State Water Resources Control Board
Roseville Telephone Company
Joseph Young/ Vice President
Southern California Water Company
185
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
186
Appendices
APPENDIX B
Witnesses Appearing at
little Hoover Commission PUC/Energy
Public Hearing
March 27, 1996
Sacramento
Virginia Coe Severin Borenstein
Former Director of Strategic Planning Director
Public Utilities Commission California Energy Institute
University of California Berkeley
l
P. Gregory Conlon
President-elect Carl Blumstein
Public Utilities Commission Research Policy Analyst
California Energy Institute
Charles Imbrecht University of California, Berkeley
Chairman
California Energy Commission Peter Navarro
Professor
Douglas Wheeler Economics and Public Policy
Secretary University of California, Irvine
Resources Agency
Matthew Brown
Senior Policy Specialist
National Conference of State Legislatures
187
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
Witnesses Appearing at
Little Hoover Commission PUC/Energy
Public Hearing
April 24-25, 1996
San Francisco
Daniel William Fessler Robert T. "Hap" Boyd
Commissioner Director, Governmental Affairs
Public Utilities Commission Zond Energy Systems
Robert Foster Ralph Cavanagh
Vice President, Regulatory Affairs Co-Director, Energy Program
Southern California Edison Natural Resources Defense Council
Robert D. Testa, Vice President Marc Joseph
Governmental Relations Attorney
Pacific Gas & Electric Coalition of California Utility Employees
Steve Davis T. Santora
Division Manager, Governmental Services Government Affairs Coordinator
San Diego Gas & Electric Communications Workers of America
V. John White, Executive Director Michael Shames
Coalition for Energy Efficiency and Executive Director
Renewable Energy Technologies Utility Consumers' Action Network
Tim Duane Mike Florio
Professor of Environmental Senior Attorney
Planning and Policy Toward Utility Rate Normalization
University of California, Berkeley
Henry Riewerts
Fred John Nabisco Fuels Management
Senior Vice President and California Industrial Users
Pacific Enerprises
Karen Lindh
John A. Gueldner Policy Director for Energy
Vice President, Regulatory Affairs and Environmental Quality
Pacific Bell California Manufacturers Association
Donald Maynor
Attorney
California Municipal Utility Association
Allen Short
General Manager
Modesto Irrigation District
188
Appendices
Witnesses Appearing at
Little Hoover Commission PUC/Energy
Public Hearing
August 28-29, 1996
Sacramento
Josiah Neeper Joel Anderson
Commissioner Executive Vice President
Public Utilities Commission California Trucking Associaiton
Donal Vial Larry 0' Addio
Chairman General Manager
California Foundation on the Environment Citizens Utilities Company of California
and the Economy and President
California Water Association
G. Mitchell Wilk
Principal Craig M. Wilson
Wilk & Associates Assistant Chief Counsel
State Water Resources Control Board
Tony Armstrong
Director, Governmental Affairs Cliff Sharpe
GTE California Branch Chief
Division of Drinking Water & Environmental
John Gueldner Management
Vice President, Regulatory Affairs Department of Health Services
Pacific Telesis Group
Ed Texeira
Randolph Deutsch Former Director
Vice President Divison of Ratepayer Advocates
Law and Government Affairs Public Utilities Commission
AT&T
Fred Schmidt
Jim Lewis Advocate for Customers of Public Utilities
Regional Executive Office of the Nevada Attorney General
MCI Communications
Herschel T. Elkins
D.O. Helmick Senior Assistant Attorney General
Commissioner Consumer Law Section
California Highway Patrol
Thomas Greene
Grace Hughes Senior Assistant Attorney General
President Antitrust Section
Marin Airporter
189
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
190
Endnotes
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
192
Endnotes
ENDNOTES
1. Daniel Wm. Fessler, IISocial, Economic and Political Perspectives on California's Role in the
Changing Dynamics of the Electric Services Industry." presented to the Federal Energy Bar
Association, Washington D.C"! May 9, 1996.
2. Constitution of California, Article XXII, Section 1.
3. Munn vs. Illinois, 94 US 113, 1877.
4. Public Utilities Commission, Annual Report, 1994-95.
5. Barbara R. Barkovich, Regulatory Intervention in the Utility Industry: Fairness, Efficiency
and the Pursuit of Energy Conservation, New York: Quorum Books, 1989.
6. Ibid, 21.
7. Public Utilities Commission, Division of Strategic Planning, California"s Electric Services
Industry: Perspectives on the Past" StraTegies for the Future, San Francisco, February
1993.
8. Warren-Alquist State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Act, California
Public Resources Code 25000 et seq.
9. W. Ahern and R. Doctor, et aI., Energy Alternatives for California: Paths to the Future"
Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1975.
10. Public Utilities Commission, memorandum to the Governor's office, May 20, 1974.
11. Virginia Coe, former director of strategic planning for the Public Utilities Commission,
in testimony to the Little Hoover Commission on March 27, 1996.
12. Governor Pete Wilson, letter to Senate President Pro Tempore David Roberti, Senate
Minority Leader Kenneth Maddy, Assembly Speaker Willie Brown, Jr. and Assembly
Minority Leader Jim Brulte, December 1, 1993.
13. Ibid.
14. Daniel Wm. Fessler. In a meeting of the Public Utilities Commission, June 19, 1996.
15. U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1994, Table
926; Public Utilities Commission, 1994-95 Yearbook.
16. Severin Borenstein, director, University of California Energy Institute, in testimony to
the California Legislature Joint Oversight Committee on Lowering the Cost of Electric
Services, October 28, 1994.
17. California Energy Commission, Energy and the Economy: The California Energy Policy,
1994.
193
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
18. Jeffrey Dasovich, former regulatory analyst, California Public Utilities Commission, in a
presentation at the JurEcon conference on electrical restructuring, "Choices for California
Electricity Customers in the New Electricity Market/' May 10, 1996, Marina del Rey.
19. Borenstein, op. cit.
20. Public Utilities Commission, liT elecommunications Primer," undated.
21. Robert Foster, vice president, regulatory affairs, Southern California Edison, in
testimony to the Little Hoover Commission; April 24, 1996 in San FrancIsco.
22. Public Utilities Commission, llComments of the California Public Utilities Commission in
Response to Questions from the Little Hoover Commission," March 20. 1996: P. Gregory
Conlon, president, Public Utilities Commission, testimony to the Little Hoover Commission,
March 27, 1996 in Sacramento; Daniel Wm. Fessler, commissioner, Public Utilities
Commission, April 24, 1996 in San Francisco; Robert Testa, vice president of government
relations, Pacific Gas and Electric Co., April 24, 1996 in San Francisco.
23. Henry Duque and Jesse Knight, Commissioners, Public Utilities Commission,
IIComments of the California Public Utilities Commission in response to Questions from the
Little Hoover Commission, March 20, 1996. While the response indicated that the PUC
II
would do some J'cost allocationslf for transmission, tariffs would be set by FERC and
necessity reviews would be conducted by the ISO.
24. Ibid. In the comments, the PUC recognizes that to provide this function to non-utility
facilities would require expanding its jurisdiction.
25. Coe, op. cit.
26. Public Utilities Commission, Division of Strategic Planning, "California's Electric
Services Industry; Perspectives on the Past,. Strategies for the Future," February 1993,
page 145.
27. Keystone Center, "Overview of the Keystone Dialogue on the Development of a Model
State Siting Act," Keystone, Colorado, June 1992.
28. Charles Imbrecht, chairman, California Energy Commission, in testimony to the Little
Hoover Commission, March 27, 1996 In Sacramento.
29. Daniel Wm. Fessler, commissioner Public Utilities Commission, in testimony to the
I
Little Hoover Commission April 24, 1996 in San Francisco; Conlon, op. cit.
30. Severin Borenstein, director, University of California Energy Institute, in testimony to
the Little Hoover Commission, March 27, 1996 In Sacramento.
31. California Public Resources Code Section 25006.
32. William E.Taylor and J. Douglas Zona, An Analysis of the State of Competition in
Long-Distance Telephone Markets, National Economic Research ASSOCiates, Inc., 1995.
33. Catherine D. Wolfram, JJMeasuring Duopoly Power in the British ElectriCity Spot
Market," November 1995, presented at the Program on Workable Energy Regulation
194
Endnotes
Conference, University of California, Berkeley March 15, 1996.
r
34. Matthew Brown, senior policy specialist, National Conference of State Legislators, In
testimony to the Little Hoover Commission, March 27/ 1996, in Sacramento.
35. California Energy Commission, Comments in the matter of the PUC/Energy Advisory
Committee to the Little Hoover Commission, February 20, 1996.
36. Coe, op. cit
37. California Energy Commission, Electricity Report 1995; Ralph Cavanagh, co-director
of energy programs, Natural Resources Defense Council, testimony to the Little Hoover
Commission, April 25, 1996 in San Francisco.
38. Robert T. "Hap" Boyd, director of governmental and regulatory affairs, lond Energy
Systems, in testimony to the Little Hoover Commission, April 24, 1996, in San Francisco.
39. "Energy Administration and Regulation in California." Staff Report to the Joint
Committee on Energy Policy and Implementation, Bob Foster, project director, March 1979.
40. Charles Imbrecht, chairman, California Energy Commission, in testimony to the Little
Hoover Commission on March 27, 1996 in Sacramento.
41. Department of Conservation, Office of the Director, Memorandum to Jeannine L.
English, Executive Director, Little Hoover Commission, June 5, 1996.
42. National Association of State Energy Offices, "1995 Survey of State Energy Offices,"
Washington, D.C.
43. Borenstein, testimony to the Little Hoover Commission, March 27, 1996, op. cit.
44. Mike Florio, senior attorney, Toward Utility Rate Normalization, in testimony to the
Little Hoover Commission, April 25, 1996 in San Francisco.
45. In testimony to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate.
JJCompetitlve Change in the Electric Power Industry'" March 6, 1996, PUC Commissioner
Daniel Fessler explained that the purpose of a 100 percent stranded cost recovery was to
assure the continued financial integrity of California's investor-owned utilities and to
provide them with an opportunity to be vital participants in the restructured market
following the transition.
46. Testa. op. cit.
47. California Public Utilities Code Section 851 provides for the PUC to review transfers of
property belonging to investor-owned utilities. Under the restructuring plan, transmission
fadlities will be transferred to the Independent System Operator and the utilities are
expected to sell major portions of their generating facilities.
48. Michael Shames, executive director, Utility Consumers' Action Network, in testimony
to the Little Hoover Commission April 24. 1996 in San Francisco and in correspondence
and interviews.
195
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
49. Florio, op. cit.
50. Borenstein, op. cit.
51. Jananne Sharpless, commissioner, California Energy Commission, memorandum to
the Little Hoover Commission, May 14, 1996.
52. Florio, op. cit.
53. Steven D. Davis, division manager of governmental services, San Diego Gas and
Electric Co., in testimony to the Little Hoover Commission, April 24, 1996 in San
Francisco.
54. Florio, op. cit.
55. Fred John, senior vice president, Pacific Enterprises, in testimony to the Little Hoover
Commission, April 24, 1996 in San Francisco.
56. G. Mitchell Wilk, in testimony to the Little Hoover Commission, August 28, 1996, in
Sacramento.
57. Douglas Wheeler, Secretary of the Resources Agency, in testimony before the Senate
Energy Committee, January 25, 1994.
58. Commission on California State Government Organization and Economy, A Study of
JI
the California State Public Utilities Commission," 1974; Commission on California State
Government Organization and Economy, JlA Study of the Organization and Coordination of
Electric Planning and Electric Utility Regulation in California, 1984.
II
59. Assembly Natural Resources Committee, staff analysis of AB 2468, May 9, 1994.
60. Coe, op. cit.
61. Daniel Wm. Fessler, commissioner, Public Utilities Commission. testimony to the Little
Hoover Commission, April 24, 1996, In San Francisco.
62. Assemblyman Byron Sher, chairman of the Assembly Joint Oversight Committee on
Lowering the Cost of Electric Services, in a hearing, October 28, 1994, p. 23.
63. JlEnergy Administration and Regulation in California," op. cit.
64. Public Utilities Commission, "A Report on Our Process for Change: Vision 2000," July
1995, Appendix A-3.
65. Randolph Deutsch, vice president, law and government affairs, AT&T, in testimony to
the Little Hoover Commission, August 28, 1996, in Sacramento.
66. The PUC has declined to allow for new area codes to be "overlaid" on existing area
codes until technology is implemented allowing customers to malntam the same telephone
number when they change carriers. Commissioners, in applYing thiS policy to the 310 and
818 area codes, acknowledged in August and October 1 996 meetmgs that thiS reqUires
changing the telephone numbers of eXisting customers rather than new customers.
196
Endnotes
67. Tony Armstrong, director, governmental affairs, GTE California, testimony to the Little
Hoover Commission, August 28/ 1996 Sacramento.
1
68. John Gueldner, vice president, regulatory affairs, Pacific Telesis GrouPI testimony to
the Little Hoover Commission. August 28. 1996, Sacramento.
69. In October of 1993, the Senate and Assembly utility committees held a joint hearing on
the "Improprieties in the PUC's Toll Rate Decision." The Legislature subsequently asked an
Advisory Group, chaired by former PUC President Donald Vial, to review PUC procedures
and offer reforms. The incident was also described in testimony from James L. Lewis,
regional executive for MCI, to the Little Hoover Commission, August 28, 1996.
70. Robert C. Fellmeth, director, Center for Public Interest Law, University of San Diego, in
written testimony to the Little Hoover CommiSSion, August 29, 1996.
71. Donald Vial, et al., "Report of the Advisory Working Group on CPUC Reforms/' to the
Senate Subcommittee on Public Utilities Commission Reforms of Senate Committee on
Energy and Public Utilities, June 1, 1994.
72. G. Mitchell Wilk, Concurring Opinion, Advisory Group Final Report to the California
State Senate Subcommittee on PUC Reform, May 16, 1994.
73. Josiah Neeper, Commissioner, Public Utilities Commission in a meeting of the
l
Commission on June 19, 1996, in San Francisco.
74. Taylor and Zona, op. cit; Leland L. Johnson, Price Caps in Telecommunications
Regulatory Reform, A Rand Note, Rand Library Collection, January 1989.
75. Charles F. Phillips Jr., liThe Changmg Structure of the Public Utility Sector," Public
Utjfjties Fortnightly, January 9, 1986.
76. Robert W. Crandall and Leonard Waverman, Talk is Cheap: The Promise of Regulatory
Reform in North American Telecommunications, The Brookings Institution, 1995.
77. Jerry Hausman, MacDonald professor of economics, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, in testImony to Congress, October 12, 1995.
78. Gueldner, op. cit.
79. Richard Nelson, Director of State Regulatory Affairs, AirTouch Communications, Inc.,
in comments to the Little Hoover Commission Water, Telecommunications and
Transportation Advisory Committee, June 12; 1996.
80. Wilk, op. cit.
81. Armstrong, op. cit.
82. California Public Utilities Code, Sections 1031 - 1042; Rules 1 through 8, 15, 1 5.1, 16
and 21, Rules of Practice and Procedure, California Public Utilities CommiSSion.
83. Taylor and Zona, op. cit.; Johnson, op. cit.; Crandall and Waverman~ op. cit.
197
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
84. William R. Schulte, former chief, Transportation Division, Public Utilities Commission.
in an interview with the Little Hoover Commission staff, October 1996.
85. Douglas Hill, president, California Moving and Storage Association, in an interview
with the Little Hoover Commission staff, June 13,1996.
86. Fellmeth, op. cit.
87. Taylor and Zonal op cit.; Johnson, op cit.; Crandall and Waverman op cit.
l
88. Crandall and Waverman, op cit.
89. Grace Hughes, president and chief executive officer, Marin Airporter Company,
testimony to the Little Hoover Commission, August 28, 1996 in Sacramento.
90. Fessler, testimony to the Little Hoover Commission, op. cit.
91. Alan Shanedling, owner, Fleetwood Limousine Company, in remarks to the Little
Hoover Commission Advisory Committee on Water Telecommunications and
t
Transportation June 25, 1996.
l
92. D.O. Helmick, commissioner, California Highway Patrol, in testimony to the Little
Hoover Commission, August 28, 1996 in Sacramento.
93. Rebecca Brady, National Conference of State Legislatures, in an interview with the
Little Hoover Commission staff, June 5, 1996.
94. Deregulation Task Force [and] Dean R. Dunphy, secretary, Business, Transportation
and Housing Agency. Report to Governor Pete Wilson. [no date].
95. Ed Snyder, interim deputy director, Industry Operations Division California Department
l
of Motor Vehicles, in an interview with the Little Hoover Commission staff, June 1996.
96. Joel Anderson, executive vice president, California Trucking Association, in testimony
to the Little Hoover Commission, August 28, 1996.
97. Hill, op. cit.
98. Douglas Hill, president, California Moving & Storage Association, letter to the Little
Hoover Commission, July 1, 1996.
99. Texas, New Mexico! New Jersey, Missouri, Arkansas Minnesota, and Kentucky have
l
assigned regulation of transportation carriers to transportation agencies other than the
public utilities commission. Roger Dunstan, California Research Bureau, California State
Library, memorandum to the Little Hoover Commission! February 14, 1995.
100. J.D. Stokes, safety/traffic engineer, Technological Applications Section! California
Division! Federal Highway Admmistration! interview with Little Hoover Commission staff!
September 30! 1996.
101. Darin Kosmak, railroad liaison branch manager, Traffic Operations Dlvlslon,Railroad
Section, Texas Department of Transportation, interview with the Little Hoover CommiSSion
198
Endnotes
staff, September 9, 1996.
102. Bill Chappell, Traffic Engineering Branch, North Carolina Department of
Transportation, interview with the Little Hoover Commission staff, September 24, 1996.
103. Bruce DeBerry, deputy director, Safety and Enforcement Division, Public Utilities
Commission, interview with the Little Hoover Commission staff, September 27, 1996.
104. Accidents That Shouldn't Happen: A Report of the Grade Crossing Safety Task
JI
Force to Secretary Federico Pena," U.S. Department of Transportation, March 1, 1996.
105. "California Trade and Goods Movement Study," prepared for the California
Department of Transportation and the San Diego Association of Governments by Barton
Aschman Associates, Inc., June 1996.
106. "Intermodal Freight Transportation: Projects and Planning Issues," Reports and
Testimony, U.S. Government Accounting Office, July 1996.
1 07. Robert A. Wolf, undersecretary for the California Transportation, Business,
Transportation and Housing Agency, Memorandum to George Dunn, Cabinet Secretary,
Governor's Office, June 26, 1996.
108. Ibid.
109. Fred L. Curry, program manager, Water Division, Public Utilities Commission, in an
interview with Little Hoover Commission staff, September 24, 1996.
110. California Public Utilities Commission, Annual Report, 1994-1995.
111 . "Analysis of Ex Parte Contact Notices Filed at the California Public Utilities
Commission, January 1 - July 31, 1995,11 prepared by William B. Marcus, Gregory A.
Ruszovan and Gayatri M. Schilberg, JBS Energy, Inc., September 1995.
112. David N. Kennedy, director, California Department of Water Resources, letter to the
Little Hoover Commission, June 27, 1996.
113. Deborah Braver, program manager, Water Management Planning, California
Department of Water Resources, interView with the Little Hoover Commission staff,
September 17, 1996.
114. KennedYI op. cit.; "Bulletin 160-93, The California Water Plan Update, October
1994," California Department of Water Resources.
115. "Bulletin 160-93, The California Water Plan Update, October 1994,11 California
Department of Water Resources.
116. Kennedy, op. cit.; Braver, op. cit.; California Urban Water Conservation CounciL
"Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Urban Water Conservation In California, Best
Management Practices Summary Report, 1993-1994."
117."Bulletin 160-93," op. cit.; Kennedy, op. cit.
199
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
118. Kennedy, op. cit.
119. Curry, op. cit.
120. Tom Smagel, Water Division, Public Utilities Commission, in an interview with the
Little Hoover Commission staff, September 24, 1996.
121. "California Urban Water Conservation Council: An Independent Evaluation of the
Council's Structure, Activities and Budget and Future Directions in Urban Water
Conservation, Final Report;" Energy Resources International, Inc., January 26, 1996.
122. Curry, op. cit.
123. David N. Kennedy, director, California Department of Water Resources in a letter to
l
Daniel William Fessler, President, California Public Utilities Commission, May 9, 1994.
124. Ibid.
125. Joseph F. Young, vice president Southern California Water Company, in an interview
l
with Little Hoover Commission staff, November 5, 1996.
126. Ibid.
127. John Garon, vice president Santa Clarita Water Company, in an interview with Little
l
Hoover Commission staff, October 25, 1996.
128. Young, op. cit.
129. Dean Evans, deputy director, Water, Commission Advisory and Compliance Division,
Public Utilities Commission, in an interview with Little Hoover Commission staff, June 14,
1996.
130. Clifford A. Sharpe, chief, Drinking Water Field Operations Branch, California
Department of Health Services, interview with Little Hoover Commission staff, September
20, 1996.
131 . Curry, op. cit.
132. Clifford A. Sharpe, chief, Drinking Water Field Operations Branch, California
Department of Health Services, interview with Little Hoover Commission staff, June 14,
1996.
133. Ibid.
134. Joseph F. Young, vice president, Southern California Water Company, in remarks to
the Little Hoover Commission Water, Transportation and Telecommunications Advisory
Committee June 25, 1996.
l
135 Sharpe, September 20. 1996 op. cit.
1
136. Larry 0' Addio, general manager, Citizens Utilities Company of California and
president, California Water Association, in testimony to the Little Hoover Commission
l
200
Endnotes
August 28, 1996.
137. Sharpe, September 20, 1996, op. cit.
138. 0' Addio, op. Cit.
139. Interview with staff of the Texas Natural Resources Conservation Commission, May
1996.
140. Douglas P. Wheeler, Secretary for Resources, In a letter to the Little Hoover
Commission; August 22, 1996.
141. Memorandum from Public Utilities Commission Division of Ratepayer staff to PUC
Commissioners P. Gregory Conlon, Daniel Wm. Fessler, Jessie J Knight, Jr., Henry M.
Duque, Josiah L. Neeper and Executive Director Wes Franklin, July 1 1996.
142. Michael Shames, executive director of the Utility Consumers' Action Network, in a
Letter to the Little Hoover Commission, January 23, 1996.
143. Ibid.
144. Edmund J. Texeira. former director, Public Utilities Commission, Division of
Ratepayer Advocates, in testimony to the Little Hoover Commission, August 29, 1996 In
Sacramento.
145. Coe, op. cit.
146. Fellmeth, op. cit.
147. California Business and Professions code section 17200 et seq.
148. Herschel T. Elkins, senior assistant attorney general for consumer law, California
Attorney General's Office, in testimony to the Little Hoover Commission, August 29, 1996
in Sacramento.
149. Thomas Greene, senior assistant attorney generaL antitrust section, in testimony to
the Little Hoover Commission, August 29, 1996.
150. V. John White, executive director of the Center for Energy Efficiency and Renewable
Technologies, Little Hoover Commission PUC i Energy Advisory Committee, May 15, 1996.
151. Florio, op. Cit.
1 52. Boyd, op. Cit.
153. Alan Gardner / California Cable Television Association, in remarks to the Little Hoover
Commission PUC I Energy AdVisory Committee. July 9, 1996.
154. Richard Severy, government affairs director, MCI Communications, in remarks to the
PUC I Energy Advisory Committee, July 9, 1996.
155. Florio, op. cit.
201
Little Hoover Commission: PUC & Energy
156. Fred Schmidt, Advocate for Customers of Public Utilities, and Sonny Popowski,
Consumer Utility Advocate, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, in interviews with
Commission staff.
157. Munn vs. Illinois, op. cit.
158. Gary McBee, chairman, Alliance for Competitive Communications, in a speech to the
Washington Telecommunications Conference, National Association of State Utility
Consumer Advocates, May 4, 1995.
202
CHAIRMAN Joint Legislative Budget Committee
RED E. ALQUIST GARY G. MILLER
TE ASSEMBLY
TG BhVERlY GOVERNMENT CODE SECTIONS 9140-9143 BARBARA ALBY
~K JOHNSTON VALERIE BROW:--;
SLTE CRL'L HI.1S"1 A~H-"TE
N ~1ARKS DE~ISE M()RF~O DLCHE:\"Y
[ >\5 C. PETRIS CALIFORNIA LEGISLATlTRE HOWARD KALOO(jl>\N
'HOMPSON DAVID KNOWLES
:.: WRIGHT CHARLc.~ POOClllGiAN
December 2, 1996
Chairman Richard R. Terzian
Little Hoover Commission
660 J Street, Suite 260
Sacramento, CA 95814
Dear Richard:
During much of my career in public service, I fought for a California energy policy that would satisfy the
state's growing demands in an economically efficient and environmentally sound manner. That balanced
approach was the premise for legislation more than two decades ago that created the California Energy
Resource Conservation and Development Commission. The work of the Energy Commission has
become a national model for encouraging new technologies and diversity in energy sources while
balancing the economic and the public health and safety concerns at stake when large new power plants
are sited.
As I leave public office, I remain convinced that a balanced and assertive state energy policy will be as
essential in an era of competitive energy services as it was in the days of monopoly power utilities. But I
also realize that as competitive forces are unleashed in an effort to provide better service at lower prices,
the state will need to realign the agencies charged with protecting those public interests that are
indivisible from the development and distribution of energy resources.
Generally, I believe the realignment outlined in the Little Hoover Commission's proposed PUC & Energy
report would provide the constant diligence needed to protect public values while encouraging the
markets to provide efficient service. By gradually assigning to the Energy Commission the regulatory
duties needed to make competitive energy markets work, Cahfomia could also end years of tension
between the state's energy-related regulatory agencies.
From the perspective of a co-author of the Act, it is unclear that the Hoover Commission proposal to
remove the CEC's efficiency and R&D authority is appropriate.
At the time the Act was drafted, the authors had a key goal: For the first time (anywhere in the U.S.) to
enfranchise one energy authority with four key responsibilities--forecasting electricity demand, siting
power plants needed to meet that demand, mandating efficiency standards to reduce demand, and
developing "alternative" technologies through R&D to ensure that power plant options are as benign as
possible.
1020 N STREET, SUITE 522· SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA 95814
Transfer of two of the four key functions to an entirely separate, new regulatory agency (particularly one
with little experience in energy) would fundamentally undermine the integrated policy approach
envisioned by the authors and legislature. In addition, the transfer at this time will jeopardize the timely
implementation of AB 1890. If the transfer must occur, it should occur after the implementation date of
January 1998.
The Public Utilities Commission, I believe, has been a valuable asset to the State during nearly a century
of monopoly utility service. But I also agree with the report's recommendations that the best value the
PUC could now provide Californians would be to focu& on nurturing the most competitive and
universally available telecommunications services possible.
With the exception of transferring the efficiency and R&D functions, I endorse the plan before the Little
Hoover Commission. However, if my long tenure on the Little Hoover Commission had lasted but one
month more, I would vote for adoption. I also would urge those who follow me in the Legislature to
embrace the organizational reforms recommended by the Little Hoover Commission.
Sincerely,
Ifred E. Alquist, Me
Little oover Commission
LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION FACT SHEET
The Little Hoover Commission, formally known as the Milton Marks 1ILittie Hoover"
Commission on California State Government Organization and Economy is an independent
I
state oversight agency that was created in 1962. The Commission's mission is to
investigate state government operations and -- through reports, and recommendations and
legislative proposals -- promote efficiency, economy and improved service.
By statute, the Commission is a balanced bipartisan board composed of five citizen
members appointed by the Governor, four citizen members appointed by the Legislature,
two Senators and two Assembly members.
The Commission holds hearings on topics that come to its attention from citizens,
legislators and other sources. But the hearings are only a small part of a long and thorough
process:
* Two or three months of preliminary investigations and preparations come
before a hearing is conducted.
* Hearings are constructed in such a way to explore identified issues and raise
new areas for investigation.
* Two to six months of intensive fieldwork is undertaken before a report -
including findings and recommendations -- is written, adopted and released.
* Legislation to implement recommendations is sponsored and lobbied through
the legislative system.
* New hearings are held and progress reports issued in the years following the
initial report until the Commission's recommendations have been enacted or
its concerns have been addressed.
Additional copies of this publication may be purchased for $5.00 per copy from:
Little Hoover Commission
660 J Street, Suite 260
Sacramento, CA 95814
Make checks payable to Little Hoover Commission.