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Meeting the Needs of California's Homeless: It Takes More than a Roof
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of California
Little Hoover Commission
MEETING THE NEEDS
OF CALIFORNIA'S HOMELESS:
IT TAKES MORE THAN A ROOF
JUNE 1989
Commission on California State Government Organization & Economy
Meeting The Needs Of California's Homeless:
It Takes More Than A Roof
Little Hoover Commission
June 1989
There are several factors that greatly complicate state efforts
to meet the needs of the homeless. As noted in the
Commission's findings:
a Because of diverse funding sources and the resulting
diffused leadership, services provided for the homeless
are fragmented. As a result, some segments of the
homeless population are not served or are served
inadequately.
o The availability of the three main types of homeless
programs (emergency, transitional and permanent) is
uneven, and there is no efficient, coordinated method of
moving the homeless through the different programs.
o Because there is no cohesive approach to a statewide
housing policy, many actions at various levels of
government drive up the cost of housing and/or discourage
the availability of adequate affordable housing.
The Little Hoover Commission has made 13 recommendations to
address the problems cited in the findings. Chief among them
are:
1. The diverse state programs dealing with the homeless
should be unified under the state Health and Welfare
Agency and the state should take an aggressive leadership
role in coordinating services.
2. Homeless Coordinated Intake Centers should be created
throughout the state so that homeless people may apply in
one location for all forms of aid for which they are
eligible. These centers would provide on-going case
management services when they are needed, as well as
coordinating placement in emergency shelters.
3 • Statutes should be amended so that the mentally disabled
homeless can be treated more effectively and more
efficiently without waiting untll they become a threat to
themselves or others.
4. The state should study the interplay of slow-growth
initiatives, locally imposed building fees, general plan
housing elements, rent control and restrictive zoning
practices to determine their effect on the availability
of affordable housing.
After a major natural disaster, such as an earthquake, or a
major man-made upheaval, such as war, it is not surprising when
people are left homeless. But it is shameful in a state such
as California, which is rich in resources and generosity, that
people are left on their own on the streets or in their cars.
California can and should take immediate steps to meet the.
needs of people without shelter.
~THAN ELL~
Mardikian(~~~.
aig Chairman
Senator Alfred Alquist
Mary Anne Chalker
Albert Gersten
Richard Gulbranson
Senator Milton Marks
Assemblywoman Gwen Moore
George Paras
Abraham Spiegel
Barbara Stone
Richard Terzian
Assemblyman Phillip Wyman
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Executive Summary
Introduction 1
Background 5
Findings and Recommendations 14
APPENDIX A 31
Hearings and participants
APPENDIX B 32
State and federal homeless programs
Meeting the Needs of California's Homeless:
It Takes More Than A Roof
California's streets, parking lots, greenbelts, alleys and
stairwells are host to thousands of homeless individuals.
Although an exact head count has eluded experts, the estimates in
California range from 100,000 to 250,000 homeless. Their common
link is the lack of a stable, permanent roof over their heads.
But beyond that link, their problems are diverse and their needs
may be multiple.
In California, 16 programs specifically targeting the
homeless are spread across at least 10 state departments and six
different state agencies, not counting the more generic state
benefit and rehabilitation programs that arguably keep many more
people from joining the ranks of the homeless.
These state efforts are not carried out in isolation: The
needs of the homeless are also targeted by local governments,
charities, private foundations and the federal government, which
often bypasses the state and deals directly with local
organizations. Altogether, more than $780 million is spent on
homeless programs in California yearly (this does not include
bond money such as the $450 million approved by voters in 1988).
The Commission on California State Government Organization
and Economy (also known as the Little Hoover Commission) has
spent almost two years studying the state's response to the needs
of the homeless.
The Commission considers homelessness a multi-faceted
problem that must be approached with solutions addressing three
levels of need: emergency, transitional and permanent. Within
that context, the Commission--which by statute reviews state
policies and actions--focused on the role of the state as a
provider of programs and funds, and as a facilitator of
solutions.
The Little Hoover Commission has concluded that despite
intense interest in meeting the needs of the homeless and despite
the allocation of considerable resources to do so, the state has
failed to provide an effective safety net that ensures people
will be adequately housed.
The Commission's investigation resulted in the following
i
findings:
A. Because of diffused leadership, services provided for the
homeless are fragmented. As a result, some segments of the
homeless population are not served or are served inadequately.
Programs around the state are as diverse as the homeless
themselves. But the effectiveness of this diversity is hampered
by a lack of firm leadership and policy direction from above.
Because no one agency or individual is in charge of setting
priorities for spending, some categories of homeless are left
with few or no programs and there is little control over
efficient use of dollars.
B. Availability of the three main types of homeless programs
(emergency, transitional and permanent) is uneven, and there is
no efficient, coordinated method of moving the homeless through
the different programs.
The homeless are being served by a wide array of programs-
when they are available and when connections are made. But the
result of having programs that are not thoroughly integrated and
"user friendly" is predictable: Many people remain on the streets
rather than successfully extracting aid from the bureaucracy that
has grown up around homeless programs.
C. Because there is no cohesive approach to a statewide housing
policy, many actions at various levels of government drive up the
cost of housing and/or discourage the availability of adequate,
affordable housing.
The law of supply and demand is a major factor in the
rapidly escalating price of housing in California. With the rapid
expansion of population moving into the state, the supply of
housing--particularly affordable housing--cannot keep up with the
demand.
In addition, many laws and programs have a direct, readily
recognizable effect on housing availability. But other policies,
while having no on-the-surface link to housing, still have an
indirect, and cumulative, effect on affordable housing. With no
overall statewide housing policy in place to rein in
counterproductive measures, the result is a complicated array of
laws and regulations that contribute to increases in the cost of
both rentals and home purchases.
Flowing from these findings, the Commission's report
recommended the following actions:
1. The diverse state programs dealing with the homeless should be
unified under the state Health and Welfare Agency.
Although the state has been diligent in its coordination
ii
efforts across many agencies and departments, strong leadership
is lost in the shuffle. The bulk of state homeless programs are
already under the Health and Welfare Agency, but a significant
and high-profile portion of these programs are housed within the
Department of Housing and Community Development, which is under
the Business, Transportation and Housing Agency.
2. The Department of Housing and Community Development should set
up a unit to qualitatively evaluate local homelessness efforts
based on state-promulgated priorities and policies, and
aggressively recommend model programs and alternatives to local
regions.
The state should be leading in efforts to replicate model
programs, direct spending to the most efficient and productive
uses and allocate resources in a manner to target those with the
greatest need and/or those who can be most helped.
3. The Department of Housing and Community Development should
serve as a clearing house for information on programs for the
homeless.
In its clearing house role, the department should attend to
functions such as (but not limited to) producing yearly updates
of shelters around the state; compiling annual reports on
programs and expenditures by region; and listing and tracking
legislation affecting the homeless and housing.
4. The Governor and the Legislature should expand the duties of
the Attorney General's Charitable Trust Division so that it can
operate more effectively on the public's behalf.
The division should be given enough staff and resources to
adopt the national standard reporting model for charities, set up
a toll-free hot-line for potential contributors and register
professional fund-raisers.
5. The Governor and the Legislature should fund the creation of
Homeless Coordinated Intake Centers, funneling one-time grants to
counties through the Department of Housing and Community
Development.
These one-stop reception centers would take all newly
homeless individuals, assess their varied needs and hook them
into all available and applicable programs (federal, state, local
and private services would be represented at the centers).
6. The Governor and the Legislature should require the Health and
Welfare Agency to create a training program for homeless case
management workers and provide such training to county personnel.
iii
The training program would ensure that case management
workers would be familiar with the gamut of benefits available
from federal, state, local and charitable agencies, as well as
with the range of needs usually found in the homeless.
7. The Governor and the Legislature should amend the Lanterman
Petris-Short Act to further define "gravely disabled" to allow a
wider scope for treatment of the homeless mentally disabled.
The civil rights and liberties of the mentally ill should
not be ignored; but these people are not served by a "right to
choose" when they don't have the mental capacity to make
appropriate choices. The Governor and the Legislature should
redefine gravely disabled to include a person who, "based on the
historical course of the person's disorder, is likely to
deteriorate without treatment until he is unable to care for his
own personal need for food, clothing or shelter."
8. The Governor and the Legislature should create a "provisional
leave" program for mentally ill persons for continued monitoring
after involuntary care is completed.
Some patients who are released after involuntary commitment
fail to continue treatment and deteriorate to the point where
they must be involuntarily committed again. This "yo-yo" syndrome
can be broken by requiring those who have been involuntarily
committed several times in the course of two years to participate
in a 180-day outpatient program that ensures adequate food,
clothing, shelter and medical care.
9. Any new funding of eaergency shelters, such as from state bond
money, should be focused on facilities for homeless families,
runaway youths and dual-diagnosed individuals (mentally ill
substance abusers).
There is universal agreement that homeless programs are
lacking for families, runaway youths and dual-diagnosed
individuals.
10. The Governor and the Legislature should investigate the use
of state-owned, vacant, surplus property for development of
transitional housing, particularly for the mentally disabled.
The use of surplus property should be explored, including the
development of lands around state mental institutions for
transitional housing purposes.
11. The Governor and the Legislature should expand the use of
tools to place people in permanent housing.
The state has made use of many innovative programs and should
explore expanding those and creating others, including: rental
iv
deposit programs, mortgage credit programs, incentives for
federally subsidized housing to remain in subsidy programs,
developer density bonuses and so-called benevolent lending
programs.
12. The Governor and the Legislature should study the interplay
and effect of land use factors including, but not limited to,
slow-growth initiatives, locally imposed building fees, general
plan housing elements, rent control and restrictive zoning
practices.
The Governor and the Legislature last year requested the
Little Hoover Commission to investigate the effects of growth
control measures on the availability and affordability of housing
(SB 2895, Chapter 1423 of the Statutes of 1988). The study was
delayed when funding was deleted from the 1988-89 budget. The
study should be funded and expanded to cover the entire range of
elements that affect housing construction. The study would
include recommendations for statewide policy changes.
13. The Governor and the Legislature should authorize a complete
review of the Building Standards Code.
The federal General Accounting Office issued a report
several years ago that concluded that unnecessary building
standards add 30 percent to the cost of housing. While safety and
durability should remain top considerations, the state Building
Standards Code should be reviewed with an eye to adopting
improved technology and cost-effective techniques, as well as
eliminating duplicative requirements and aesthetic frills.
v
lntroduction
James Stone leans against the wall of a Sacramento
store, his dark glasses hiding his blind eyes and his
small stock of new pencils protruding from a cup that
holds the coins from his sales. Homeless, he is hooked
into none of the state programs that could help him
because of his fear that his young daughter would be
removed from his care by social workers. They both will
sleep under a bridge by the river tonight.
Filthy and tattered, a constantly muttering Eric Smith
collects cans in San Francisco streets and dumpsters to
buy marijuana and food, usually in that order.
Described by a counselor as psychotic, he receives no
government aid, sleeps in city parks and cadges
infrequent meals from homeless missions or food banks.
In Los Angeles, a man refuses to touch the thousands of
dollars deposited in a bank account for him from an
inheritance. He prefers to ramble the streets, rent an
occasional single-room-occupancy hotel room and ignore
the pleas of relatives.1
California's streets, parking lots, greenbelts, alleys and
stairwells are host to thousands of homeless individuals. Some
are sympathetic, even heart-rending figures, others are
frightening and may appear dangerous, and still others seem to
bring their homeless condition on themselves.
Although an exact head count has eluded experts, the
estimates in California range from 100,000 to 250,000 homeless.
Their common link is the lack of a stable, permanent roof over
their heads. But beyond that link, their problems are diverse and
their needs may be multiple.
This diversity, more than the sheer numbers of those living
on the streets, makes the problem of the homeless seem
overwhelming. That no one right answer works for all homeless
individuals can throw into disarray the usual governmental
efforts to quantify solutions, ascribe costs, track results and,
above all else, coordinate actions.
In California, 16 programs specifically targeting the
homeless are spread across at least 10 state departments and six
1. "California's Homeless: 24 Hours in Their
Lives," The Sacramento Bee, March 5, 1989; and
Associate~presS:-T988-.-------
1
different state agencies,2 not counting the more generic state
benefit and rehabilitation programs that arguably keep many more
people from joining the ranks of the homeless.
These state efforts are not carried out in isolation: The
needs of the homeless are also targeted by local governments,
charities, private foundations and the federal government (which
often bypasses the state and deals directly with local
organizations).
Multiple problems, multiple approaches--and, unfortunately,
multiple holes in the safety net that is meant to extend beneath
all homeless. Where do these holes come from?
The Commission on California State Government Organization
and Economy (also known as the Little Hoover Commission) has
spent almost two years studying the state's response to the needs
of the homeless.
The Little Hoover Commission considers home1essness a multi
faceted problem that must be approached with solutions addressing
three levels of need: emergency, transitional and permanent.
Within that context, the Commission--which by statute reviews
state policies and actions--focused on the role of the state as a
provider of programs and funds, and as a facilitator of
solutions.
In the course of its study, the Little Hoover Commission
reached several conclusions about the reasons for holes in the
safety net:
1. An absence of strong coordination keeps an eclectic array
of programs from being firmly linked together. No one person or
agency at any level of government is responsible, and therefore
accountable, for addressing the homeless plight.
2. The aid offered is often not "user-friendly." Since help
can come in many forms from many different sources, the homeless
are faced with a maze of bureaucracy that can prevent them from
knowing about available aid or discourage them from even trying
to obtain aid they are aware of.
3. An overall strategic policy doesn't exist. In the absence
of centralized leadership on the homeless issue, all levels of
government continue to pursue policies that are counterproductive
to assuring an adequate supply of affordable housing.
2. Health and Welfare Agency Secretary Clifford A11enby,
testimony to Little Hoover Commission, December 9, 1988. See
Appendix C for listing of programs. departments and agencies.
2
Although the problems may appear overwhelming, the Little
Hoover Commission bel_eves meeting the needs of the homeless is
manageable:
1. The homeless can be categorized and, therefore, targeted:
Most cannot find housing that is affordable on budgets driven by
government benefit checks or minimum-wage jobs. Many are mentally
incapable of taking care of their own basic need for shelter,
either because of mental illness or substance abuse--or a
combination of the two. Others suffer from literacy problems or
lack of money management skills. And some simply are not
interested in meshing with the rest of society.
2. The homeless are not being ignored in California: Last
year, homeless programs in the state used more than $780 million
from federal, state, local government and charitable sources. To
tie together homelessness efforts, state officials participate in
several interagency task forces and other state-wide networks,
county-wide organizations have sprung up, and federally required
report filings promote information sharing.
3. The homeless can be helped: Programs can and do
permanently end the cycle of homelessness. For example, recent
studies of a new AFDC program that pays for temporary shelter and
rental deposits on permanent housing shows that of 114,782
families who received money under the program lastar, 37,152
families were helped by the rental deposit porlion of the
program.3 Los Angeles' showcase Weingart Center on Skid Row
maintains its statistics show that 62 percent of the people it
helps each year are removed from the streets.4
In reaching the above conclusions, the Little Hoover
Commission conducted three hearings on the homeless issue. The
first, on December 1, 1987, dealt with the scope of the homeless
problem facing the state. The second, on September 29, 1988,
explored the problems of the mentally ill and/or substance abuser
homeless. The third, on December 9, 1988, focused on solutions
and programs. (Appendix A details the witnes.es at each hearing.)
During this time, Commission staff conducted an extensive
review of studies, literature and reports on homelessness in
general and conditions in California specifically. In addition,
meetings and interviews with various homeless advocates,
governmental officials and academic experts also were conducted.
3. From interview with AFDC and Food Stamp Policy
Implementation Bureau, California Department of Social Services,
April 1989.
4. "The Weingart Center: On the Cutting Edge," Weingart
Center Association, 1988.
3
The following report, which details the results of the
Commission's study, is provided in two sections: a background
section and a statement of findings and related
recommendations.
4
Background
How Big Is The Problem?
Any discussion of the homeless should begin with an
agreement on the scope of the problem. But an exact count--in
fact, even a reliable estimate--remains elusive. Current
estimates of California's homeless range from 100,000 to 250,000.
Studies that produce figures on the low end of the scale are
criticized for missing the homeless who have dropped out of
society so far that they have no contact with government and
charitable programs. Figures on the high end of the scale may
fail to take into account the temporary--as opposed to annual-
nature of homelessness for many p~rple. These high figures may
also include, rightly or wrong' , 1~legal aliens, those in
rentals that are unfit for habitatio' and those temporarily
sharing someone else's home.
One baseline study frequently cited in literature is the
state Department of Housing and Community Development's 1985
report, which estimated 50,000 to 75,000 homeless in the state
with the largest concentrations in Los Angeles and the San
Francisco Bay area. 5
The Health and Welfare Agency updated this data in 1987,
surveying 20 county welfare departments, to conclude that the
hom,ess population is closer to 100,000 (not counting an
estimated 46,000 undocumented immigrants), with 80,000 of those
in Los Angeles and the Bay Area. 6
These state figures are in line with a well-known 1986 study
by Harvard Professor Richard Freeman, who concluded there are
350,000 homeless nationwide. (Although the state has roughly 10
percent of the nation's population, California, with its
welcoming climate, national allure and high property values, is
known to have a disproportionate share of the homeless.)
On the other hand, the National Coalition for the Homeless
estimates the numbers of homeless in the course of a year at 3
million across the country. Statewide homeless advocacy groups,
many of whom testified at Little Hoover Commission hearings,
commonly use a figure of 250,000 for California.
5. California Department of Housing and Community
Development, "A Study of the Issues and Characteristics of the
Homeless Population in California," April 1985}
6. California Legislative Analyst Elizabeth G. Hill, "The
1988-89 Budget: Perspectives and Issues," pps. 109-126, 1988.}
5
Among the more recent studies, the Urban Institute in
Washington, D.C., released in November 1988 a survey of 229,000
individuals who used shelters and food services in six large
urban areas and concluded that there are about 600,000 homeless
in the United States. But one of the study's authors pointed out
that the results were extrapolated to take into account people
who make no contact with shelters or food banks and those in
rural areas--and such extrapolation is not always reliable.7
Closer to home, the Los Angeles County Grand Jury in April
1988 issued an update of its 1985 report on homelessness. The new
report concluded that there are almost 35,000 homeless in that
county alone.8
Finally, a federal General Accounting Office analysis in
1988 (GAO/PEMD-88-24) reviewed 27 surveys of the homeless and
concluded that the best-documented and most carefully conducted
studies show a median homeless rate of 13 per 10,000 population,
or about 320,000 people nationwide.9 As mentioned above,
California can be expected to have a disproportionate share of
that number.
Despite the depressing disparity in all of these figures,
one fact is evident: Whichever end of the scale is correct, the
homeless comprise less than 1 percent of California's 28 million
plus population. While the plight of the homelessness is very
real, the magnitude of the problem California faces is hardly
hopeless.
Who Are The Homeless?
Many of the same studies that attempt to quantify the
homeless also attempt to classify them. Some of the statistics:
The Urban Institute study interviewed 1,700 homeless people
and found: 81 percent male, 54 percent nonwhite, 51 percent
between 31 and 50, 75 percent single adults and 15 percent
children. A fifth of those interviewed had been homeless for more
than four years, but the median period was about 10 months. About
20 percent of those interviewed received some form of government
7. Interview with Barbara Cohen, Urban Institute co-author,
"Feeding the Homeless," November 1988.
8. Los Angeles County Grand Jury, "An Interim Report on
Homelessness in the County of Los Angeles," April 1988.
9. Warren T. Brookes, "We Can Afford To Help The Truly
Homeless," Sacramento Union, December 26. 1988.
6
income support and 25 percent had worked for pay during the
month.
The Legislative Analyst's "Perspectives and Issues" tallied
surveys in San Francisco, Alameda and Los Angeles' Skid Row, but
pointed out the homeless -opulations differed significantly in
each location. For instance San Francisco's homeless were white
males by a large major~r.y, while Alameda's homeless were
predominately black women nd children. Los Angeles and San
Franciscd figures both show,; a high degree of mental illness and
substance abuse that was not found in Alameda County.
Relying on a United Way 1986 survey of shelter inhabitants,
the Los Angeles County Grand Jury concluded that 40 percent of
the homeless in Los Angeles are families with children, 40
percent are veterans, 33 percent suffer mental illness and 25
percent have full-time jobs with pay low enough to preclude
finding affordable housing. (Overlap among the groups results in
a total larger than 100 percent.)
In the Little Hoover Commission's 1987 report, "The
Children's Services Delivery System in California," it was noted
that there are no accurate statistics on the number of
runaway/homeless youths. But experts place the number at about
20,000 to 25,000 on any given day. A 1984 study by the California
Child, Youth and Family Coalition estimated that almost 40,000
homeless children received service from some level of government
agency that year. Exact figures still remain elusive today, but
the state Department of Education is expected to issue a report
soon that shows some 25,000 children have been identified in
shelters and classrooms as homeless.
} 1986 study by United Way of downtown and suburban programs
n LL Angeles gave a snaps~ot profile of homeless people served
oy sh01ters and is illustrated by a chart (on the next page)
compiled by The Sacramento Bee from study deta for a March 5,
1989 report.
7
fd
How old are they?
.... Here were the percentages of various age groups housed in the
. downtown-and suburban Los ·Angeles shelters in 1986.
~ ~
I
ffi
40~~~~~
c.>
a:
~ 30~~~~---
20 +--..
0-18 . 19-35 36-50
AGE
Source: United Way Inc. Planning Division
The chart above shows that the bulk of the homeless fell in
the1-9-to.-35 ·age group, although a substantial number of .homeless
were under 18, especially in the suburban areas. This belies the
image that some people may have of the homeless consisting mostly
of aging, washed-up winos.
Emerging from these and other sources is a picture of a
multi-faceted, diverse homeless population. But three sets of
statistics ·are worth focusinhg on because of their impact on the
state's 'ability ·to meet the needs of the homeless:
*
~bout 25 percent of the homeless work, either full-time or
sporadically, but cannot find affordable housing.
*
About 40 percent suffer mental illness, have substance
abuse problems or both (dual-diagnosed).
*
Families with children make up between 25 and 40 percent
of the homeless and are perceived to be the most rapidly growing
segment of homelessness.
Another way of looking at the homeless population relies
less on statistics and more on a problem-solving approach. Maxene
Johnston, president of Los Angeles' Weingart Center, wraps it up
succinctly:
To begin to devise a solution it is important to
understand the three different segments of this
population: the can-nots and the will
have-nots~ ~he
nots.
8
The "have-nots" are working Americans temporarily
derailed by economic downturn or family crisis who need
relatively little support to provide for themselves and
their families. The strategy with this group is to give
them an immediate remedy to keep them from becoming so
emotionally or economically disabled that they fall
into the "can-not" category.
The "can-nots" are those disabled by mental
illness, drug or alcohol addiction, poor health,
inadequate education or illiteracy. With short-term
strategies to link them to existing benefits and
programs, they can lead relatively self-sufficient
lives, in available housing with minimal supervision.
The goal is to prevent them from becoming completely
dysfunctional.
The "will-nots" are those most visible to us. They
are 80 distraught and incapacitated from years of
mental illness and/or living on the streets that they
are amenable to only limited assistance. While we
should not turn our backs on this group, our time and
resources should first be invested in services for the
two segments of the homeless population that still have
the ability and desire to help themselves.10
What Causes Homelessness?
There is no single, or even predominate, answer to the
question of what causes homelessness. United Way, in its 1986 Los
Angeles survey, illustrated on the next page, questioned the
homeless about why they were on the streets and received a
variety of answers.
10. Maxene Johnston, "Homeless Are More Than Homeless," Los
Angeles Times, June 29, 1988.
9
[3 Why are they homeless?
Here were the primary reasons for homeless ness. according to a
survey of the downtown and suburban Los Angeles shelters in
1986. .
u~m~~m~t6::::;n~~~8;:<~n~>'~A;%~:~:~;::~4/~~~,~:It~r;J77J~~l
Runaway youth fL-.. .........." .
Domestic violence
Disabled' elderly
o 10 20 30 40 50
PERCENT
. Source: United Way Inc. Planning Division
The chart above, taken from The Sacramento Bee's March 5,
1989, report, shows that the primary cause cited for homelessness
was unemployment for those in suburban areas. But alcoholism and
mental illness were the major causes of homelessness for those
settling in the downtown area.
Na.tionally, .. a .. general. ·shift i.n. the economy away. from: fact.ory
'jobs' to lower-paid service jobs has squeezed many out of their
.,homes • ..simply put, poverty, even among the working, is a large
cause of homelessness. (A person earning California's minimum
wage of $4.25 an hour for 40 hours a week makes $736 a month
before withholding. If 30 percent of this gross income were
allocated for housing, the worker could only afford rent of $221
a month--far less than the rents available in some of the state's
urban areas.)
Some policies at all levels of government have worked
against the creation of affordable housing, ranging from a
federal cutback in funding for housing development to rent
control, special district taxes on building, initiatives to
control growth (which generally drive up land values) and local
redevelopment efforts (which tend to eliminate existing low-cost
housing).
Another factor leading to homelessness has been the lack of
adequate mental health services. People suffering from mental
illness who are not dangerous enough or gravely disabled enough
to be committed to an acute-care facility may need constant
outpatient care. But such programs may be crowded or unavailable,
10
leaving the mentally ill adrift and, in many cases, homeless.
Not all factors that lead to homelessness are negative,
although certainly the consequence is. An increase in the number
of women and children who are homeless has been linked to an
enlightened atmosphere that results in more frequent breakup of
homes where wives are battered and/or children are abused. In
escaping unhealthy and dangerous conditions, many of these
people, unfortunately, suffer some duration of homelessness.
People may become homeless because of a temporary crisis
(such as job loss) that pushes them over the edge of what was
already a precarious existence. Or they may be homeless because
of repeated patterns of money mismanagement or poor coping skills
that make it impossible for them to keep a job or make good use
of government benefit programs.
Pinpointing the causes of homelessness would not be a
crucial task if the only goal is to place a roof over the heads
of people now on the streets. But much more than a roof is needed
to break the cycle of homelessness. Services needed to help
someone escape homelessness permanently range from the simple
(providing an alarm clock, a shower and clean clothes to assure
job hunting success) to the complex (arranging mental health
treatments and drug rehabilitation). And ongoing services, such
as help in money management or medication maintenance, are vital
for many of the homeless.
In short, the homeless are not a homogenous group that can
be dealt with in bulk. They come to the streets from different
backgrounds and for different reasons. And because they are
diverse and their problems are varied, multiple approaches are
necessary to help them.
Resources Devoted To Homelessness
Funds to help the homeless come from federal, state and
local governments, charities and private sector efforts
(philanthropic foundations and business coalitions, for
instance).
Even when one is dealing with an accountable entity, such
as state government, it is difficult to arrive at a "correct"
total of how much is being spent on the homeless. Do you only
count money spent directly on housing programs? Do you include
funds allocated for alcohol rehabilitation, AFDC, mental health
and other programs that may give people the resources to escape
homelessness?
The Salvation Army, as one example, runs a 290-bed alcohol
recovery facility near Skid Row in Los Angeles. The primary
purpose is treating alcohol problems, but the side effect is to
11
put a roof over the heads of 290 men, many of whom would
otherwise be homeless.
The Little Hoover Commission looked at spending with a
fairly narrow focus on homelessness, and estimated the following
expenditures by source:
Government: The state will spend $86.7 million on programs
narrowly targeted for the homeless this fiscal year (1988-89).
Another $54.4 million in federal funds is spent by the state, and
an additional $24.1 million bypasses the state and goes from the
federal government directly to local entities.11 This total state
and federal spending of $165 million excludes bond measures
approved by voters in 1988 that will come on line in future
years.
Local government spending, by both counties and cities,
often comes in the form of matching funds for state and federal
dollars, funds for county general assistance grants and property
taxes raised by Community Redevelopment Agencies.
Statewide totals are difficult to pin down. A report issued
by the County Supervisors Association of California in 1986 used
only two examples (Monterey and Los Angeles) to show the
diversity of funding included when counties responded to a survey
question on spending for the homeless. Sifting out state and
federal contributions from those examples, Los Angeles spent in
excess of $100 million (mostly on general relief) and Monterey
spent about $300,000, both figures from 1984-85.12 Statewide,
about $250 million is spent solely on general relief grants, with
another $50 million to administer the program.13
In a report issued in April 1988 on Community Redevelopment
Agencies by the Department of Housing and Community Development,
statewide figures show that almost 11,000 units for low-income
persons were assisted, rehabilitated and/or added to the housing
stock. Spending (for fiscal year 1986-87) nudged $74 million.
Although some figures are unavailable and some listed above
are from differing fiscal years, one can peg a conservative
estimate of annual total government spending in California on
homeless programs at about $540 million.
11. Health and Welfare Agency Secretary Clifford Allenby,
testimony to Little Hoover Commission, December 9, 1988.
12. "Report of the CSAC Homeless Task Force," October 1986.
13. Interview with County Welfare Directors Association,
April 1989.
12
Charities: The Department of Justice's Charitable Trust
Division tracks all tax-exempt charitable organizations, but
unfortunately categorizes them by very broad designations. For
instance, in its report dated April 1989 (which reflects annual
records from charities for 1987 or 1988), the division lists 940
charities with the main purpose of providing housing. Excluding
government grants, these charities spent about $440 million. But
included in the category are those who clearly are not providing
immediate aid for the homeless, such as non-profit organizations
that run housing for seniors, disabled people and various ethnic
groups, as well as nationally based housing interest groups.
Other categories tallied by the Charitable Trust Division
under which homeless programs might be operated include General
Social Welfare (3,537 groups, $497 million), Services to
Alcoholics and Narcotic Users (845 groups, $120 million), Needy
Persons (732 groups, $142 million), General Charitable (4,131
groups, $865 million), Adult Education (66 groups, $3 million),
Vocational Training (467 groups, $76 million) and Public Health
(407 groups, $416 million). Spending by religious charities is
delineated by denomination rather than by goal, making it
impossible to determine how much is concentrated on social
services. (All spending figures exclude money provided by
government grants.)
Although the recordkeeping mechanisms simply are not in
place that would allow an accurate estimate of charitable
spending on the homeless, it would appear reasonable to at least
accept the statistics in the Needy Persons category as E low
floor ($142 million) and add an additional $100 million to
include the massive efforts of religious missions, the Salvation
Army, United Way and other multi-purpose charitable
organizations.
From the evidence cited above, it can be estimated that
spending from all sources on programs that are fairly narrowly
targeted for the homeless exceeds $782 million. The chart on the
following page illustrates the breakdown of expenditures, and
Appendix B details state and federal programs.
The information available makes it clear that homelessness
is an issue that has been much studied, and considerable
resources have been devoted to solving the problems of the
homeless. Nonetheless, people remain on the streets, unreached by
efforts to help them.
13
CALIFORNIA'S HOMELESS
Annual Expenditures on Services
Local
$374
Other $18
Housing $6.8
" Alcohor $8.8
State
Mntl Hlth $20.2
$86.7
Federal~
~~~ Soc Srvcs $32.9
$78.5 ~~
~~
Charities
$242
Sources of Funds State Programs
All figures are in millions
Findins! and Recommenda!ions
A. FINDING: Because of diffused leadership, services provided for
the homeless are fragmented. As a result, some segments of the
homeless population are not served or are served inadequately.
Programs around the state are as diverse as the homeless
themselves. But the effectiveness of this diversity is hampered
by a lack of firm leadership and policy direction from above.
Because no one agency or individual is in charge of setting
priorities for spending, some categories of homeless are left
with few or no programs and there is little control over
efficient use of dollars.
This lack of leadership from above should not be confused
with a lack of coordination. There is ample evidence that
coordination and information sharing is rife:
* The state operates at least 16 programs for the
homeless spread across 10 different departments and six
different agencies (see Appendix B), with a Health and
Welfare Agency Assistant Secretary designated the point
person on homeless issues. Ongoing coordination comes
in the form of bimonthly meetings of the
Interdepartmental Task Force and quarterly reports
prepared by each department, which are summarized for
the governor. In addition, the state actively
participates in the California Working Group on the
Homeless, which since 1985 has involved all levels of
. government and charitable organizations in bimonthly
meetings in San Francisco.
*
Regions and counties have set up their own task
forces and information-sharing seminars. For instance,
in Orange County, Assemblywoman Marian Bergeson has led
in the formation of the Orange County Homeless Issues
Task Force, which has been meeting since April 1988 as
a coalition of 170 organizations and individuals.14 In
Los Angeles County, the Shelter Partnership and United
Way have each brought the many homeless service
providers together through seminars, surveys and
reports.15
*
The federal government has required states and all
recipients of McKinney homeless funds to file
14. Orange County Homeless Task Force, "Five-Year General
Plan," April 1988.
15. Shelter Partnership Inc., "The Short-Term Housing System
of Los Angeles County," August 1987.
14
Comprehensive Homeless Assistance Plans (CHAPs). These
plans detail the perceived needs of the homeless and
how funds will be spent to meet those needs. In
addition to filing the CHAPs with the federal
government, state and local entities are required to
share CHAPs with each other.
Information sharing and consultation, therefore, is
occurring. The key element missing is summed up by Health and
Welfare Secretary Clifford A11enby in his testimony to the Little
Hoover Commission on Dec. 9, 1988:
It is important to note that the state does not
have a u£i1atera1 responsibility (emphasis added) for
determining the needs of California's homeless
population. Instead, it fulfills the role jointly with
local and federal governmental entities, the private
sector and homeless advocacy groups.
The same viewpoint was conveyed more colloquially by an
official in the state Department of Housing and Community
Development, who rejected the idea that more reporting and
information sharing is needed. The state receives all the various
CHAPs now, he said, but it does little good to review them when
the state has no power to tell local entities they are wasting
money, spending it unwisely or making the wrong choices on
programs.
One symptom of the lack of clear direction is the hit-and
miss nature of spending on the homeless. There was almost
universal agreement in testimony before the Little Hoover
Commission that facilities and programs are few for homeless
families, runaway youths and the so-called dual diagnosed (people
with both mental illness and substance abuse problems). In
addition, Rand Corp., in its February 1988 report entitled
"Review of California's Program for the Homeless Mentally
Disabled," notes that the dual-diagnosed and the hard-to-reach
mentally disabled homeless are underserved. Yet there is no
evidence that funds are being shifted or new funds are being
allocated to attend to these priorities.
The fragmented structure of support for homeless services
also means that some expenditures may not be adequately monitored
to ensure efficiency. With money pouring in from diverse sources
and with the varied reporting requirements of each of these
sources, no one agency or person is in charge of seeing that
money is allocated to get the "biggest bang per buck."
This does not mean expenditure reports are lacking. Health
and Welfare Agency Secretary Clifford A11enby gave convincing
testimony to the Little Hoover Commission (December 9, 1989) that
each state department involved in homeless programs requires
15
monthly or quarterly reports and, in many cases, sends staff to
conduct on-site inspections. But reports can be fairly
meaningless unless they are evaluated for an overall pattern,
checked against articulated goals and acted upon.
For instance:
* In 1987, Los Angeles County returned $3.2 million to the
state in funds meant to serve the mentally disabled homeless.
County officials maintain they were barred from spending the
funds for acute-care beds and that time constraints and the one
time nature of the funds kept them from using the money for other
purposes.
But neither state nor county records show any concentrated
effort by Los Angeles to expend the funds on any services rather
than return them to the state.
State officials correctly have pointed out that statutory
provisions rerouted the $3.2 million to a housing program for the
mentally ill so that it did not return to the general fund.
Nonetheless, more aggressive leadership from the state and
increased authority from the top would have assured that these
funds were expended in a time period and location where clearly
there was a need for services for the mentally disabled.
*
Little Hoover Commission Chairman Nathan Shapell and
Commissioners Haig Mardikian, Abraham Spiegel and Mary Ann
Chalker conducted on-site investigations of five Los Angeles
homeless facilities. Two of the programs, each one-stop centers
offering an array of integrated services for the homeless with
mental problems, operate within a few miles of each other in Los
Angeles. One, which can house up to 14 persons per night, says
its cost per person-day is $39. The other, which includes 600
beds, figures costs at about $17.50 per person.16
While the efficiency of programs cannot be determined by
merely comparing cost-per-individual-served, the disparity in
expenditures at various homeless programs is of concern at a time
when resources are scarce. Can more people be helped more
efficiently at large centralized locations? Or do small
neighborhood settings that are more costly produce better, more
long-lasting results?
Now these questions are answered on a case-by-case basis as
organizations apply for grants from various levels of government
and private foundations. But they should be addressed by
16. Interviews with officials from Portals Community
Connections, 3881 S. Western, Los Angeles, and the Weingart
Center, 566 S. San Pedro, Los Angeles, November 1988.
16
coordinated and planned policies rather than by the whims of
grant-application victories.
* The Sacramento Homeless Project, created by two
professional fund-raisers, took in $8,000 from telephone appeals
in October 1988. But less than $2,000 of that actually went to
the homeless.17
There is nothing illegal about the small pass-through of
contributions gathered. In fact, recent U.S. Supreme Court
decisions have made it impossible for regulators to require
professional fund-raisers to limit what they charge or to reveal
in their phone solicitations the percentage that actually goes to
the charitable purpose.
But the state does have an existing role in monitoring
charities, requiring charities to register and file annual
reports of earnings and expenditures. However, more than 72,000
charities exist in the state, 500 new ones register each month
(with only 100 closing down each month) and the state office in
charge--the Attorney General's Charitable Trust Division--is both
understaffed and underfunded. (In 1968, there were 1,300
charities per clerical employee. Twenty years later, there are
4,600 charities per clerical employee.) This means consumers have
no access to information that could guide their charitable giving
and produce the most benefit for the homeless.
As previously noted, more than three-quarters of a billion
dollars are spent on the homeless in California by a variety of
sources. But the leadership that would ensure a safety net
without holes for the homeless in return for those dollars is
missing.
Recommendations:
1. The diverse state programs dealing with the homeless should be
unified under the state Health and Welfare Agency.
Although the state has been diligent in its coordination
efforts across many agencies and departments, strong leadership
is lost in the shuffle.
The bulk of state homeless programs are already under the
Health and Welfare Agency, but a significant and high-profile
portion of these programs are housed within the Department of
Housing and Community Development, which is under the Business,
Transportation and Housing Agency. This department could be moved
under the wing of Health and Welfare and designated the lead
17. "Charities Get Loose Financial Rein, Officials Warn,"
The Sacramento Bee, November 17, 1988.
17
department for all statewide homeless efforts. (Some functions of
the existing department, such as building standards, rould be
shifted to remaining departments under the Busin€ss and
Transportation Agency.)
2. The Department of Housing and Community Development should set
up a unit to qualitatively evaluate local homelessness efforts
based on state-promulgated priorities and policies, and
aggressively recommend model programs and alternatives to local
regions.
The state should be leading in efforts to replicate model
programs, direct spending to the most efficient and productive
uses and allocate resources in a manner to target those with the
greatest need and/or those who can be most helped.
As the department develops standards and integrated plans
for regions, it may become desirable legislatively to tie local
acceptance of state guidance to continued state funding of local
programs.
3. The Department of Housing and Community Development should
serve as a clearing house for information on programs for the
homeless.
In its clearing house role, the department should attend to
functions such as (but not limited to) producing yearly updates
of shelters around the state; compiling annual reports on
programs and expenditures by region; and listing and tracking
legislation affecting the homeless and housing.
4. The Governor and the Legislature should expand the duties of
the Attorney General's Charitable Trust Division so that it can
operate more effectively on the public's behalf.
The division should be given enough staff and resources to
immediately adopt the national standard reporting model for
charities, which would allow better tracking of the billions of
dollars in contributions and spending by categories of services
rendered.
The Governor and the Legislature should create a program
within the division that offers consumers information at a toll
free number on how much specific charities collect and spend,
including how much money actually reaches the intended
recipients. (This information already is filed annually with the
division, but the overwhelming number of charities, the lack of
updated computerized models and the lack of consumer awareness of
what is available keeps the information from being useful.)
In addition, the Governor and the Legislature should require
all professional fund-raisers to register with the Attorney
18
General's Charitable Trust Division.
B. FINDING: Availability of the three main types of homeless
programs (emergency, transitional and permanent) is uneven, and
there is no efficient, coordinated method of moving the homeless
through the different programs.
Simply placing a roof over someone's head for one night
rarely solves the causes for that person's homeless state. As
discussed in the background section of this report, homelessness
can stem from a variety of causes, some singular and some in
combination. Removing an individual from the street one night, or
giving him housing for 30 days, or even finding him a job does
not break the cycle of homelessness he may be trapped in by
mental illness, substance abuse problems, poor money management
skills, illiteracy and/or poor work habits.
Clearly, then, programs for the homeless need to cover three
levels of need. 1) They need to tackle immediate, short-term
needs with emergency shelter. 2) They need to provide transition
services that are appropriate for the specific homeless person,
such as on-going monitoring of medication for the mentally ill,
support for continued abstinence for substance abusers and
reinforcement for work-habit and money-management training. 3)
They need to help secure permanent housing and living situations.
Testimony received by the Little Hoover Commission indicates
the following status for each category of aid:
*
Emergency: Roughly 17,000 beds are available in some 350
shelters, with more shelters expected to come on line as voter
approved bond money becomes available. (A problem that is
expected to develop is that the bond money allows only
construction of facilities that can show operating funds for
three years, but no new operating funds have been provided.)
There is universal concurrence that emergency shelters for
families, runaway youths and the dual-diagnosed (mentally ill
substance abusers) are lacking. Some homeless individuals avoid
shelters because they believe the shelters have too rigid rules,
are unclean or are dangerous. Most are open only at night,
leaving the homeless without facilities during the day.
*
Transitional: The Rand evaluation of homeless services
notes that there is a "lack of appropriate alternative housing
arrangements" for the mentally ill and substance abusers.1S
Facilities that would provide monitored housing for these
individuals have difficulty securing sites because of oppositio~l
from neighboring property owners. Such facilities also may become
18. Rand Corp., "Review of California's Program for the
Homeless Mentally Disabled." February 1988.
19
permanent homes by default when other long-range housing is not
found.
*
Permanent: Long-term policy effects on permanent housing
is discussed under the following finding. However, there are
short-term considerations under this category:
1. Existing affordable housing stock is threatened
because of the expiration of federal subsidized housing
programs, which will allow owners to convert the units
to fair-market rentals.
2. Community Redevelopment Agencies, which spent
$74 million in 1986-87 to assist, add and/or
rehabilitate 11,000 units statewide, failed to spend
another $86 million that same year that was designated
for low-income housing. Some sources estimate $200
million has now accumulated statewide, although a new
"use it or lose it" law is expected to bring more rapid
expenditures in the next few years.19
3. Although about 25 percent of the homeless are
employed, their salaries are such that they cannot put
together first month, last month and security deposits
even when they can find affordable rentals.
In addition to the holes in the safety net that stem from a
lack of facilities, there are also the cracks between programs.
Without solid linkage between programs, a homeless individual may
never make the connection with the program best designed to meet
his needs.
Information-sharing has ensured that many homeless service
providers know what aid is available from the various federal,
state and local agencies. But viewed from street-level, shared
information is not the same as solid linkage. The homeless person
may have to go to a dozen different sites and fill out up to 70
different forms to apply for the many varieties of aid from all
levels of government that may fit his needs.20 For a person who
has no transportation or money for public transit fare, this task
is daunting; for someone with a mental illness, substance abuse
habits or literacy problems, it is impossible.
The Los Angeles Grand Jury's April 1988 report on
homelessness spoke eloquently on this point:
19. William Fulton, "From Selling To Dwelling," Golden State
Report, April 1989.
20. Los Angeles County Grand Jury, "An Interim Report on
Homelessness in the County of Los Angeles," April 1988.
20
The General Relief process is tedious and
difficult to complete •••• An applicant must submit an
application and wait an average of seven hours to speak
to a caseworker ••• Generally, the Relief offices have
more than 200 people waiting all day in smokey rooms
with inadequate seating. Armed, uniformed security
guards are the only staff members in the room ••••
To apply for General Relief, you have to make
three or four other trips to other agencies, usually on
foot, to gather eligibility information •••• Fully 10
percent of the checks that are issued each month get
"lost" in the system, often because of incorrect data
entry. Once a check is lost, it takes a minimum of ten
days to replace it, and generally two more office
visits ••••
Sixty-day penalties are applied to applicants who
do not complete some aspect of the General Relief
process. During this 60-day period the applicant cannot
apply for General Relief and is essentially denied all
help for food or shelter.
The vast majority of penalties are related to
noncompliance with the workfare project. The workfare
project is a requirement that those who apply for
General Relief and deem themselves "employable" must
work off their $280 grant at minimum wage (about 10
days of work) ••••
There is no effort made to match the location of a
General Relief recipient's shelter to location of
work •••• Most shelters serve meals during established
time periods--perhaps 7 a.m., noon and 5 p.m. If a
General Relief recipient must leave at 6 a.m. to work
at a workfare project, works all day in a remote
location, and arrives back at the shelter at 7 p.m., he
or she receives no food the entire day.
The problems with Los Angeles' General Relief are not unique
to that benefit program. Several of those who testified before
the Little Hoover Commission estimated that between 30 percent
and 40 percent of the homeless who are eligible for monthly
government benefit checks, such as Supplemental Security Income
or veteran's payments, are never signed up. In addition to the
paperwork barrier, many are stymied by a lack of an address where
checks can be sent.
Others who do not have the mental capacity to handle their
own money may have their Social Security or other benefits
21
withheld unless they find a "payee." Under the "payee" system,
the benefit checks ar' sent directly to the designated third
party (the "payee") cashes them and turns the funds over to
\0
the original intended recipient. Problems arise when the "payee"
is not honest or charges a disproportionate fee for his service.
Another group that frequently is underserved, as mentioned
previously, are the hard-to-reach, or severely, mentally disabled
homeless. Many refuse to participate in programs, but involuntary
treatment cannot be invoked unless the person meets legal
criteria, including being a clear and present danger to
themselves or others. The Little Hoover Commission, after
discussions with experts and family members, agrees with the
conclusion reached in the Rand study of programs for the homeless
mentally disabled:
Most program staff, often reluctantly, suggested
that making involuntary commitment easier is both
desirable and necessary.
They cautioned, however, that such a measure must
be accompanied by 1) an extension of the initial
maximum period of commitment to allow for full
stabilization of the individual before release and 2)
an increase in the available number of hospital, crisis
or transitional beds.
In addition, staff also noted the need to
establish or expand the temporary conservatorship
program to help individuals discharged from hospitals
or transitional facilities manage their affairs while
in the community.
Clearly changes are needed in the laws that govern when a
person can receive mental health treatment.
Despite the concerns about insufficient programs cited
above, it should be noted the state has taken an active role in
provj.ding programs for the homeless. But many of these innovative
approaches should be expanded, and model programs from other
areas of the country should be replicated. Programs could include
the following:
*
The state is successfully operating a program to
provide AFDC families with grants to cover first month,
last month and security deposits (almost 115,000
families were served last year). Although the program
has not been problem-free (counties have reported that
some families spend the grants without ever obtaining
permanent rental housing), it has succeeded in placing
almost 35,000 families in permanent housing. A program
with similar goals offers loans for rental deposits to
22
---- ---- ------
homeless who are not eligible for AFDC under a pilot
project in eight counties. This loan program should be
expanded statewide.
*
Under federal tax changes adopted in 1984,
states and local governments can authorize a Mortgage
Credit Certificate program. This allows first-time home
buyers to receive annual tax credits of $2,000 to
$3,000 on beyond regular mortgage deductions, which
should make more people eligible financially to buy
homes. The state has never authorized this program,
although some local jurisdictions, including
Sacramento, have.21
* Federal subsidies that financed the building of
low-rent housing 20 years ago are beginning to expire.
Owners of thousands of units (39,000 in Los Angeles and
7,000 in Sacramento alone) will be able to convert to
fair-market value rents--and undoubtedly will do so
unless the state devises incentives to keep the
buildings affordable.
*
Under existing laws, builders can be granted
differing "density bonuses" when they commit 25 or 50
percent of their developments to low-cost housing. An
innovative expansion of this program would allow
developers to contribute to a housing trust fund (to
build low-cost units off-site) in return for greater
density bonuses. The trust fund could be managed by a
separate state commission or by local housing
authorities to ensure low-cost housing is built in
areas of need.
*
Other creative programs are developing elsewhere
that could be copied in California, such a "benevolent
lending" program.22 This Baltimore-area program known
as the Enterprise Plan encourages individuals and
corporations to place money in one-year certificates of
deposit that yield below-market rates, such as 3
percent compared to a market rate of 7 percent. The
excess interest becomes a contribution from the
depositors that, when pooled, is used to subsidize
mortgages to such a degree that low-income people can
own their own home cheaper than one can be rented.
21. Golden State Report, October 1987, and "Few Bills Likely
From Legislature," The Sacramento Bee, January 1, 1989.
22. "Loan Plan For Low-Income Buyers Gains Support," The
Sacramento Bee, March 19, 1989.
23
The homeless, then, are being served by a wide array of
programs--when they are available and when connections are made.
But the result of having programs that are not thoroughly
integrated and "user friendly" is predictable: Many people remain
on the streets rather than successfully extracting aid from the
bureaucracy that has grown up around homeless programs.
Recommendations:
5. The Governor and the Legislature should fund the creation of
Hoaeless Coordinated Intake Centers, funneling one-time grants to
counties through the Department of Housing and Community
Development.
Pilot projects for San Diego and Santa Clara counties were
authorized in 1988, but funding was deleted. The urgency of
providing integrated services to the homeless is such that other
counties should not be delayed the several years the pilot
projects may take.
These one-stop reception centers would take all newly
homeless individuals, assess their varied needs and hook them
into all available and applicable programs (federal, state, local
and private services would be represented at the centers).
Services to be rendered at such centers would include
processing paperwork, referring children to appropriate schools,
providing an address and phone number for work contacts, and
providing benefit payee services and case management.
6. The Governor and the Legislature should require the Health and
Welfare Agency to create a training program for homeless case
management workers and provide such training to county personnel.
The training program would ensure that case management
workers would be familiar with the gamut of benefits available
from federal, state, local and charitable agencies, as well as
with the range of needs usually found in the homeless.
This training program would be made available to all workers
designated by counties as homeless case management specialists,
with the goal of making the specialists available in the one-stop
referral centers.
Case management specialists, who are responsible for
tracking and serving the needs of the homeless beyond short-term
shelter, are vital to the success of efforts to permanently break
the cycle of homelessness for individuals with mUltiple problems.
7. The Governor and the Legislature should amend the Lanterman
Petris-Short Act to further define "gravely disabled" to allow a
wider scope for treatment of the homeless mentally disabled.
24
The civil rights and liberties of the mentally ill should
not be ignored; but these people are not served by a "right to
choose" when they don't have the mental capacity to make
appropriate choices.
Under present law, to be judged gravely disabled and
therefore subject to involuntary commitment one has to be unable
to care for his own personal needs for food, clothing or shelter.
The Governor and the Legislature should add a further definition
of gravely disabled as a person who, "based on the historical
course of the person's disorder, would be likely to deteriorate
without treatment until he is unable to care for his own personal
need for food, clothing or shelter."
8. The Governor and the Legislature should create a "provisional
leave" program for mentally ill persons for continued monitoring
after involuntary care is completed.
Some patients who are released after involuntary commitment
fail to continue treatment and deteriorate to the point where
they must be involuntarily committed again. This "yo-yo" syndrome
can be broken by requiring those who have been involuntarily
committed several times in the course of two years to participate
in an outpatient treatment program that ensures adequate food,
clothing, shelter and medical care.
9. As funding is provided for emergency shelters, such as from
state bond money, it should be focused on facilities for homeless
families, runaway youths and dual-diagnosed individuals (mentally
ill substance abusers).
Shelters around the state continue to turn away homeless
people nightly. Voters already have approved bond money packages
that provide for some new shelters, but operational funds for new
shelters also need to be allocated. In the process of funding the
operation of new shelters, the Governor and the Legislature can
target the population served by the shelters.
10. The Governor and the Legislature should investigate the use
of state-owned vacant, surplus property for development of
transitional housing, particularly for the mentally disabled.
The state has taken steps to use its property creativelYt
such as the opening of National Guard facilities for shelter
during the winter. However, the use of other, surplus property
should be explored. Although the state may wish to retain
ownership of vacant lands, such as property surrounding state
mental institutions, creative long-term lease arrangments that
could provide transitional housing for the mentally ilIon these
lands should be pursued.
25
11. The Governor and the Legislatl should expand the use of
tools to place people in permanent housing.
The state has already instituted some innovative programs
that could be expanded and it could explore copying other
programs used elsewhere. These efforts should include rental
deposit programs, mortgage credit programs, incentives for
federally subsidized housing to remain in subsidy programs,
developer density bonuses and so-called benevolent lending
programs.
C. FINDING: Because there is no cohesive approach to a statewide
housing policy, many actions at various levels of government
drive up the cost of housing and/or discourage the availability
of adequate, affordable housing.
Many laws and programs have a direct, readily recognizable
effect on housing availability. But other policies, while having
no on-the-surface link to housing, still have an indirect, and
cumulative, effect on affordable housing. With no overall
statewide housing policy in place to rein in counterproductive
measures, the result is a complicated array of laws and
regulations that changes from city to city and county to county
and drives up the cost of both rentals and home purchases.
For instance, special fees designed to shift infrastructure
cost to new developments (such as school developer fees and
Mello-Roos special district taxes) obviously increase the cost of
building new housing.
More subtle are the effects of building standards and codes,
which may require developers to choose higher-cost fire safety
systems or not use cheaper materials for aesthetic reasons. A
General Accounting Office assessment has indicated that
unnecessary building standards add about 30 percent to the cost
of housing units.
The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's
"Joint Venture for Affordable Housing" has documented cases in
dozens of communities where flexibility in building and zoning
requirements has cut the cost of units dramatically without
endangering life or aesthetics. A development in Redding, Ca.,
for example, showed savings of $8,050 per lot when the developer
was granted a density bonus, allowed to eliminate sidewalks from
one side of all streets, allowed to reduce street widths and
allowed to joint trench all gas, telephone and electrical
conduit.23
23. Joint Venture For Affordable Housing, "Approved
Communities," Vols. 1 and 2, and "Building Better Communities
Through Regulatory Reform."
26
The city of San Diego has had notable success with
construction of hundreds of single-room-occupancy units that were
made possible, and profitable, by altering building codes and
parking ordinance requirements.24 Flexibility and incentives for
pursuing alternative building methods can make a difference in
the maze of regulations and ordinances that currently discourage
the construction of affordable housing.
While the major factor in the high cost of housing is the
population growth in California rapidly outstripping the supply
of affordable housing, other factors also come into play.
Insistence on preserving local control in California has led to
growth limiting initiatives and restrictive zoning in rapidly
growing communities, both of which contribute to the increased
cost of land and housing placed on that land.
In addition, many local areas are now considering imposing
non-residential developer assessments that will be placed in
housing funds for the construction of low-cost housing. These
fees, which in some cases are being challenged as
unconstitutional, may well change the pattern of the state's
development, and thus its housing needs.
Local, rather that statewide, planning also allows
communities to say "Not In My Back Yard" (the NIMBY factor) to
low-cost or transitional housing for the homeless. The right to
local control is ensured by California Constitution Article 34,
Section 1, which expressly requires majority approval of low-rent
housing projects by local voters.
However, the state has exercised its authority to require
local governments to have housing elements in their general
plans. These elements are supposed to consider housing needs and
growth patterns, including the need for low-cost housing. Some
state legislators, concerned that these housing elements are
perfunctory at best, are seeking to add more regulations and
guidelines for further factors to be considered, such as areas
where job growth is expected.
None of this is to suggest that restrictive zoning
ordinances that hold down population densities, codes that ensure
fire safety and other policies that preserve an enjoyable quality
of life should be thrown out en masse. But currently the
cumulative affect of state and local policies is seldom weighed
so that decisions adversely affecting housing prices can be
mitigated, when possible. In other words, the state does little
to rein in disjointed decision-making that ignores the need for
24. City of San Diego, "Single Room Occupancy: Residential
Hotel Program," October 1988.
27
affordable housing.
Statistics indicate the problem is the affordability factor
rather than the amount of housing itself. Nationally, 12 million
new housing units were added from 1980-87 while only 8.7 million
new households were created. Rental vacancy rates during the same
period rose from 7.1 percent nationally to 8.6 percent.25 In
California, rental vacancy rates vary by region but far more than
250,000 (the highest estimate of the state's homeless) units
remain unfilled.
It is the price tag of those units that puts them beyond the
reach of even that element of the homeless (an estimated 25
percent) who are working and bringing home wages. The chart on
the next page is taken from the Sacramento Bee report on
homelessness (March 5, 1989).
25. Irving Welfeld, "Where We Live," Simon & Schuster, 1989.
28
II
Why can't they afford a home? . .
Th. u.s. government standard is that most people should spend no more than 30 percent of theIr. g~ Income
on rent But as the chart below indicates, spending 30 percent of the average incomes of people In vanous
classifications leaves them well short of the median rents in San Francisco, Los Angeles and Sacramento. The
median rant figure means half pay more than that amount; haH less.
1YP• • n dg~sslncome ~A~ff~o~rd~a~b~le~re~n~t __~ ~ ____~ ~-,~~~~~~~~~~~~,
:::am:, :PI::~· .-.~~~.~ J~~~:~:~~"r!~l:~i~ :~~1'~}£i
,.:5
month" $180.60<~"",-~',,o-,:·t:::~~)~I·~:;."~~1 i1 " - -,,~:,.~ . ;
E~~:~:?~" $14238·:·=·';~J~~U~l~il·-! .~'.;
. " ',' . '.=g I:', .'.'g I'~ I
Minimum-wage earner: $736. 67 a
'.' "'E ("TEL' lIIl
month"
~~~~~~~-.-::.=~...;;, tl"t~i:J:
2 minimum·wage earners: ..,
$1,473.34 a month" b I ,,' .. lu:I " ,
c~h.3 I all'
Family of 4 at poverty level: $967.66 , I I I
a month" I I I
White-collar Incomes: executives, $882.50
managers, professionals, $2,941.66-' ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~=;~~~~_-:---I
a month. ~
"1989 data o 200 4CO 600 800 1000
- 1988 data IN DOLLARS
- 1987 data
Sources: California Coal ilion for Rural Housing, California Department of Social Services, SoCaI Security Administration, U.S. Census Bureau.
Oivine MIS, Alai eSlate research company; Bay AAla Council; City or Los Angeles
The chart reiterates that the state's large urban areas,
where most of the homeless are located, have median rents ranging
form $510 to $725--well beyond the abilities of a minimum wage
earner whose full-time gross salary may only be $736--or even two
minimum wage earners grossing $1,473 monthly.
The need to address affordability of permanent housing is as
pressing as the short-term need for temporary shelters. Experts
who peg the national homeless total at 3 million today believe
that will double within 15 years unless efforts are directed at
permanent, affordable housing. The danger of concentrating too
many funds on short-term shelters is that a permanent underclass
of shelter dwellers will be created.
The homeless person on the street needs immediate attention
from the state for food and shelter. But the state should have a
larger, long-range role of creating an environment where
affordable housing units, rather than the numbers of homeless,
will flourish.
29
Recommendations:
12. The Governor and the Legislature should study the interplay
and effect of land use factors including, but not limited to,
slow-growth initiatives, locally i.posed building fees, general
plan housing elements, rent control and restrictive zoning
practices.
The Governor and the Legislature last year requested the
Little Hoover Commission to investigate the effects of growth
control measures on the affordability of housing (SB 2895,
Chapter 1423 of the Statutes of 1988). The study was delayed when
funding was deleted from the 1988-89 budget.
The study should be funded and expanded to cover the entire
range of elements that affect housing construction. The study
would include recommendations for statewide policy changes.
13. The Governor and the Legislature should authorize a complete
review of the Building Standards Code.
While safety and durability should remain top
considerations, the state Building Standards Code should be
reviewed with an eye to adopting improved technology and cost
effective techniques, as well as eliminating duplicative
requirements and aesthetic frills.
30
APPENDIX A
Participants at the three hearings on California's homeless
conducted by the Little Hoover Commission:
1. The State's Homeless December 1, 1987 Los Angeles
Conway Collis, Chairman, State Board of Equalization
Ruth Schwartz, on behalf of Senator Milton Marks
Anita Landecker, Executive Director, Equity Fund Project for
Low Income Housing
The Rev. Gene Boutilier, United Way
Suzanne Campi, President, Greater Los Angeles Partnership
for the Homeless
Ann Reiss-Lane, Chairman, Shelter Partnership
Margaret DeBow, Assistant Secretary, California Health and
Welfare Agency
Christine Diemer-Reed, Director, California Department of
Housing and Community Development
Bill Evans, Manager, California Emergency Shelter Program
2. Homeless Mentally III September 29, 1988 Los Angeles
in California
Mollie Lowery, Director, Los Angeles Men's Place
Roberto Quiroz, Los Angeles County Mental Health Director
Frances Griffith, Los Angeles County Homeless Coordinator
Walter Watson, Statewide Coordinator for California Mentally
Disabled Programs
Toni Reinis, Director, California Homeless Coalition
3. California's Homeless December 9, 1988 Los Angeles
Population
Senate President Pro Tem David Roberti
Conway Collis, member, State Board of Equalization
Maxene Johnston, President, Weingart Center
Judith Lenthall, San Diego housing planner
Dale Maharidge, author
Clifford Allenby, Secretary, Health and Welfare Agency
31
APPENDIX B
1988-89 state and/or federally funded programs for the homeless:
1. State-funded programs by administering entity.
Department of Housing and Community Development
Emergency Shelter Program ($1.94 million)
Homeless Mentally III Program ($1.46 million)
Rental Deposit Guarantee Program ($.2 million)
Special User Housing Rehabilitation Program ($3.2 million)
Office of Criminal Justice Planning
Homeless Youth Hotline ($.2 million)
Homeless Youth Projects ($.9 million)
Family Violence Shelter Program ($1.5 million)
Family Violence Prevention Training ($.2 million)
Department of Mental Health
Homeless Mentally III Program ($20.2 million)
Department of Alcohol and Drug Programs
Residential Recovery Services ($8.8 million, plus $3.7
million in federal funds)
Department of Social Services
AFDC Homeless Assistance Program ($32.9 million, plus $35.8
million in federal funds,
$3.9 million in county funds)
Department of Health Services
Homeless AIDS Shelters ($.7 million)
Department of the Military
National Guard armories for shelter ($150,000)
2. Federally funded programs, operating through state entities
Department of Housing and Community Development
Permanent Housing for the Handicapped ($.4 million federal,
$.3 million state)
Emergency Shelter Grant Program ($.2 million)
Department of Economic Opportunity
Community ~ervices Block Grant ($1.1 million)
Emergency Community Services and Homeless Grant Program
($1.8 million)
Office of Criminal Justice Planning
Domestic Violence Shelters ($1.6 million)
32
Department of Mental Health
Case Management Demonstration Projects ($.5 million)
Mental Health Block Grant Program ($6.1 million)
Employment Development Department
Petty cash to help homeless job seekers ($25,000)
Specialized Employment Services ($.3 million)
JTPA Targeted Projects ($2 million)
Department of Education
Adult Education (literacy for homeless) ($.5 million)
Homeless Children and Youth ($.4 million)
3. Federally funded programs administered at local level
Primary health services, substance abuse projects ($9.7 million)
Emergency shelter grants ($1.8 million)
Emergency food and shelter grants to FEMA boards ($1.3 million)
Transitional housing demonstration project ($4.5 million)
Special assistance for disabled, elderly, families ($1.5 million)
Alcohol and drug treatment demonstration grants ($.9 million)
Mental health demonstration grants ($.9 million)
Single room occupancy hotel rehabilitation ($3.5 million)
Job training ($.8 million)
Job training for veterans ($.2 million)
33