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A Review of the Organization and Management of the State "Superfund" Program for Cleaning Up Hazardous Waste Sites

Little Hoover Commission · 61 · 1984-07-01

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INTRODUCTION In tracing the history of the Superfund Program, the Commission discovered that high media visibility and public concern do not necessarily result in a program receiving special treatment or priority attention within State government. In fact, the Commission found that a very convincing argument could be made that the Superfund Program has never been given a fair opportunity to succeed. From the day the Superfund Program was created it continually confronted unnecessary and insurmountable obstacles to success. For three years the program was underfunded, understaffed, and subjected to freezes on hiring, contracting and purchasing. The program was also forced to compete for management attention and adminstrative support within one of the largest and most cumbersome bureaucracies in State government. The limited progress that has been made in identifying and cleaning up hazardous waste sites has been a source of extreme frustration and disappointment. As a result, the Department has been widely criticized and under constant pressure from residents and the Legislature to evaluate known dump sites, complete health studies and accelerate cleanup activities. While this outside pressure has sometimes exacerbated the Department's management problems, it has also led to many incremental improvements. Some of these improvements were made in response to issues raised during the Commission's three hearings. While the Department's past efforts to correct deficiencies and willingness to make further improvements is to be commended, 138 the Commission believes that there is a serious danger in placing too much emphasis on "fine-tuning" specific elements of the Superfund program. Many of the problems documented by the Commission are related to major organizational conflicts; the failure of the State to commit needed resources; and serious management deficiencies linked to the placement of the program within the Department of Health Services. Many of these problems are well beyond the control of the Department and can only be corrected through major reforms. The six broad recommendations presented in this chapter respond to the most serious problems identified by the Commission. Although most of these recommendations will require legislation, there are many management improvements and procedural efficiencies that can be pursued immediately. The Commission believes that the implementation of these six recommendations will result in immediate improvements and lead to the development of an effective program to clean up California's toxic dump sites. RECOMMENDATION 11. THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE SHOULD CREATE AN OFFICE OF SUPERFUND MANAGEMENT WITHIN THE GOVERNOR'S' OFFICE TO: - IMMEDIATELY ACCELERATE THE CLEANUP OF HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES; AND - CENTRALIZE AUTHORITY, ESTABLISH ACCOUNTABILITY, AND IMPROVE COORDINATION WHILE MAJOR REORGANIZATION PROPOSALS ARE CONSIDERED. Since 1981, the Commission has been concerned about the location of the Hazardous Waste Management Program within the Department of Health Services. The Commission's previous hearings on on the proposal to create a new Department of Toxic 139 Substances Control revealed that: • The Department had been unable to devote the attention and resources needed to develop an effective hazardous waste program. • There was a need for improved coordination among the State agencies responsible for the management of hazardous wastes. • The program had been hindered by sluggish administrative support, particularly in personnel .and contracts. Attempts by the Department to reorganize internally and to streamline certain support activities have been largely unsuccessful. Efforts to improve coordination with other State agencies, particularly the State Water Resources Control Board, have also failed to resolve serious problems that have led to confusion and inaction by both agencies. The Commission strongly urges that a special Superfund Management Office be created within the Governor's Office to plan, organize and supervise the work of the State agencies which are responsible for cleaning up toxic dump sites. This Office would be responsible for overseeing the following activities: 1. Developing a multi-year plan to guide the identification, assessment and cleanup of toxic dump sites, and to assess the financial and staff resources needed to carry out an effective cleanup program. 2. Supervising the completion of the Abandoned Site Project. 3. Coordinating the evaluation of all sites identified as potential hazardous waste sites. 4. Revising the ranking system for hazardous waste sites and setting priorities for the allocation of resources. 140 5. Issuing a complete list of all the sites in California which are contaminated with toxic substances and will require cleanup. 6. Establishing strategies for using available Superfund monies as efficiently as possible. One strategy should be to use funds for early and complete characterization of sites, and then developing tough schedules for responsible party negotiations and cleanup work. This would ensure that Superfund monies can be immediately spent by the State if responsible parties fail to take action. 7. Coordinating the approval of cleanup plans by the Department of Health Services, the State Water Resources Control Board, and the Air Resources Board. 8. Designating lead agencies for all cleanup projects, and coordinating the activities of State agencies involved in the cleanup. 9. Coordinating the development of policies to guide clean- up decisions and to protect public health. 10. Coordinating the preparation of a strategy to strengthen the laws and regulations needed to prevent the creation of new Superfund sites. The Office of Superfund Management will provide an opportunity to centralize authority, establish accountability, and improve coordination among State agencies. However, the Commission believes that this can only be accomplished if the Director of the Office reports to the Governor and is given broad administrative authority. 141 The Commission recommends that the Superfund Management Office be established for a two-year period as an interim strategy to improve the effectiveness of the program. During this time serious consideration should be given to major and permanent reorganization of the State's toxics programs. The Commission considered several different options for organizational reform before deciding on the creation of a "Superfund Czar" located within the Governor's Office. These options are discussed below: Superfund Management Board: The State of New York has established a Superfund Management Board for the purpose of developing a strategy for resolving the shortfall in the New York State Superfund. Although the State defines the role of the Board very narrowly, the Commission considered the creation of a Board to fulfill many of the functions previously listed for the Superfund Management Office. Although a Board would offer greater opportunities for public involvement, the Commission decided a Board would be complicated to establish on an interim basis and would not be particularly well suited for the day-to- day coordination responsibilities. Department of Hazardous Wastes: Several witnesses who appeared before the Commission supported the creation of a new Department of Hazardous Waste Management. Proponents argued that the hazardous waste program would function more efficiently and effectively if it was separated from competing Medi-Cal functions. Although the Commission was generally supportive of the concept of a new department, the scope of this study was too 142 limited to make such a recommendation. A more detailed analysis of the State's entire toxic substance control program is required before recommending the creation of a new Department. Expanded Role for the Hazardous Substances Task Force: The Legislative Analyst recommended an expansion of the role of the existing Hazardous Substances Task Force. The Analyst argued that the statutory creation of the Task Force would strengthen efforts initiated by the Governor, while improving legislative involvement in setting priorities for hazardous substances control programs. The functions of the Task Force would be to: • review existing statutes and organizational structure; ~ review budget requests and develop a coordinated budget for the control·of toxic substances; and • develop a comprehensive State plan for the control of toxic substances. The Commission strongly supports a strong and expanded role for the Governor's Task Force. However, the Commission concluded that the Analyst's recommendations were directed more towards the problems of regulating toxic substances than of the delays in cleaning up hazardous waste sites. The Commission also concluded that a task force made up of agency secretaries and department directors would not be able to devote the time and attention needed to oversee the Superfund Program. RECOMMENDATION 12. CALIFORNIA SHOULD IMMEDIATELY DOUBLE THE RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO CLEAN UP TOXIC DUMPS. The Commission concluded that both State and Federal Superfunds are inadequate to clean up sites which are known to be contaminated with hazardous wastes. Although it is currently 143 impossible to estimate the total amount of the revenue shortfall, the Commission believes that California may need at least $400 to $500 million in State revenues during the next 10 years. This amount could be reduced if: 1. The Federal Superfund is authorized at a rate significantly higher than the current fund; or 2. The State improves the legal mechanisms used to increase the amount of monies recovered from responsible parties. In the Governor's Budget for 1984-85, the Administration proposed a $300 million general obligation bond to provide "up- front" funding for contracts to clean up those sites which have been identified as posing the most serious threat to public health and the environment. The Administration predicted that the full cost of the bond issue would be repaid from the State Superfund, federal funds, and collections from responsible parties. However, in a recent analysis of AB 3181, which authorizes the issuance of a $300 million cleanup bond, the Legislative Analyst concluded that a 30-year, $300 million bond which is backed by the full faith and credit of the State would: • result in total costs of $826 million for repayment of the bond principal and interest; and • require the General Fund to support a major portion of the debt service. The Analyst estimated that the Department of Health Services would collect only $251-$497 million from all revenue sources, leaving a General Fund obligation of $329-$575 million. The Commission is extremely concerned that the creation of a general obligation bond may create a large and unfair burden on 144 the general taxpayer. It has long been the policy of the Congress and the California Legislature to require that cleanup activities be financed primarily or entirely by the companies or industries which are responsible for the contamination. Congress limits the taxpayer's share of the Federal Superfund to 12.5%, and the California Legislature structured the State Superfund to be paid entirely by industry. The Commission has concluded that California does not have adequate information upon which to develop long-term financing arrangements to increase the amount of money available for cleaning up contaminated sites. Precipitous adoption of a $300 million bond act, with its accompanying commitment to a long-term public debt which may be as high as $575 million, will severely limit future financing options. In the absence of sufficient information it is difficult to justify locking the State into a course that could make it extremely difficult to raise additional funds if the $300 million bond is inadequate to complete the cleanup of California's toxic dump sites. More information is needed on: • the number of sites which will require cleanup and the costs of cleanup; • the potential for California to receive increased revenues from the Federal Superfund; and • the potential for increasing revenues from responsible parties. Furthermore, the Commission has concluded that many organizational and management changes must occur if any additional funds are to be used effectively. During the past two years the Department has been unable to spend the entire $10 145 million appropriated by the Legislature and has encountered enormous difficulties in awarding and monitoring a small number of cleanup contracts. Therefore, the Commission recommends: A. The Legislature should pass urgency legislation doubling the amount of the Superfund Program from $10 million to $20 million per year. B. The Legislature and the Administration should determine the percentage of cleanup cost activities that should be borne by the general taxpayer prior to developing any long-term financing program for Superfund. C. The Legislature should memorialize Congress to: - increase the amount of the Federal Superfund to a level not less than $1.8 billion per year for each of the next five years; and, - require EPA to award a portion of the Superfund revenues to states under a block grant formula that considers the number of sites in each state. D. The Administration should double the authorized staff positions for site characterization and cleanup within the Department of Health Services, the State Water Resources Control Board, and each of the Regional Water Ouality Control Boards. In addition, the Administration should approve additional resources for the Attorney General's Office to pursue civil and criminal actions to clean up these sites. These recommendations represent a constructive interim step toward resolving the resource shortfall. within the Superfund program. They are designed to help the Legislature and Administration plan and carefully manage the growth of the Superfund program while avoiding many of the problems that have plagued the program .in the past. RECOMMENDATION 13. THE DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH SERVICES SHOULD CREATE A SPECIAL TASK FORCE TO RESOLVE SERIOUS MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS. Many of the problems discussed in this report are the result of bureaucratic delays, inefficiencies, inadequate legal and administrative support, and the failure to develop effective 146 administrative procedures. The Commission believes that many of these problems can be resolved by creating a special task force or management team within the Department. These efforts are not dependent on any major organizational reforms and should begin immediately. The Commission recommends that the Department immediately create a Superfund Management Task Force to consider and follow up on the following recommendations: 1. The Department should immediately assess staffing needs (clerical, professional, technical) to determine the number and type of staff that will be needed to carry out an expanded program. The Department needs to develop detailed job descriptions and workload standards to help determine how many and what type of staff are needed to manage cleanup projects ranging from simple projects like Llano Barrels to complex projects like Aerojet and Stringfellow. 2. The Department should develop guidelines on when and how to conduct site characterizations. Site characterization is the most critical step in determining the risks a site represents to human health and provides the basis for later decisions on cleanup. The Department needs detailed guidelines to ensure that complete site characterizations are performed at the earliest possible date. 3. The Department should prepare a comprehensive staff training and development program for new and existing staff. Most of the staff hired by the Department of Health Services have little previous experience in managing cleanup projects. The Department should design an in-service and continuing education program to help staff develop the expertise needed to manage complex cleanup projects. 4. The Department should assemble a specialized team to prepare and monitor Superfund contracts. The team should include staff who have extensive experience with State public works contracts and at least one full-time attorney. The new team should streamline contracting procedures in the Superfund program, including development of standing contracts for such common and repeated services as posting and fencing of contaminated sites. 147 5. The Department should re-evaluate the job requirements and the qualifications of key management staff to ensure that managers have been appropriately placed. The Department should place greater emphasis on directly relevant experience in determining if current managers are placed in appropriate positions. 6. The Department should create an Advisory Committee to assist the Office of Public Information and Participation in developing a more effective program. The Advisory Commi ttee should include residents living near toxic dumpsites, individuals experienced in community organizing and the health effects of toxic chemical exposure. 7. The Department should develop specific policies to guide decisions on when to construct fences, when and how to notify residents of potential health hazards, when to evacuate residents, and when to supply alternative sources of water. These policies should be developed with the assistance of the Advisory Committee described above and in consultation with Legislative policy committees. 8. The Department should develop a computerized data management system to track the status of all abandoned sites. The tracking system should consolidate all the various lists now used by the Department of Health Services and the Regional Water Quality Control Boards. The system should show which agency has lead responsiblity, the schedule for cleanup and the status of the site. 9. The Department should prepare regulations revising the ranking system for Superfund sites. The new regulations should create a system which is less susceptible to constant change, and should categorize sites as follows: Priority One: Sites which represent an immediate threat to hUman health or have a high potential to contaminate groundwater. Priority Two: Sites which represent a less immediate threat to human health or to the environment. Priority Three: Sites which will require cleanup, but present a limited threat to human health or the environment. 10. The Department should develop a special recruitment program to attract highly qualified candidates into the State's Superfund Program. The Department should actively recruit from all major colleges and universities which offer academic programs in hazardous waste management, and should encourage applications from professionals with experience in private industry. 148 RECOMMENDATION 14. THE LEGISLATURE SHOULD AMEND STATE LAW TO CONFORM TO FEDERAL LAW AND SHOULD CONSIDER ADOPTING PROCEDURES TO ACCELERATE THE COLLECTION OF FUNDS FROM RESPONSIBLE PARTIES. Although we have discussed increased funding and judicial reforms as alternative means of speeding cleanup, neither should be viewed as an exclusive and solely satisfying remedy. Even if the Superfund were amply funded to support a full scale assault by the State on the most hazardous waste sites, the pace of Superfund litigation would have to be accelerated to insure that money for the next phase of site remediation will be available. Without the financial resources made available to the State by court-imposed reimbursement, even the most extravagant levels of funding would soon be exhausted. First, the Commission recommends that the Legislature adopt statutory changes in the definition of responsible parties, and in California's standards and provisions of strict liability to conform to Federal law. Not only would such changes eliminate much of the ambiguity which currently exists in California law, but they would greatly facilitate the coordination and efficiency of joint governmental remediation and enforcement activities. They would also permit California courts to consider the growing body of Federal case law on these often-litigated issues. All of this would accelerate the pace of litigation. Second, the Commission recommends either of two options be taken by the Legislature to expedite the judicial process. The first option is Legislative amendment of current statutes regarding joint and several liability so that they would conform with Federal law. The second option is Legislative adoption of 149 a bifurcated litigation procedure for Superfund cases. The initial phase of the trial would be exclusively concerned with determining, as a matter of fact, the amount of damages being sought and the identities of the responsible parties. Damages would be based upon the cost of site remediation as determined by the site characterizations performed by the Department. Using disposal records, billing records, manifests, contaminant analyses, and other information sources presented by the Department, the court could establish, to the satisfaction of criteria to be set forth in the proposed statute, who the liable parties are. In the second phase of the bifurcated trial, within a specified number of days, the trial judge would determine, for the purpose of assessing damages, the amount of the total cleanup costs to be borne by each of the liable parties. The apportionment would be made on the basis of the approximate quantities of waste which can be attributed to each party on the basis of the existing evidence, and the relative hazards of the waste to public health and the environment. Some degree of judicial license would be anticipated, and provided for, in the statute. Subsequently, after the monies had been paid by the parties to accomplish the cleanup, or reimburse Superfund for its next publicly funded cleanup, a full trial would be held to readjudicate apportionment with greater particularity, or to establish the liability of a previously unidentified party, or to determine the proper contribution of the Superfund to the cleanup costs where there are insolvent liable parties. In short, the 150 fine-tuning of a Superfund enforcement action for damages, which ordinarily can delay a cleanup, could take place after determinations of liability were made, approximate apportionment of costs was allocated, and cleanup was underway. Similar to jOint and several liability, this procedural change would make cleanup monies available immediately upon the determination of liability and the identification of some liable party, or parties, with an ability to pay. Unlike joint and several liability, the court would nQt have the authority to assign the responsibility for site remediation to the defendant with the "deep pocket". This judicial procedure is unconventional. Conventional approaches to litigation, likely to require four to five years to reach a conclusion, may not meet the challenge of Superfund cleanups. RECOMMENDATION 15. THE LEGISLATURE SHOULD REQUIRE THAT ALL EXISTING HAZARDOUS WASTE DISPOSAL FACILITIES MEET THE REQUIREMENTS AND STANDARDS FOR NEW FACILITIES NO LATER THAN 1988. Both State and Federal regulations for hazardous waste facilities differentiate between requirements for new and existing facilities. Existing facilities are "grandfathered" into the regulatory system and have been allowed to operate under "interim status." Although these facilities will eventually be granted full permits, they will be allowed to operate under conditions that the regulatory agencies have determined are inadequate for new facilities. The major concession granted the operators of existing landfills and surface impoundments is an exemption from the requirement that all land disposal facilities should have at 151 least a single liner, and in many cases a double liner, in order to prevent waste migration into soil and groundwater. By allowing these existing facilities to continue to operate in a manner that presents a clear threat to the purity of groundwater, it is almost certain that new contaminated sites will continue to be added to the Superfund list for decades to come. The Legislature should close this regulato'ry loophole by requiring that new and existing facilities be treated equally. Although there will be significant costs associated with bringing these facilities into compliance with new regulations, the Commission believes that these costs are reasonable when compared to the enormous costs of cleaning up a leaking hazardous waste site. RECOMMENDATION 16. THE LEGISLATURE SHOULD REQUIRE THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH SERVICES TO DEVELOP REGULATIONS PROHIBITING THE LAND DISPOSAL OF ALL HAZARDOUS WASTES WHICH PRESENT SERIOUS POTENTIAL RISKS TO HUMAN HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT. In December 1982 the Department of Health Services adopted regulations restricting certain highly toxic wastes from land disposal. These wastes were to be phased out of land disposal facilities between 1983 and 1985 as alternative waste treatment capacity became available. To date, the wastes that have been prohibited from land disposal represent only about 15% of the total volume of wastes currently going to land disposal. Yet there are many other types of waste that should be prohibited from land disposal due to the extreme risks they represent to human health and the environment. 152 Since the Department has made no effort to extend the existing land disposal restrictions, the Legislature should require the Department to prohibit from land disposal all wastes which present serious potential risks to human health and the environment. 153 FOOTNOTES and APPENDICES FOOTNOTES CHAPTER II 1. M. Zelen, S. Lagakos and B. Wesson, Th~ NQburn Study, Department of Biostatistics, Harvard University, in press. 2. Dr. Beverly Paigen, Testimony before the Little Hoover Commission, Berkeley, January 27, 1984. 3. Michael H. Brown, Laying Waste, Pantheon Books, New York, 1979, p. 130. 4. Dr. Raymond Neutra, Testimony before the Little Hoover Commission, Berkeley, January 27, 1984. 5. Toxicity Testing: strategies ~ Determine Needs gng Priorities, National Academy of Sciences, Washington D.C., 1984. CHAPTER III 1. Legislative Analyst's Report on the 1984-85 Budget Revisions prepared by DHS, April 12, 1984 ; and also, Report ~ ~ Legislature regarding Remedial Actions ~ Hazardous Waste Sites, DHS, October 1983. 2. Tom Bailey, Chief of the Program Management Section, Testimony before the Little Hoover Commission, Berkeley, January 27, 1984. 3. Letter from Joel Moskowitz, Deputy Director, Toxic Substances Control Programs, DHS, to Richard Mahan, Executive Director, Little Hoover Commission, January 17, 1984. 4. Legislative Analyst, Analysis .Q.f ~ Budget !till .f..Q.I. .tM Fiscal ~ 1984-85, February 1984. 5. California DHS Application to EPA 3012 Program, Statement of Work, April 29, 1983. 6. Interview with staff, Abandoned Site Project, DHS, May 23, 1984. 7. U.S. EPA, Superfund Status Report, May 4, 1984. 8. Assembly Office of Research, ~ ~ Water ~ tQ Drink, April 1983. 9. Letter from Mohinder Sandhu, Hazardous Waste Management Engineer, DHS, to the Independent Oil Producers' Agency, October 154 27, 1982. 10. Robert Therkelsen, Wildlife Habitat Enhancement of Qil Fields in ~ County, A Publication of the California Division of Oil and Gas, 1973. 11. U.S. EPA Office of Research and Development, ~~ of the Drilling Fluid Hazard Assessment Program Qf ~ ~ EPA, April 1982. 12& Citizens for a Better Environment, San Francisco Office, Toxics Control gt ~ Source, Industrial Pretreatment Qf Waste Prior tQ Disposal ~ Municipal Sewer Systems, by Mike Belliveau, May, 1984. 13. Central Valley Regional water Quality Control Board, Inyentory Qf Wastewater Methods lIQm Agricultural Chemical Operations, Feburary 27, 1981. 14. Tom Harris, "Are Pesticide Firms Dumping Illegally?", Sacramento ~, June 20, 1984. 15. Interview with Ned Therian, former Chief of the Abandoned Site Project, DHS, April 13, 1984. 16. Hazardous Waste Management Branch, DHS, Potential Superfund Candidates = ~ Eyaluation Reports. 17. Phone interview with Arvind Shah, Site Mitigation Unit, DHS, May 29,1984. 18. Phone interview with Arvind Shah, Site Mitigation Unit, DHS, April 20, 1984. CHAPTER IV 1. Section 25l0l(a) of the California Health and Safety Code. 2. Phone interview with Stan Phillippe, Site Mitigation Unit, DHS, June 7, 1984. 3. Dr. Beverly Paigen, Testimony before the Little Hoover Commission, Los Angeles, November 30, 1984. 4. Stan Phillippe, QJ2.. tl.t..a.. 5. K. Shea to B.T. Collins, Governor's Office Memorandum, September 23, 1982. 6. Roxane Arnold, "High Radioactivity Found in Two Wells Near Stringfellow Acid Pits", Los Angeles Times, May 31, 1984. 7. Stan Phillippe, OPe cit. 155 8. Legislative Analyst, Analysis Qf ~ Budget ~ ~ ~ Fiscal ~ 1984-85, February 1984, p. 941. 9. Linnea Samanc, South Bay Chemical Action Network and other community residents from Southern California Superfund sites, Testimony before the Little Hoover Commission, Los Angeles November 30, 1983. Also see, Andrea Turner, Citizen's Action League, Testimony before the Little Hoover Commission, Berkeley, January 27, 1984. 10. Ibid. 11. Ibid. 12. Ibid. 13. Ibid. 14. Hank Martin, California Manufacturers Association. Testimony before the Little Hoover Commission, Torrance, November 30, 1984. 15. Interview with Lloyd Batham, Hazardous Wastelands Determination Unit, DHS, April 18, 1984. 16. Interview with Charles White, Chief, Site Mitigation Unit, DHS, April 22, 1984. CHAPTER V 1. Auditor General, ~ State's Hazardous Waste Management Program; Some Improyement; ~ ~ Needs ~ ~ ~, Transmittal letter from Thomas Hayes to Assemblyman Art Agnos, November 30, 1983. 2. Ibid., page i. 3. Governor's Hazardous Substances Task Force, TOXICS MANAGEMENT IN CALIFORNIA; An Identification Qf Issues; September 1983, page i. 4. Legislative Analyst, ~ 1964-85 Budget: Perspectives and Issues, page 187. 5. Dr. Lester Breslow, Testimony before the Little Hoover Commission on "The Governor's Reorganization Plan No.2, 1981", Sacramento, June 11, 1981. 6. Legislative Analyst, Testimony presented to the Assembly Ways and Means Subcommittee #1, December 14, 1983. 7. Ibid. 156 8. Auditor General, op. ci t. November 1983. 9. Dr. Raymond Neutra, Testimony before the Little Hoover Commission, Berkeley, January 27, 1984. 10. Dr. Beverly Paigen, Testimony before the Little Hoover Commission, Berkeley, January 27, 1984. 11. Dr. Raymond Neutra, op cit. 12. Phone interview with Dr. George Berkowitz, Administrator of the Hazardous Site Mitigation Administration, New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, November 10, 1983. 13. Thomas Bailey, Chief of the Program Management Section, Testimony before the Little Hoover Commission, Berkeley, January 27, 1984. 14. Auditor General: (a) Reyiew Qf Selected Contracts ~ Cleanup Qf ~ Stringfellow Toxic Waste ~, August 1983. (b) OPe cit., November 1983. (c) Letter to Assemblyman Art Agnos, Chairman, Joint Legislative Audit Committee, January 23, 1984. 15. Auditor General, op cit., November 1983, page 27. 16. Thomas Bailey, Chief of the Program Management Section. Testimony before the Little Hoover Commission, Berkeley, January 27, 1984. 17. Auditor General, op cit., January 23, 1984 18. Interview with Glenn Twitchell, Site Mitigation contracts officer, DHS, March 5, 1984. Also, interview with Rich Wilcoxon, Chief, Toxic Substances Control Division, DHS, Mar6h 9, 1984. 19. Auditor General, op cit., January 23, 1984. 20. Phone interview with Brad Parsons, Toxic Substances Control Division, Central Valley Regional Office, DHS, April 19,1984. 21. Phone interview with Carl Overmeier, Sacramento County Department of Health, April 19,1984. 22. Linnea Samanc, South Bay Chemical Action Network, Testimony before the Little Hoover Commission, Los Angeles November 30, 1983. Also, Andrea Turner, Citizen's Action League. Testimony before the Little Hoover Commission, Berkeley, January 27, 1984. 23. Linnea Samanc, OPe ci t. 24. Phone interview with Florence Pearson, Office of Public 157 Information and Participation, DHS, June 5, 1984. 25. Gloria Jennings, Citizen's Action League, Testimony before the Little Hoover Commission, Berkeley, January 27, 1984. 26. Fred Turner, Chief of Office of Public Information and Participation, DHS, Testimony before the Little Hoover Commission, Berkeley, January 27, 1984. 27. Source: document entitled "Little Hoover Questions/Answers (4/84)" received by the Little Hoover Commission from the Office of public Information and Participation, DHS, April 1984. 28. Fred Turner, OPe cit., January 27, 1984. 29. Dede Hapner, Prevention Resource Center. Testimony before the Little Hoover Commission, Berkeley, January 27, 1984. 30. Governor's Hazardous Substances Task Force, op. ci t. 31. Phone interview with Larry Akers, San Diego County Department of Health, May 25, 1984. 32. Maureen Kindall, Chair, Los Angeles City Board of Public Works, Testimony before the Little Hoover Commission, Los Angeles, November 30, 1983. 33. Dr. George Wolfe, Health Officer, County of Santa Cruz. Testimony before the Little Hoover Commission, Berkeley, January 27, 1984. CHAPTER VI 1. Assembly Office of Research, ~ ~ Water ~ tQ Drink?, April 1983. 2. Subcommittee on Commerce, Transportation and Tourism, u.s. House of Respresentatives, Superfund Reauthorization: ~!all Funding Leyels. Mandatory Schedule ~ Cleanup Standards ~ ., Sheet. 3. Samuel Epstein, M.D., Lester Brown and Carl Pope, Hazardous Waste in America, 1982, p. 203. 4. Hazardous Materials Intelligence Report. "Senate holds hearings on Superfund reauthorization." June 1, 1984. 5. Joel Moskowitz, Deputy Director for Toxic Substances Control, DHS, Testimony before the Little Hoover Commission, Berkeley, January 27, 1984. 6. Written correspondance from Congressmen Fazio and Waxman to 158 Assemblyman Art Agnos, May 5, 1984. 7. Legislative Analyst, Analysis Qf the Budget ~ ~ ~ Fiscal ~ 1984-85, February, 1984, p. 936. 8. Ibid, p. 936. 9. Joel Moscowitz, Deputy Director, DHS, Testimony before the Little Hoover Commission, Berkeley, January 27, 1984. 10. Legislative Analyst, Analysis Qf Aa 3181., May 25, 1984. 11. Joel Moscowitz, Ope cit. 12. Ibid. 13. Interview with Charles White, Chief, Site Mitigation Unit, D H S, Apr i 1 2 2, 1 9 84. 14. Antonia K. Vorster, Senior Engineer, Delta Regulatory Unit, Central Valley Water Quality Control Board, memo to Lawrence Pearson, Supervising Engineer, Central Valley Regional Water Quality Control Board Status Qf Water Quality Problems ~ ~ Hazardous Waste in ~ JoaQuin County, April 20, 1984. 15. Donald Robinson, Deputy Attorney General, Testimony before the Little Hoover Commission, Berkeley, January 27, 1984. CHAPTER VIII 1. Federal Register, Volume 46, #24, February 5, 1981. 2. Richard Fortuna, Executive Director, Hazardous waste Treatment Council, Testimony before the Little Hoover Commission, Sacramento, March 29, 1984. 3. David Roe, Senior Attorney, Environmental Defense Fund. Testimony before the Little Hoover Commission, Sacramento, March 29, 1984. 4. Joel Hirschhorn, Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, Testimony before the House of Representatives Government Operations Subcommittee on Environment, Energy and Natural Resources, April 11, 1984. 5. Michael Belliveau, Research Associate, Citizens for a Better Environment, Testimony before the Little Hoover Commission, Sacramento, March 29, 1984. 6. Staff Memorandum, Congressional Office of Technology, Assess~ Qf Groundw~ Protection Standards ~ Hazardous N~ Lgng Disposal Facilities; Hill ~ Prevent ~ Superfund 159 Sites?, April 1984, p.l. 7. Joel Hirschhorn, op cit. 8. Auditor General, ~ State's Hazardous Waste Management Program: Some Improvement ~ ~ Needs tQ ~ ~, November 1983, p. 10. 9. Thomas Hayes, Auditor General, Testimony before the Little Hoover Commission, Torrance, November 30, 1983. 10. Assemblyman Richard Katz, Testimony before the Little Hoover Commission, Sacramento, March 29, 1984. 11. Patricia Schifferle, Assembly Office of Research, Testimony before the Little Hoover Commission, Sacramento, March 29, 1984. 12. u.S General Accounting Office, Interim Report Qn Inspection. Enforcement. gnQ ~itting Activities ~ Hazardous Waste Facilities, Report GAO/RCED-83-24l, September 21, 1983, p. 15. 13. Legislative Analyst, Analysis Qf ~ Budget ~ ~ ~ Fiscal ~ 1984-85, February 1984, p. 923. 14. Richard Wilcoxon, Chief, Division of Toxic Substances Control, DHS, Testimony before the Subcommittee #1, Assembly Ways and Means Committee, May, 1983. 15. U.S. General Accounting Office, OPe cit., page 7. 16. Auditor General, OPe cit., November 1983, p. 17. 17. Auditor General, ~ State Should DQ M~ tQ Reduce ~ Prevent Contamination Qf Water Supplies, April 1984, pp. 18-19. 18. Ibid, p. 34. 19. u.S. General Accounting Office, OPe cit.,' page 2. 20. Ibid, p. 7. 21. Auditor General, op cit., April 1984, p. 14. 22. Division of Toxic Substances Control, DHS, Report ~ ~ Hazardous Waste Management Council Qn Current Hazardous Waste Generation, August 31, 1982. 23. Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies ~ Management Strategies ~ Hazardous Waste Control, March 1983, p. 16. 24. Ibid, p. 6. 25. Assembly Office of Research, Toxic Ponds; Antiguated Methods 160 gng Unacceptable Dangers, April 1984, p.3. 26. Ibid, p. 10. 27. Federal Register, Volume 46, #24, February 5, 1981. 28. Bryant Fischback, Alternative Waste Pisposal Technologies ~ ~ Chemical Industry ~point, Paper presented to the Third National Conference on Hazardous Materials Management, Anaheim, California, March 5, 1981. 29. Office of Appropriate Technology, Alternatives ~ ~ ~ Disposal Qf Hazardous Wastes = An Assessment ~ California, 1981. See also, Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies sng Management Strategies ~ Hazardous Waste Control, March 1983. 30. Department of Health Services, ~ Report ~ ~ Legislature Qn Hazardous Waste Recycling, January 1984. 31. Office of Appropriate Technology, op cit., p. 183. 32. Department of Health Services, Changes in Regulations Qf ~ Department Qf Health Services Regarding Hazardous Waste ~ Disposal Restrictions (R-32-82L Final Statement .Q.f Reasons., November 1982, p. 2. 33. Ibid, p. 23. 34. Office of Appropriate Technology, OPe cit., p. 7. 35. Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, OPe cit., p. 196. 36. Office of Appropriate Technology, OPe cit., pp. 176-178. 37. Richard Fortuna, OPe cit., March 29, 1984. 38. Hazardous Waste Management Council, Draft Hazardous Waste Management ~, January 1984, p. 27. 39. David Roe, OPe cit., March 29,1984. 40. Michael Belliveau, OPe ci t., March 29, 1984. 41. Richard Wilcoxon, Chief, Toxics Substances Control Division, PHS, Testimony before the Little Hoover Commission, Sacramento, March 29, 1984. 42. Governor's Office, Proposed Budget ~ FY 1984-85, January 1984. 43. Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, OPe cit., p. 5. 161 44. Toxics Assessment Group, Report tQ ~ Assembly Office Qf Research Qll ~ ~ Qf Surface Impoundments ~ ~ Treatment. Storage. gng Disposal Qf Hazardous Waste; An Assessment ~ California, 1983. 45. Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, OPe cit., p.6. 46. Ibid. 47. Ibid. 162 APPENDIX I PRIORITY RANKING OF CALIFORNIA SUPERFUND SITES (State/Federal Remedial Action Contract Expenditures) NAME 1984 1983 1982 COUNTY (thousands of dollars - state/federal) Aerojet+ 1 (100/) 2 (500) 3 Stringfellow+ 2 (/3,000) 11 4 (100/6,300) (373/) Iron Mountain Mine+ 3 15 (100/200) (200/) Selma Pressure Treating+ 4 Atlas Asbestos Mine+ 5 Coalinga Asbestos Mine+ 6 (same as Arroyo Pasejaro) Coast Wood Preserving+ 7 8 8 24 7 (100/) 5 5 15 10 16 Liquid Gold+ Purity Oil Sales+ 9 1 14 (40/4,000) (90/700) Alviso San Fernando Valley- North Hollywood Area 10 (600/250) 11 (250/1,500) San Gabriel Ground Water 12 13* Basin Area 1+ (150/1,500) (100/1,000) San Gabriel Ground Water 13 Basin Area 2+ Southern Pacific, Roseville 14 (100/) 3 Sacramento Riverside Shasta Fresno Fresno Fresno Mendocino Contra Costa Fresno Santa Clara Los Angeles Los Angeles Los Angeles Sacramento McColl+ 15 10 1 Orange (400/11,100) (2,900/3,400) (653/) Operating Industries 16 Los Angeles 163 Fairchild Camera and Instrument (250/) 17 18 Del Norte County Pesticide Storage+ (250/250) (150/) MGM Brakes+ Koppers (Oroville)+ IBM Celtor Chemical Works+ San Fernando Valley - Crystal Springs Area San Fernando Valley - Glorietta Area San Fernando Valley - Pollock Area 19 20 (200/) 21 22 (36/) 23 24 25 San Gabriel Ground Water 26 Basin Area 3+ San Gabriel Ground Water 27 Basin Area 4+ Westinghouse, Sunnyvale 28 Pacific States Steel Wickes Forest Products Chevron Chemical/Ortho Valley Wood Preserving 29 30 31 32 Clorox Company 33 Apache Services 34 Southern Pacific, Sacto 35 Locomotive Works Hoopa Veneer 36 Commercial Electroplater 37 Church and Fruit Junkyard 38 9 26 14 (37) 19 20 35 31 37 30 40 22 164 7 11 13 52 21 51 42 12 18 Santa Clara Del Norte Sonoma Butte Santa Clara Humboldt Los Angeles Los Angeles Los Angeles Los Angeles Los Angeles Santa Clara Alameda Solano Contra Costa Stanislaus Alameda San Diego Sacramento Humboldt Fresno Fresno Gardena Sumps Brea Agricultural Services Cal Pacific Lumber Capri Pumping Leviathan Mine Lyle Van Patten Paints Metropolitan Circuits Jibboom Junkyard+ Los Banos Airport H.S. Mann Metals Waste Chatham Brothers El Capitan Hazel Avenue Ponds Metten and Gebhardt Manville Corporation Cal Compact Landfill Hercules Properties Point Isabel Sulfur Bank Mine Zoecon Corporation/ Chipman Chemical 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 (150/) 47 48 49 (100/) 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 Levin Richmond Terminal/59 United Heckathorn Benham and Johnson Balakala Mine 60 61 23 43 12 (1,015/) 41 17 165 4 (25/) 16 (20/) 34 46 32 47 48 27 39 50 38 29 57 33 48 (345/) 49 17 24 (8/) 29 35 23 45 6 38 22 Los Angeles San Joaquin Humboldt Los Angeles Alpine Los Angeles Orange Sacramento Merced Fresno San Diego San Diego Sacramento San Diego Los Angeles Los Angeles Contra Costa Contra Costa Lake San Mateo Contra Costa Kern Shasta Chemical and Pigment 62 51 39 Contra Costa Company Mammoth Mine 63 28 41 Shasta TCL Corporation 64 49 36 Los Angeles Eagle Field Airport 65 Fresno Point Pinole 66 45 37 Contra Costa (Bethlehem Steel) Lyco Chemical 67 Kern ASARCO 68 21 8 Contra Costa Cooper Chemical 69 54 Contra Costa Sun Chemical Corp. 70 53 43 San Mateo Merced Municipal Airport 71 Merced White Rock Road Dump 72 59 Sacramento Walker Mine 73 44 58 Plumas < Pine Logging Camp 74 Fresno Southern Pacific 75 Santa Clara Del Arno Blvd. 76 6 9 Los Angeles (formerly Cadillac (500/) (450/) Fairview) Ascon Landfill 77 Orange Burma Castrol/ 78 Contra Costa Bray Oil Almaden Quicksilver 79 Santa Clara County Park Centex Properties 80 33 54 Contra Costa FMC Newark 81 52 19 Alameda Auburn Sanitary Landfill 82 Placer Westinghouse 83 56 20 Alameda (Emeryville) Wildberg Bros./ 84 42 27 San Mateo Healy Tibbett Plessey Micro Sciences 85 46 Santa Clara 166 Beacon Oil PG&E - Martin Service Center PG&E - Shell Oil Consolidated Iron and Metal Electro Coatings Inc. Koppers Chemical, LA Leslie Salt FMC Richmond Trojan Powder Works ABEX General Electric Valimet Stauffer (Contra Costa) Holaco Llano Barrels Hirshdale Dump Macy's Flying Service Stauffer (Los Angeles) 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 57 25 59 60 55 58 18 36 56 2 40 25 47 34 53 26 28 30 31 32 44 (2ll/) 50 55 60 Kings San Mateo Contra Costa San Francisco Alameda Los Angeles Alameda Contra Costa Alameda Los Angeles Alameda San Joaquin Contra Costa Ventura Los Angeles Nevada Siskiyou Los Angeles SOURCES: 1. Priority Ranking of Hazardous Waste Sites in California, • Department of Health Services, January 1984 2. Report to the Legislature on the Priority Ranking of Hazardous Waste Sites in California, Department of Health Services, February 1983 3. State Superfund Program, Hazardous Waste Sites, 1982, from the Auditor General's Report: "The State's Hazardous Waste Program: Some Improvement, But More Needs to Be Done." 4. Toxic Substances Control Division 1984-85 Workp1an, March 30, 1984 + On the National Priority List for Federal Superfund actions as of August, 1983 167 * This site was split into 4 areas for more precise characterizatione It is suspected that the San Gabriel Groundwater Basin may have been contaminated by several discrete sources. 168 APPEND I ;': I I Abandoned Site Sea~~~ ?~J:ect Counties Survey Cocpleted or Expected to Be Co~pleted by January 1985 Al~'7.eda Bu~~e Cont:-a Costa t:-es:1c Hu.~;:o 1:: ': Ker:1 Ki:;gs :·te!"Ce:: S';!1 :·~:.s ~~':'s;o Sa:1 :':3 teo Sa~~..l C!..3.!'a Sta:;.:.s:".=.LlS Su~-:er Yc:"c Yui:a Venwr3. Sou rce: Abandoned Site Project, CO'..l::-.::'es Survey 3egu:: 3\.:~ Expected to Be Cc::-.:;:::"ec:ed by January 1985 Imperial Los Angeles Riverside San Ber.ito San Ber:iardi:::: San Diego Toxic Substances Control Division Department of Heal th Services 4/84 169 Alpine Acador Calaveras Colusa Del Norte El Ocrac.o Glenn Inyo Lake Lasse!"'. :·:ade!.·,;, :·:a~in Mari?csa ~!e~dcci:-.. ~ ~!odoc r-!ono ~apa ~evada Pl·..1::".as Santa 3a.:-;:3ra Sant.a Cr'..:.= Shasta Sierra Sl.skiyou Sonoma Tehama '!'rinity :'uolur:lne