Juvenile Justice Reform: Realigning Responsibilities

J J R : UVENILE USTICE EFORM R R EALIGNING ESPONSIBILITIES L H C ITTLE OOVER OMMISSION July 2008 State of California L I T T L E H O O V E R C O M M I S S I O N July 14, 2008 The Honorable Arnold Schwarzenegger Governor of California The Honorable Don Perata The Honorable Dave Cogdill President pro Tempore of the Senate Senate Minority Leader and members of the Senate The Honorable Karen Bass The Honorable Michael Villines Speaker of the Assembly Assembly Minority Leader and members of the Assembly Dear Governor and Members of the Legislature: In shifting responsibility to the counties for hundreds of California’s youth offenders, the state recognized that its juvenile justice system cannot be reformed without radical change. Though prompted by cost concerns, the realignment of responsibilities to the counties was the right policy move, one previously recommended by this Commission and others. Many counties have demonstrated that they can provide programs and treatment to youth offenders who need to turn their lives around in settings that allow them to reintegrate more successfully into their communities. Once realignment is complete, the number of youth offenders in state hands will shrink to fewer than 1,500. The annual cost of providing services to each ward, however, next year will rise to $252,000. This startling figure reflects the overhead expenses of a system built to serve a far larger population, the cost of reforms required under a court-supervised consent decree and the complex needs of these seriously troubled youth. Californians may fairly ask what they are getting for this outlay and whether other strategies can better deliver public safety and youth rehabilitation. The state has made slow, yet undeniable, progress. Still, advocates for youth offenders, frustrated by the pace of reform, have asked a court to place the juvenile justice system in receivership. Whatever the court’s decision, the state’s costs per ward likely will increase as juvenile programming and treatment services are expanded and its crumbling facilities continue to age. The state’s master plan for renovating or replacing its juvenile facilities, promised to legislators, is long overdue. The delay may mean that the cost of bringing California’s facilities in line with current programming requirements or replacing them is unaffordable, particularly in light of the current budget deficit. The prospect of ever-higher outlays for an ever-smaller juvenile population in state custody should prompt policy-makers to extend realignment to completion. The Commission recommends that the state begin planning now to ultimately eliminate its juvenile justice operations and create regional rehabilitative facilities for high-risk, high-need offenders to be leased to and run by the counties. Juvenile justice operations and policy should be moved from the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and placed in a separate Office of Juvenile Justice that reports to the governor’s office. This office should combine and consolidate the juvenile justice divisions currently under the chief deputy secretary of juvenile justice as well as the juvenile offender grant administration and oversight currently under the Corrections Standards Authority. Consolidating these activities into one office will fill gaps that exist despite the multiple agencies and committees charged with pieces of juvenile justice policy and oversight. Establishing an Office of Juvenile Justice does more than streamline and consolidate overlapping functions; it establishes an office to lead statewide juvenile justice efforts, to ensure that a continuum of proven responses to juvenile crime are available throughout California. The state has long lacked a strong leadership structure for juvenile justice, and the realignment legislation failed to assign a single entity to be accountable for state operations and for how counties use state funds. The realignment legislation did temporarily reconstitute the State Commission on Juvenile Justice, though the jury is still out on what role it can play in providing leadership or oversight. The Legislature should extend the commission’s life another year. Through the new office, the state can provide real value through consistent leadership, technical advice and guidance to help counties implement and expand evidence-based programs for juvenile offenders. This office should conduct research and analysis on best practices and share them with counties. It should coordinate with other state agencies that provide youth services and provide counties with guidance on how to best leverage funding sources. In addition to consolidating juvenile justice functions into an Office of Juvenile Justice, the Legislature should consolidate the major grant programs that provide funding for juvenile offenders, including the new funding that the state agreed to provide counties through the realignment, into a dedicated, annual allocation. Additionally, policy-makers should fix flaws in the realignment plan to prevent counties from using their realignment funds to supplant existing funding and to require counties to report annually outcomes for how they spent state money. Using staff and resources shifted from the Corrections Standards Authority, the office should oversee and analyze county outcomes for programs and services funded by the state and provide an annual report to the governor and the Legislature. Unaddressed, these flaws could undermine counties’ ability to make the most of this opportunity. Without question, realignment will be a major challenge for many counties, especially those which previously had not invested in juvenile offenders programs and treatment services. Early indications suggest that counties are embracing the change, one made easier by the state’s commitment to help fund the higher level of services required by this more complex group of offenders. It is essential that this realignment succeeds. It can, with the help and leadership of a separate, streamlined Office of Juvenile Justice. The governor and the Legislature now must weigh their options for the juvenile justice operations that will remain in state hands. Reforming the state system to meet the terms of the consent decree may prove unaffordable. Failing to speed reforms may increase the likelihood of a court receivership, incurring political costs that are unacceptable. The realignment is a start in the right direction on a path that ultimately leads to the state closing or transferring its juvenile facilities. Faced with options that may be unaffordable or unacceptable, it is the path the state must take. Sincerely, Daniel W. Hancock Chairman Commissioner Eloise Anderson voted in favor of the report but disagrees with the recommendation to establish an Office of Juvenile Justice reporting to the Office of the Governor, favoring instead that a Department of Juvenile Justice be established within the Health & Human Services Agency. J J R : UVENILE USTICE EFORM REALIGNING RESPONSIBILITIES Table of Contents Executive Summary……………..……….…………………………………………………………… i Juvenile Justice in California..……………………………………………………………………… 1 Realignment Leadership and Oversight.………………………………………….…………….. 21 Juvenile Offenders Remaining at the State Level.……………………………………………… 39 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………………… 53 The Commission’s Study Process………………………...……………………………………….. 55 Appendices…………………………………………………………………………………………….. 57 Appendix A: Public Hearing Witnesses………………………………………..………………………..…… 59 Appendix B: List of 707(b) Offenses…………………………………………………………………………... 61 Appendix C: Summary of County Juvenile Justice Development Plans……………………………… 65 Appendix D: Major Sources of Funding for California’s Local Juvenile Justice Programs and Services…………….….…..………… 69 Appendix E: Selected Acronyms……………………………………………………………………………….. 71 Appendix F: Commissioner David A. Schwarz Comments………………………………………………. 73 Notes…………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 79 Table of Sidebars & Charts Commission’s Proposed Organizational Structure for an Office of Juvenile Justice….. vii Rise and Fall of California Juvenile Justice……………………………………………………… 2 Involvement in State and Local Juvenile Justice Interventions…………………………….. 3 California Division of Juvenile Facilities Institutional Cost per Ward per Year: 1996 -- 2008……………………..……………………………………………………………………. 6 707(b) Offenses Defined..…………………………………………………………………………… 7 Youthful Offender Block Grant Options…………………………………………...…………… 9 What’s In a Name: DJJ or DJF?......………………………………………………………………. 10 Corrections Standards Authority..………………………………………………………………… 11 State Commission on Juvenile Justice.……………………………………………………..……. 12 Other State Agencies with a Role in Juvenile Justice……..……………………………..….. 13 State Budget and Budgeted Positions for Youthful Offenders in State Facilities or on Parole, FY 2007-08 (in millions)…………..………………………………………………………. 14 Major Juvenile Justice Grant Programs FY 2007-08 (in millions)..…………..……………. 14 Proposition 6: Criminal Penalties and Laws. Public Safety Funding.……..……………... 15 Youth Offenders Remaining in DJF…..………………………………………………………….. 17 Comparison of Youth Offenders in State Facilities 1996, August 2007 and June 2008……………..……………..………………………………………………………………… 18 Orange County Juvenile Justice Continuum………………………………….………………… 23 Missed Opportunity to Lead..…...………………………………………………………………… 25 California Department of Justice…………...………………………………………………...….. 26 Restructuring Juvenile Justice in Washington.…………………………………………………. 27 Major Sources of Funding for California’s Juvenile Justice System..……………………… 30 Sacramento County’s Mix of Juvenile Offenders in State Facilities………………………. 32 Commission’s Proposed Organizational Structure for an Office of Juvenile Justice…. 38 CDCR Organizational Chart 2006……………………………………………………………….. 42 CDCR Organizational Chart 2008……………………………………………………………….. 42 Annual Costs Per Juvenile Offender Housed in a State Facility 2007-08……………….. 44 Organization of State Delinquency Institutions in Other States………………………….. 46 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Executive Summary E ach year California spends nearly a billion dollars on its juvenile justice system. More than half of that amount is spent confining less than 2,000 youth offenders in state facilities. The remainder helps fund programs and services for nearly 100,000 youth supervised at the local level.1 Spending half a billion dollars annually on such a small number of youth in state facilities is a choice the state has made. It is a sizeable investment, next year more than $250,000 for each youth offender in confinement.2 As Californians see policy-makers choose to cut budgets for higher education, health care and services for the rest of the population, they deserve an accounting for their return on this investment. They are not getting improved public safety – three out of four youth who leave state facilities commit a new crime within three years of their release.3 To a large degree, this state and its taxpayers are paying now for choices made earlier – to forego investment in adequate facilities and programs and to allow a juvenile correctional culture to develop that elevated punishment over rehabilitation. Unsafe conditions and illegal practices in state juvenile facilities led advocates for youth offenders to file the Farrell lawsuit in 2003. In response to the litigation, the state hired experts to assess state juvenile justice operations in 2003. The experts found a system plagued by unprecedented violence and pervasive lockdowns that prevented education and counseling programs, with some youth offenders locked up 23 hours per day.4 In November 2004, the state entered into a consent decree in which it agreed to embark on significant reforms.5 The state’s attempt to comply with the consent decree is a substantial driver of the rising costs. Yet nearly four years and hundreds of millions of dollars later, the state still is struggling to implement the required reforms. Though conditions have improved, the plaintiffs in the Farrell case have asked a state superior court to appoint a receiver to oversee the implementation of the agreed-upon reforms. Realizing the state could not afford to comply with the Farrell consent decree, in 2007, policy-makers acted to reduce the number of youth offenders housed in state facilities by enacting realignment legislation i LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION which shifted responsibility to the counties for all but the most serious youth offenders. This major step had long been recommended by youth advocates and experts, and by this Commission in 1994 and 2005, as many counties had demonstrated they were more effective and efficient in managing and rehabilitating youth offenders. As part of the realignment, the state made the historic commitment to provide counties with the money to pay for the programs and services for the shifted population. The Commission took the opportunity to evaluate the realignment as it unfolded with the goal of making recommendations on areas in which the state could improve. This study focused on two key areas of California’s juvenile justice system: (cid:57) Implementation of the realignment and what it will take to be successful and efficient. (cid:57) Effective management of the small number of youth offenders who, under the realignment legislation, will remain at the state level. Most involved with the realignment agree that so far the process appears successful and marks an important first step in improving California’s juvenile justice system, though many point to areas that require attention. In particular, while the state is giving an increasing portion of its juvenile justice budget to counties, it is not providing leadership or oversight to ensure this money is spent well or that outcomes are monitored and measured. Juvenile justice represents a very small part – less than 10 percent by budget – of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, an agency whose focus is dominated by its adult correctional operations.6 The agency currently is grappling with the substantial challenges of prison overcrowding and related federal litigation as well as a costly federal court receivership of its medical system. It is unrealistic to believe the agency’s juvenile division will be able to get the attention it requires. The state must do what is necessary to avoid a costly court receivership of its juvenile operations. At the same time, it is untenable to continue to invest money into a system that has failed for many years and, despite recent signs of progress, will take many more years to fully turn around. Looking forward, the state must plan to take the process to its logical conclusion – turning supervision of all youth offenders over to counties and providing the resources for counties and county consortiums to supervise the most serious youth offenders. This report provides a long- term vision for an effective, efficient and sustainable statewide juvenile justice system. In it, counties take the biggest role. The counties have ii EXECUTIVE SUMMARY proven more adept at juvenile justice, and given time to develop or contract for programs and rehabilitation facilities and with dedicated funding, the counties could rescue the state from the grip of a fiscal and legal vice. Realignment Leadership and Oversight Through the 2007 realignment legislation, the state has transferred the responsibility to the counties for all but the most serious youth offenders, saving millions of dollars. The counties have long supervised the vast majority of youth involved in the juvenile justice system, but up until the realignment, they had flexibility in choosing which offenders they sent to state facilities. Under the realignment, the state has codified which offenders can be sent to the state. The realignment also dedicated new funding from the savings to counties to establish and expand programs and services for the shifted youth offender population. Through this historic policy change, policy-makers could have, but chose not to create or designate an existing government department or committee to lead and oversee the realignment to ensure that a continuum of effective juvenile justice responses is available statewide. Policy-makers opted instead for a “hands off” approach. They tasked the Corrections Standards Authority (CSA) with administering two new grant programs: (cid:57) The Youthful Offender Block Grant, which provides annual funding to counties to expand programs and services for youth offenders. (cid:57) The Youthful Offender Rehabilitative Facilities Construction grant program, which provides up to $100 million for counties to expand facilities for youth offenders. Lawmakers gave the CSA a very limited oversight role. As part of the realignment, lawmakers also revived the State Commission on Juvenile Justice and gave it responsibility for developing a Juvenile Justice Operational Master Plan by January 2009. This new commission has a short life – it will sunset when the plan is due – and although it appears to be on track with the plan development, it has not yet demonstrated whether it could live up to a broader mission of leadership or oversight. Language within a budget trailer bill to extend the life of the commission an additional year currently is under consideration by the Legislature. Youth advocates told the Little Hoover Commission that the most serious threat to successful realignment was the lack of a leadership structure at iii LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION the state level to guide and oversee the juvenile justice system. Witnesses did not criticize state officials and staff with various state-level roles in juvenile justice, and in fact frequently praised the professionalism and dedication of those involved with the realignment and juvenile justice reforms. Witnesses also were quick to point out that the weak leadership structure was not new. Youth advocates, this Commission and others have identified this unusual structural void numerous times over the past two decades. Now, the state has reached a critical juncture where it efficiently could establish an office to provide the leadership that has been lacking for so long. And it must do so, given the state’s diminishing role in supervising youth offenders and its commitment to provide an increasing amount of taxpayer money to counties to expand their role in juvenile justice. As the state realizes savings from the reduced juvenile offender population under state supervision, it should shrink the state bureaucracy within the various juvenile justice-related entities within the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), streamline state- level juvenile justice functions and consolidate resources into a unified Office of Juvenile Justice within the governor’s office. A small but focused office should be given the resources and authority to provide leadership and oversight of the state’s juvenile justice system. One of its goals should be to ensure that a continuum of effective responses is consistently available statewide. Witnesses also identified several specific shortcomings in the realignment that present opportunities for the state to bolster its efforts, including: (cid:57) The statutory code created by the realignment does not contain language to prevent counties from supplanting rather than expanding existing spending on programs and services for youth offenders with the new block grant money. (cid:57) Although counties were required to provide a plan to the state identifying how they would use the partial-year grant money provided in 2007-08, no plans are required in the future. (cid:57) Counties are not required to report how the grant money was spent, what outcomes were expected or what success they had in meeting those outcomes. A budget trailer bill that would require counties to provide an annual plan and report outcomes for the new block grant currently is pending in the Legislature. (cid:57) Grant accountability is diluted. The Corrections Standards Authority has limited oversight of the new block grants; the Department of Finance determines the grant amount; and, the State Controller’s Office has fiduciary responsibility for the grants. iv EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (cid:57) The new block grant adds another funding stream to a mix of state and federal funding sources with overlapping objectives and different reporting requirements. (cid:57) The new block grant initially increased overall state funding for local juvenile offenders, until two existing state-funded grant programs – the Juvenile Justice Crime Prevention Act and the Juvenile Probation and Camps Funding – got caught in the crossfire of broader state budget maneuvering. Another funding piece is a November ballot measure that, if passed, would cement in juvenile offender funding permanently but would leave the state with little control over whether the money is used efficiently or effectively. (cid:57) Recent research has identified gaps in local juvenile offender programs, but the state lacks a way to ensure that the new money will be used to fill those gaps. In the past, significant state and federal grant money was available for juvenile hall construction. In the absence of guidance from the state, some counties overbuilt, resulting in under-utilized facilities, while other counties lack space. (cid:57) Many counties were caught off guard by the swift policy shift and are struggling to implement programs and services quickly for dangerous, severely mentally ill offenders these counties now must serve. To ensure the success of the realignment, policy-makers should establish a state-level entity to provide leadership and oversight of the realignment effort. Additionally, policy-makers should take steps to address specific identified weaknesses in the realignment. Finally, lawmakers should lengthen the life of the State Commission on Juvenile Justice to give it the opportunity to implement its recommendations that are due in January 2009. Recommendation 1: To improve public safety and provide statewide leadership on juvenile justice policy, the governor and the Legislature must consolidate programs and services into a streamlined Governor’s Office of Juvenile Justice outside of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, to develop a strategy for a comprehensive, statewide juvenile justice system that includes a complete and consistent continuum of evidence-based services for youth and to oversee county programs funded by state General Fund allocations. Specifically, the Office of Juvenile Justice should: (cid:137) Be led by a director, formerly the chief deputy secretary of juvenile justice, who is appointed by the governor and reports directly to the governor’s office. v LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION (cid:137) Have two divisions that coordinate and collaborate: the Division of Juvenile Justice Policy and the Division of Juvenile Justice Planning and Programs. (cid:137) Require the Division of Juvenile Justice Policy, consisting of positions shifted from the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, including officials from the Divisions of Juvenile Facilities, Programs and Parole, to: (cid:57) Provide leadership, technical assistance and guidance to help counties implement and expand evidence-based programs for juvenile offenders to improve outcomes, to set priorities for filling identified gaps and to lead and guide counties in developing regional consortiums and regional juvenile offender facilities. (cid:57) Conduct research and analysis on best practices and provide a Web-based information clearinghouse. (cid:57) Coordinate with other state entities that have a role in providing youth services, including the departments of mental health, alcohol and drug programs, social services and education, and provide guidance to counties on opportunities to leverage funding sources. (cid:57) Provide juvenile justice policy recommendations to the governor and the Legislature. (cid:137) Require the Division of Juvenile Justice Planning and Programs, with positions shifted from the Corrections Standards Authority Planning and Programs Division, to: (cid:57) Oversee county juvenile offender programs funded through annual state General Fund allocations to ensure that evidence- based programs are implemented. (cid:57) Oversee and analyze county outcome reports and provide an annual report on juvenile justice performance measures to the governor and the Legislature. (cid:57) Administer state and federal juvenile offender grants. (cid:57) Be advised by the Advisory Committee on Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention as federally required for the federal juvenile offender grants, shifted from the Corrections Standards Authority to the Governor’s Office of Juvenile Justice. (cid:137) The new office should develop, in connection with the Corrections Standards Authority, standards and enforcement mechanisms to guide the transfer of the juvenile offender population to county and regional facilities. vi EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Recommendation 2: To ensure the success of juvenile justice realignment, the governor and the Legislature must bolster the accountability and oversight of the Youthful Offender Block Grant by consolidating it with the Juvenile Justice Crime Prevention Act funding and the Juvenile Probation and Camps Funding program into one dedicated funding stream for local juvenile justice programs and services. Specifically, they must: (cid:137) Consolidate the state’s three major juvenile offender grant programs, using existing formulas, into one stable annually dedicated General Fund allocation tied to performance-based outcomes overseen by the Governor’s Office of Juvenile Justice. (cid:137) Require counties to provide an annual outcome report and streamline reporting requirements to match the outcomes currently required by the Juvenile Justice Crime Prevention Act. (cid:137) Strengthen the statutory code to prevent counties from supplanting juvenile offender funding. Commission’s Proposed Organizational Structure for an Office of Juvenile Justice Governor Governor’s Office / Chief of Staff Office of Juvenile Justice State Commission Director on Juvenile Justice (former Chief Deputy Secretary of Juvenile Justice) Division of Juvenile Justice Policy Division of Juvenile Justice Planning and Programs Provide leadership, technical assistance and guidance to Oversee of county juvenile counties. offender programs funded by the General Fund (formerly Advisory Conduct research and analysis to grant programs). Committee on provide a Web-based Juvenile Justice & clearinghouse of best practices. Analyze county reports on Delinquency outcome measures and Coordinate with other state annually report to the Prevention entities that have a role in youth governor and Legislature. services. (moved from CSA) Administer other state and Provide policy recommendations federal juvenile offender to the governor and Legislature. grants. (moved from CDCR Divisions of Juvenile (moved from CSA, Division of Facilities, Programs and Parole) Corrections Planning & Programs) vii LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION Recommendation 3: The governor and the Legislature should extend the sunset of the State Commission on Juvenile Justice until January 2010 and charge it with assisting counties in implementing the recommendations in its master plan and providing oversight of the realignment process. The commission should: (cid:137) Serve as an advisory body to the Governor’s Office of Juvenile Justice. (cid:137) Develop training and technical assistance for counties to assist in the implementation of the recommendations in the Juvenile Justice Operational Master Plan and report on progress implementing the recommendations in January 2010. (cid:137) Develop recommendations to improve and expand data elements reported to the California Department of Justice Juvenile Court and Probation Statistical System. Juvenile Offenders Remaining at the State Level State policy shifts and the overall reduction in youth crime in California have led to a significant reduction in the number of youth supervised in state facilities and on state parole. Despite the significant reduction in the state-supervised youth population, costs have continued to climb. The state spent $344 million on youth offenders in state facilities in 1996, when the population peaked at 10,000 wards. In 2008, California will spend an estimated $554 million on a population a fifth the size of the 1996 population.7 That amount includes an allocation for nearly 4,000 positions in 2008-09 to manage operations and supervise the nearly 2,000 youth offenders in state facilities and approximately 2,300 youth on state parole.8 Costs of implementing reforms the state agreed to in the Farrell consent decree are one reason the spending for juvenile offenders has risen. The state agreed to a major overhaul in six areas: education, medical treatment, access for wards with disabilities, sex offender treatment, mental health treatment and overall safety and welfare. The reduction in the number of youth in state facilities coupled with a significant boost in spending to meet the requirements of the consent decree equates to more than a quarter million dollars spent each year for each youth in state custody. Plaintiffs in the Farrell lawsuit say that despite the increased spending and the commitment to reform by top officials in the state’s juvenile justice divisions, there has been little progress. Some of the youth facilities have experienced a reduction in violence as well as other improvements, including an increasing number of youth attending and graduating from high school and other measurable outcomes, though overarching reforms to the entire system viii EXECUTIVE SUMMARY have not occurred consistently. The plaintiffs have asked the court to appoint a receiver to take over implementation of the required reforms. When the Commission reviewed the governor’s plan to reorganize the Youth and Adult Corrections Agency into the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation in 2005, youth offender advocates warned that placing what was then the fairly autonomous California Youth Authority under the larger corrections organization would be detrimental to implementing the necessary reforms. In a combined system, the attention would be focused mainly on the department’s 170,000 adult offenders. In testimony for this study, these advocates told the Commission that the reorganization has in fact impeded progress as they predicted. Witnesses have said that Bernard Warner, the chief deputy secretary of juvenile justice, who was appointed shortly after the reorganization, and his staff are committed to implementing the agreed upon reforms. But the 2005 reorganization blunted their early efforts and since then, they have only made as much progress as the system would allow. The realignment further complicated the situation, despite its positive overall impact, by significantly reducing the previously projected juvenile offender population, requiring new plans for consolidation and speeding the closure of some of the state’s out-dated juvenile facilities. Seven of the state’s eight juvenile facilities were built 40 or more years ago. The state’s newest facility, built in 1991, was designed more like a mini-prison than the modern rehabilitative model structures that other states have designed and built successfully. The Legislative Analyst and the CDCR have written that the existing facilities are physically obsolete and are not designed to meet the rehabilitative needs of the current population of youth offenders.9 Building new facilities or adapting existing structures is likely to be prohibitively expensive. Given the shrinking youth offender population, the state’s dismal track record in providing effective rehabilitative programs, the costs of responding to the Farrell lawsuit and California’s crumbling juvenile facilities, the state should continue the process started with the 2007 realignment and embark on a path to turn all youth offender supervision over to the counties. This recommendation is by no means a reflection of the efforts of the dedicated and professional staff working hard to comply with the courts and bring about long-overdue reform. Under difficult circumstances, signs of progress are beginning to emerge. Unfortunately, compliance and reform come at a price that the state cannot afford to pay. ix LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION Other states have decentralized youth corrections, improving public safety and programs and services for youth offenders, and did so at a much lower cost. Missouri – often cited as a successful example of decentralization – shifted from a punitive system with two central facilities to a regionally-based rehabilitative approach with 42 facilities spread across the state. The annual cost per bed is about $47,000, or one-fifth what California spends.10 Missouri and other states can provide models for how decentralized youth corrections should look and function, though any attempt to do so should recognize that California is one of just two states where local government is the primary source of probation funding.11 Additionally, two small groups of youth offenders in state facilities – those beyond age 21 and those who will transfer to adult prison with long or life sentences – would require policy-makers to review and possibly revise state jurisdictional policies for youth offenders. County probation departments are in no position to immediately take on the remaining serious, violent and older youth offender population, as they are still adjusting to the abrupt implementation of the 2007 realignment legislation as well as the uncertainty of state funding given California’s estimated $15 billion deficit for 2008-09.12 Counties could, however, take on this responsibility, given time and resources to plan, develop and contract for programs; adequate time to establish regionally- based facilities; and, given a dedicated source of money to pay for these programs and facilities. The Commission has recommended that the state establish a Governor’s Office of Juvenile Justice to provide leadership and oversight of the state’s juvenile justice system to improve public safety and to ensure the success of the realignment. The current leadership of the state’s divisions of juvenile facilities, programs and parole should be consolidated and transferred into this new office. The new office should be outside the organizational structure of the CDCR and should guide and oversee the development of joint state-local juvenile justice strategies. These strategies should include multi-county consortiums and build-lease arrangements for regional facilities. Simultaneously, the state should develop and implement a plan to close all existing state-run juvenile facilities and eliminate all state supervision of youth offenders. x EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Recommendation 4: The state should eliminate its juvenile justice operations by 2011. As previously described, the governor and the Legislature must consolidate all programs and services for juvenile offenders into a Governor’s Office of Juvenile Justice. In addition to the responsibilities described previously, the office should: (cid:137) Guide, facilitate and oversee the development of new regional rehabilitative facilities or the conversion of existing state juvenile facilities into regional rehabilitative facilities for high-risk, high-need offenders to be leased to and run by the counties. (cid:137) Provide counties with sustained, dedicated funding to establish programs and services for regional facilities. (cid:137) As regional facilities become fully operational, the state should: (cid:57) Eliminate state juvenile justice operations, including facilities, programs and parole and the Youthful Offender Parole Board. All juvenile offender release decisions should be made by presiding juvenile court judges. (cid:57) Provide guidance and oversight of the regional juvenile facilities and administer dedicated funding to counties to manage the regional juvenile offender programs and services tied to performance-based outcomes. xi LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION xii JUVENILE JUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA Juvenile Justice in California O n any given day, more than 100,000 youth are under some form of supervision in the juvenile justice system in California.13 Responses to juvenile crime in California are divided between state and local governments, with county probation carrying the heaviest workload, supervising more than 95 percent of all youth that enter the juvenile justice system. The state supervises a smaller, but much more serious, violent and older juvenile offender population.14 Youth follow varied paths into the juvenile justice system. Most are under 18 years old, have committed a misdemeanor or felony crime and have been arrested by local law enforcement. The continuum of responses to juvenile crime includes everything from releasing a youth to family to informal or formal probation; placement in a group home or residential treatment facility; confinement in a juvenile camp or ranch; or, in more serious and violent cases, commitment to a state juvenile facility. Additionally, for the most serious cases, charges can be filed in an adult court, which could lead to a prison sentence. Generally, law enforcement and probation have more flexibility in determining responses for lower level felony and misdemeanor offenses as well as status offenses. “Status offenses,” or activities that are considered an offense because the offender is a minor, include truancy, running away from home, curfew violations and incorrigibility.15 Youth committing status offenses most likely receive intervention services that do not lead to an out-of-home placement immediately. At the other end of the spectrum, responses to the most serious and violent offenses are dictated more specifically by laws. Proposition 21: The Juvenile Crime Initiative, passed with the support of 62 percent of voters in 2000, requires an adult trial for juveniles 14 or older who are charged with murder or specific sex offenses. Additionally, the law gives prosecutors the option to move a juvenile case to adult court for certain other serious crimes, an action often referred to as a “direct file.” For lower level crimes not covered by Proposition 21, prosecutors can request a fitness hearing to determine whether a youth offender should be tried in juvenile or adult court with a judge making the decision. Of all the youth referred to probation in recent years, less than one-third become a ward of the court. Of these, more than half are supervised on 1 LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION probation but are placed in their own home or with a relative. Most of the rest are committed by the court to a county facility, with a small fraction committed to a state facility.16 Continuum of Responses to Youth Crime A continuum of graduated responses to juvenile crime is not uniformly available statewide. The most common county-level intervention is community supervision. This typically is prescribed for lower-level offenses when the home environment is fairly stable. It may include participation in short-term programs or counseling, community service or restitution or regular probation supervision. More serious youth offenders may be placed on intensive supervision, which may include day reporting or day treatment, participation in drug or mental health courts, house arrest or short-term detention. Rise and Fall of California Juvenile Justice California once was the national model for juvenile justice. The Legislature adopted the Youth Corrections Authority Act in 1941, essentially creating what was until recently known as the California Youth Authority (CYA). Lawmakers at the time recognized that youth offenders were different from adult offenders and should be housed separately. Youth corrections put the emphasis on education and rehabilitation. From the 1940s to the 1970s, the authority rose to national prominence for its programs, research and effectiveness in helping youth offenders turn their lives around. During this period, the CYA was led by three directors. Multiple factors together with the cumulative impact of many isolated decisions since the 1970s, led to a dramatic decline in the state’s juvenile justice system, culminating in a 2003 lawsuit alleging illegal and inhumane conditions. Where leadership once had been stable, turnover became the rule. Since 1976, there have been a dozen directors – six during the 1990s – many with backgrounds in local law enforcement or state bureaucracy, not rehabilitation of juvenile offenders. Outside factors influenced the CYA decline as well. The 1990s gave rise to the criminalization of what once was considered youthful misbehavior. Influential experts coined such terms as “super-predators” and predicted a new breed of “severely morally impoverished” youth would flood the country as the teenage population grew rapidly. Despite the hysteria, and the new laws that came with it adding stiffer penalties for a broad range of youthful misconduct, the youth crime wave never materialized and juvenile arrests decreased dramatically. Yet, 47 states passed laws making it easier to try children as adults, resulting in harsher, more punitive outcomes. In California, voters adopted Proposition 21 in 2000, which made prosecution of youth as young as 14 in an adult court mandatory for certain offenses and gave prosecutors the flexibility to directly file charges in adult court against juvenile offenders for other specified crimes. Within the CYA, some subtle and not-so-subtle changes occurred, with correctional officers – who once wore civilian clothing – now uniformed and armed with pepper spray and tear gas. The focus moved toward custody and use of force to control wards, and away from education and rehabilitative programs. Conditions inside state facilities deteriorated and were marked by unprecedented levels of violence and lengthy facility lockdowns leading to suicides as youth were confined to their cells 23-hours a day, for months at a time. Youth considered dangerous were caged for educational programs. As judges became aware of the deplorable conditions, they committed fewer youth to state facilities. Pressured by lawsuits and reports from its own experts, the state acknowledged the need to reform and re-emphasize rehabilitation. Reforms, stipulated in a consent decree, are now slowly being implemented. Sources: Barry Krisberg, Ph.D., President, National Council of Crime & Delinquency. October 22-23, 2007. “Current State of California’s Youth Corrections.” Presentation at Critical Juncture – Innovative Solutions for Addressing the Impact of Youth and Adult Incarceration in Our Communities.” Also, Barry Krisberg, Ph.D., December 23, 2003. General Corrections Review of the California Youth Authority. Also, CDCR Web site: About the DJJ – History. http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Divisions_Boards/DJJ/About_DJJ/History.html. Also, John J. DiIulio. November 27, 1995. “The Coming of the Super-Predators.” The Weekly Standard. 2 JUVENILE JUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA For youth offenders who pose a greater risk, present a higher need for services or who have failed with less intensive supervision, a judge may order placement outside the home. Community-based placement includes foster care or group homes and unlocked facilities that provide such services as mental health or substance abuse treatment. Nearly half of all California counties have camps or ranches for more serious juvenile offenders that provide educational and vocational programs Involvement in State & Local Juvenile Justice Interventions Youth Offenders Statewide Proportions Interventions Involved (Percent of Total Count) PROBATION SUPERVISION Early Intervention 14,207 13.1% Regular 57,210 52.8% Intensive 9,861 9.1% Aftercare 7,298 6.7% OUT-OF-HOME PLACEMENT All Placement 3,977 3.7% Foster Care (408) Group Homes – RCL 11 or less (1,389) Group Homes – RCL 12 or more (2,110) COUNTY DETENTION All Detention 6,375 5.9% Pre-disposition (4,051) Ordered Confinement (853) Post-disposition (1,267) Camps, Ranches, Other Residential 3,991 3.7% STATE LEVEL Juvenile Facilities 2,390 2.2% Juvenile Parole Supervision 2,708 2.5% YOUTH IN ADULT SYSTEM Adult Prison / INS / Other 315 0.3% TOTAL COUNT 108,332 100.0% Note: The data in this table capture a point-in-time count of California’s juvenile justice population based on surveys distributed from April through October 2006. Involvement in the various levels, particularly at the state level, may have diminished due to the changes introduced in SB 81. Group home rate classification levels, or RCLs, are used to rate all group homes based on a 14-point scale that compares the level of care and services they provide. The higher the level of serves needed, the higher the RCL score. Sources: Karen Hennigan, et. al, University of Southern California Center for Research on Crime. April 18, 2007. “Juvenile Justice Data Project: Summary Report.” Los Angeles, CA. Pages 8-9 and 36. Also, California Department of Social Services. “Overview of the Group Home Rate Classification Levels.” http://www.childsworld.ca.gov/Res/pdf/OverviewClassificationLvls.pdf. Accessed June 19, 2008. 3 LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION often in a rural setting. Counties that do not operate camps or ranches can contract for bed space from counties that have these facilities and programs. Solano and Colusa counties, for example, operate the Fouts Springs Youth Facility under a joint powers agreement, which not only provides educational and vocational programs in a rural camp setting for youth offenders from those counties but also for youth from neighboring counties that contract for bed space.17 All but a few counties in California operate juvenile halls, which are designed for short-term stays, typically for pre-disposition youth or post- disposition youth awaiting placement in a camp, ranch or group home. Additionally, judges sometimes order short-term or weekend-only confinement in a juvenile hall as a sanction. Juvenile halls provide educational services but are not designed for long-term commitments and often lack adequate counseling, mental health or drug treatment programs. The most extreme response to youth crime is a commitment to a state facility. Youth sent to state facilities are the most serious and violent offenders as well as those with high needs – such as severe mental health issues – that counties cannot serve. Until the 2007 realignment legislation was enacted, lower-level offenders who either had failed locally based, less restrictive programs or came from counties that did not have a broad continuum of responses also were sent to the state. Shift in State Juvenile Offender Population The youth offender population in state facilities has fallen 80 percent to less than 2,000 from more than 10,000 youth in 1996 as a result of policy changes, an overall decline in youth crime rates as well as a growing body of evidence that revealed that state facilities were overly violent and not adequately providing legally required educational and rehabilitative services.18 Policy changes. In an effort to discourage counties from sending the state low-level, non-violent offenders, in 1996, the Legislature changed state policy by raising the cost to counties to send offenders to state facilities. Previously, counties paid the state $25 a month for each youth sent to a state facility. The 1996 law raised the monthly fee to $150 for the most serious offenders and implemented an inverse sliding scale for the others, requiring counties to pay from 50 to 100 percent of the actual cost of confinement, the higher fees assigned to the least serious offenders.19 In July 2003, the Legislature raised the minimum monthly fee to $176 and set the maximum annual cost at $36,504 for the least serious offenders. Future increases in costs were tied to increases in the 4 JUVENILE JUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA California Consumer Price Index.20 Additionally, as a means of counterbalancing the expanded punitive measurers implemented through Proposition 21, state lawmakers enacted the Schiff-Cardenas Crime Prevention Act of 2000, later renamed the Juvenile Justice Crime Prevention Act, which provided a significant boost in money for county probation departments to expand and enhance juvenile crime prevention and intervention tactics to further reduce commitments to state facilities.21 Declining arrests. Another major factor contributing to the decline in the youth offender population has been the overall decrease in juvenile arrests. From 1997 to 2006, youth felony arrests fell 21 percent in California to 65,189 from 82,748. The decline has been steady since the late 1990s, though the past few years have seen a slight increase in juvenile arrests. However, even with the increase, arrests are still significantly lower than a decade ago even as the state’s overall population of youth ages 10-17 swelled to 4.5 million from 3.8 million. The percentage of felony arrests for violent offenses has remained stable over this time period, at a rate of 26 percent of all juvenile felony arrests. Property offenses, on the other hand, have declined to 39 percent of all juvenile felony offenses from 51 percent.22 The Farrell Lawsuit and the Fiscal Effect of Compliance In 2003, the Prison Law Office filed a lawsuit on behalf of Margaret Farrell alleging that the state’s treatment of youth offenders was illegal and inhumane. The lawsuit alleged violations in six areas: education, medical treatment, access for wards with disabilities, sex offender treatment, mental health treatment and overall safety and welfare. The California attorney general responded to the allegations by hiring independent experts to investigate. The experts found unprecedented levels of violence, substantial use of force by correctional officers against wards and a lack of educational and counseling programs. In some instances, youth offenders were locked up 23 hours a day for months at a time.23 As juvenile court judges became aware of the deplorable conditions, they sent fewer youth offenders to state facilities. In response to the lawsuit and the experts’ findings, in November 2004, state officials signed a consent decree agreeing to reform what was then called the California Youth Authority to bring its practices into compliance with state and federal laws. As part of the Farrell consent decree, the state agreed to oversight by a court-appointed special master and to develop remedial plans to address the six problem areas. The state’s plans outlined hundreds of steps to reduce the culture of violence in the state facilities, to significantly expand programs and to increase staff to ward ratios. Although plaintiffs 5 LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION in the Farrell lawsuit alleged the state “has demonstrated a long- standing, severe and damaging inability to comply with court orders,” the state has continued to expand programs and staff, increasing the budget for youth offender programs and services, even as the population of youth offenders continues to decline.24 By the time lawmakers were negotiating the 2007-08 budget, the annual costs for each ward in a state facility had soared to $218,000.25 As the youth population continues to fall, costs per ward for 2008-09 are projected to rise to $252,000.26 The escalating costs significantly influenced policy-makers’ decision to enact the realignment as part of 2007’s summer budget negotiations. According to advocates involved with negotiating the realignment, lawmakers concluded California could not afford to comply with the Farrell consent decree and took steps to cut the population at the state level in an attempt to contain and reduce the escalating costs. $252,000 $200,000 $218,000 $178,000 $150,000 $100,000 $115,000 $92,545 $83,223 $50,000 $63,961 $56,247 $49,111 $36,118$39,425$40,528$43,565 $0 Realignment Legislation The decline in the state youth population culminated with the August 2007 passage of juvenile justice realignment legislation through a budget 6 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 California Division of Juvenile Facilities Institutional Cost per Ward per Year: 1996 – 2008 Farrell consent decree Sources: David Steinhart, Director, Commonweal Juvenile Justice Program. October 26, 2007. Conference presentation. Juvenile Justice Reform: Forty Years After Gault. Berkeley Law School Criminal Justice Center. Also, the 2008 figures are based on projections from the Governor’s Budget 2008-09, January 2008. JUVENILE JUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA trailer bill, SB 81, and a subsequent clean-up bill, AB 191. This codified a historic policy 707(b) Offenses Defined reform that had been advocated for years by SB 81, the realignment legislation, prevents counties experts and oversight panels, including the from sending youth offenders to a state facility unless Little Hoover Commission. SB 81 prevents they have committed an offense listed in section 707(b) counties from sending all but the most serious of the California Welfare & Institutions Code. AB 191, and violent offenders and certain classes of sex which further clarified SB 81, added sex offenses in Penal Code 290 (d)(3) to the list of offenses that offenders to the state, and at the same time, counties could commit a youth offender to a state provides grant money for counties to use for facility. In general, 707(b) offenses are the most programs and services for youth that no longer serious and violent offenses, including murder, rape, can be sent to the state. kidnapping, serious assaults, robbery, armed carjacking, drive-by shootings and arson. A complete SB 81 prohibits counties from committing list of all the offenses that can lead to commitment to a state juvenile facility is included as Appendix B. youth offenders to the state for any offense not listed in Welfare and Institutions Code section While a significant portion of wards sent to state 707(b) – the list of serious crimes that make facilities prior to realignment had committed 707(b) offenses, nearly 20 percent of the current ward youth eligible for trial in the adult system or population committed non 707(b) offenses, primarily for sex offenses listed in Penal Code section burglary or theft, auto theft or drug crimes. 290 (d)(3).27 Additionally, the bill established Sources: California Welfare and Institutions Code Sections 707 (b), the Youthful Offender Block Grant Program to 731 and 1731.5. Penal Code Section 290(d)(3). Penal Code Section provide counties with money for programs and 290(d)(3) was deleted by Senate Bill 172 (2007). Crimes listed in former Penal Code 290(d)(3) are now listed in Penal Code Section placement for youth who will no longer be 290.008(c). Also, California Department of Corrections and committed to state corrections facilities. Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice. September 2007. “Characteristics of Population.” Under SB 81, county probation departments became responsible for non 707(b) youth offenders released from state facilities after September 1, 2007. Another change: non 707(b) youth offenders under state parole supervision prior to September 1, 2007 who violate a condition of parole cannot be returned to a state facility and instead are turned over to county probation officials. Counties also have the option of recalling youths on an individual basis from state facilities who were not committed under a 707(b) offense. As of May 2008, six counties had recalled a total of 14 youth offenders and 370 youth offenders were eligible for recall.28 Youthful Offender Block Grant The Youthful Offender Block Grant (YOBG) provides money to counties to “enhance the capacity of county probation, mental health, drug and alcohol, and other county departments to provide appropriate rehabilitative and supervision services” for the youthful offenders who become the responsibility of the county under SB 81.29 7 LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION The state released approximately $23 million to county supervisors in September 2007 for the 2007-08 fiscal year. The grants will grow to $93 million by 2010-11 as the number of youth under county supervision grows and the population remaining in state facilities continues to decline.30 The total state grant amount is calculated by the Department of Finance, which determines the average daily state ward and parole violator population who, if not for the 2007 law, would have been in a state facility. This average daily population is multiplied by $117,000. The total state grant amount also includes the average daily population of wards released to county supervision who previously would have been supervised by state parole staff. This average daily population is multiplied by $15,000. Out of this grant amount, counties are allocated money by formula, with 50 percent of the award based on the total county population of juveniles aged 10 to 17. The remaining 50 percent is based on the number of felony juvenile court dispositions reported to the Department of Justice in the prior year. All counties receive a minimum of $58,500.31 Relief from the sliding scale fees adds additional value for counties. The grant formula was devised so that counties such as Orange, San Luis Obispo, Santa Cruz, San Francisco and others that previously had opted to send fewer offenders to state facilities would not be penalized for their earlier efforts to expand local services.32 Juvenile Justice Development Plans The realignment legislation required counties to submit a Juvenile Justice Development Plan for youthful offenders to the Corrections Standards Authority (CSA) by January 1, 2008. By statute, each plan had to include three elements: (cid:57) A description of the programs, placements, services or strategies to be funded by the Youthful Offender Block Grant allocation. (cid:57) A description of any regional agreements or arrangements to be supported by the block grant allocation. (cid:57) A description of how these new programs would coordinate with Juvenile Justice Crime Prevention Act (JJCPA) block grant funding.33 The CSA developed a grant application to standardize how counties reported their plans. Counties were asked to specify, in both a narrative and budgetary form, how they would spend the YOBG money for each of seven possible uses identified in SB 81. The application also provided an 8 JUVENILE JUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA option for counties to describe if and how they would use the grant money for programs or Youthful Offender Block Grant Options services outside the scope of the options listed Senate Bill 81 specified that counties could allocate in the legislation. Youthful Offender Block Grants for the following purposes: The county plans are as diverse as the A. Risk and needs assessment tools and evaluations to assist in the identification of appropriate counties themselves. In general, larger youthful offender dispositions and re-entry plans. counties spread the money across a number of B. Placements in secure and semi-secure youthful the use categories, while smaller counties offender rehabilitative facilities and in private focused spending on fewer categories. A residential care programs, with or without foster significant number of counties are using the care waivers, supporting specialized programs for grant money to implement risk and needs youthful offenders. assessment tools. C. Nonresidential dispositions such as day or evening treatment programs, community service, While witnesses who testified before the restitution, and drug-alcohol and other Commission indicated that there was a counseling programs based on an offender’s assessed risks and needs. significant need for regional partnerships, only nine of the 58 counties indicated that they D. House arrest, electronic monitoring, and intensive probation supervision programs. plan to use YOBG funds to establish or enhance joint ventures for programs and E. Re-entry and aftercare programs based on individual aftercare plans for each offender who placements. A number of counties lack is released from a public or private placement or juvenile detention or commitment facilities. confinement facility. Instead of building a local commitment facility, F. Capacity building strategies to upgrade the these counties have opted to enhance existing training and qualifications of juvenile justice and regional partnerships. Many counties lack probation personnel serving the juvenile justice services and programs to treat older and caseload. potentially more violent returnees. Some of G. Regional program and placement networks, these counties plan to lease additional bed including direct brokering and placement space from partner counties, while others said locating networks to facilitate out-of-county they planned to form new partnerships to fill dispositions for counties lacking programs or facilities. the gaps. H. Other programs, placements, services, or strategies to be funded by the block grant Nearly half of the counties have indicated that, allocation. in addition to spending in the seven categories identified in SB 81, they intend to use some of their block grant money to purchase “other programs, placements, services or strategies.”34 A spreadsheet detailing the total grant award to each county, the juvenile population, the number of youth returning from state facilities and the intended use of the grants by category is included as Appendix C. 9 LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION Youthful Offender Rehabilitative Facility Construction The realignment legislation included up to $100 million in lease revenue bond proceeds to pay for the expansion of local juvenile justice rehabilitation facilities. The bond revenue proceeds are to be disbursed through the CSA. The authority formed an executive steering committee to oversee the grant process. A draft request for proposals for the local Youthful Offender Rehabilitative Facilities Construction Funding Program was released for public comment in June 2008. Once CSA releases a final request for proposals, counties will have until January 2009 to submit proposals. The executive steering committee anticipates awards will be made at the March 2009 CSA meeting.35 The State’s Role in Juvenile Justice Although approximately 95 percent of juvenile offenders are under supervision at the county level, several state What’s In a Name: DJJ or DJF? agencies have roles in juvenile justice through programs and services for juvenile offenders The 2005 reorganization of the Youth and Adult spanning multiple departments and agencies, Correctional Agency into the California including the California Department of Corrections Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation created the Divisions of Juvenile Facilities, and Rehabilitation (CDCR), the Health & Human Programs and Parole reporting to a chief deputy Services Agency and the California Department of secretary of juvenile justice. Many commonly Education.36 Additionally, the California refer to these divisions as the division of Department of Justice is responsible for the juvenile justice or DJJ and this is how it is listed Juvenile Court and Probation Statistical System, on the CDCR Web site and on other official the state’s primary information system for juvenile documents. crime. While not the focus of this study, it is While the statutes that abolished the California important to note that there are many other Youth Authority in 2005 identified a chief juvenile crime prevention programs and services deputy secretary of juvenile justice, they do not refer to any division by that name. The that target youth spread across even more agencies reorganization legislation provided that all and departments, including such key entities as the references to the California Youth Authority in Department of Justice Crime and Violence the dozens of code sections that were not Prevention Center and the recently established amended as part of the legislation now refer to Governor’s Office on Gang and Youth Violence the CDCR Division of Juvenile Facilities. Policy. Within the CDCR, juvenile justice policy is Because the division of juvenile justice does not exist in the California code, in this report, the primarily informed by: the chief deputy secretary of Commission follows the Government Code and juvenile justice and the divisions overseen by the uses the Divisions of Juvenile Facilities, secretary; the Corrections Standards Authority Programs and Parole, except when quoting Planning and Programs Division; and, the Advisory sources that use “DJJ.” Committee on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Source: Kenneth G. Peterson, Presiding Juvenile Court Prevention. Additionally, the State Commission on Judge, Superior Court of California, County of Sacramento. February 28, 2008. Written testimony to the Commission. Juvenile Justice has a role in juvenile justice policy. Also, California Government Code section 12838, 12838.3 and 12838.5 and 1000. 10 JUVENILE JUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA CDCR chief deputy secretary of juvenile justice. Several divisions under the direction of the chief deputy secretary of juvenile justice within the CDCR have a role in juvenile justice. The Division of Juvenile Facilities and the Division of Juvenile Programs house and provide programs and services for approximately 2,000 youth offenders committed to state facilities. The Division of Juvenile Parole Operations provides supervision for 2,300 youth offenders who have been released from state facilities to parole.37 Under the realignment, state parole will now only supervise offenders released from state facilities who have committed a 707(b) offense. The Juvenile Parole Board also is overseen by the chief deputy secretary of juvenile justice. The board conducts hearings for juveniles in state facilities and determines when a juvenile offender is ready for release. Corrections Standards Authority Corrections Standards Authority. The Corrections Standards Authority (formerly the Board of The Corrections Standards Authority (formerly Corrections) is a 19-member board chaired by the the Board of Corrections) has 19 members: secretary of the CDCR with four additional CDCR (cid:57) Secretary of CDCR (serves as chair). representatives and 14 other members – primarily (cid:57) 4 CDCR officials who report to the local law enforcement officials – appointed by the secretary, one who must be a manager or governor. The CSA develops and maintains administrator of an adult prison and one standards for the construction and operation of who must be a manager or administrator of local jails and juvenile detention facilities and for a state juvenile facility. The other 14 the selection and training of state and local members are appointed by the governor, corrections personnel. The CSA also inspects local with advice from the CDCR secretary and with advice and consent of the Senate. adult and juvenile detention facilities and (cid:57) 2 sheriffs. administers facility construction grant programs. In addition, the CSA administers three major state (cid:57) 2 chief probation officers. juvenile justice grant programs – the Youthful (cid:57) 1 county supervisor or administrative officer. Offender Block Grant, the Juvenile Justice Crime Prevention Act and the Juvenile Probation and (cid:57) 1 administrator of a county detention facility. Camps Funding – as well as other smaller state (cid:57) 1 administrator of a community-based grant programs. The authority also administers correctional program. and oversees federal juvenile justice grants and is (cid:57) 2 public members, including one advised by the federally-required state advisory representing the interests of crime victims. group, the Advisory Committee on Juvenile Justice (cid:57) 1 representative of a community-based and Delinquency Prevention, whose responsibilities youth service organization. were added when the Legislature abolished the (cid:57) 4 rank and file members including a Office of Criminal Justice Planning (OCJP) in juvenile probation officer, a sheriff’s 2003.38 deputy, a parole officer and someone working in a state correctional facility. Source: California Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation, Corrections Standards Authority Web site. http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Divisions_Boards/CSA/Admin/About _us/CSA_Major_Duties_And_Responsibilities.html. 11 LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. The federal Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Act requires every state to form an advisory body in order to qualify for federal Delinquency Prevention & Intervention Program (Title II) grants. The Advisory State Commission on Juvenile Justice Committee on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (ACJJDP), an executive steering committee The purpose of the State Commission on Juvenile of the CSA, serves this purpose in California. Under Justice is “to provide comprehensive oversight, federal guidelines, the advisory committee must have planning and coordination of efforts, which enhance the partnership and performance of state at least 15 members appointed by the governor. In and local agencies in effectively preventing and California, the governor has delegated responsibility to responding to juvenile crime.” The Commission the secretary of CDCR for making recommendations includes 12 members: for committee appointments. Federal law requires the • Chief Deputy Secretary of Juvenile Justice, advisory committee to develop a three-year juvenile CDCR (Tri-chair). justice plan, focusing on core federal goals, and to review grant applications for the federal programs.39 • County representative, designated by the statewide organization representing counties (Tri-chair). State Commission on Juvenile Justice. Prior to the 2007 realignment legislation, the state had two • Chief probation officer, designated by the statewide chief probation officers juvenile justice advisory commissions, beyond the organization (Tri-chair). ACJJDP, that had existed mostly on paper. The most recent commission was established through the 2005 • County sheriff, designated by the statewide sheriffs association. legislation that enacted the CDCR reorganization, but it existed only in statutory code as commissioners had • Manager or administrator of a county local never been appointed. In 2007, SB 81 revived and detention facility for juveniles (appointed reconstituted the State Commission on Juvenile by the Governor). Justice. • Rank and file representative from state or local juvenile corrections (appointed by the SB 81 left the statutory purpose of the commission Speaker of the Assembly). intact: “to provide comprehensive oversight, planning, • Representative from a community-based and coordination efforts, which enhance the organization serving at-risk youth partnership and performance of state and local (appointed by Senate Rules Committee). agencies in effectively preventing and responding to • Crime victim advocate (appointed by the juvenile crime.”40 Speaker of the Assembly). • Juvenile court judge (appointed by the chair SB 81 slightly changed the membership of the of the Judicial Council). commission and reduced the number of members • Director of a county human services agency appointed by the governor and gave appointment (appointed by the statewide organization authority to organizations representing local representing county welfare directors). government officials. SB 81 also gave the commission • Attorney with expertise in juvenile justice a key role in the realignment. The commission was policy (appointed by Senate Rules charged with producing a statewide Juvenile Justice Committee). Operational Master Plan by January 1, 2009. A • Director of a county mental health agency, required interim report documenting the commission’s appointed by the statewide organization progress and initial strategies was due on May 1, representing county mental health directors. 2008 and was released to the Legislature in June Source: Welfare & Institutions Code 1798.5. 2008. 12 JUVENILE JUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA Other State Agencies with a Role in Juvenile Justice Health & Human Services Agency. The California Health & Human Services Agency provides grants and programs that can be used for services for juvenile offenders. The Department of Mental Health Services oversees Proposition 63: Mental Health Services Act grants that can be used to provide services to juvenile offenders. The Department of Social Services oversees group homes serving youth involved in either the juvenile dependency or delinquency systems. The Department of Health Services provides health care to eligible youth, through Medi-Cal or Healthy Families, though only to those youth who are not in a state or local detention facility. The Department of Alcohol and Drug Programs oversees state and federal grants that can be used for a variety of substance abuse treatment programs for youth, including programs in juvenile detention facilities, aftercare programs for youth released from detention facilities as well as for juvenile drug courts. California Department of Education. The Department of Education funds and sets education requirements for educational and some vocational programs provided to youth in state and local detention facilities. It also oversees various prevention programs for at-risk youth and early intervention programs for youth on informal probation or in diversion programs. California Department of Justice. The California Department of Justice (DOJ), Criminal Justice Statistics Center is charged with collecting juvenile justice data through the Juvenile Court and Probation Statistical System. Counties report juvenile arrest and disposition data to the Department of Justice, which collects and analyzes the data and publishes an annual report. Within DOJ, the Crime and Violence Prevention Center provides a clearinghouse for information on youth crime and violence prevention and provides training, technical assistance and tools for local communities. For the Juvenile Justice Operational Master Plan, the commission is to “develop and make available for implementation by the counties” a set of strategies for risk and needs assessment, juvenile justice data collection elements common to all counties and a continuum of evidence-based programs.41 Unless reauthorized by the Legislature, the commission sunsets on January 1, 2009. The commission was given $600,000 to hire consultants and experts to assist in carrying out its mission. It has met monthly since January 2008. Juvenile Justice Funding California currently spends nearly $1 billion annually on juvenile justice programs, services and supervision. The 2007-08 budget included approximately $580 million for state level juvenile justice operations, programs, health care and parole supervision. Beyond custody costs, when youth become wards of the state, the state is required to provide educational programs, adequate health and mental health care and other rehabilitative services. Out of the $580 million spent on state juvenile justice operations, more than $23 million was included for the Youthful Offender Block Grants that were distributed to the counties as part of the realignment. The estimated budget for state juvenile justice programs, services and supervision in 2008-09 will decline to $554 million due to 13 LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION the decrease in the population. Of this amount, $66 million will be allocated to counties as part of the new block grant program to pay for local programs and services.42 In 2007-08, the state allocated more than $340 million in additional money from the General Fund for other juvenile justice grant programs administered by the CSA to fund county juvenile probation programs: (cid:57) Juvenile Justice Crime Prevention Act (JJCPA) – $119 million. (cid:57) Juvenile Probation and Camps Funding (JPCF) – $201.4 million. (cid:57) Mentally Ill Offender Crime Reduction Program (MIOCR) – $22.3 million. The CSA also administers various federal programs for juvenile offenders that total approximately $14 million.43 State Budget and Budgeted Positions for Youth Offenders in Major Juvenile Justice Grant Programs State Facilities or on Pa role, FY 2007-08 (in millions) FY 2007-08 (in millions) Education, JJCPA Vocations and $119 Offender Programs Parole $205 $39 (1,583 positions) (171 positions) MIOCR JPCF Health Care $22.3 $201.4 Local Assistance - $123 YOBG (886 positions) $23.7 Op erations Total: $342.7 million $189 (1,290 positions) Total: $580 million Note: Operations includes juvenile security, support, facilities administration, reception and diagnosis and local assistance funds, which include the Youthful Offender Block Grant and transportation. Health Care includes medical, mental health and dental. Source: Governor’s Budget 2008-09. It is unclear how much money the state will provide counties for juvenile offenders as lawmakers wrangle with a budget shortfall estimated at $15 billion for 2008-09.44 The governor’s January budget proposed across the board cuts of 10 percent for all the state juvenile justice grant 14 JUVENILE JUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA programs – except the new Youthful Proposition 6: Criminal Penalties and Laws. Offender Block Grant. In the May Public Safety Funding. budget revision, the governor A November 2008 ballot initiative, if enacted by voters, maintained the 10 percent cuts.45 could significantly affect California’s 2007 juvenile justice Meanwhile, the Senate Budget realignment. Cited as the Safe Neighborhoods Act, the Subcommittee No. 4 in May 2008 measure re-writes a portion of the statutory code denied all of the approximately $340 established through the realignment legislation million in state-funded juvenile eliminating mental health, alcohol and drug treatment and offender grant programs, leaving only other departments from the list eligible for the new block grant funding and directing all funds toward probation, the new YOBG funding intact for the which would still have the option to contract with these 2008-09 budget.46 These cuts to other departments with the grant money for services. juvenile offender grant programs will The measure also permanently locks approximately $500 exceed what the new block grant adds. million annually to fund juvenile probation and other The Budget Conference Committee in local law enforcement efforts. The measure would July 2008 restored $281 million to the eliminate the uncertainty of this funding that local state-funded juvenile offender grant governments currently face, however, it also would programs, an amount close to that eliminate state control over this allocation and incentives proposed in the Governor’s 2008-09 for counties to achieve outcome measures. The 32-page initiative also includes numerous other changes including Budget.47 As of July 14, 2008, it was increasing penalties for various crimes that potentially not known if this would be the level of would expand the need for state facilities to incarcerate funding for these grants in 2008-09 as additional juvenile and adult offenders at a cost the the final budget bill had not approved Legislative Analyst estimates will be in the hundreds of by the Legislature. The May action, millions. The measure does not include new revenue to however, underscores the vulnerability pay for the expanded fiscal outlay. of local youth offender funding and the Sources: Full text of the ballot measure is available on the Secretary of uncertainty that complicates county State’s Web site: http://ag.ca.gov/cms_attachments/initiatives/pdfs/i765_07-0094_a1s.pdf. efforts to plan programs and services The Legislative Analyst’s Office fiscal analysis of the ballot measure is for youth offenders. available on the LAO Web site: http://www.lao.ca.gov/ballot/2007/070919.pdf. Proposition 6, a November 2008 ballot measure would permanently lock in money from the General Fund for local probation departments to pay for programs, services and supervision for juvenile offenders.48 The measure also would change the law established by SB 81, deleting “mental health, drug and alcohol and other county departments” from the list of agencies eligible for Youthful Offender Block Grant money, leaving probation as the only authorized grant recipient.49 This initiative also would permanently allocate additional money to local law enforcement and lengthen sentences for some offenders. The Legislative Analyst’s Office estimates the initiative, if enacted, would increase state outlays by a half billion dollars annually in dedicated funding to local law enforcement and potentially hundreds of millions of dollars more in increased state prison costs.50 Beyond the major grant programs, counties cobble together money to pay for programs and services for youth offenders from various other state 15 LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION and federal funding sources. A list of the major sources of funding is included as Appendix D. In addition to these and other programs, a small but significant percentage of the local juvenile probation budget comes from county general funds. Juvenile Population Remaining at the State Level Once realignment is fully implemented, the CDCR projects a steady population of less than 1,500 youth will remain in state facilities.51 Barring additional legislative changes, by 2012, CDCR estimates there will be 1,365 male and 62 female youth offenders in state facilities. The CDCR estimates that SB 81 will result in 230 to 240 fewer juvenile court admissions a year. The state will have 200 fewer parole violators in 2007-08 than in 2006-07, according to CDCR estimates, and this downward parole supervision and violation trend will continue as the state juvenile offender population declines. Also contributing to the decline is the projected decline in California’s overall juvenile population and the trend toward fewer juvenile arrests.52 Most of the 1,500 youth in state facilities will be committed by juvenile courts for 707(b) or sex offenses. Several hundred of the youth who will remain in state facilities were convicted in adult courts and ordered to serve time in a juvenile facility or housed in DJF through an interdepartmental agreement within the CDCR. The interdepartmental agreement primarily is used to ensure that youth convicted in adult courts receive legally required educational services, which are not widely available in adult prisons. Those with long or life sentences may serve their time at a youth facility until age 18, then graduate to an adult prison. With lower-level offenders no longer entering state juvenile facilities, the characteristics of the population remaining in state facilities is changing. Parole violators and offenders convicted of burglaries, thefts and drug crimes are shrinking as an overall percentage of the population, while the proportion of offenders convicted of assaults, robberies, homicides and sex offenses is increasing. Eventually, as all lower level offenders are released, the state will house only the most serious offenders.53 16 JUVENILE JUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA State Juvenile Justice Facilities Youth Offenders Remaining in DJF Currently, youth offenders are housed in six juvenile justice facilities and one camp As of March 2008, there were 2,077 youth in state juvenile facilities. Nearly 94 percent were committed by a juvenile operated by the CDCR’s Division of Juvenile court while the remaining six percent were committed by a Facilities. As a result of the realignment criminal court. Approximately 84 percent (1,642) of the legislation, the CDCR is in the process of youth offenders were first commitments, while 16 percent closing two youth facilities – the DeWitt were parole violators (330). Nelson Youth Facility in Stockton and El Paso de Robles Youth Correctional Facility Gender: Male 1,980 95.3% in Paso Robles. The remaining DJF facilities Female 97 4.7% are out of date and would require millions of dollars to be updated.54 Age: Under 18 440 13.6% In 1996, when the state juvenile offender 18-21 1,329 65.7% population peaked and facilities bulged 22 or older 308 14.8% beyond capacity, the state operated three Race/Ethnicity: additional detention facilities and three Hispanic 1,103 53.1% additional camps. As the juvenile offender African American 653 31.4% population declined, the state closed three White 243 11.7% facilities and three of four fire camps it Asian 38 1.8% operated in cooperation with the California Native American 18 .9% Other 22 1% Department of Forestry and Fire Protection. Commitment Offenses: Status of Closed Facilities Assault 659 31.7% Robbery 626 30.1% Other sex offenses 244 11.7% Of the various closed youth facilities, only Burglary 180 8.7% one has a new use. The Northern Youth Homicide 109 5.2% Correctional Center and Clinic in Other offenses 61 2.9% Sacramento, was transferred to nearby Rape 55 2.6% California State University, Sacramento, Auto theft 38 1.8% Theft (except auto) 30 1.4% which demolished unusable structures and Narcotics and drugs 30 1.4% plans to use the land to develop affordable Kidnap/extortion 27 1.3% housing for faculty and students. The Arson 18 .9% Department of General Services listed the Total 2,077 99.7% 75-acre Fred C. Nelles Youth Correctional Elsewhere in the report we cite the DJF population at 1,896 Facility in Whittier for sale and received 13 as of June 2008. As of publication, a detailed demographic purchase offers.55 While a sale to the city of breakdown is not yet available to reflect the smaller June Whittier was pending in 2006, the CDCR 2008 population. requested that the Department of General Source: California Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation, Division Services pull the property off the market in of Juvenile Justice. March 2008. “Characteristics of Population.” Also, order to re-evaluate all CDCR properties in CDCR. Monthly Population Report. June 30, 2008. response to the governor’s corrections proposals to add more prison beds.56 17 LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION The state has proposed converting El Paso de Robles into an adult facility, housing lower-level offenders age 50 and older and adding an adult offender fire camp. The state held local public meetings to present these ideas and gain feedback in April 2008. Such a conversion could help ease overcrowding in adult facilities and allow the state to avoid spending some of the money the Legislature and governor previously authorized in 2007 through AB 900 to expand the adult system. Constructing a re-entry facility on the property also has been discussed. Comparison of Youth Offenders in State Facilities 1996, August 2007 and June 2008 Year Design Population Population Population Facility Opened Capacity 1996 8-31-07 5-31-08 Preston Youth Correctional Facility (Ione) 1950 720 968 365 368 Northern California Youth Correctional Center (Stockton): DeWitt Nelson Youth Correctional Facility* 1967 433 633 303 0 O.H. Close Youth Correctional Facility 1966 379 545 232 195 N.A. Chaderjian Youth Correctional Facility 1991 600 967 225 211 Karl Holton (Closed 2003) 1968 388 524 0 0 Paso de Robles Youth Correctional Facility (Paso Robles)* 1953 690 911 176 0 Fred C. Nelles Youth Correctional Facility (Whittier) 1945 650 948 0 0 (Closed 2004) Ventura Youth Correctional Facility (Camarillo) (Female) 1962 295 377 129 86 Ventura Youth Correctional Facility (Camarillo) (Male) 1962 381 468 74 171 Heman G. Stark Youth Correctional Facility (Chino) 1959 1,200 2,024 689 524 Southern Youth Correctional Reception Center and 1954 350 210 258 Clinic (Norwalk) Pine Grove Youth Conservation Camp (Pine Grove) 1980 80 77 83 Conservation Camps (total for all 4) 483 (3 camps closed 2004/2005) Total 6,166 10,112 2,480 1,896 *Scheduled for closure July 2008. The Northern Youth Correctional Center and Clinic in Sacramento is not included as the facility no longer exists and the land is now owned by the California State University system. Facilities shown in italics are either closed or scheduled to be closed. Sources: Legislative Analyst’s Office. May 2004. “A Review of the California Youth Authority’s Infrastructure.” Also, CDCR. 2004. “A Comparison of the Youth Authority’s Institution and Parole Populations, June 30, 1995 through June 30, 2004.” This annual report does not provide data on wards in the north or south reception center for 1996. These wards are included in the count of other facilities. Also, CDCR. Monthly Population Reports as of August 31, 2007 and June 30, 2008. 18 JUVENILE JUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA A facilities master plan detailing the CDCR’s future plans for youth facilities is long overdue.57 At one time, state officials told the Commission that a plan was under consideration to demolish the shuttered Karl Holton Youth Correctional Drug and Alcohol Treatment Facility at the Stockton youth complex and replace it with a new prototype facility designed for youth rehabilitation. Additionally, the court-appointed receiver for adult inmate health care reportedly is considering building a hospital for adult offenders at the Ventura Youth Correctional Facility, which potentially would result in the closure of the youth facility.58 The receiver also has proposed razing the Karl Holton Youth Facility to build an adult inmate medical facility.59 19 LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION 20 REALIGNMENT LEADERSHIP AND OVERSIGHT Realignment Leadership and Oversight Despite nearly a billion in outlays for the various agencies, commissions and committees involved in juvenile justice programs and services and grants to local government, the state requires little accountability as to how this money is spent or what goals are expected, much less achieved. Through realignment, an increasing portion of the billion dollar budget is going directly to counties with even less state oversight. No state entity has been given the mission or authority to provide overall leadership to guide program development or to oversee how public money is spent. The shift in population from state facilities to county supervision began in the late 1990s. Lawmakers enacted fiscal policies to deter counties from sending youth to state facilities. Courts lost faith in the state’s ability to carry out its mission of rehabilitating youth offenders and kept more offenders under local supervision. Still, the present realignment is historic in two ways. First, the state specifies in law which offenders can be sent to state facilities, and more important, the state dedicates money to counties to develop programs and services for youth who are no longer sent to the state. Youth advocates and expert panels, including the Little Hoover Commission, long had recommended that the state provide expanded resources for counties to expand their role providing programs and services for youth offenders. Over the past decades, costs for the state system had spiraled upward – particularly in attempting to comply with the Farrell consent decree – and counties were proving to be more capable of providing effective programs and services for youth. Despite initial snags resulting from the abrupt implementation requirement – the law was signed by the governor August 24, 2007 and became effective September 1, 2007 – most experts and advocates agree realignment was the right thing to do. However, many said important improvements can be made to the realignment legislation to ensure ongoing success. Weak State Leadership Structure The realignment legislation transferred responsibility to counties to supervise higher risk and higher need youth offenders and provided a 21 LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION significant new funding source to accomplish this difficult task. At the time, however, lawmakers did not designate any entity at the state level to provide overall leadership and guidance to ensure that a continuum of proven responses to juvenile crime is consistently available statewide. The structural leadership vacuum is not new. The Commission, in its 1994 review of juvenile crime as well as in its 2005 assessment of the governor’s plan to reorganize corrections, identified the lack of a focal point at the state level to provide juvenile justice leadership as a serious problem.60 It recommended the state establish a mechanism to ensure an integrated state and local continuum of juvenile justice programs and services. This did not happen and remains a weakness. Legislative budget consultants who negotiated the details of SB 81 told the Commission that the law was written to prevent the state from micromanaging how counties spent their block grant allocations and to provide counties flexibility in spending decisions.61 Youth advocates have expressed concerns that the new money will not be spent on programs and services for the intended population, and as time passes, memories in Sacramento will fade, and it will become less clear to lawmakers why a separate, dedicated fund exists for offenders “who used to go” to state facilities. County officials and advocates said that the realignment only will be successful if funding is maintained, the money is spent wisely and counties are held accountable for outcomes. While many counties outperform the state in providing effective programs and services to youth offenders, some counties – particularly those that formerly relied most heavily on state juvenile facilities – have not demonstrated the capacity to establish effective local programs for juvenile offenders. Disparities between counties are well-documented. Some counties, such as San Francisco, Orange, San Diego and Santa Cruz, historically committed very few youth to state facilities, while other counties, including Monterey, San Bernardino and Riverside, have sent a high number of juveniles to state facilities.62 There are reasons for this disparity. Santa Cruz and Orange County, for example, have invested time, money and resources for programs and local interventions. Both counties have made a significant effort to get various partners – including mental health, alcohol and drug programs and education as well as probation – to work together. Those counties that sent more youth to state facilities chose not to invest in local programs and services and are ill-prepared to do so now. Youth advocates fear that without state guidance and oversight, some counties simply will expand juvenile hall space, rather than invest in mental health, substance abuse, education or other interventions that have proven effective in turning young lives around. 22 REALIGNMENT LEADERSHIP AND OVERSIGHT Orange County Juvenile Justice Continuum Orange County provides a model from which the state and other California counties can learn. As part of this review, the Commission’s subcommittee met with Orange County officials that provide services for youth offenders and toured some of the facilities serving the most serious and highest need youth offenders. Orange County officials across and throughout departments expressed a clear sense of mission that the goal is “helping kids.” The system emphasizes collaborative efforts between the courts, juvenile probation, education, mental health and law enforcement in addition to partnerships with community-based organizations. This partnership is reinforced by the Orange County juvenile court, which has authorized multidisciplinary departments to share information. The continuum of programs and services includes a secure juvenile hall for pre-disposition youth offenders and those who have been committed to a facility or program and are awaiting placement, as well as a 120-bed non-secure facility, the Youth Leadership Academy, which provides a residential program for youth offenders with mental health services. Orange County also runs a Youth Guidance Center, an unlocked facility with space for 125 youth. Youth live in housing units with up to 25 other offenders, with one housing unit dedicated for young women. In addition to attending high school, youth participate in various counseling and substance abuse treatment programs. Orange County also has two camps in rural settings and a secure housing facility for the most serious offenders – those who will be charged as adults – in a module of the adult jail facility. Beyond facilities and programs for high-risk, high-need youth offenders, Orange County also is known for its early intervention programs, particularly its “8% Early Intervention Program.” Various studies of Orange County youth offenders revealed that a small number of youth offenders (8 percent) in the county are responsible for more than half of all repeat crime offenses. To target this small, but high-risk youth offender population, Orange County combined local resources from various departments with state grants to implement the “8% program” which provides various services for these youth and their families. An assessment of the program showed numerous outcome improvements in the youth participating in the program versus a control group. The knowledge gained has been used to assist other counties and also changed Orange County’s overall approach to juvenile offender supervision. Sources: Commission site visit to Orange County. November 29, 2007. Also, Orange County Probation Department. September 2002. Repeat Offender Prevention Project – 8% Early Intervention Project.” Also, Superior Court of California, County of Orange. December 21, 2001. “Authorization for the Sharing of Information Through Orange County Multidisciplinary Teams.” Witnesses identified the structural leadership void as the biggest obstacle to successful realignment implementation. They elaborated that the lack of leadership is not an indictment of state juvenile justice officials or departments, but rather policy-makers’ reluctance to identify and authorize an entity to provide statewide leadership over juvenile justice policy and how state dollars are spent at the state and local level. Even among those with direct connections to juvenile justice, none have definitive leadership over the system. Some entities have partial oversight, others have overlapping areas of responsibility but none provide overall leadership. These include: (cid:57) CDCR Chief Deputy Secretary of Juvenile Justice and the Division of Juvenile Facilities, the Division of Juvenile Programs and the Division of Juvenile Parole Operations. (cid:57) State Commission on Juvenile Justice. (cid:57) CDCR Corrections Standards Authority. 23 LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION (cid:57) Advisory Committee on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. CDCR Chief Deputy Secretary of Juvenile Justice. The CDCR chief deputy secretary of juvenile justice manages the Division of Juvenile Facilities, Division of Juvenile Programs and Division of Juvenile Parole Operations. California code authorizes these divisions to operate and manage facilities housing youthful offenders, provide comprehensive programs and rehabilitative services and to supervise re-entry into the community.63 But the mission of the divisions focuses on the wards under state supervision, not providing leadership or oversight to ensure a statewide continuum of responses for youth offenders, most of which are supervised at the local level. Witnesses told the Commission the chief deputy secretary is committed to moving forward on the reforms required by the Farrell consent decree. The experts hired to assist the state in developing the remedial plans for the Farrell lawsuit highlighted the competency of the staff in a March 2006 report: “the Division of Juvenile Justice has many good people working for it – hard working, dedicated, and well-meaning. The current leadership is professional, knowledgeable and committed to reform.”64 County officials told the Commission that the state’s juvenile justice divisions are working cooperatively with county probation staff to ensure successful transition of offenders released from state facilities to county courts and probation. Beyond facilitating a smooth transition, however, the chief deputy secretary of juvenile justice and the juvenile divisions within CDCR do not have the responsibility nor the authority to lead or oversee the realignment implementation. State Commission on Juvenile Justice. Lawmakers involved with the realignment legislation recognized and responded to the lack of leadership in California’s juvenile justice system by reviving and reconstituting the State Commission on Juvenile Justice and giving it an important, if temporary, role in the realignment effort. Under SB 81, the 12-member commission is required to produce a statewide Juvenile Justice Operational Master Plan by January 1, 2009 to include a set of strategies for risk and needs assessment, juvenile justice data collection elements common to all counties, and a continuum of evidence-based programs.65 An interim report documenting the commission’s progress and strategies it has identified was due May 1, 2008. The report was submitted to the governor’s office, although such review is not required in the statute; there is only one state official serving on the commission; and, only one of the 11 other members is a governor appointee. The interim report was submitted to the Legislature in June 2008. 24 REALIGNMENT LEADERSHIP AND OVERSIGHT While the commission has potential it also has shortcomings Missed Opportunity to Lead that may prevent it from filling the leadership and oversight Many counties plan to use Youthful roles envisioned for it: Offender Block Grant money to (cid:57) The commission sunsets on January 1, 2009. implement risk and needs assessment tools. In its April 2007 report, the (cid:57) It has no dedicated staff. Juvenile Justice Data Project found that of 55 California counties participating in (cid:57) Not all commissioners were appointed promptly. One a survey, 26 counties had no risk appointment, designated for a victim’s rights assessment tool and 9 others used a risk advocate, had not been made as of June 2008. assessment tool that had not been validated. Researchers have found that (cid:57) Some stakeholders, including district attorneys, youth placed inappropriately can lead to public defenders and education officials, are not more crime, instead of less. The report represented on the commission. found that “this is an area where a large part of the California juvenile justice The commission was given $600,000 in 2007-08 to hire system is currently not taking advantage consultants to assist in fulfilling its central mission of of the best practices available. Supporting counties in their efforts to developing the operational master plan. The commission select and adopt a valid risk assessment began meeting monthly in January 2008 and appears to be tool and to train staff to use it is a on track to meet its final report deadline. It is not clear, necessary and critical goal if the system however, whether the commission will live up to the broader is to take advantage of evidence-based mission originally envisioned by the Legislature – providing practices in juvenile justice intervention oversight, planning and coordination among state and local to improve outcomes for juveniles in the state.” agencies that respond to juvenile crime. In May 2008, Senate Budget Subcommittee No. 4 adopted budget language to While it is a step in the right direction for extend the life of the commission through January 2010. As counties to implement assessment tools, it also marks a missed opportunity for the of July 2008, this was still under consideration by the state to lead by providing guidance and Legislature. technical support. DJF is currently implementing a risk and needs CDCR Corrections Standards Authority. The Legislature gave assessment tool for juvenile offenders. the CSA some oversight authority for the Youthful Offender Before counties independently adopt and Block Grant and CSA staff have shown the capacity for implement assessment tools, the state could have guided counties to ensure leadership beyond what was identified in the realignment future compatibility. The State legislation in managing the first year of the block grant. The Commission on Juvenile Justice has been CSA also is responsible for developing the request for tasked with providing guidance on a risk proposals for the Local Youthful Offender Rehabilitative and needs assessment tool in its report Facilities Construction Program grants and will evaluate the due January 1, 2009. This may be too responses and award the grants. The executive director of late to influence counties using their 2007-08 block grants to implement these the CSA indicated the authority would have a limited role in tools. oversight of the realignment implementation beyond review and approval of the county plans submitted as part of the Sources: County Juvenile Justice Development Plans. Also, Juvenile Justice Data Project. April first year of the grant process. In written testimony to the 2007. “Phase 1: Survey of Interventions and Commission, the executive director wrote that “the only Programs – A Continuum of Graduated Responses for Juvenile Justice in California. potential oversight role CSA has once the plans are approved is the monitoring and/or inspection of facilities or programs. CSA assumes that any services or facilities provided or obtained through use of the block grant funds should match what was specified in each 25 LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION county’s respective plans, however this is not actually spelled out in the legislation. Again, CSA’s oversight is only authorized and NOT required and will unlikely be implemented without additional resources.”66 While the CSA has proven adept at grant management, it also has been sued for lax oversight of juvenile facilities and does not have the mission or the authority to provide statewide juvenile justice leadership.67 Advisory Committee on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. The state established the Advisory Committee on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (ACJJDP), an executive steering committee of the CSA, to fulfill a requirement of the federal Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Act. As part of its federal mandate, it develops a three-year juvenile justice plan prescribed by federal requirements. Federal rules require all ACJJDP members to be appointed by the governor. Federal rules also dictate the make-up of the 15 member committee, the focus of the three-year plan and the role of the committee in oversight and distribution of federal juvenile justice grants. In contrast, the State Commission on Juvenile Justice members are appointed by both the governor and the Legislature and state not federal lawmakers determined the make-up and the role of California Department of Justice the commission. Through the realignment, lawmakers could have expanded the role of the The California Department of Justice collects ACJJDP to develop the Juvenile Justice Operational county data on juvenile arrests, dispositions and Master Plan, but rightly chose not to. crime trends and publishes an annual report. However, counties are not required to provide outcome data, which could better measure During the past few years, the ACJJDP has statewide performance in improving juvenile struggled as only eight members had been offender outcomes. Researchers involved with the appointed and it did not meet regularly. However, Juvenile Justice Data Project have recommended as of February 2007, all 15 members had been expanding key data elements included in the DOJ appointed and the committee has been meeting Juvenile Court and Probation Statistical System (JCPSS) to include checklists based on current more frequently. The State Commission on practices and evidence-based practices. Other Juvenile Justice in April 2008 voted to make an recommendations for improving data elements in update on ACJJDP activities a standing agenda the JCPSS include updating the out-of-date method item so the two entities can potentially work in of recording race and ethnicity to conform to the concert and avoid duplication of efforts. U.S. Census; adding a check-off to indicate the first entry for the juvenile offender; and, adding a data field to facilitate the linkage of records for youth in Each state entity in California’s juvenile justice multiple county systems. system plays an important role but no single division or commission provides overarching Source: Karen Hennigan, Kathy Kolnick and Siva Tian, Center for Research in Crime, Center for Urban Youth, University of statewide leadership and oversight. Other states Southern California. February 27, 2008. “Juvenile Justice and California counties provide models that can Project Phase 2 Report: Longitudinal Outcome Indicators for Juvenile Justice Systems in California.” serve as useful examples for the state. 26 REALIGNMENT LEADERSHIP AND OVERSIGHT Models to Emulate Restructuring Juvenile Justice in Washington California has adopted a light-handed approach In 1997, the Washington Legislature embarked on a to directing and guiding local program path to restructure juvenile justice by providing implementation. Washington State provides funding to local juvenile courts to expand programs another model of how the state can provide and services. Local courts that wanted the funding direction and guidance while still leaving local were required to implement programs identified on a officials sufficient autonomy. In 1997, the list established by the Legislature. Key elements of the Washington Legislature passed the Community restructuring included: Juvenile Accountability Act which made state (cid:57) A state-adopted evidence-based list coupled with funding available to local juvenile courts to select local government choice from the list. and implement juvenile offender programs from a Washington’s list includes: state-adopted list. The Washington State (cid:131) Functional Family Therapy Institute for Public Policy studied the outcomes (cid:131) Aggression Replacement Training of the local program implementation and found (cid:131) Multi-Systemic Therapy that, when competently delivered, the programs reduced crime and saved the state thousands of (cid:131) Family Integrated Transitions dollars in the long run. The institute found, for (cid:131) Coordination of Services example, that for every dollar spent on (cid:131) Restorative Justice – Victim Offender Functional Family Therapy, an evidence-based Mediation program that includes intensive in-home short- (cid:57) A research and development funding level set by term counseling for youth and their families, the the state for local initiatives; state outcome state saved nearly $32,000. The expected evaluation. corresponding reduction in crime was nearly 16 (cid:57) Formal coordinated statewide assessment tools to percent. However, the institute also found that align the programs and participants. the programs only reduced recidivism and saved the state money when delivered competently and (cid:57) Program quality assurance provided by the state. delivered poor results when staff were not (cid:57) Funding formulas (state/local mix) based on life- adequately trained or did not effectively replicate cycle avoided cost calculation. the program. Washington continues to use state Sources: Steve Aos, Assistant Director, Washington State Institute for General Fund money to fund its local juvenile Public Policy. February 28, 2008. Testimony to the Commission. Also, Washington State Institute for Public Policy. June 2007. programs and has expanded its list of evidence- “Evidence-Based Juvenile Offender Programs: Program Description, based programs.68 Quality Assurance and Cost.” Several California counties also provide model systems for juvenile offenders. As part of this study, the Commission visited juvenile justice facilities and met with local officials in Orange and San Mateo counties. Orange County, despite having the third largest youth population in the state, has sent relatively few youth offenders to state facilities, because the county has established a broad continuum of responses to juvenile crime. This continuum exists because the county taps into a variety of funding sources and various county departments collaborate to provide mental health, substance abuse treatment, and educational and vocational programs for youth offenders in a range of facilities overseen by probation staff. 27 LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION In San Mateo County, the presiding juvenile court judge recognized a void in placement options for young female offenders, tapped federal grant funding and implemented G.I.R.L.S. (Gaining Independence and Reclaiming Lives Successfully). G.I.R.L.S. is a gender responsive program that includes 180 days in an unlocked camp setting followed by community-based supervision relying on collaborations with community partners. San Mateo County monitors the outcomes of participants in the G.I.R.L.S. program and continues to improve the program based on data. The state could learn from what these and other counties are doing and promote the transfer of knowledge and use of proven practices among California counties. California has a collection of divisions, commissions and committees with overlapping responsibilities, but this collection does not add up to consistent or comprehensive oversight and no single entity is in charge. To improve public safety and the outcomes for youth offenders, the state needs focused leadership and accountability, a single identifiable entity with the authority to ensure that taxpayer money is effectively and efficiently spent at both the state and local level and that a consistent continuum of responses is available statewide. Realignment Issues and Concerns Witnesses told the Commission that the weak leadership and accountability structure raises significant concerns about how the realignment will be implemented. SB 81 established the Youthful Offender Block Grant (YOBG) to help counties expand programs and services for juvenile offenders. Approximately $23 million was given to counties in 2007-08. This amount will grow to $66 million in 2008-09 and will reach nearly $100 million every year thereafter. Despite this significant new investment, the state requires very little accountability for this money. Witnesses have identified several issues and concerns with the block grant in particular and the realignment in general. Potential for Supplanting. The Welfare and Institutions Code section created by SB 81 lacks language to prevent counties from supplanting existing spending with the YOBG money. While the law requires the money be used to “enhance the capacity” of programs and services for youthful offenders, nothing prevents counties from reducing juvenile offender funding in other areas.69 Limited, Short-Term Planning. SB 81 required counties to submit a plan explaining how they would use the new money in the initial year. Counties were given a very short time frame – four months – to develop their plans. Money that would have helped counties develop the plans 28 REALIGNMENT LEADERSHIP AND OVERSIGHT was eliminated through a line-item veto in the budget. SB 81 did not require counties to develop plans for future years. No Expenditure Reports or Outcome Data. Counties are not required to report how the grant money is spent, what outcomes are expected, or the level of performance in meeting those outcomes. With no reporting requirements it will be difficult, if not impossible, to monitor whether or not the money is used on programs that improve public safety and assist youthful offenders in turning their lives around. With no outcome data, it will be impossible to know which programs are effective and should be expanded and replicated and which programs should be adjusted or eliminated. Senate Budget Subcommittee No. 4, in an April 17, 2008 hearing on the realignment, adopted budget trailer bill language that will require an annual report from the counties, including a report on outcome measures currently tracked for the Juvenile Justice Crime Prevention Act grants. The bill language also recommends combining the reporting for both grants. Limited Oversight. The CSA was given limited oversight of the new block grant under SB 81: “the Corrections Standards Authority may monitor and inspect any programs or facilities supported by block grant funds…and may enforce violations of grant requirements with suspensions or cancellations of grant funds.”70 As of February 2008, all counties had submitted their one-time plans. The CSA approved the majority of the plans at its March 2008 meeting and the remaining plans at its May 2008 meeting. While limited oversight responsibility was given to CSA, the funding for the grants is determined by the Department of Finance and is distributed to counties by the State Controller’s Office. CSA would need to coordinate with these two entities if it determined that grant funds should be withheld. Multiple Grants, Multiple Reporting Requirements. In addition to the new Youthful Offender Block Grant, the CSA oversees two other major grants – the Juvenile Justice Crime Prevention Act (JJCPA) and the Juvenile Probation and Camps Funding (JPCF) program – that also target juvenile offenders and require counties to report on various outcome measures. Of the two, the JJCPA, is lauded for its requirement that counties report six outcome measures: arrest rate; incarceration rate; probation violation rate; probation completion rate; restitution completion rate; and, community service completion rate.71 Opportunities exist to consolidate and streamline the major juvenile offender grant programs. In February 2008, the Legislative Analyst’s Office recommended that the state consolidate funding for JJCPA and the JPCF programs and projected administrative savings of about $16 million.72 29 LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION Major Sources of Funding for California’s Juvenile Justice System73 Juvenile Justice Crime Juvenile Probation and Camps Youthful Offender Block Prevention Act (JJCPA) Funding (JPCF) Grant (YOBG) Enhance the capacity of local Support a broad range of services communities to implement an for at-risk youth and juvenile effective continuum of Enhance and build Purpose of offenders and their parents or response to juvenile crime programs designed to grant: family members; additional funding and delinquency. Grant reduce juvenile crime. to support county juvenile camp money intended to fund the facilities. population shifted through realignment. FY 2007-08: FY 2007-08: FY 2007-08: $118.7 million $201.4 million $23.7 million Funding amount: FY 2008-09 (Governor’s FY 2008-09 (Governor’s proposed FY 2008-09 (Governor’s proposed budget): budget): proposed budget): $106.8 million $181.3 million $66 million Half based on the total county Program money distributed based population of juveniles age on allocations established in statute; 10-17. Grant funds distributed to Distribution of camps money distributed based on counties on a per capita grant: county reporting of the annual Half based on the number of basis. number of occupied camp/ranch felony juvenile court beds. dispositions reported to the DOJ in the prior year. County probation departments and other County probation, mental government agencies Grantee: County probation departments health, drug and alcohol or through a multi-agency other county departments. committee chaired by a chief probation officer. Counties submit semi-annual Funded programs must be progress reports to CSA for non- modeled on evidence- camp programs. Report includes based strategies. amount of JPCF grant and, if Counties are statutorily applicable, other grants used to required to report data for The Legislature is considering support program; number program expenditures and legislation that would require Reporting entered/exited program; reason for six outcomes: arrest rate; counties to report the same six requirements: exit; number of family members incarceration rate; outcomes as required for served; program setting; services probation violation rate; JJCPA. provided; types of other agencies probation completion rate; involved and number of restitution completion community-based organizations rate; and community under contract to provide program service completion rate. services. Counties must submit Juvenile Application Justice Development Plan to requirements: CSA in initial year only (FY 2007-08). Statute / Crime Prevention Act of SB 81; Chapter 175, Statutes Enabling 2000; Chapter 353, AB 139; Chapter 74, Statutes 2005. 2007. legislation: Statutes 2000. 30 REALIGNMENT LEADERSHIP AND OVERSIGHT Uncertain Funding. Witnesses told the Commission the only way that realignment will be successful is for the state to continue to provide funding for the shifted population and provide oversight to ensure the money is spent wisely. While the Youthful Offender Block Grant by 2010 will provide nearly $100 million per year, in a May 2008 budget hearing, Senate Budget Subcommittee No. 4 denied funding for approximately $340 million in funding in the 2008-09 budget for other grants that target juvenile offenders, including the JJCPA and JPCF. In recent years, the JJCPA program has been cut in early budget negotiations only to be restored in the final budget, creating fiscal uncertainty and planning challenges for probation departments. In July 2008, the Budget Conference Committee restored $281 million of the funding for the JJCPA and JPCF for 2008-09. This reduction almost completely reduces the net gain – $66 million in 2008-09 – that counties anticipated from the new Youthful Offender Block Grant. The state should consolidate all three funds – YOBG, JJCPA and JPCF and using existing formulas, make the funding one dedicated annual General Fund allocation. Counties should be required to report outcomes in the six areas currently required for the JJCPA grant. If the ballot initiative that would make youthful offender funding for county probation departments permanent is enacted by voters in the November 2008 election, the state can continue to require counties to report outcomes, but there will be little opportunity for oversight as the money will be perpetually allocated no matter how efficiently or effectively it is spent. Priorities Need to Be Established to Fill Statewide Gaps. Recent research has identified gaps in local juvenile offender programs, but there is no mechanism to ensure the new state funding will be prioritized to fill the gaps.74 Because the realignment occurred rather abruptly, many counties do not have programs or supervision alternatives for the more serious offenders who otherwise would have been sent to the state but are now under county supervision. The block grant will help smaller counties purchase program space from sister counties with established programming. But representatives from larger counties have indicated the need for regional collaboration for certain hard-to-place offenders, an effort that will take time to establish and will require assistance from the state. Lack of Local Options to Respond to Serious Offenders. Some counties previously sent a disproportionate number of youth offenders to state facilities – typically small counties or counties that did not develop adequate local responses – while many counties sent only offenders who had exhausted all local options, regardless of whether or not they committed a serious offense. These might include offenders with multiple vehicle thefts or burglaries or other lower level crimes who repeatedly ran away from local placements. They also frequently 31 LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION included offenders with severe mental health problems that many counties are ill-equipped to treat. Witnesses told the Commission that very few, if any, counties have sufficient case numbers in a single year to support building new facilities or programs on a local level and that regional facilities are the only feasible answer to this problem. Regional collaboration not only will take time, but also will take a great deal of political will from agencies and governments in different counties that may not have a current working relationship.75 The state could play a role in facilitating and fostering regional collaborative efforts or providing incentives for counties to work together to respond to hard-to-place juvenile offenders, but currently there is no state entity that can fulfill this role. Sacramento County’s Mix of Juvenile Offenders in State Facilities W&I 707(b) PC 290(d)(3) Year Other Total Serious/Violent Sex Offense 1998 18 2 12 32 1999 16 8 37 61 2000 25 7 32 64 2001 16 4 26 46 2002 16 14 41 71 2003 10 8 25 43 2004 12 5 12 29 2005 5 2 10 17 2006 8 1 11 20 2007 11 8 3 22 Total 137 59 209 405 % of Total 33.8% 14.6% 51.6% Source: Kenneth G. Peterson, Presiding Juvenile Court Judge, Superior Court of California, County of Sacramento. Sacramento, CA. February 5, 2008. Testimony to the Commission. Issues to Watch Other issues warrant continued monitoring. As more youth offenders are kept at the county level, it is more important than ever to ensure conditions in local facilities are safe, legal and humane. Several witnesses said that realignment will fail if it only results in counties replicating the state conditions that led to the Farrell consent decree. CSA is charged with setting standards, monitoring local juvenile facilities and enforcing standards compliance, but history suggests its efforts have not been sufficient. In the past several years, the federal Department of Justice has led two investigations, in Los Angeles and Santa Clara counties, and the Prison Law Office has filed two lawsuits on facility conditions in San Joaquin and Sacramento counties.76 32 REALIGNMENT LEADERSHIP AND OVERSIGHT The problems that led to the investigations and lawsuits were well- known, but they have not been quickly resolved, in part because CSA historically has not used its authority to enforce compliance to improve local facilities. The CSA – whose membership is dominated by county probation officials, sheriffs and state and local detention facility officials – in the past has chosen to work more collaboratively with sister counties, allowing extended timelines to reach facility compliance. Additionally, many problems have been allowed to persist because the Attorney General has taken the position that state juvenile facilities regulations are unenforceable.77 In 2006, the Prison Law Office sued the CSA for failing to exercise its authority to require counties to improve unsafe and inhumane conditions in some juvenile facilities. The lawsuit alleged that the CSA had not required counties to meet legally prescribed deadlines for correcting identified problems. In January 2008, the state agreed to accept a court order requiring the CSA to enforce deadlines for local juvenile halls to file and implement plans to correct problems. The agreement should bolster CSA’s ability to enforce improvements, and, if it does not, the agreement will make it easier for advocates to request action from the courts.78 Youth advocates testified to the Commission that the state should reassess the standards set for juvenile facilities and consider moving the enforcement authority from the CSA and suggested the Office of the Inspector General might be more capable of fulfilling this role.79 County probation officials testified that they would welcome stronger state licensing requirements and stricter enforcement, indicating it would strengthen their ability to gain local support for improving programs, services, staffing and facilities for youth offenders.80 As part of this study, the Commission did not further explore whether the state should revise its standards for juvenile facilities and whether or not the CSA should continue to monitor and enforce standards in county juvenile facilities. The state agreed to the consent order in January 2008 and the court issued the final consent order in March 2008, and as a result, it is too early to tell whether or not the CSA’s acceptance of the court order will resolve the enforcement challenges. This issue warrants further monitoring and the Legislature should review CSA’s ability to enforce standards and potentially consider shifting this responsibility to a more capable entity in the future. Another issue that warrants monitoring is the potential increase in the number of youth tried as adults. Youth advocates expressed concerns that district attorneys might file more serious charges than they would have in the past or increase the use of the “direct file” option – where a 33 LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION district attorney can choose to file a criminal charge against a youth directly in adult court. Additionally, district attorneys might drop new charges, if they were less serious than a prior charge, so that the most serious offense can be the basis for a resultant commitment to a state facility. Judges and district attorneys told the Commission that they assess each case on its own merit and that they will continue to file charges and commit youths in whatever manner best protects public safety and benefits the youth. State law requires that “no ward of the juvenile court shall be committed to the Youth Authority unless the judge of the court is fully satisfied that the mental and physical conditions and qualifications of the ward are such as to render it probable that he will be benefited by the reformatory educational discipline or other treatment provided by the Youth Authority.” Additionally, case law requires that the court must believe less restrictive alternatives would be ineffective or inappropriate.81 In written testimony to the Commission, one presiding juvenile court judge wrote that “the findings of ‘benefit’ in committing the minor to the state and [the findings] that there are no ‘less restrictive’ local options are not easily or lightly made.”82 Additionally, serious crimes which typically lead a district attorney to direct file a case to adult court are typically 707(b) charges, which under realignment, still allow a judge to commit a youth to a state facility, reducing the likelihood of an increase in direct files, witnesses said. If anything, there could be an increase in fitness hearings, in which a district attorney requests a judge to consider moving a lower-level offense case to adult court, but in these cases, the decision to move the case to adult court lies with the judge and not the district attorney.83 However, any spike in juvenile offender commitments should be monitored and analyzed as this would affect the cost savings the state expects through the realignment. Finally, the State Commission on Juvenile Justice has the potential to provide leadership and oversight, but its temporary existence may prevent it from fulfilling its mission. It is too early to tell how successful the commission will be as its final report is not due until January 1, 2009 – the day the commission is scheduled to sunset. Senate Budget Subcommittee No. 4 in May 2008 voted in favor of extending the life of the commission an additional year and to continue to use the $600,000 allocated in 2007-08 to fund the consultants hired by the commission through January 1, 2010. The fact that the commission’s interim report was given to the Legislature late because it was under review by the governor’s office calls into question its ability to independently advise lawmakers and counties. 34 REALIGNMENT LEADERSHIP AND OVERSIGHT There is no requirement in the statute that the governor’s office review the report and the majority of the commission members are appointed by associations representing local government agencies. Summary The state has no structure in place to provide leadership and accountability for the $1 billion it spends on programs, services and supervision of youth offenders at the state and local level. Its collection of divisions, commissions and committees, despite the important role each plays, do not add up to state leadership and oversight. The governor and lawmakers should move existing state resources in the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to establish an entity that can provide the leadership to ensure that an evidence-based continuum of responses are available statewide for youth offenders and that the money the state provides to counties is tied to performance- based outcomes. The realignment legislation was an important step in the right direction, but the legislation leaves room for improvement. Lawmakers should align the new block grant with the state’s other major grant programs that target youth offenders and bolster and streamline the reporting of outcome measures. Policy-makers should ensure that the state maintains the funding for the youth offender population shifted through the realignment process and for the two other major programs targeting juvenile offenders. Policy-makers should closely monitor CSA to ensure it successfully monitors and enforces standards in county juvenile facilities. Finally, lawmakers should support the budget language adopted by Senate Budget Subcommittee No. 4 that briefly extends the life of the commission so that it can advise and assist counties in implementing the recommendations in its final report and to give the commission an opportunity to prove whether or not it can fulfill its broader mission of leadership and oversight. If the commission proves effective in this role, policy-makers should consider further extending the sunset date of the commission. 35 LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION Recommendation 1: To improve public safety and provide statewide leadership on juvenile justice policy, the governor and the Legislature must consolidate programs and services into a streamlined Governor’s Office of Juvenile Justice outside of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, to develop a strategy for a comprehensive, statewide juvenile justice system that includes a complete and consistent continuum of evidence-based services for youth and to oversee county programs funded by state General Fund allocations. Specifically, the Office of Juvenile Justice should: (cid:137) Be led by a director, formerly the chief deputy secretary of juvenile justice, who is appointed by the governor and reports directly to the governor’s office. (cid:137) Have two divisions that coordinate and collaborate: the Division of Juvenile Justice Policy and the Division of Juvenile Justice Planning and Programs. (cid:137) Require the Division of Juvenile Justice Policy, consisting of positions shifted from the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, including officials from the Divisions of Juvenile Facilities, Programs and Parole, to: (cid:57) Provide leadership, technical assistance and guidance to help counties implement and expand evidence-based programs for juvenile offenders to improve outcomes, to set priorities for filling identified gaps and to lead and guide counties in developing regional consortiums and regional juvenile offender facilities. (cid:57) Conduct research and analysis on best practices and provide a Web-based information clearinghouse. (cid:57) Coordinate with other state entities that have a role in providing youth services, including the departments of mental health, alcohol and drug programs, social services and education, and provide guidance to counties on opportunities to leverage funding sources. (cid:57) Provide juvenile justice policy recommendations to the governor and the Legislature. (cid:137) Require the Division of Juvenile Justice Planning and Programs, with positions shifted from the Corrections Standards Authority Planning and Programs Division, to: (cid:57) Oversee county juvenile offender programs funded through annual state General Fund allocations to ensure that evidence- based programs are implemented. (cid:57) Oversee and analyze county outcome reports and provide an annual report on juvenile justice performance measures to the governor and the Legislature. (cid:57) Administer state and federal juvenile offender grants. 36 REALIGNMENT LEADERSHIP AND OVERSIGHT (cid:57) Be advised by the Advisory Committee on Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention as federally required for the federal juvenile offender grants, shifted from the Corrections Standards Authority to the Governor’s Office of Juvenile Justice. (cid:137) The new office should develop, in connection with the Corrections Standards Authority, standards and enforcement mechanisms to guide the transfer of the juvenile offender population to county and regional facilities. Recommendation 2: To ensure the success of juvenile justice realignment, the governor and the Legislature must bolster the accountability and oversight of the Youthful Offender Block Grant by consolidating it with the Juvenile Justice Crime Prevention Act funding and the Juvenile Probation and Camps Funding program into one dedicated funding stream for local juvenile justice programs and services. Specifically, they must: (cid:137) Consolidate the state’s three major juvenile offender grant programs, using existing formulas, into one stable annually dedicated General Fund allocation tied to performance-based outcomes overseen by the Governor’s Office of Juvenile Justice. (cid:137) Require counties to provide an annual outcome report and streamline reporting requirements to match the outcomes currently required by the Juvenile Justice Crime Prevention Act. (cid:137) Strengthen the statutory code to prevent counties from supplanting juvenile offender funding. 37 LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION Commission’s Proposed Organizational Structure for an Office of Juvenile Justice Governor Governor’s Office / Chief of Staff Office of Juvenile Justice State Commission Director on Juvenile Justice (former Chief Deputy Secretary of Juvenile Justice) Division of Juveni le Justice Policy Division of Juvenile Justice Planning and Programs Provide leadership, technical assistance and guidance to Oversee of county juvenile counties. offender programs funded by the General Fund (formerly Advisory Conduct resear ch and analysis to grant programs). Committee on provide a Web-based Juvenile Justice & clearinghouse of best practices. Analyze county reports on Delinquency outcome measures and Coordinate wit h other state annually report to the Prevention entities that hav e a role in youth governor and Legislature. services. (moved from CSA) Administer other state and Provide policy recommendations federal juvenile offender to the governor and Legislature. grants. (moved from CDCR D ivisions of Juvenile (moved from CSA, Division of Facilities, Program s and Parole) Corrections Planning & Programs) Recommendation 3: The governor and the Legislature should extend the sunset of the State Commission on Juvenile Justice until January 2010 and charge it with assisting counties in implementing the recommendations in its master plan and providing oversight of the realignment process. The commission should: (cid:137) Serve as an advisory body to the Governor’s Office of Juvenile Justice. (cid:137) Develop training and technical assistance for counties to assist in the implementation of the recommendations in the Juvenile Justice Operational Master Plan and report on progress implementing the recommendations in January 2010. (cid:137) Develop recommendations to improve and expand data elements reported to the DOJ Juvenile Court and Probation Statistical System. 38 JUVENILE OFFENDERS REMAINING AT THE STATE LEVEL Juvenile Offenders Remaining at the State Level California spends more than $500 million a year on approximately 2,000 youth offenders housed in state facilities. The Governor’s Budget projects that the cost per youth for the 2008-09 fiscal year will total $252,000, more than 30 times what the state spends educating law- abiding high school students and six times the cost of institutionalizing adult offenders.84 The projected outlays per ward have increased six-fold from an average of $36,000 in 1996, the year the Legislature enacted the sliding scale fees.85 As more youth offenders remain at the local level, the number of youth in state facilities will decline further. Although overall expenditures for the state facilities also are projected to decline, the amount spent per youth will rise as the state serves an increasingly smaller number of youth in a system designed for thousands more. With California spending more than a quarter million dollars a year for each ward, taxpayers and other citizens can reasonably ask what return they are getting on this significant investment and whether alternative investments would deliver better returns in the form of improved public safety and youth offender rehabilitation. Once an international leader in juvenile justice, California’s juvenile justice system fell into decay over the past three decades. Juvenile justice experts who provided the system with consistent and high-quality leadership over long tenures gave way to a carousel of appointees who lacked the experience and vision to guide and drive change as juvenile justice evolved. The culture of the system changed as well. The law that created the former California Youth Authority states its role is to “provide comprehensive education, training, treatment, and rehabilitative services to youthful offenders under the jurisdiction of the department, that are designed to promote community restoration, family ties, and accountability to victims, and to produce youth who become law-abiding and productive members of society.” The law did not change, yet the system’s culture increasingly became defined by punitive measures as the state and the nation adopted a “tough on crime” mentality.86 39 LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION In the late 1990s and early 2000s, California’s state facilities for juvenile offenders found themselves in the media spotlight for the violence and brutality inside their walls and the lack of programs and services for the youth offenders in their care. In 2003, plaintiffs in the Farrell case alleged that the state’s treatment of its youth offenders violated state laws. In November 2004, state officials signed a consent decree in which the state agreed to reform its juvenile justice system. Two months later, in January 2005, the governor proposed a reorganization of the Youth and Adult Correctional Agency into the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. The Little Hoover Commission, charged with reviewing all governor’s reorganization plans, reviewed the plan and recommended that the Legislature allow the plan to go forward, but expressed concerns about certain aspects of the plan, particularly placing the fairly autonomous California Youth Authority under a correctional organization whose primary focus is on its much larger adult offender population. In approving the plan, the Commission also recommended that the governor, the Legislature and the secretary of the new department continue to work with stakeholders to develop a statewide strategy for juvenile justice and address the need to ensure a continuum of facilities for youth offenders and stable source of funding for counties.87 The Commission’s most serious concerns centered on the placement of the California Youth Authority (CYA) within the larger CDCR organization dominated by adult corrections. Several youth advocates who testified at the Commission’s 2005 hearing on the reorganization told the Commission that the plan should not be implemented because the reorganization would be extremely detrimental to the CYA, the wards in its care and the implementation of the reforms required in the Farrell consent decree. The Commission shared these concerns, but determined that the reorganization plan overall was a step in the right direction for the state’s troubled corrections system. At that time, the Commission committed to ongoing oversight of the implementation of the plan and twice held roundtable discussions on the reorganization progress and juvenile justice reforms. In August 2007, when lawmakers enacted the juvenile justice realignment, the Commission committed not only to review the realignment but also to return to its oversight of the implementation of juvenile justice reforms, with a specific focus on the effects of the population reductions on the Farrell consent decree implementation and other state-level reforms. 40 JUVENILE OFFENDERS REMAINING AT THE STATE LEVEL Reorganization Delays Reforms As part of this study, youth advocates told the Commission that their concerns expressed prior to the reorganization had been realized – that implementing the reforms required by the consent decree would be overshadowed by the enormity of the challenges in the adult correctional system. The 2005 reorganization buried the state’s juvenile justice divisions in a correctional bureaucracy primarily focused on its 170,000 adult offenders, a system plagued by overcrowded conditions, multiple lawsuits, including a federal receivership for inmate health care, and significant turnover at the secretary level – four secretaries in three years.88 Since the initial reorganization, an additional layer of management has been added, further marginalizing the juvenile justice divisions in the organizational chart. In 2005, the chief deputy secretary of juvenile justice reported directly to the secretary of CDCR. Now the position reports to an undersecretary of operations – currently a 25-year veteran of the adult prison system – who oversees the massive adult operations and the much smaller juvenile justice operations.89 The reorganization became effective in July 2005. Shortly thereafter, the governor appointed Bernard Warner as chief deputy secretary to lead the juvenile justice divisions. Mr. Warner brought experience from juvenile justice leadership positions in other states. Youth advocates have praised the efforts of Mr. Warner – now entering his third year in the position – and his commitment to the tough reform agenda. But despite the efforts of Mr. Warner and his staff, reform progress has been slow. They have only made as much progress as the bureaucracy and organizational structure would allow. By August 2006, the state had filed six remedial plans that detailed the changes that needed to occur to comply with the Farrell consent decree. All involved agreed that fixing the severely broken juvenile justice system would require considerable time and resources. The expert panel hired to assist the state in developing the remedial plans in a 2006 report wrote that the state’s juvenile justice divisions can be fixed, “but it will take great effort, money and lots of time. We know of no other state that has undertaken such a major reform that has finished in as short a time (four years) as DJJ proposes. Failure by DJJ to meet a deadline now and then should not be interpreted as failure to reform.”90 More than three years after entering into the consent decree, the Farrell plaintiffs contend little progress has been made. In an October 2007 report to the court, the Farrell special master indicated that true systemic reform had not taken place and that this was in part “due to DJJ’s conversion from its relative autonomy as the California Youth 41 LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION CDCR Organizational Chart 2006 CDCR Organizational Chart 2008 42 JUVENILE OFFENDERS REMAINING AT THE STATE LEVEL Authority to being a unit of the much larger California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Although this conversion took place several years ago, it continues to act as a barrier to implementation of the remedial plan.”91 Citing the report, the plaintiffs asked the court to appoint a receiver to oversee four areas: hiring, contracts, policy development and information technology. In February 2008, the plaintiffs expanded their request and asked the court to appoint a receiver to provide overall leadership and oversight of the implementation of the Farrell reforms. In their request, the plaintiffs stated that “the primary reason DJJ gives for its chronic, severe failures regarding contracts is ‘growing pains’ from the nearly two-and-a-half- year-old reorganization of CDCR.”92 Additionally, the document states, “this is not a matter of a few missed deadlines. DJJ is not simply late – it is incapable of reform.”93 Recent Signs of Progress Despite the plaintiff’s claims, the state has begun to show progress in several areas, overcoming some of the hurdles created by the organizational structure and rapid change in the make-up of the population due to the realignment. An increasing number of youth offenders in state facilities are graduating from high school and earning GEDs and vocational certificates. A massive effort is underway to train staff on proven practices such as motivational interviewing and safe interventions and conflict resolutions. Staff vacancies have been reduced at central headquarters and in facilities.94 A March 2008 report submitted by the court-appointed special master in the Farrell case stated that “numerous individuals are working diligently to move DJJ forward toward the goals of the remedial plans with some significant progress and successes. For example, O.H. Close (Youth Correctional Facility) has been singled out as exemplary by a consensus of the experts, where youth are benefiting from its substantial progress toward compliance with the remedial plans. Some of the experts have reported that the Southern Youth Correctional Reception Center and Clinic may be making comparable progress under the remedial plans, with comparable benefits for youth.”95 The special master cautioned, however, that the “successes appear to be the result of the exceptional efforts and skillfulness of some individuals and do not appear to be reliably sustainable and replicable. DJJ’s largest facility with over 600 youth, Heman G. Stark, still is characterized by endemic racial violence that, among other things, greatly limits school attendance. By consensus, the experts believe that deficiencies in 43 LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION management effectiveness and/or systems capacity issues are seriously impeding DJJ’s progress in implementation of the remedial plans.”96 In a January 2008 site visit to the Stark facility, the Commission met with various staff and were impressed with the dedication of the teachers as well as the impressive array of equipment for hands-on learning in career technical education courses, from welding to printing to warehouse management and forklift driving. However, of the 600 offenders housed at the Stark facility on the day of the visit, the Commission saw few youth participating in these programs. Whether or not the Farrell case will lead to another costly and time- consuming receivership for CDCR is yet to be determined. Case management conferences on the request for receivership were held in April and May 2008. As of July 14, 2008, the judge had not ruled on the request for receivership. The Price of Reform The state’s progress in reform has not come without substantial cost. The state has injected a significant amount of money to expand juvenile programs and staff. While the state juvenile offender population declined, spending to meet the Farrell requirements increased. The 2007-08 budget for the juvenile justice divisions was $580 million and the state currently houses 1,896 offenders – about the same number of youth at an urban high school. Approximately 2,300 are under state parole supervision.97 Annual Costs Per Juvenile Offender Housed in a State Facility 2007-08 (Average Daily Population = 2,294) Operations - Security $37,490 Operations - Support Education, $29,250 Operations - Vocations and Facilities Offender Programs Administration $89,420 $13,930 Operations - Other Health Care $1,980 $53,450 Source: Governor’s Budget 2008-09. 44 JUVENILE OFFENDERS REMAINING AT THE STATE LEVEL The governor’s budget projects that expenditures will decline to $554 million in 2008-09, of which $66 million will be sent to the counties as part of the SB 81 realignment. This translates to approximately $252,000 per youth in state facilities for the 2008-09 fiscal year, a per ward increase from $218,000 in 2007-08.98 The state anticipates the population will eventually fall to under 1,500 and will stabilize, barring any changes in law or local commitment practices.99 Crumbling Infrastructure Most agree that the state’s juvenile facilities – for the most part designed to house truants and runaway teens in the mid-twentieth century – are inappropriate for today’s youth offenders and are crumbling as a result of years of deferred maintenance. New facilities will be needed to meet the reform requirements of the Farrell consent decree.100 In a May 2004 assessment of state juvenile facilities, the Legislative Analyst found the state’s juvenile facilities to be “functionally and physically obsolete.”101 In a preliminary facilities master plan published in November 2005, CDCR asserted that “these facilities have exceeded their useful life and have not been properly maintained ... in general, they lack flexibility, are inappropriate in terms of size, and were not designed to address the risk and treatment needs of today’s more sophisticated population of youth offenders.”102 As previously described, the state has shut down facilities and consolidated the youth offender population, however, as the population continues to shrink, the state has yet to lay out plans for continued closures and consolidations. A facilities master plan is long overdue to the Legislature.103 In an April 2008 Senate budget subcommittee hearing, CDCR officials briefly discussed the planned closures of the DeWitt Nelson Youth Correctional Facility and El Paso de Robles Youth Correctional Facility in July 2008, and indicated a more detailed proposal detailing any further consolidation or closures would be forthcoming.104 Should Juvenile Justice Operations be Moved or Eliminated? Given the difficulty and significant expense of moving forward on reforms to comply with the Farrell lawsuit, improve public safety and help youth offenders become self-sufficient, law-abiding adults, Commissioners asked witnesses at its public hearings for this study whether the state’s juvenile justice facilities and programs should be removed from the umbrella of the CDCR. Commissioners also raised the question of 45 LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION whether the state should exit the business of housing juvenile offenders entirely, given its track record, the costs of responding to the Farrell lawsuit, its shrinking juvenile offender population and its crumbling infrastructure. Witnesses told the Commission that the juvenile justice divisions are still adjusting to the 2005 reorganization; another reorganization at this point would further slow progress implementing the Farrell reforms. And while some witnesses suggested the state’s juvenile justice operations could be more closely aligned with other youth related programs and services if the divisions were placed within the Health & Human Services Agency or the Department of Social Services, others suggested that juvenile justice would be equally buried in those organizations. Other witnesses suggested that the most effective and efficient organization would be to follow the lead of 16 other states and establish a separate juvenile justice agency or department. This type of department would promote policies for juvenile justice system improvement, provide technical assistance, help counties leverage funding opportunities and manage state and federal grants. The Ohio Department of Youth Services, for example, not only oversees state facilities, it also funds and provides oversight for community correctional facilities and administers RECLAIM Ohio, a program which provides funding for juvenile courts to develop or purchase a range of community-based options for juvenile offenders.105 Organization of State Delinquency Institutions in Other States Juvenile Corrections Agency (16 states): Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia Social or Human Services Agency (16 states): Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Iowa, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Utah, Washington Adult Corrections Agency (10 states): California, Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, West Virginia, Wisconsin Child Protection/Juvenile Corrections Agency (8 states): Connecticut, Delaware, New Mexico, New York, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, Wyoming Other (1 state): New Jersey (Department of Law and Public Safety) Source: Patrick Griffin and Melanie King. 2006. “National Overviews.” State Juvenile Justice Profiles. Pittsburg, PA: National Center for Juvenile Justice. 46 JUVENILE OFFENDERS REMAINING AT THE STATE LEVEL Several witnesses, particularly local officials, asserted that California will continue to need state facilities and programs for the small number of serious youth offenders who either pose a high risk for violence or have needs beyond what counties can provide. Counties have indicated that these offenders are such a small percentage of the youth offender population from each county, that counties, individually, can not provide them with efficient or effective custody, treatment, rehabilitation and education. Counties, already under pressure to absorb more youth offenders through the realignment, and destabilized by the uncertainty of state funding for juvenile offender programs in the 2008-09 budget, currently are not in a position to absorb the most serious and violent offenders and sex offenders, particularly those who will serve longer term sentences. Most county programs are designed for youth under 18 years of age and the program duration in county facilities is typically 90 days or a year, for even the most serious offenders. Counties, however, could plan and develop or contract with community partners for appropriate programs, and hire and train staff, if given adequate time and ongoing dedicated funding.106 As counties implement new programs and services through the new block grant money and establish expanded rehabilitative facilities, particularly regional facilities, the state should embark on a path to eliminate its juvenile justice operations. State policy should be directed toward joint state-local strategies such as encouraging multi-county consortiums and establishing build-lease arrangements for facilities. Existing law already authorizes the state to “establish, maintain, or facilitate the development of regional centers, which may be available on a contract basis to counties for the placement of wards.” Additionally, the law provides that counties may jointly develop regional centers.107 As the state transfers responsibility for all juvenile offenders to counties, the duties of the Juvenile Parole Board – which currently decides when wards in state facilities are ready for release – will no longer be required. Currently, presiding juvenile court judges – advised by probation officials – set goals and requirements for offenders in local facilities and determine when juvenile offenders are ready for release from detention or probation. As a result of SB 81, juvenile court judges now are conducting re-entry disposition hearings to set probation requirements for non 707(b) offenders released from state juvenile facilities.108 As all juvenile offenders eventually are kept at the local level, juvenile court judges will have jurisdiction over probation requirements and release dates for all juvenile offenders. To improve public safety and outcomes for offenders, counties could consider establishing juvenile re-entry courts for older and more serious offenders. 47 LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION It is important to point out that two categories of offenders will continue to pose challenges, even if the state provided dedicated resources and gave counties time to plan and implement programs targeting the longer- term, more serious youth offender population. Older Youth Offenders. California is one of four states that allow juvenile court jurisdiction of offenders through age 25. The other three states are Montana, Oregon and Wisconsin. The vast majority, 33 states, retain juvenile court jurisdiction through age 20.109 In the 2004-05 Governor’s Budget, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger proposed reducing the age of jurisdiction in state juvenile facilities from 25 to 22 although the proposal was not adopted. The Governor’s Juvenile Justice Working Group, convened in 2004 to advise the governor on various issues, discussed jurisdictional age and members concluded that the age should remain at 25. The governor’s proposal in part was based on the hope that changing the age of jurisdiction would save the state money, but the number of young adults above age 22 in juvenile facilities was and remains fairly small, and changing the jurisdictional age would not generate significant savings. The Commission did not specifically look at the state’s policy on supervising youth offenders until age 25 as part of this study, though the issue did come up at one of the Commission’s prior roundtable meetings on juvenile justice.110 Some at the meeting said that having youth languish in state facilities for so many years at significant cost to the state, often without participating in programs or services, provided no benefit. However, they said one alternative – housing them in an overcrowded adult prison, where programs and services are even less frequently available and where the primary goal of incarceration is punishment as opposed to rehabilitation – was worse. Another alternative – releasing offenders at a younger age – would mean shorter sentences for serious crimes, an option that was not acceptable to district attorneys or crime victims. One participant on the Governor’s Juvenile Justice Working group said that prosecutors and defenders agreed that housing youth offenders in juvenile facilities through age 25 was a sentencing option that should not be discarded, even if California is unlike other states in this respect.111 Many states have adopted blended sentencing schemes where a juvenile court can combine a juvenile disposition with a suspended criminal sentence. Blended sentencing encourages and rewards good behavior and often requires youth offenders to participate in various programs and achieve specific goals – such as high school graduation, earning a GED or successfully completing a drug treatment program. Youth are given the opportunity to succeed in the juvenile system and if they do not, can be transferred to an adult prison at age 18 or 21, depending on 48 JUVENILE OFFENDERS REMAINING AT THE STATE LEVEL the state. Many other states have criminal blended sentencing laws that allow criminal courts to impost sanctions normally ordered in a juvenile court, also providing an opportunity for a youth to remain in the juvenile system on a conditional basis.112 If California were to consider implementing some form of blended sentencing option, such a policy would require that programs and services be available to youth so that they could achieve identified goals. It also would require a reduction in violence in the facilities that have led to ongoing lockdowns and prevent offenders from participating in treatment and education programs. The Legislature should hold public hearings on whether the state should lower the jurisdictional age for youth offenders to be more in line with practices in other states and to determine whether all youth offenders should have the opportunity to be released from confinement should they achieve specified goals or be moved to a state prison after age 21. In the meantime, two state juvenile facilities house youth aged 18 to 25 – the Heman G. Stark Youth Correctional Facility in Chino, and the N.A. Chaderjian Youth Correctional Facility in Stockton. A joint powers authority could be established to supervise these older offenders or the state could lease its existing facilities housing older offenders to multiple willing counties and provide funding for county-run programs and services for the older youth offender population. Ideally, appropriate regional facilities should be built by the state and leased to and operated by the counties. Additionally, counties could develop or contract with community-based providers to provide re-entry programs for the final months of confinement for older offenders who have served longer sentences. Youth Serving Lengthy or Life Sentences. A small number of offenders in state youth facilities have been convicted of serious crimes in adult courts and are serving very long terms or, in some cases, life sentences in prison, but are too young to be transferred to an adult prison where legally required educational programs may not be available. Currently, there are approximately 245 youth offenders convicted in adult criminal courts serving time in state youth facilities.113 Those who will complete their sentence and parole before age 21 can remain in a juvenile facility up until age 21. Those who will not complete their term before turning 21 will graduate directly from youth facilities at age 18 to adult prisons to continue their terms.114 Counties currently do not have programs geared toward providing these offenders with the skills needed to survive a long or a life sentence in an adult prison. While both categories of offenders – older offenders and those sentenced to long or life sentences – are relatively small, special consideration 49 LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION would need to be given to them as far as appropriate housing, should the state eventually turn supervision of all youth offenders over to counties. Summary Costs to run the state’s juvenile justice operations have sky-rocketed as the state has attempted to comply with the reforms it agreed to in the Farrell consent decree. The realignment legislation eased the state’s burden by significantly reducing the population. But the state’s annual costs per ward will continue to increase as the state supervises an increasingly smaller number of youth in facilities and simultaneously supports a system designed for many more. The majority of the state’s youth facilities are more than 40 years old and have not been consistently or adequately maintained. Despite some progress in implementing the reforms required by the Farrell consent decree, the plaintiffs in the case have asked the court to consider appointing a receiver – a move that would put control of the juvenile justice divisions and their budgets under the court and not the state’s elected officials. In the previous chapter, the Commission recommended that the state establish a Governor’s Office of Juvenile Justice to provide statewide leadership on juvenile justice. The Commission recommended that this office provide technical assistance and guidance to help counties implement evidence-based programs and provide oversight of state- funded local programs and grants. With assistance from the counties, the Governor’s Office of Juvenile Justice should analyze the types of programs and services needed for the most serious offenders. It should guide and facilitate the development of county consortiums and joint powers authorities to develop regional facilities for the most serious offenders. These facilities could be built by the state but leased to and run by the counties. The Youthful Offender Parole Board should be eliminated, with release decisions turned over to presiding juvenile court judges. Closing the state’s current juvenile justice facilities and operations would result in substantial savings, some of which should be used to pay for county-run regional facilities. Additionally, key state officials and staff involved with developing and implementing the state-level reforms should be shifted from CDCR to the Office of Juvenile Justice to guide statewide juvenile justice policy and to facilitate and oversee the establishment of state-local build-lease regional facilities, joint powers authorities or other state and local partnerships. 50 JUVENILE OFFENDERS REMAINING AT THE STATE LEVEL Recommendation 4: The state should eliminate its juvenile justice operations by 2011. As previously described, the governor and the Legislature must consolidate all programs and services for juvenile offenders into a Governor’s Office of Juvenile Justice. In addition to the responsibilities described previously, the Office should: (cid:137) Guide, facilitate and oversee the development of new regional rehabilitative facilities or the conversion of existing state juvenile facilities into regional rehabilitative facilities for high-risk, high-need offenders to be leased to and run by the counties. (cid:137) Provide counties with sustained, dedicated funding to establish programs and services for regional facilities. (cid:137) As regional facilities become fully operational, the state should: (cid:57) Eliminate state juvenile justice operations, including facilities, programs and parole and the Youthful Offender Parole Board. All juvenile offender release decisions should be made by presiding juvenile court judges. (cid:57) Provide guidance and oversight of the regional juvenile facilities and administer dedicated funding to counties to manage the regional juvenile offender programs and services tied to performance-based outcomes. 51 LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION 52 CONCLUSION Conclusion C alifornia has entered a new era of juvenile justice. In 2007 policy-makers took the historic step of turning responsibility for all but the most serious and violent youth offenders over to the counties and provided counties with resources to handle the expanded population. This realignment was overdue, had long been advocated by many, and marks a critical juncture – policy-makers awakening to the reality that the state can no longer afford its failed juvenile justice system. While the realignment represents substantial savings, the state will continue to spend half a billion dollars per year on fewer than 2,000 youth offenders in state facilities, approximately $252,000 per youth offender. These youth are the highest risk to public safety and rarely are sent to the state without a long list of prior offenses. They have extensive mental health and substance abuse issues which require intensive counseling and often highly-specialized intervention programs – expensive whether they are provided at the state or local level. During the past decades, the state has not shown the will or the capability to provide the programs and services to help the youth in its care become self-sufficient, law-abiding adults. This was not always the case. In the 1970s, California’s juvenile justice system was a national model. Its slide into mediocrity and eventually utter failure did not happen overnight. The culture inside the walls and fences – fed by fear and false prophesies of rampant teenage crime on the outside – became more punitive than rehabilitative. Reform schools became mini-prisons. Violence and lockdowns became the order of the day. Gang leaders called the shots, not counselors or correctional officers. Though these youth are in state facilities because they committed serious offenses – leaving countless victims in their wake – the vast majority will return to the community. Most will commit new crimes. No one planned for the state’s juvenile justice system to go from national leader to where we are today. If performance measures were in place, the state could have tracked where it was headed and evaluated whether or not it wanted to spend half a billion dollars on juvenile justice policies that tear at the social fabric of California communities and divert resources from education, health care and other critical needs. 53 LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION The enormous cost in terms of lives and dollars leads to important questions. What is the goal of the system? What are Californians getting for this significant investment and what is the state accomplishing? The goal of the juvenile justice system is grounded in California law: When juvenile offenders become wards of the court, the court must “consider the safety and protection of the public, the importance of redressing injuries to victims, and the best interests of the minor.”115 Answers to the other questions are more elusive. The state cut back on its highly acclaimed juvenile justice research department. Data the state collects can tell policy-makers how many offenders are in state facilities, where they came from, the category of crime they committed and other facts, but it cannot tell policy-makers what programs are working. The state must track what is working by measuring how many offenders returning to the community remain free from crime and substance abuse, get jobs or return to school, or other identifiable outcomes. If not for this data void, perhaps policy-makers would have seen and responded to the systemic problems before lawyers and the courts became involved. Counties saw the problems and expanded intervention and local detention programs realizing that the youth they were sending to the state eventually would be coming back to their communities. Many counties took note that they were coming back more violent and disturbed than when they left. But youth offender programs are costly and not all counties chose to make the investment, leading to disparities. Forced by the courts, the state has slowly begun to turn its system around, but the road to reform is long and expensive. Unfortunately, it is too late and the price of reform is too steep. The Commission could come to no other conclusion than to recommend that the state set course for turning all offenders, together with the necessary resources, over to the counties. The cost for the highest risk, highest need offenders is significant. Resources can be re-directed from state savings, but must be dedicated and stable so that counties can build the programs and infrastructure to do what the state could not. As the state moves toward this end, leadership to ensure a statewide continuum of juvenile justice programs and services, and oversight to ensure that counties spend new money wisely, will be more important than ever. To accomplish this, the Commission recommends the state establish an Office of Juvenile Justice to ensure the new era of juvenile justice in California is one that results in improved public safety and public spending. Californians must get the highest possible return on their investments in juvenile justice policies and programs. 54 THE COMMISSION’S STUDY PROCESS The Commission’s Study Process T he Commission previously examined juvenile justice in its 1994 study, “The Juvenile Crime Challenge: Making Prevention a Priority” and again in its 2001 study, “Never Too Early, Never Too Late to Prevent Youth Crime and Violence.” It also reviewed Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger’s reorganization plan creating the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) in its 2005 report, “Reconstructing Government: A Review of the Governor’s Reorganization Plan Reforming California’s Youth and Adult Corrections Agency.” The Commission initiated this study in the fall of 2007 to review the realignment of California’s juvenile justice system, through the examination of both the shift in responsibility from the state to the counties for the majority of juvenile offenders and the role and responsibilities of the state for the most serious and violent juvenile offenders. This study also served as an opportunity for the Commission to return to the oversight role that it committed to following its 2005 review of the reorganization plan creating CDCR. In pursuing its study, the Commission convened two public hearings and a number of site visits. At the first public hearing, held in November 2007, youth advocates discussed the major events that led up to the realignment as well as the challenges and opportunities that the shift presented. The Commission also heard from a panel of chief probation officers who shared their perspectives on implementation, as well as from the chief deputy secretary of juvenile justice from the CDCR and the executive director of the Corrections Standards Authority who discussed the roles of each organization in the realignment. The second hearing, in February 2008, brought together a national expert who discussed evidence-based corrections practices for juvenile offenders; a researcher who specializes in data collection and analysis of California juvenile justice programs; representatives of key local officials, including judges, district attorneys and county officials; and, two members of the State Commission on Juvenile Justice. In addition to the public hearings, the Commission’s Juvenile Justice Subcommittee visited county-run juvenile justice facilities in Orange 55 LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION County in November 2007 and in San Mateo County in January 2008. The subcommittee also visited the state-run Heman G. Stark Youth Correctional Facility in Chino in January 2008. Commission staff also visited Sacramento County’s juvenile facilities in December 2007. Commission staff received valuable feedback from a number of experts representing various components of California’s juvenile justice system as well as from experts in other states. Hearing witnesses are listed in Appendix A. The Commission greatly benefited from the contributions of all who shared their expertise, but the findings and recommendations in this report are the Commission’s own. All written testimony submitted electronically for each of the hearings, and this report is available online at the Commission Web site, www.lhc.ca.gov. 56 APPENDICES & NOTES Appendices & Notes (cid:57) Public Hearing Witnesses (cid:57) List of 707(b) Offenses (cid:57) Summary of County Juvenile Justice Development Plans (cid:57) Major Sources of Funding for California’s Local Juvenile Justice Programs and Services (cid:57) Selected Acronyms (cid:57) Commissioner David A. Schwarz Comments (cid:57) Notes 57 LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION 58 APPENDICES & NOTES Appendix A Little Hoover Commission Public Hearing Witnesses Witnesses Appearing at Little Hoover Commission Public Hearing on Juvenile Justice, November 15, 2007 Kim Barrett, Chief Probation Officer, San Dan Macallair, Executive Director, Center Luis Obispo County and President, Chief on Juvenile and Criminal Justice Probation Officers of California Don Specter, Executive Director, Prison Donald H. Blevins, Chief Probation Officer, Law Office County of Alameda Verne Speirs, Chief Probation Officer, Sue Burrell, Staff Attorney, Youth Law Sacramento County Center Bernard Warner, Chief Deputy Secretary for C. Scott Harris, Executive Director, Juvenile Justice, California Department of Corrections Standards Authority Corrections and Rehabilitation and Tri- Chair, State Commission on Juvenile Justice Witnesses Appearing at Little Hoover Commission Public Hearing on Juvenile Justice, February 28, 2008 Steve Aos, Assistant Director, Washington Rick Lewkowitz, Supervising Deputy State Institute for Public Policy District Attorney, Sacramento County District Attorney’s Office, Juvenile Division Penelope Clarke, Administrator, Countywide Services Agency, County of The Honorable Kenneth G. Peterson, Sacramento and Tri-Chair, State Presiding Juvenile Court Judge, Superior Commission on Juvenile Justice Court of California, County of Sacramento Karen Hennigan, Director, Center for David Steinhart, Director, Juvenile Justice Research on Crime and Social Control, Program, Commonweal, and Member, State Department of Psychology, University of Commission on Juvenile Justice Southern California 59 LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION 60 APPENDICES & NOTES Appendix B List of 707(b) Offenses Eligibility for Commitment California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Facilities (DJF) Welfare and Institutions Code § 1731.5(a)(1) Offenses listed in W&I § 707(b) and PC § 290(d)(3) By Senate Bill 81 and Assembly Bill 191 LISTED NUMERICALLY BY CODE SECTION Qualifying § Crime Crime Code § 707(b)(19) Witness intimidation 136.1, 137 PC 707(b)(21) Violent gang felony 186.22(b) PC + 667.5 PC 707(b)(1) Murder 187 PC 707(b)(30) Manslaughter, voluntary 192(a) 707(b)(24) Mayhem, aggravated 205 PC 707(b)(23) Torture 206, 206.1 PC 290(d)(3)© Kidnap with intent to commit rape, sodomy, 207(a) PC + sexual purpose child molest, oral copulation or penetration with a foreign object 707(b)(11) Kidnap with bodily harm 207(a) PC + bodily harm 290(d)(3)© Kidnap by enticement to molest 207(b) PC 707(b)(26) [No such section] 208(d) PC 707(b)(9) Kidnap for ransom 209(a) PC 707(b)(10) Kidnap for robbery 209(b)(1) PC 290(d)(3)© Kidnap with intent to commit rape, sodomy, 209(b)(1) PC child molest, oral copulation or penetration with a foreign object 707(b)(27) Kidnapping for carjacking 209.5 PC 707(b)(3) Robbery 211 PC 707(b)(25) Carjacking while armed with weapon 215 PC + “armed” with weapon 290(d)(3)(A) Assault with intent to commit specified sexual 220 PC offenses Qualifying § Crime Crime Code § 707(b)(14) Assault by means of force likely to produce 245(a)(1) PC great bodily injury 707(b)(13) Assault with firearm 245(a)(2) PC 707(b)(15) Shooting into inhabited building 246 PC 290(d)(3)(B) Rape of victim incapable of consent 261(a)(1) PC 707(b)(4) Rape by force or violence or threat of great 261(a)(2) PC 290(d)(3)(B) bodily harm 61 LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION 290(d)(3)(B) Rape of intoxicated victim 261(a)(3) PC 290(d)(3)(B) Rape of unconscious victim 261(a)(4) PC 290(d)(3)(B) Rape by threat of future retaliation 261(a)(6) PC 290(d)(3)(B) Sexual offense in concert 264.1 PC 290(d)(3)(B) Sexual assault by false pretenses 266c PC 290(d)(3)(B) Abduction of minor for prostitution 267 PC 290(d)(3)(B) Sodomy with minor 286(b)(1) PC 290(d)(3)(B) Sodomy of child under 14, 10 years younger 286©(1) PC 707(b)(5) Sodomy by force, violence, duress, menace or 286©(2) PC 290(d)(3)(B) threat of great bodily harm 290(d)(3)(B) Sodomy in concert 286(d) PC 290(d)(3)(B) Child molest of child under 14 288(a) PC 707(b)(6) Child molest by force, violence, duress, menace 288(b) PC 290(d)(3)(B) or fear of great bodily harm 290(d)(3)(B) Child molest of 14-15 year old child 288©(1) PC 290(d)(3)(B) Continuous child molest 288.5 PC 290(d)(3)(B) Oral copulation with child under 18 288a(b)(1) PC 290(d)(3)(B) Oral copulation of child under 14, 10 years 288a©(1) PC younger 707(b)(7) Oral copulation by force, violence, duress, 288a©(2) PC 290(d)(3)(B) menace or threat of great bodily harm 290(d)(3)(B) Oral copulation in concert 288a(d) PC 707(b)(8) Penetration with a foreign object 289(a) PC 290(d)(3)(B) 707(b)(2) Arson 451(a) or (b) PC 290(d)(3)(B) Annoy/molest child under 18 647.6 PC 707(b)(12) Attempted murder 664/187 PC 707(b)(22) Escape from juvenile hall/ranch by force with 871(b) PC + 12022.7 PC great bodily injury on employee 707(b)(16) Robbery with great bodily injury on elderly or 1203.09(a)(2), 211 PC disabled victim; or attempt; or attempt 62 APPENDICES & NOTES Qualifying § Crime Crime Code § 707(b)(16) Burglary with great bodily injury on elderly or 1203.09(a)(5), 459 PC disabled victim; or attempt 707(b)(16) Rape by force, violence, duress, menace or fear 1203.09(a)(6), 261(a)(2), of bodily injury of spouse with great bodily 262(a)(1) PC injury on elderly or disabled victim; or attempt 707(b)(16) Rape or rape of spouse by threat of retaliation 1203.09(a)(6), 261(a)(6), with great bodily injury on elderly or disabled 262(a)(4) PC victim; or attempt 707(b)(16) Assault with intent to commit robbery or 1203.09(a)(7), 220 PC sodomy with great bodily injury on elderly or disabled victim; or attempt 707(b)(16) Carjacking with great bodily injury on elderly 1203.09(a)(8), 215 PC or disabled victim; or attempt 707(b)(28) Shoot from a vehicle at another who is not in a 12034© PC vehicle 707(b)(13) Assault with destructive device 12303.3, 12308, 12309, 12310 PC 707(b)(29) Explode a device with intent to murder 12308 PC 707(b)(20) Manufacturing or selling ½ ounce or more of 11352, 11379, 11379.6 H&S Schedule II drug (opiates, cocaine, (11055 H&S) methamphetamine, PCP) SPECIAL SITUATIONS: 707(b)(18) Use of prohibited weapon in any felony, 12020(a) PC personal 707(b)(17) Use of a firearm 12022.5, 12022.53 PC Note: Penal Code section 290(d)(3) was deleted by Senate Bill 172, chaptered October 13, 2007. The crimes listed in the former Penal Code section 290(d)(3) are now listed in Penal Code section 290.008(c). However, the sections that provide for commitment to the Division of Juvenile Facilities (Welfare and Institutions Code sections 731(a)(4), 733(c) and 1731.5(a)(1)) were not amended and still refer to the now deleted Penal Code section 290(d)(3). This list was submitted to the Commission by the Honorable Judge Kenneth G. Peterson, Presiding Juvenile Court Judge, Superior Court of California, County of Sacramento, as part of his testimony to the Commission on February 28, 2008. 63 LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION 64 APPENDICES & NOTES Appendix C Summary of County Juvenile Justice Development Plans County Population Total YOBG YOBG Funds Used For The Following Programs & Projection Expected Allocations to Services Ages 10-17 Returnees Counties (0=No, 1=Yes) for Fiscal (through (2007-08) Year 2009) 2006-07 Totals A B C D E F G H Los Angeles 1,348,528 131 $5,460,396 6 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 San Diego 370,356 34 $1,434,647 5 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 Orange 364,624 30 $1,539,093 4 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 San 293,055 51 $1,648,906 8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Bernardino Riverside 291,380 33 $1,814,310 7 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 Santa Clara 196,166 13 $790,663 4 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 Sacramento 177,021 28 $1,103,062 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 Alameda 160,548 27 $730,128 5 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 Fresno 125,334 43 $689,807 4 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 Contra 122,084 9 $443,277 2 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 Costa Kern 112,517 34 $849,966 6 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 Ventura 100,513 27 $389,123 6 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 San Joaquin 98,630 18 $602,322 7 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 Stanislaus 75,547 11 $278,735 5 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 San Mateo 70,226 14 $363,742 8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Tulare 61,646 31 $260,455 7 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 Sonoma 53,756 5 $261,015 6 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 Solano 51,930 3 $409,064 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 Monterey 50,827 21 $185,697 3 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 Santa 47,708 7 $259,089 5 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 Barbara San 41,785 1 $287,150 3 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 Francisco Placer 41,177 3 $147,000 6 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 Merced 36,774 31 $236,877 3 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 San Luis 26,164 1 $100,274 3 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 Obispo Santa Cruz 25,742 1 $94,752 3 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 Butte 23,903 7 $119,232 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 Marin 23,604 0 $103,118 3 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 Imperial 22,554 3 $74,364 5 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 65 LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION County Population Total YOBG YOBG Funds Used For The Following Programs & Projection Expected Allocations to Services Ages 10-17 Returnees Counties (0=No, 1=Yes) for Fiscal (through (2007-08) Year 2009) 2006-07 Totals A B C D E F G H Yolo 22,261 2 $102,919 6 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 El Dorado 21,812 1 $94,387 3 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 Shasta 21,548 8 $90,595 7 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 Madera 20,469 11 $101,441 7 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 Kings 19,617 5 $96,499 5 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 Napa 15,384 3 $92,250 3 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 Humboldt 13,125 0 $58,851 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 Sutter 12,617 1 $58,568 6 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 Nevada 10,746 0 $58,500 3 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 Yuba 10,501 1 $58,500 3 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 Mendocino 9,700 1 $58,500 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 San Benito 8,193 1 $58,500 4 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 Tehama 7,520 5 $58,500 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 Lake 6,546 5 $58,500 3 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 Tuolumne 5,132 0 $58,500 6 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 Siskiyou 4,786 3 $58,500 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 Calaveras 4,651 0 $58,500 8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Glenn 3,789 2 $58,500 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 Amador 3,749 0 $58,500 3 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 Lassen 3,623 3 $58,500 5 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 Del Norte 3,115 1 $58,500 7 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 Colusa 2,895 0 $58,500 4 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 Plumas 2,110 0 $58,500 4 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 Inyo 2,062 0 $58,500 3 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 Mariposa 1,749 0 $58,500 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 Trinity 1,590 0 $58,500 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 Mono 1,420 0 $58,500 3 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 Modoc 1,182 0 $58,500 5 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 Sierra 348 0 $58,500 3 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 Alpine 101 0 $58,500 3 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 Total 4,656,440 670 $22,658,771 34 37 35 38 31 30 9 27 Sources: Number of Total Returnees from the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice. "Non 707(b) Commitments in DJJ Facilities, as of October 14, 2007." Also, Department of Finance. "Population By County Ages 10-17 Projections For Fiscal Year 2006-2007." Data provided by Department of Finance, Demographic Research Unit. Also, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Corrections Standards Authority. County Juvenile Justice Development Plans. 66 APPENDICES & NOTES Youthful Offender Block Grant (YOBG) Fund Categories Totals: The total number of spending categories identified in County Juvenile Justice Development Plans A: Risk and needs assessment tools and evaluations to assist in the identification of appropriate youthful offender dispositions and reentry plans. B: Placements in secure and semi-secure youthful offender rehabilitative facilities and in private residential care programs, with or without foster care waivers, supporting specialized programs for youthful offenders. C: Nonresidential dispositions such as day or evening treatment programs, community service, restitution, and drug-alcohol and other counseling programs based on an offender's assessed risks and needs. D: House arrest, electronic monitoring, and intensive probation supervision programs. E: Reentry and aftercare programs based on individual aftercare plans. F: Capacity building strategies to upgrade the training and qualifications of juvenile justice and probation personnel serving the juvenile justice caseload. G: Regional program and placement networks, including direct brokering and placement locating networks to facilitate out-of-county dispositions for counties lacking programs or facilities. H: Other programs, placements, services, or strategies to be funded by the county's block grant allocation. 67 LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION 68 APPENDICES & NOTES Appendix D Major Sources of Funding for California’s Local Juvenile Justice Programs and Services Source Purpose Amount Available 2007-08 State Juvenile Justice Crime Supports local government to reduce juvenile crime. $119 million116 Prevention Act Juvenile Probation and Camps Supports programs for at-risk youth and juvenile offenders Funding and their families; additionally supports counties that $201.4 million117 operate juvenile camps or ranches. Youthful Offender Block Grant Funding to counties to support realignment. $23.7 million118 Juvenile Mentally Ill Offender Supports local efforts to reduce recidivism and promote $22.3 million119 Crime Reduction Program long-term stability among juvenile mentally ill offenders. Juvenile Justice Community Supports counties or nonprofit organizations that provide Reentry Challenge Grant reentry services for juvenile parolees. Awarded to 5 $9.5 million120 Program counties for use during 2007-2009. Proud Parenting Program Supports community-based organizations and other local agencies to teach parenting skills to at-risk youth and $.837 million121 youth reentering the community from state juvenile facilities. Pupil Retention Block Grant Provides funds to county offices of education and school districts to provide a variety of programming, including after-school programs for students who have been $95.5 million122 incarcerated or who are first-time offenders and are on probation. All counties, except for Alpine, are eligible to receive these funds. Comprehensive Drug Court Provides funds to support a variety of drug court systems, Implementation Act including those for juvenile offenders. The Judicial Council and the California Department of Alcohol and $.809 million123 Drug Programs administer the program. 13 counties support juvenile drug courts with funding from this act. Mental Health Services Act Funds a broad continuum of public mental health services. Prohibits spending on offenders in state facilities unknown124 or on parole, but allows spending on offenders in juvenile detention facilities or on probation. Proposition 98 Education services are funded through Proposition 98, unknown125 including services for juveniles in correctional institutions. State Total > $473 million 69 LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION Federal Juvenile Accountability Block Provides states with funds to support accountability-based $4.02 million126 Grant improvements in state and local juvenile justice systems. Neglected and Delinquent Provides formula grants to state education agencies for State Agency and Local education services for incarcerated youth. $2.52 million127 Educational Agency Program (Title I-D) Delinquency Prevention & Supports state and local efforts to prevent and reduce Intervention Program delinquency and to improve the juvenile justice system. $6.6 million128 (Title II) Only 13 counties received this grant funding. Federal Payments for Foster County probation departments receive administrative Care and Adoption Assistance funding for a variety of activities including determining $193 million129 (Title IV-E) eligibility for foster care, conducting assessments, training, court-related functions and case management. Community Prevention Grants Supports activities that keep at-risk youth and first-time Program (Title V) non-serious offenders from entering the local juvenile $0.75 million130 justice system. Federal Total > $206.9 million Combined Total > $679.9 million Note: This table is meant to document a point-in-time assessment of some of the major funding sources available to California’s counties for juvenile justice programs and services. However, it is not exhaustive for a number of reasons. The amounts of grant awards may change from year to year depending on both federal and state budget climates—what is listed for FY 2007 may not accurately reflect the funding available in FY 2008. The focus of this table is on local grants, but some federal grants fund both state and local programs and services. Additionally, some of the grants listed here are only available to a limited number of counties. The focus also is on funds for youth in the juvenile justice system, but some grants listed also target youth who are at-risk of entering the juvenile justice system. Finally, counties are very creative in tapping into various other grant programs that may not be listed here. 70 APPENDICES & NOTES Appendix E Selected Acronyms ACJJDP – Advisory Committee on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention CDCR – California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation CSA – Corrections Standards Authority CYA – California Youth Authority DJF – Department of Juvenile Facilities DJJ – Division of Juvenile Justice (a commonly-used acronym for two divisions in the Department of Juvenile Facilities) DOJ – Department of Justice JCPSS – Juvenile Court and Probation Statistical System JJCPA – Juvenile Justice Crime Prevention Act (formerly the Schiff-Cardenas Crime Prevention Act of 2000) JPCF – Juvenile Probation and Camps Funding MIOCR – Mentally Ill Offender Crime Reduction Program OCJP – Office of Criminal Justice Planning Proposition 21 – The Juvenile Crime Initiative of 2000 Proposition 63 – The Mental Health Services Act YOBG – Youthful Offender Block Grant 71 LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION 72 APPENDICES & NOTES Appendix F Commissioner David A. Schwarz Comments July 21, 2008 The Honorable Arnold Schwarzenegger Governor of California The Honorable Don Perata The Honorable Dave Cogdill President pro Tempore of the Senate Senate Minority Leader and members of the Senate The Honorable Karen Bass The Honorable Michael Villines Speaker of the Assembly Assembly Minority Leader and members of the Assembly Re: Juvenile Justice Reform: Realigning Responsibilities, Report of the Little Hoover Commission (July 14, 2008) Dear Governor Schwarzenegger and Members of the Legislature: I agree with many of the conclusions in the Commission's Report, Juvenile Justice Reform: Realigning Responsibilities (the "Report"), in particular the recommendation to create a Governor's Office of Juvenile Justice separate from the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation ("CDCR"). At this moment, the most urgent issue to be addressed is how the counties will cope with implementation of Senate Bill ("SB") 81, and what the state can do to assist the counties to meet the challenges of juvenile justice realignment. Those challenges are great: As Judge Kenneth Peterson stated, "[u]nless there is a timely, significant – and I fear, unlikely – increase in sophisticated and secure treatment facilities at the local level, the judges will make the same finding that there is no effective or appropriate facility or program for the young person, but will have no answer to solve the problem." February 5, 2008 Written Testimony by Judge Kenneth G. Peterson, Presiding Judge of the Juvenile Court, Superior Court of California, County of Sacramento ("Peterson Testimony"), at 5. I express concerns as to two conclusions reached in the Report. First, the Commission recommends that the state should eliminate its juvenile justice operations by 2011, with the counties assuming these responsibilities. That conclusion is based on the observation that the state is struggling to meet the judicially-imposed standards for running juvenile offender facilities, the high recidivism rate of offenders who are sent to a state facility, and the significant costs involved with housing and treating a diminishing number of offenders. 73 LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION However, I remain concerned as to whether the counties can succeed where CDCR has failed in the past, or that the state should abdicate this core public safety responsibility. The proposed three year transition to the counties for the responsibility of housing those that otherwise are sent to state juvenile facilities – typically the most dangerous or most problematic offenders – will add significant burdens to the counties. SB 81 is already placing the counties under the tremendous burden of dealing with certain high- risk or special needs offenders, while eliminating the alternative to sending certain of these individuals to a state facility. Many counties are not equipped to supervise and treat wards who displayed behaviors that caused Juvenile Court judges to conclude that they could not be treated in community, county, or out-of-state facilities; that is why, as a last resort, they were sent to a state facility. The Report recognizes this reality. See Report at 47. Most county juvenile justice programs "are designed for youth under 18 years of age and the program duration in county facilities is typically 90 days or a year, for even the most serious offenders." Report at 47. Thus, counties will have to fundamentally retool themselves to deal with the hardest cases, adding to their rehabilitative model of short-term care and community supervision the responsibility of housing dangerous or mentally incompetent offenders, for whom early release is simply not an option. Some of the counties lack the staff, experience, mandate, or guaranteed (and adequate) financial resources to provide these wards a constitutionally-required level of care. There will always be a subset of juvenile offenders for whom long-term incarceration is the only option. SB 81 still provides state incarceration as an alternative to county custody as to certain juvenile offenders. The elimination of that option may only cause a repeat of the problems which led to the Farrell litigation, but this time on the county level. Some counties are not equipped to meet the minimum requirements for maintaining juvenile facilities, as reflected in the fact that there have been two Department of Justice investigations into county conditions, and two lawsuits brought to address Farrell-like conditions. Those problems may likely magnify as the counties take on increasingly large responsibilities for juvenile incarceration and rehabilitation. The elimination of state facilities may also deprive Juvenile Court judges of a key deterrent tool for recidivist youths. The prospect of remanding a recidivist offender to a state prison can motivate a juvenile to abide by the terms of the lesser sentence, or a term in a less confining institution. He (or she) knows that there will be significant consequences to a parole violation, or to acting out within a facility oriented toward rehabilitation. See Peterson Testimony, at 8.i Eliminating the threat of incarceration in a state facility may also curtail the use of private out-of- state facilities. The ward must agree to be sent to such a facility, and often will only agree to this when given a choice between a state prison or an assignment to a facility in Pennsylvania or Nevada. Once that choice is eliminated, youths will be told by their public defender that they i As Judge Peterson notes, since the adoption of SB 81, "some minors have intentionally 'sabotaged' their commitment to the county's last-resort ranch/camp option under the belief that there is nothing else the Juvenile Court can do to them. The ranch program returned those minors to court as ranch failures, leaving the court with no effective follow-up option. Young people, even reasonably well-adjusted ones, are famous for testing limits. It is likely that there will be some effect of this sort in other cases now that the prohibition on commitment to a state facility for most offenses has been established. Probation Officers will see some there-is-nothing-you-can-do-to-me attitudes among their most recalcitrant wards. Then what?" Id. 74 APPENDICES & NOTES don't have to opt for this solution; they will go to a county or regional facility, which may not be equipped to handle them, or which may be overcrowded, in part because the option of out-of- state (or state correctional) facilities has been eliminated. There is also the subsidiary, but no less important, issue of whether a county facility, or a regional facility, can be required to house a juvenile sent to it from another county. As Judge Peterson noted, the Juvenile Court has the power to order a ward to a facility, but does not have the power to keep them there, if that county refuses to take the offender, or sends him back for bad behavior, or a shortage of beds. What is to happen to that offender, if the alternative of state incarceration – where there is little choice but to accept the ward – is eliminated? However serious may be the continuing problems within CDCR, we acknowledge that some progress is being made to address the issues raised in the Farrell litigation. See Report at 43. Bernard Warner, Chief Deputy Secretary for Juvenile Justice, CDCR, testified that one of the consequences of SB 81's realignment will be to reduce, perhaps dramatically, the number of inmates in state facilities. This may, in his opinion, facilitate the ability of the state to meet the goals of the Farrell consent decree, while at the same time reducing the overall costs to house and treat wards. Certain state facilities will be closed; those that remain open can be the focus of reform efforts. We have already seen that one facility, the O.H. Close (Youth Correctional Facility) "has been singled out as exemplary by a consensus of the experts, where youth are benefiting from its substantial compliance with the remedial plans. Some of the experts have reported that the Southern Youth Correctional Reception Center and Clinic may be making comparable progress under the remedial plans, with comparable benefits for youth." Report at 43. Finally, the transition of responsibilities to the counties won't eliminate CDCR's on-going obligation to comply with the Farrell consent decree. Absent a dramatic, coordinated, and court- approved shift from the state to the counties, CDCR will still have to meet the requirements of the court's order, and it will have to do it, soon. That effort is on-going, and will continue to be subject to court jurisdiction. Significant monies have been dedicated to meeting the goals of the consent decree, and I suspect that implementation of the required reforms will not be shelved while the state waits for new regional facilities to be constructed. The continuum of care mandated by the Farrell consent decree goes well beyond addressing facilities problems; there is every reason to believe that the court will require no less compliance (under court supervision), in the event an effort is made to shift responsibilities from the state to the counties, or a consortium of counties. The proposed Office of Juvenile Justice may be exactly what is needed for the state to meet the Farrell requirements, and to avoid a receivership: An organization reporting directly to the Governor’s Office, which has no other priority or mission than juvenile justice and rehabilitation. That does not lead, however, to the conclusion that the state should, in essence, get out of the business of incarcerating youth offenders, or that the counties can meet these needs. Second, the Report recommends that the Governor's Office of Juvenile Justice be given some oversight as to the funding and outcomes to be implemented on the county levels, using General 75 LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION Fund allocations. This would, in other words, split (or perhaps dilute) oversight between this new organization and the Correctional Standards Agency ("CSA"). At present CSA is charged with setting standards, monitoring county juvenile facilities and enforcing standards compliance. As the Report notes, CSA has not done an exemplary job in this regard, as reflected by the numerous litigations and U.S. Department of Justice investigations into county facilities which CSA is supposed to monitor. The Report also notes that CSA was given a very limited oversight role in the realignment. As the Commission did not directly consider CSA's role under a realigned juvenile justice system, it remains an issue to watch carefully. What we do know about CSA does not support the conclusion that it can provide the necessary oversight and enforcement of minimum standards at present. Yet such oversight will be even more critical in the context of any proposal to transfer all correctional housing responsibilities to the counties. Removing juvenile justice responsibilities from CDCR, and placing supervision of its facilities under a stand alone organization makes sense. That could be part of the mandate of the proposed Office of Juvenile Justice, provided it is given oversight and enforcement responsibilities over county or regional facilities. An office dedicated to state-wide standards setting, with licensing authority, enforcement powers, and the mandate to operate a limited number of state facilities, presents an opportunity to assemble in one organization the spectrum of expertise – mental health, drug rehabilitation, therapeutic alternatives for developmentally disabled, and correctional expertise specific to a youth population – seems to be a more plausible alternative to the elimination of the state’s juvenile justice operations and putting these responsibilities at the county level. In this regard, the recommendation does not go far enough. While it proposes consolidation of certain programs and services into the Office of Juvenile Justice, it stops short of giving that new organization the authority to set standards and to enforce them. Instead, it proposes to split oversight between the new Office of Juvenile Justice and the CSA. As noted, this balkanization of oversight and enforcement may dilute the power of the new organization we propose. A consistent theme heard from both the probation chiefs and the public interest advocates is that there is no enforcement mechanism to put "teeth" into the requirements of meeting certain minimum standards for juvenile correctional facilities. The probation chiefs would welcome state-imposed standards, whether through licensing or some other mechanism. It would give them a more powerful basis to negotiate a budget with their County Board of Supervisors that is sufficient to meet the requirements imposed by a state enforcement authority. As the Report notes, many problems have been allowed to persist because the Attorney General has taken the position that state juvenile facilities regulations are unenforceable. Report at 33. As Sue Burrell of the Youth Law Center testified, the only "enforcement" mechanism is public interest (or federal agency) litigation. That's a cumbersome, inefficient, and uncertain avenue to resolve serious problems, and when "successful," places the correctional system under the mandate of a consent decree or a receiver. We have seen the consequences of these outcomes in the area of health care to our adult prison population, which are not only costly, but reflect the state's inability to address its own problems short of litigation. 76 APPENDICES & NOTES In the long run, it may be that the only way to achieve the management of regional facilities is under the supervision of a state organization, with standard setting and enforcement powers, dedicated funding, a full-time staff, and the ability to achieve economies of scale within an organizational framework that has the expertise to provide mental health, rehabilitative training, therapeutic programs, and experience in incarcerated environments, to address issues such as gang violence and inmate discipline. I believe that certain of the course corrections proposed by the Commission – in particular decoupling juvenile justice oversight and program administration from CDCR – are a critical step in the right direction. We ought to see if they work before the state abdicates this responsibility, and leaves to the counties the task of fixing the problem. 77 LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION 78 APPENDICES & NOTES Notes 1. California Department of Finance. “Governor’s Budget 2008-09.” Sacramento, CA. Also, California Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice. “Monthly Population Report as of June 30, 2008.” http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Divisions_Boards/CSA/SAG/Index.html. Accessed July 11, 2008. Also, Karen Hennigan, et al, University of Southern California Center for Research on Crime. April 18, 2007. “Juvenile Justice Data Project: Summary Report.” Los Angeles, CA. 2. California Department of Finance. See endnote 1. “Summary of Adult and Juvenile Per Capita Costs and Staff Ratios.” 3. Brandon Bailey and Griff Palmer. October 17, 2004. “Where Hope is Locked Away: High Re-arrest Rate: Three-Fourths of Wards Released Over 13 Years Held on New Charges.” San Jose Mercury News. According to the news article, in 2004, what was then the California Youth Authority conducted a computerized review of Department of Justice Arrest records for more than 28,000 wards who were released from CYA institutions from 1988 through 2000. The study counted any ward arrested on a new criminal charge, but excluded those sent back to CYA for technical parole violations. Other research, with varying time frames and definitions of recidivism have shown rates varying from 91 to 47.3 percent. Cited in Michele Byrnes, Daniel Macallair and Andrea D. Shorter. August 2002. “Aftercare as an Afterthought: Reentry and the California Youth Authority.” Prepared for the California State Senate Joint Committee on Prison and Construction Operations. 4. Barry Krisberg, President, National Council on Crime and Delinquency. December 23, 2003. “General Corrections Review of the California Youth Authority.” http://prisonlaw.com/pdfs/CYA5.pdf. Accessed June 10, 2008. This report was filed with the court in February 2004. 5. Consent Decree. Farrell v. Allen. Filed November 19, 2004. Superior Court of California, County of Alameda. http://prisonlaw.com/pdfs/farrellcd2.pdf. Accessed June 10, 2008. 6. California Department of Finance. See endnote 1. The total 2007-08 budget for the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation was slightly more than $10 billion. Approximately $580 million was allocated for juvenile operations, programs, health care, parole and the Youthful Offender Block Grant. Another approximately $343 million was allocated for other juvenile offender grants programs for local government through the Corrections Standards Authority, also within the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. 7. California Department of Finance. “Governor’s Budget 1998-99” and “Governor’s Budget 2008-09.” Sacramento, CA. Also, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Department of the Youth Authority. 2005. “A Comparison of the Youth Authority’s Institution and Parole Populations June 30 Each Year, 1996-2005.” Also, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice. “Monthly Population Report as of June 30, 2008.” http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/research_tips.html. Accessed July 11, 2008. 8. California Department of Finance. See endnote 1. Also, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice. “Monthly 79 LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION Population Report as of June 30, 2008.” Also, April 2008. Monthly Population Trends. http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/research_tips.html. Accessed July 11, 2008. 9. Legislative Analyst’s Office. May 2004. “A Review of California Youth Authority’s Infrastructure.” Also, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. November 30, 2005. “Reforming California’s Juvenile Corrections System. Farrell v. Hickman. Safety & Welfare Remedial Plan.” 10. Associated Press. “Missouri Set Example in Juvenile Rehabilitation.” December 30, 2007. Columbia Herald Tribune. Also, Mark D. Steward, director, Missouri Youth Services Institute. January 20, 2008. Meeting with Commission staff. Sacramento, CA. 11. California Administrative Office of the Courts and California State Association of Counties. June 2003. “Probation Services Task Force: Final Report.” Page 2. 12. California Department of Finance. “Governor’s Revised Budget 2008-09.” http://www.ebudget.ca.gov/pdf/Revised/BudgetSummary/FullBudgetSummary .pdf. Accessed June 20, 2008. Also, Legislative Analyst’s Office. May 19, 2008. “Overview of the 2008-09 May Revision.” http://www.lao.ca.gov/2008/bud/may_revise/may_revise_051908.pdf. Accessed June 20, 2008. The Governor’s May Revision indicates a budget gap of $17.2 billion but includes a reserve of $2 billion. The Legislative Analyst’s review states that there is a remaining budget shortfall of $15 billion and generally agrees with the overall revenue and expenditure estimates outlined in the Governor’s May Revision. 13. Karen Hennigan, et al. See endnote 1. 14. Karen Hennigan, et al. See endnote 1. 15. California Department of Justice, Criminal Justice Statistics Center. “Juvenile Justice in California 2005.” 16. California Department of Justice, Criminal Justice Statistics Center. See endnote 15. 17. Solano County. “Department Description and Functionality.” http://www.solanocounty.com/Department/Department.asp?NavID=85. Accessed June 18, 2008. 18. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Department of the Youth Authority. 2005. “A Comparison of the Youth Authority’s Institution and Parole Populations June 30 Each Year, 1996-2005.” Also, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice. “Monthly Population Report as of June 30, 2008.” http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/research_tips.html. Accessed July 11, 2008. 19. SB 681 (Alquist, Campbell and Hurtt), Chapter 6, Statutes of 1996. 20. California Welfare and Institutions Code, Sections 912-912.5. 21. AB 1913 (Cardenas), Chapter 353, Statutes of 2000. Bill text. Also, AB 1913 (Cardenas), Chapter 353, Statutes of 2000. Bill analysis. March 23, 2000. Page 5. Author’s Statement. 22. Office of the Attorney General. California Department of Justice. Criminal Justice Statistics Center. “Juvenile Felony Arrests by Gender, Offense and Arrest Rate Statewide.” May 29, 2008. Written communication. On file. 80 APPENDICES & NOTES 23. Barry Krisberg, President, National Council on Crime and Delinquency. October 21, 2007. “Current State of California’s Youth Corrections.” Conference presentation. Critical Juncture – Innovative Solutions for Addressing the Impact of Youth and Adult Incarceration in Our Communities. Also, Barry Krisberg. December 2003. “General Corrections Review of the California Youth Authority.” http://www.prisonlaw.com/pdfs/CYA5.pdf. Accessed October 22, 2007. 24. Sara Norman, Prison Law Office. October 26, 2007. “Plaintiff’s Amended Case Management Conference Statement.” 25. SB 77 (Ducheny), Chapter 171, Statutes of 2007. 26. California Department of Finance. See endnote 1. 27. SB 81 (Committee on Budget and Fiscal Review), Chapter 175, Statutes of 2007. Also, The Honorable Kenneth G. Peterson, Presiding Juvenile Court Judge, Superior Court of California, County of Sacramento. Written testimony to the Commission. February 28, 2008. In his written testimony, Judge Peterson points out that Penal Code Section 290 (d)(3), referred to in Welfare and Institutions Code 733 which was amended by SB 81, no longer exists. The offenses formerly listed in Section 290 (d)(3) are now listed in Penal Code 290.008(c). 28. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice. June 26, 2008. “SB81/AB191 Status Update.” Written materials provided at the June 26, 2008 State Commission on Juvenile Justice meeting. Sacramento, CA. 29. SB 81 (Committee on Budget and Fiscal Review). See endnote 27. 30. Amy L. Jarvis, Principal Program Budget Analyst, Department of Finance. January 30, 2008. Written communication. On file. 31. Amy L. Jarvis. See endnote 30. 32. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. “Non 707(b) Commitments in DJJ Facilities, Anticipated Parole Board Date as of October 14, 2007.” Document provided to the Commission by Rachel Rios at the October 2007 hearing. (29 counties had either one or zero Non 707(b) offenders.) Also, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. September 30, 2007. “Characteristics of Population.” http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/docs/research/SEP2007- CHARACTERISTICS.pdf. Accessed June 20, 2008. As of September 30, 2007, shortly after SB 81 was enacted, the total number of juvenile offenders in state facilities from these three counties was as follows: San Francisco, 11; San Luis Obispo, 6; and, Santa Cruz, 6. 33. SB 81 (Committee on Budget and Fiscal Review). See endnote 27. Article 2. Sec. 1961. 34. Juvenile Justice Development Plans. Submitted to Corrections Standards Authority by 58 California counties and provided to the Commission by the Corrections Standards Authority. 35. Executive Steering Committee SB 81 Local Youthful Offender Rehabilitative Facility Construction Funding Program. June 9, 2008. Meeting discussion. 36. Karen Hennigan, et al. See endnote 1. 95 percent of all juvenile offenders are supervised at the county level. 37. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice. “Monthly Population Report as of June 30, 2008.” Also, April 2008. 81 LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION Monthly Population Trends. http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/research_tips.html. Accessed June 20, 2008. 38. AB 1757 (Budget Committee), Chapter 229, Statutes of 2003. 39. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. “State Advisory Committee on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (SACJJDP/SAG).” http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Divisions_Boards/CSA/SAG/Index.html. Accessed June 10, 2008. 40. California Welfare and Institutions Code, Section 1798.5. Also, SB 737 (Romero), Chapter 10, Statutes of 2005. 41. California Welfare and Institutions Code, Section 1960.5. 42. California Department of Finance. See endnote 1. 43. JABG $4.02 million; Title I-D $2.52 million; Title II $6.6 million and Title V $.75 million. Also, California Department of Finance. See endnote 1. Also, AB 1913 (Cardenas). See endnote 21. Also, Legislative Analyst’s Office. 2008-09 Analysis. Major Issues: Judicial & Criminal Justice. Also, AB 139. Chapter 74, Statutes of 2005. Also, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Corrections Standards Authority. “JPCF Program Overview.” Also, SB 81 (Committee on Budget and Fiscal Review). See endnote 27. Also, Todd Jerue, Program Budget Manager and Amy Jarvis, Principal Program Budget Analyst, Department of Finance. January 23, 2008. Written communication. Also, Senate Budget Subcommittee 4. Public hearing. April 17, 2008. Also, Corrections Standards Authority. June 3, 2008. Written communication to the Commission. 44. California Department of Finance. May 14, 2008. “Governor’s Budget May Revision 2008-09.” Also, Legislative Analyst Office. May 19, 2008. “Overview of the 2008-09 May Revision.” 45. California Department of Finance. “Governor’s Budget 2008-09.” and “Governor’s Budget May Revision 2008-09.” Sacramento, CA. 46. Senate Budget Subcommittee No. 4. May 8, 2008. Budget Hearing. Sacramento, CA. 47. 2008 Conference Committee Actions. July 8, 2008. http://www.assembly.ca.gov/acs/newcomframeset.asp?committee=4. Accessed July 11, 2008. Also, California Department of Finance. “Governor’s Budget 2008-09.” 48. Criminal Penalties and Laws. Public Safety Funding. Statute. Cited as the “Safe Neighborhoods Act: Stop Gang, Gun, and Street Crime.” http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/elections_j.htm. Accessed June 20, 2008. 49. David Steinhart, Director, Juvenile Justice Program, Commonweal. February 28, 2008. Written testimony to the Commission. 50. Elizabeth Hill, Legislative Analyst. January 29, 2008. Letter to Attorney General Jerry Brown. Review of proposed initiative cited as the “Safe Neighborhoods Act: Stop Gang, Gun, and Street Crime.” 51. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice. February 2008. “Spring 2008 Juvenile Institution and Parole Population Projections.” 82 APPENDICES & NOTES 52. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice. February 2008. “Spring 2008 Juvenile Institution and Parole Population Projections.” Also, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Office of Research, Juvenile Justice Branch. September 2007. “Fall 2007 Juvenile Population Projections.” 53. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice. September 2007, December 2007 and March 2008. “Characteristics of Population.” 54. Legislative Analyst’s Office. May 2004. “A Review of the California Youth Authority’s Infrastructure.” 55. SB 575 (Calderon), 2007-08 Session. Bill Analysis. July 9, 2007. Senate Committee on Governmental Organization. 56. Senator Ron Calderon. August 25, 2006. “Residents Speakout Over Nelles Prison Plan: A Prisoner in Its Home.” Whittier Daily News. Also, SB 575 (Calderon). See endnote 54. Senate Committee on Governmental Organization. 57. Budget Act of 2005-06, 5225-001-0001, Item 29 (A). (Required CDCR to submit quarterly status reports to the Legislature including a preliminary facilities master plan due in December 2005, which was submitted to the Legislature and a detailed facilities master plan due in March 2006.) 58. Zeke Barlow. May 24, 2008. “Adult Prison Hospital a Possibility: It Could Replace Youth Facility Near Camarillo.” Ventura County Star. 59. Scott Smith. June 17, 2008. “2 Prison Hospitals for San Joaquin.” Stockton Record. 60. Little Hoover Commission. September 1994. “The Juvenile Crime Challenge: Making Prevention a Priority.” Also, Little Hoover Commission. February 2005. “Reconstructing Government: A Review of the Governor’s Reorganization Plan Reforming California’s Youth & Adult Correctional Agency.” 61. Craig Cornett, Consultant, Assembly Appropriations Committee; Diane Cummins, Consultant, Office of the President Pro Tempore; and, Geoff Long, Consultant, Assembly Appropriations Committee. November 28, 2007. Sacramento CA. Personal communication. 62. Dan Macallair, Executive Director, Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice. November 15, 2007. Written testimony to the Commission. Also, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice. September 2007 “Characteristics of Population.” 63. California Welfare and Institutions Code 1705. 64. Farrell v. Hickman Safety & Welfare Planning Team. Christopher Murray, Chris Baird, New Loughran, Fred Mills and John Platt. March 31, 2006. “Safety and Welfare Plan: Implementing Reform in California.” 65. California Welfare and Institutions Code 1960.5. 66. C. Scott Harris. Executive Director, Corrections Standards Authority. November 15, 2008. Written testimony to the Commission. 67. Waters v. CSA. http://www.prisonlaw.com/pdfs/CSAComplaint2.pdf. Accessed June 25, 2008. 68. Steve Aos, Assistant Director, Washington State Institute for Public Policy. February 28, 2008. Written testimony to the Commission. Also, Washington Institute for Public Policy. October 2006. “Evidence-Based Public Policy 83 LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION Options to Reduce Future Prison Construction, Criminal Justice Costs and Crime Rates.” http://www.wsipp.wa.gov. Accessed June 25, 2008. 69. California Welfare and Institutions Code 1951. 70. California Welfare and Institutions Code 1962 b. 71. AB 1913 (Cardenas). See endnote 21. 72. Legislative Analyst’s Office. February 20, 2008. Analysis of the 2008-09 Budget Bill. http://www.lao.ca.gov/analysis_2008/crim_justice/cj_anl08002.aspx#zzee_link _1_1202846137. 73. California Department of Finance. See endnote 1. Also, AB 1913 (Cardenas). See endnote 21. Also, Legislative Analyst’s Office. 2008-09 Analysis. Major Issues: Judicial & Criminal Justice. Also, AB 139 (Committee on Budget), Chapter 74, Statutes of 2005. Also, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Corrections Standards Authority. “JPCF Program Overview.” Also, SB 81 (Committee on Budget and Fiscal Review). See endnote 27. Also, Todd Jerue, Program Budget Manager and Amy Jarvis, Principal Program Budget Analyst, Department of Finance. January 23, 2008. Written communication. Also, Senate Budget Subcommittee 4. Public hearing. April 17, 2008. Also, Corrections Standards Authority. June 3, 2008. Written communication to the Commission. 74. Karen Hennigan, et al. See endnote 1. Also, Karen Hennigan, et al, University of Southern California Center for Research on Crime. February 14, 2008. “Juvenile Justice Data Project: Phase 2 Report: Longitudinal Outcome Indicators for Juvenile Justice Systems in California.” Also, Administrative Office of the Courts, Center for Families, Children & the Courts and Judicial Council of California, Family and Juvenile Law Advisory Committee. April 2008. “Juvenile Delinquency Court Assessment: Probation Officer Report.” http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/cfcc/resources/publications/JuvenileD elinquency.htm. Accessed June 18, 2008. 75. The Honorable Kenneth G. Peterson. See endnote 27. Also, Donald H. Blevins, Chief Probation Officer, County of Alameda and Verne Speirs, Chief Probation Officer, Sacramento County. November 15, 2008. Testimony to the Commission. 76. Sue Burrell, Staff Attorney, Youth Law Center. November 15, 2007. Written testimony to the Commission. 77. Sue Burrell. See endnote 76. 78. Michael Rothfeld, Staff Writer. March 13, 2008. “Judge Acts on Juvenile Hall Conditions.” Los Angeles Times. Also, Don Specter, Executive Director, Prison Law Office. June 5, 2008. Written communication. 79. Sue Burrell. See endnote 76. 80. Kim Barrett, Chief Probation Officer, San Luis Obispo County and President, Chief Probation Officers of California, Donald H. Blevins, Chief Probation Officer, County of Alameda, and Verne Speirs, Chief Probation Officer, Sacramento County. Testimony to the Commission. November 15, 2007. 81. The Honorable Kenneth G. Peterson. See endnote 27. Page 2. (Also see California Welfare and Institutions Code section 734 and In re Teofilio A. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 571, 576.) 82. The Honorable Kenneth G. Peterson. See endnote 27. 84 APPENDICES & NOTES 83. The Honorable Kenneth G. Peterson. See endnote 27. 84. California Department of Finance. See endnote 1. Also, Edsource. February 2008. “California Rankings 2005-06.” http://www.edsource.org/sch_rankings.cfm. Accessed April 8, 2008. (California Average per Pupil Expenditure: $8,486). 85. David Steinhart, Director, Commonweal Juvenile Justice Program. October 26, 2007. Conference presentation. “Juvenile Justice Reform: Forty Years After Gault.” Berkeley Law School Criminal Justice Center. Citing California state budgets, California Department of Finance, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Facilities. ($36,118 – cost per ward in 1996). Also, California Department of Finance. See endnote 1. ($252,000, projected cost per ward in 2008-09). 86. California Welfare and Institutions Code 1700. 87. Little Hoover Commission. February 2005. “Reconstructing Government: A Review of the Governor’s Reorganization Plan: Reforming California’s Youth & Adult Correctional Agency.” 88. Since the July 2005 implementation of the reorganization, there have been four secretaries of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Roderick Hickman led the reorganization effort in 2005. He resigned in February 2006. Jeanne Woodford served as secretary in March and April 2006. James Tilton served as interim secretary and then secretary from April 2006 through May 2008. Matthew Cate was appointed secretary in May 2008. 89. Office of the Governor. October 12, 2007. “Governor Schwarzenegger Announces Appointments.” 90. Barry Krisberg, President, National Council on Crime and Delinquency. March 31, 2006. “Safety & Welfare Plan: Implementing Reform in California.” 91. Farrell v. Tilton. “Plaintiff’s Response to Order to Show Cause Re: Appointment of Receiver and Compliance with Consent Decree and Remedial Plans.” February 11, 2008. Referring to Farrell v. Tilton. “Fifth Report of the Special Master.” Appendix E. October 23, 2007. 92. Farrell v. Tilton. See endnote 89. Page 37. 93. Farrell v. Tilton. See endnote 89. Page 41. 94. Farrell v. Tilton. “Defendant’s Response to Order to Show Cause Re: Appointment of Receiver and Compliance with Consent Decree and Remedial Plans.” April 14, 2008. 95. Seventh Report of Special Master. March 28, 2008. Farrell v. Tilton. 96. Seventh Report of Special Master. See endnote 93. 97. California Department of Finance. See endnote 1. Also, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Juvenile Justice Division. “Monthly Population Report as of June 30, 2008.” Also, “Monthly Population Report as of April 30, 2008.” 98. California Department of Finance. See endnote 1. 99. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Spring 2008 Juvenile Institution and Parole Population Projections Fiscal Years 2007-08 through 2011-12. February 2008. CDCR projects the population by the end of fiscal year 2008-09 would be 1,731 and the parole population will be 1,758. With no additional changes in law or significant changes in local commitment practices, 85 LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION CDCR anticipates the juvenile offender population supervised at the state level will slowly decrease to 1,427 in facilities and 1,240 on parole. 100. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice. March 31, 2006. “Safety and Welfare Plan: Implementing Reform in California.” Pages 1 and 38. 101. Legislative Analyst’s Office. May 2004. “A Review of the California Youth Authority’s Infrastructure.” 102. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. November 30, 2005. “Reforming California’s Juvenile Corrections System. Farrell v. Hickman. Safety and Welfare Remedial Plan.” 103. Budget Act of 2005-06, 5225-001-0001, Item 29 (A). (Required CDCR to submit quarterly status reports to the Legislature including a preliminary facilities master plan due in December 2005, which was submitted to the Legislature and a detailed facilities master plan due in March 2006.) 104. Bernard Warner, Chief Deputy Secretary of Juvenile Justice, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. April 17, 2008. Testimony to Senate Budget Subcommittee No. 4. 105. Ohio Department of Youth Services. www.dys.ohio.gov. Accessed June 25, 2008. 106. Dan Macallair, Executive Director, Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice. November 15, 2007. Written testimony to the Commission. Suggests counties could contract with community-based providers for highly specialized programs. Also, some counties send very few or no offenders to state facilities, thus exhibiting the ability to provide programs and services to a full range of youth offenders. El Dorado County has no youth in state facilities. San Francisco has 10, Santa Cruz has 5, San Luis Obispo has 6 and Yolo has 3. Also, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. “Characteristics of Population.” March 2008. Table 2, Page 1. 107. California Welfare and Institutions Code Section 1000.1. 108. California Welfare and Institutions Code, Section 1766. 109. National Center for Juvenile Justice. State Juvenile Justice Profiles. www.ncjj.org/stateprofiles/overviews.extendedage.asp. Accessed March 28, 2008. (Other states are Montana, Oregon and Wisconsin. Also, Colorado, Hawaii and New Jersey extend juvenile jurisdiction until the full term of the dispositional order.) 110. Little Hoover Commission. November 15, 2006. Corrections Oversight Meeting. 111. David Steinhart, Director, Juvenile Justice Program, Commonweal. May 9, 2008. Written communication. 112. Patrick Griffin. 2007. “National Overviews.” State Juvenile Justice Profiles. Which States Have Blended Sentencing Laws? Pittsburgh, PA. National Center for Juvenile Justice. www.ncjj.org/stateprofiles. Accessed June 19, 2008. 113. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Division of Juvenile Justice. February 2008. “Sprint 2008 Juvenile Institution and Parole Population Projections Fiscal Years 2007-08 through 2011-12.” 114. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Division of Juvenile Justice Research and Information Systems. May 27, 2008. Written communication. On file. 86 APPENDICES & NOTES 115. California Welfare and Institutions Code, Section 202. 116. Legislative Analyst’s Office. “Analysis of the 2008-09 Budget Bill. Judicial & Criminal Justice.” Page D-21. http://www.lao.ca.gov/analysis_2008/crim_justice/crimjust_anl08.pdf. Accessed on May 15, 2008. 117. Corrections Standards Authority, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. “JPCF Program Overview.” http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Divisions_Boards/CSA/CPP/Grants/JPCF/Docs/Overv iew_of_JPCF_Program.pdf. Accessed on May 15, 2008. 118. Office of the Governor. September 12, 2007. Press Release GAAS:722:07. http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Divisions_Boards/CSA/CPP/Grants/YOBG/Docs/YOB G_County_Funding_Awards.pdf. Accessed on May 15, 2008. 119. Corrections Standards Authority California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. “Mentally Ill Offender Crime Reduction Grant Program.” http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Divisions_Boards/CSA/CPP/Grants/MIOCR/MIOCRG. html. Accessed on May 15, 2008. 120. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice. January 16, 2007. “The Juvenile Justice Community Reentry Challenge Grant Program.” Page. 2. http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Divisions_Boards/DJJ/RFP/docs/RFP.pdf. 121. Aaron Long. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. April 8, 2008. Personal communication. 122. California Department of Education. Pupil Retention Block Grant 2007 Funding Results. “Schedule of the First Apportionment.” http://www.cde.ca.gov/fg/fo/r14/documents/prbg07apptsch1.xls. Accessed May 15, 2008. 123. California Department of Alcohol and Drug Programs. June 12, 2008. Written communication. Counties may be supporting additional juvenile drug courts with other state, federal, county or private funding. 124. Department of Mental Health staff. December 21, 2007. Sacramento, CA. Personal communication. Some portion of the Mental Health Services Act (MHSA) funding (totaling $1.5 billion in 2007-08) is used for juvenile offender programs, although the exact amount is unknown. The Department of Mental Health allocated $320.4 million to the Community Services and Supports and $115 million to the Prevention and Early Intervention components of the MHSA in fiscal year 2007-08. While both components can be used for juvenile offenders, the PEI component targets youth in or at-risk of entering the juvenile justice system. 125. Proposition 98 funds educational services, including services for juveniles in correctional institutions. The amount of Proposition 98 funding that is dedicated to serving incarcerated youth is unknown. 126. Lisa Wagoner, Research Associate. Justice Research and Statistics Association. March 6, 2008. Written communication. 127. U.S. Department of Education. March 2008. “Fiscal Year 2001-2009 State Tables for the U.S. Department of Education: State Tables by State.” Page 11. http://www.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/statetables/index.html#update. Accessed on April 4, 2008. 87 LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION 128. Corrections Standards Authority, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Title II Delinquency Prevention & Intervention Program. http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Divisions_Boards/CSA/CPP/Grants/TitleII/TitleIIProje ctDescriptions.html. Accessed on May 15, 2008. 129. Probation Business Managers Association. “PBMA Annual Revenue Survey 2006-2007: Title IV-E Administrative Cost Revenue.” Accessed on May 1, 2008. http://www.cpoc.org/Data/PBMA0607/t4einfo.php. Accessed on May 15, 2008. The amount available is an estimate from Probation Business Managers Association Annual Revenue Survey 2006-2007. 130. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Office of the General Counsel. Washington, D.C. May 15, 2008. OJP FOIA No. 08-00210. 88