OIG
Staff Misconduct Investigation Monitoring Report
Read the report at CDCR ↗
Amarik K. Singh, Inspector General Shaun Spillane, Chief Deputy Inspector General
of the
OFFICE
OIG
INSPECTOR GENERAL
Independent Prison Oversight March 2025
The Office of the Inspector General’s
Monitoring in 2024 of the Staff Misconduct
Complaint Investigations and the
Employee Disciplinary Process
of the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation
2024 Annual Report
Electronic copies of reports published by the Office of the Inspector General
are available free in portable document format (PDF) on our website.
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For information on how to subscribe,
visit www.oig.ca.gov.
For questions concerning the contents of this report,
please contact Shaun Spillane, Public Information Officer,
at 916-288-4233.
Connect with us on social media
STATE of CALIFORNIA
OIG OFFICE of the Amarik K. Singh, Inspector General
INSPECTOR GENERAL Shaun Spillane, Chief Deputy Inspector General
Independent Prison Oversight
Regional Offices
Sacramento
Bakersfield
Rancho Cucamonga
March 10, 2025
The Governor of California
President pro Tempore of the Senate
Speaker of the Assembly
State Capitol
Sacramento, California
Dear Governor and Legislative Leaders:
Pursuant to California Penal Code section 6126 (i), the Office of the Inspector General
is responsible for the oversight of the staff misconduct investigations and the employee
disciplinary processes of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
(the department). This report concerns the OIG’s monitoring of the department’s staff
misconduct investigations and the employee disciplinary processes in 2024.
The OIG monitored the performance of the department’s Office of Internal Affairs
investigators in conducting investigations; the performance of hiring authorities, including
wardens, in handling the employee discipline process for those cases; and the performance
of department attorneys who provided legal advice to the investigators and hiring
authorities and represented the department in legal proceedings, if any, regarding these
cases. The OIG determined the department’s performance was poor both in conducting
staff misconduct investigations and in handling the employee disciplinary process. From
January 1, 2024, through December 31, 2024, the OIG monitored and closed 162 staff
misconduct investigations and the employee disciplinary process, if any, for those cases. The
OIG assigned one of three overall ratings for each case: superior, satisfactory, or poor. The
department’s overall performance was poor in 119 of 162 cases, or 73 percent, and satisfactory
in 43 cases, or 27 percent.
Three principal departmental entities were involved in cases the OIG monitored:
investigators from the Office of Internal Affairs, department attorneys, and hiring
authorities, such as wardens. In addition to providing an overall rating for each case, the
OIG evaluated the performances of the investigators, department attorneys, and hiring
authorities separately, and issued one of three ratings—superior, satisfactory, or poor—to
each of the entities for each case. The OIG found the performance of investigators poor
in 99 of 162 cases, or 61 percent, of investigations the OIG monitored and closed, and
satisfactory in 63 cases, or 39 percent. Of the 162 cases the OIG monitored and closed in
2024, the department assigned an attorney in 83 cases. Of those 83 cases, the OIG found
department attorneys performed poorly in 59 cases, or 71 percent, and satisfactorily in
Gavin Newsom, Governor
10111 Old Placerville Road, Suite 110
Sacramento, California 95827
Telephone: (916) 288-4212
www.oig.ca.gov
Governor and Legislative Leaders
March 10, 2025
Monitoring the Staff Misconduct Investigation and Review Process
Page 2
25 cases, or 30 percent. Regarding wardens and other hiring authorities, the OIG found
their performance to be poor in 103 of 162 cases, or 64 percent, and satisfactory in 59 cases, or
36 percent.
Should you have any questions regarding this report, please contact the OIG at 916-288-4233.
Sincerely,
Amarik K. Singh
Inspector General
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Monitoring the Staff Misconduct Investigation and Review Process, 2024 Annual Report | iii
Contents
Introduction 1
Summary 2
The Office of Internal Affairs Conducted Mostly Poor Staff
Misconduct Investigations 3
Office of Internal Affairs Investigators Delayed Completing More Than
Half the Investigations Monitored by the OIG 3
The Office of Internal Affairs Created Duplicative and Superfluous
Investigations, Resulting in an Inflated Investigation Count and
Inefficient Use of Resources 6
Department Attorneys Performed Poorly in Most Staff Misconduct
Cases Monitored by the OIG 10
Department Attorneys Drafted Few Disciplinary Actions and Did Not
Litigate Any Evidentiary Hearings Before the State Personnel Board
in 2024 on OIG-Monitored Cases 10
Department Attorneys Provided Incorrect or Poor Advice to Either the
Investigator or the Hiring Authority in Almost Two-Thirds of All OIG-
Monitored Cases 11
Employee Relations Officers Often Performed Poorly While
Representing the Department in Employee Disciplinary Cases 12
In Most OIG-Monitored Cases Involving Alleged Staff Misconduct,
Hiring Authorities Performed Poorly in Making Decisions and
Processing Cases 15
The Department Did Not Have a Current Policy Regarding Officers’
Use of Physical Holds 16
In Multiple Cases, Hiring Authorities Failed to Enforce the
Department’s Use-of-Force Regulation Related to Improper
Physical Holds 17
Hiring Authorities, Including Wardens, Did Not Make Consistent
Notifications to Complainants After the Conclusion of Staff
Misconduct Investigations 18
OIG Recommendations to the California Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation Regarding Its Staff Misconduct Complaint
Investigation and Employee Disciplinary Process 21
The Department’s Response to Our Staff Misconduct Monitoring Report 23
Office of the Inspector General, State of California
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iv | Monitoring the Staff Misconduct Investigation and Review Process, 2024 Annual Report
he Inspector General
T
shall be responsible for contemporaneous
oversight of internal affairs investigations
and the disciplinary process of the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation,
pursuant to Section 6133 under policies to be
developed by the Inspector General.
— State of California
California Penal Code
section 6126 (a)
The Inspector General shall provide
contemporaneous oversight of grievances
that fall within the department’s process
for reviewing and investigating inmate
allegations of staff misconduct and other
specialty grievances, examining compliance
with regulations, department policy, and best
practices. . . . The Inspector General shall
issue reports annually, beginning in 2021.
— State of California
California Penal Code
section 6126 (i)
The Office of the Inspector General shall
be responsible for contemporaneous public
oversight of the Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation investigations and
staff grievance inquiries conducted
by the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation’s Office of Internal Affairs.
— State of California
California Penal Code
Lady Justice
section 6133 (a) (1)
The Office of the Inspector General shall be
responsible for advising the public regarding
the adequacy of each investigation and
whether discipline of the subject of the
investigation is warranted.
— State of California
California Penal Code
section 6133 (a) (3)
Office of the Inspector General, State of California
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Monitoring the Staff Misconduct Investigation and Review Process, 2024 Annual Report | 1
Introduction
The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (the department)
has a process by which an incarcerated person, a parolee, or any third-party
individual or group can submit an allegation of staff misconduct to the
department for further review and handling. An allegation of staff misconduct
is one in which an individual or group alleges that a departmental employee
violated a law, a regulation, departmental policy, or an ethical or a professional
standard. The California Penal Code directs that the Office of the Inspector
General (the OIG) “shall provide contemporaneous oversight of grievances that
fall within the department’s process for reviewing and investigating inmate
allegations of staff misconduct and other specialty grievances, examining
compliance with regulations, department policy, and best practices.”1
The department maintains a list of the most serious allegations called the
Allegation Decision Index. The department’s Office of Internal Affairs
investigates the department’s most serious staff misconduct allegations as noted
in an Allegation Decision Index. In turn, the OIG Staff Misconduct Monitoring
Unit Investigations Monitoring Team monitor the most serious cases involving
allegations against staff for misconduct. These cases often involve allegations of
dishonesty, unreasonable force, retaliation, and sexual misconduct.
The OIG’s Staff Misconduct Monitoring Unit Investigations Monitoring Team
consists of a group of seasoned attorneys with a broad range of experience in
various legal disciplines, including criminal prosecution, employment law,
administrative law, and civil litigation. These OIG attorneys monitored the
performances of departmental staff members who conducted investigations
into staff misconduct allegations and who handled the employee discipline
process. OIG attorneys monitored cases from the start of investigations until
the conclusion of the cases, and in doing so, evaluated the performances of
investigators, department attorneys, and hiring authorities, such as wardens. If
an investigation led to discipline of an employee, the OIG attorneys continued to
monitor the case until its conclusion.
OIG attorneys evaluated whether investigators conducted thorough and
timely investigations. They assessed whether department attorneys provided
appropriate and timely advice to investigators and hiring authorities. OIG
attorneys also analyzed whether department attorneys properly handled
employee disciplinary cases, including any litigation stemming from employee
disciplinary actions. Moreover, OIG attorneys evaluated whether hiring
authorities made reasonable decisions about whether staff misconduct occurred,
selected the appropriate penalty, timely served the disciplinary action paperwork,
and, if there was a settlement, appropriately settled the case.
1. California Penal Code, section 6126 (i).
Office of the Inspector General, State of California
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2 | Monitoring the Staff Misconduct Investigation and Review Process, 2024 Annual Report
The law requires that we issue reports annually. This report covers the
OIG’s monitoring and assessment of the department’s handling of its staff
misconduct complaint investigations and employee disciplinary processes from
January 1, 2024, through December 31, 2024.
Summary
In 2024, the OIG monitored and closed 162 staff misconduct investigations and
the employee disciplinary process for those cases. Some of the cases the OIG
monitored and closed in 2024 were opened by the Office of Internal Affairs
in 2023, but did not conclude until 2024. For each case, we assigned one of
three overall ratings: superior, satisfactory, or poor. Overall, the department’s
performance was poor in conducting staff misconduct investigations and the
disciplinary process.
• The department’s performance was poor in 119 of the 162 cases, or
73 percent.
• The department’s performance was satisfactory in 43 of the 162 cases,
or 27 percent.
• The department did not perform in a superior manner in any cases
pertaining to staff misconduct investigations and the employee
disciplinary process.
Below, we provide specific information on our assessments of the performances
of the three main entities—investigators, department attorneys, and hiring
authorities, such as wardens—responsible for the department’s internal staff
misconduct investigations and employee disciplinary processes. As a whole, these
performances led to the overall poor rating we assigned to the department. In
the concluding section of this report, as well as in the individual sections below,
we also offer recommendations to the department for the improvement of its
internal investigative and employee disciplinary processes.
Office of the Inspector General, State of California
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Monitoring the Staff Misconduct Investigation and Review Process, 2024 Annual Report | 3
The Office of Internal Affairs Conducted Mostly Poor Staff
Misconduct Investigations
The OIG monitored Office of Internal Affairs’ staff misconduct investigations
from the time the Office of Internal Affairs received a staff misconduct allegation
for investigation until the Office of Internal Affairs closed its investigation and
sent a final investigative report to a hiring authority for review.
In 2024, the OIG monitored and closed 162 staff misconduct investigative cases.
Of these, the OIG found Office of Internal Affairs investigators poorly conducted
99 investigations, or 61 percent. The OIG found Office of Internal Affairs
investigators satisfactorily conducted 63 investigations, or 39 percent. In no
cases did an Office of Internal Affairs investigator perform in a superior manner.
The Office of Internal Affairs received poor ratings due to excessive delays in
conducting investigations, a lack of preparedness, ineffective questioning during
interviews, failure to collect relevant evidence, and unnecessary duplication of
investigative work.
Office of Internal Affairs Investigators Delayed Completing More
Than Half the Investigations Monitored by the OIG
The OIG found the Office of Internal Affairs delayed completing investigations
in 100 of the 162 cases the OIG monitored and closed in 2024, or 62 percent.
Investigators delayed performing the following investigative activities:
conducting an initial case conference, obtaining video recordings, conducting
the initial interview in an investigation, and conducting the final interview
in an investigation. In addition, investigators allowed significant delays to
occur between interviews; delayed completing investigative reports; and
failed to thoroughly conduct investigations, which resulted in the hiring
authority returning cases to Office of Internal Affairs investigators for further
investigation. Moreover, the Office of Internal Affairs caused delays when it
reassigned cases to different investigators.
Time is of the essence during investigations. Delays can lead to a loss of critical
evidence due to unavailable witnesses, faded memories, or the destruction of
video recordings. In addition, delayed investigations cause both the complaining
parties and the subjects of investigations undue stress and loss of morale as they
await resolution. Incarcerated people may lose faith in the complaint reporting
process if they are made to wait from several months to a year for closure. The
department has a one-year statutory deadline in which it can issue disciplinary
penalties against officers. Delayed investigations impact the department’s
ability to issue and sustain disciplinary penalties against officers, which may
further undermine the trust of incarcerated people and that of the public in the
department’s commitment to holding officers accountable for misconduct they
carry out against incarcerated people and parolees.
Office of the Inspector General, State of California
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4 | Monitoring the Staff Misconduct Investigation and Review Process, 2024 Annual Report
The department is aware that investigations must be completed in a timely
manner. As part of a court-ordered remedial plan,2 investigations involving
complaints by disabled incarcerated people at six prisons must be completed
within either four or six months.3 The department has informally adopted the
same time frames for prisons not bound by the remedial order. Yet despite its
stated commitment to completing investigations promptly, the department
continues to inefficiently complete investigations.
The OIG found investigators delayed investigations at the outset by not
conducting timely initial case conferences in 23 of the 162 monitored cases, or
14 percent of the investigations. The department’s operations manual requires
investigators to hold an initial case conference within 10 business days of
case assignment.4 In one case, the investigator did not conduct an initial case
conference until 54 an initial days after the Office of Internal Affairs assigned
the case to an investigator. The initial case conference is an important meeting
during which the investigator, the OIG, and the department attorney, if one is
assigned, meet to discuss the investigative plan and strategies, determine the
order of witnesses to interview, and schedule a tentative first interview date.
Because the initial case conference typically precedes the first interview, delaying
the initial case conference may lead to a delayed first interview, which then
threatens to delay the entire investigation.
The OIG found investigators delayed conducting interviews in 100 of the
162 cases we monitored, or 62 percent. In general, the first person an investigator
interviews is the person who filed the complaint so that the investigator can
clarify the complaint and establish all important dates. This first interview is
vital because the investigator must ensure that video recordings for all relevant
dates are requested and obtained, and witnesses and subjects identified. In
100 cases, investigators delayed conducting the first interview by more than one
month. In one case, the investigator did not conduct the first interview until six
months after having been assigned the case. The OIG also found instances in
which the investigator had months’ long gaps between interviews. In another
case, the investigator’s delay in preparing to interview two percipient staff
witnesses in a use-of-force case prevented the investigator from interviewing
them at all. Although the Office of Internal Affairs assigned an investigator to
the case on October 5, 2023, the investigator did not attempt to send a notice
of interview to an officer witness until February 29, 2024, and learned only on
March 4, 2024, that the officer’s last day with the department was March 7, 2024.
On April 30, 2024, the investigator attempted to interview a nurse but learned
2. The court implemented the Armstrong Remedial Plan at the following prisons: California Institution
for Women (CIW); California State Prison, Corcoran (COR); Kern Valley State Prison (KVSP);
California State Prison, Los Angeles County (LAC); and Substance Abuse Treatment Facility and State
Prison, Corcoran (SATF). Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (RJD) is also under a remedial plan
with substantially similar remedial measures (Armstrong et al. v. Newsom et al., No. 94-cv-02307-CW,
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California).
3. Per the Armstrong Remedial Plan, the department must complete investigations within 120 days
(when assigned to a sergeant or a lieutenant) or 180 days (when assigned to a special agent). The time
frames may be extended for extenuating circumstances (Armstrong et al. v. Newsom et al., No. 94-cv-
02307-CW).
4. Department Operations Manual, Section 33070.10.6. This manual is also referred to as the DOM.
Office of the Inspector General, State of California
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Monitoring the Staff Misconduct Investigation and Review Process, 2024 Annual Report | 5
that she had left the department’s employment on February 4, 2024. Although the
investigator continued to attempt to schedule interviews with these witnesses,
once the employees had left the department, the investigator was unable to reach
them to secure their cooperation, preventing the hiring authority from having the
benefit of their eyewitness accounts.
The OIG also observed delays in the investigative process that resulted in a
failure to obtain video recordings before their destruction. As we reported in
the OIG publication titled Monitoring the Staff Misconduct Investigation and
Review Process of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation,
published on May 24, 2023, the department adopted a retention policy that
requires retaining video recordings for only a 90-day period, unless a triggering
event requires the recording to be retained for a longer period.5 As noted in that
publication, delayed interviews and reassignment of investigators contributed to
investigators’ failure to obtain video recordings. The OIG observed this concern
continued to be a problem in 2024. For instance, in one case, an officer acted
dishonestly when he added false information to a departmental form, which
caused an incarcerated person to lose his prison job assignment. The department
assigned an investigator on March 13, 2023. The department reassigned the case
to another investigator on May 3, 2023. Both investigators delayed reviewing the
available video evidence. By the time the second investigator reviewed the video
recordings and realized the investigator needed additional earlier video footage,
the department had already purged the earlier video recording.
In another case, the Office of Internal Affairs assigned an investigator who
conducted no interviews and then reassigned the case to a second investigator
who delayed the investigation by prolonging the time needed to conduct nine
interviews. The investigator needed seven days to complete the nine interviews,
yet the investigator spread out the interviews over the three months and 18 days.
The Office of Internal Affairs subsequently reassigned the case to yet another
investigator who took two months and 26 days to provide the investigative report
to the hiring authority, one month before the deadline to take disciplinary action
was set to expire. In this example, the Office of Internal Affairs took nine months
and 13 days to provide its investigative report to the hiring authority from the
date the Office of Internal Affairs first assigned an investigator to the case.
The OIG also found investigators delayed conducting final interviews and
completing investigative reports. Of the 162 cases the OIG monitored, in
60 cases, the investigator delayed completing the final interview,6 which is often
the last investigatory task before the investigator prepares the final investigative
report for the hiring authority’s review. In one example, the investigator did
not complete the final interview until 333 days had elapsed, nearly a year, from
when the Office of Internal Affairs assigned the case to an investigator. The OIG
found in 84 of 162 cases it monitored, the investigator delayed in completing
5. Examples of triggering events are use-of-force incidents; incidents resulting in serious bodily
injury, great bodily injury, or death; sexual assault allegations; and allegations of staff misconduct.
6. In these 60 cases, the investigator conducted final interviews beyond the investigation
completion deadlines.
Office of the Inspector General, State of California
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6 | Monitoring the Staff Misconduct Investigation and Review Process, 2024 Annual Report
the final investigative report for the hiring authority.7 In one instance, the
investigator completed the last interview on September 27, 2023, but did not
complete the final investigative report until February 16, 2024, four months and
20 days thereafter.
Untimely investigations not only impacted an investigator’s ability to secure
evidence, but also directly impacted the hiring authority’s ability to impose
disciplinary action when appropriate. The department must complete an
investigation and impose disciplinary actions within one year of the department’s
discovery of any alleged act of misconduct by an officer.8 The longer an
investigator takes to complete the investigation, the less time the hiring authority
has to review the investigative report, the supporting documentation, the video
evidence, and the audio recordings; to make findings; to determine penalties,
if any; and to ensure the preparation and service of disciplinary actions. In
one case, the investigator did not provide the hiring authority with the final
investigative report until 22 days before the deadline to take disciplinary action
was set to expire.
At times, investigators’ attempts to quickly close cases resulted in insufficient
investigations. Of the 162 cases the OIG monitored, the hiring authority had
to return seven cases to Office of Internal Affairs investigators for further
investigation. When a hiring authority returns a case to the Office of Internal
Affairs, the investigator must conduct more interviews and prepare a new
investigative report, which requires the hiring authority to undergo the
disciplinary process anew. In one case, the investigator’s failure to conduct a
thorough investigation required the hiring authority to return the case to the
investigator for further investigation, causing a delay of three months and 15 days
before the hiring authority could reconvene the investigative and disciplinary
findings conference. To alleviate these concerns, the OIG recommends that
investigators conduct the initial interview in staff misconduct investigations and
request all video recordings within one month of case assignment.
The Office of Internal Affairs Created Duplicative and Superfluous
Investigations, Resulting in an Inflated Investigation Count and
Inefficient Use of Resources
The Office of Internal Affairs reported completing 7,990 staff misconduct
investigations in 2024.9 While there was a substantial number of staff misconduct
investigations in 2024, the Office of Internal Affairs compounded the problem
by opening new investigative cases relating to alleged staff misconduct
that the Office of Internal Affairs had already investigated or was currently
7. In these 84 cases, the investigator completed the final investigative report beyond the investigation
completion deadlines.
8. Government Code section 3304(d) provides that the department cannot impose disciplinary action
against a peace officer for any act of misconduct if the investigation of the allegation is not completed
within one year of the department’s discovery by a person authorized to initiate an investigation of
the allegation.
9. Based on data provided by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Office
of Research.
Office of the Inspector General, State of California
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Monitoring the Staff Misconduct Investigation and Review Process, 2024 Annual Report | 7
investigating. The Office of Internal Affairs opened a new investigative case
when an incarcerated person or parolee filed a complaint, when a third-party
filed a complaint, when departmental staff initiated a complaint, and when
the hiring authority, such as a warden, initiated an investigation into the same
allegation. Instead of ensuring that they were not creating more than one case for
the same allegations, the Office of Internal Affairs knowingly created separate
cases when a complainant made both a verbal and written complaint about the
same incident, when one incarcerated person filed multiple complaints about
the same incident, and when multiple people filed complaints about the same
incident. The creation of duplicative cases and the failure to combine allegations
related in time and scope into one investigation inflated the actual number of
staff misconduct investigations the Office of Internal Affairs handled in 2024 and
caused investigators to use resources inefficiently.
The Office of Internal Affairs routinely created new cases when there were
already existing investigative cases that addressed the same or related allegations.
The Office of Internal Affairs identified some of these cases as “duplicate” cases
and some as “subsequent source” cases, meaning the complaint related, at least
in part, to a previous complaint for which the Office of Internal Affairs had
already assigned an investigation. However, the Office of Internal Affairs failed
to identify many of the duplicative and subsequent source cases as such and
failed to uniformly document the duplicative nature of investigations that the
Office of Internal Affairs identified in the staff misconduct database. Due to the
existence of unidentified duplicative investigations, it is difficult to measure the
actual number of staff misconduct investigations the Office of Internal Affairs
completed in 2024. The Office of Internal Affairs uncovered some previously
unidentified duplicative investigative cases during the investigative stage when
subjects stated they had already been interviewed for the same allegations.
In other situations, hiring authorities discovered the duplicative nature of
investigations when holding or preparing for the investigative and disciplinary
findings conference. Of the 162 cases the OIG monitored and closed in 2024, at
least 19 of the cases were duplicative and had some relation to another pending
or closed investigation. For these 19 cases the OIG monitored, the Office
of Internal Affairs opened and counted approximately 40 staff misconduct
investigations. Some of the duplicative investigations the OIG monitored related
to other investigations the Office of Internal Affairs handled; however, many of
the duplicative investigations the OIG monitored were related to more than one
additional staff misconduct investigation.
Of the 7,990 staff misconduct investigative cases completed in 2024, the Office
of Internal Affairs reported 103 as “duplicate” cases. In addition, the Office of
Internal Affairs also identified 48 cases as a “subsequent source.” However, even
when it identified a case as a “duplicate” or “subsequent source,” the Office of
Internal Affairs created a new case number for subsequent complaints, which
caused the Office of Internal Affairs to open superfluous cases. Sometimes, the
Office of Internal Affairs seemed unaware that complaints were duplicative
and assigned multiple investigators to conduct identical investigations. Other
times, the Office of Internal Affairs assigned duplicative cases to the same
investigator. Even when the Office of Internal Affairs assigned cases to the
Office of the Inspector General, State of California
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8 | Monitoring the Staff Misconduct Investigation and Review Process, 2024 Annual Report
same investigator, investigators repeated the same investigative tasks, which
wasted resources.
The OIG monitored several cases in which the Office of Internal Affairs
intentionally assigned duplicative investigations to the same investigator,
who then prepared and submitted separate investigative reports to the hiring
authority. For example, after one incarcerated person made both a verbal and a
written complaint that an officer used unreasonable force by firing a less-lethal
round that hit him in the head, the Office of Internal Affairs created two cases,
assigned both cases to the same investigator, and the investigator submitted two
separate investigative reports to the warden. In another instance, the Office of
Internal Affairs created one case after an incarcerated person filed a complaint
that alleged officers used unreasonable force against another incarcerated
person after he witnessed an incident and then created a second case after the
incarcerated person involved in the incident subsequently filed a complaint
alleging that the officers used unreasonable force against him. Again, the Office
of Internal Affairs assigned both cases to one investigator who prepared and
submitted two separate investigative reports to the warden. In another example,
the Office of Internal Affairs created two cases after two incarcerated people
filed separate complaints alleging officers used unreasonable force against them
even though they had complied with officers’ orders to stop fighting. The Office
of Internal Affairs assigned both cases to the same investigator who prepared and
submitted two separate investigative reports to the warden.
The OIG also monitored two sets of cases in which different investigators
simultaneously investigated identical allegations in separate cases. In the first set
of cases, during an investigative and disciplinary findings conference, the hiring
authority recognized he had already made findings on two identical allegations
under a different case number. This occurred because the Office of Internal
Affairs assigned an investigator to one investigation on July 6, 2023, and then
assigned a different investigator to the duplicative investigation two weeks later,
on July 17, 2023. Both investigators completed their separate investigations of the
same allegations. The first investigator submitted a report to the hiring authority
on August 18, 2024, and the second investigator submitted a report to the hiring
authority on December 5, 2023.
In the second set of cases, an incarcerated person filed a complaint on
May 1, 2023, alleging that officers endangered him and created an environment
that caused other incarcerated people to injure him, and the Office of Internal
Affairs assigned an investigator to investigate the allegations on May 8, 2023.
On June 12, 2023, another incarcerated person filed a complaint alleging he
witnessed the same misconduct as referenced by the initial complainant, and
the Office of Internal Affairs assigned a different investigator to investigate
the allegations on June 28, 2023. In the initial investigation, the investigator
conducted 11 interviews and submitted an investigative report to the hiring
authority on November 16, 2023. In the subsequent investigation, the investigator
interviewed four witnesses, including two that were interviewed for the
previous case, and submitted an investigative report to the hiring authority on
November 2, 2023. The Office of Legal Affairs discovered the duplicative case
Office of the Inspector General, State of California
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Monitoring the Staff Misconduct Investigation and Review Process, 2024 Annual Report | 9
after the OIG sought a higher level of review of the hiring authority’s findings at
the investigative and disciplinary findings conference in the initial case.
In addition to investigating identical and related allegations in multiple cases,
the Office of Internal Affairs also divided single complaints into multiple cases,
which further unnecessarily duplicated investigatory work. In contrast to the
low numbers of cases identified as a duplicate of a subsequent source, the Office
of Internal Affairs reported 950 of the investigations it completed in 2024 were
related to its process of splitting cases.
The Office of Internal Affairs divided single complaints into multiple cases
when complainants alleged misconduct that occurred at different prisons and
at different times even where the allegations of staff misconduct were within
the same scope and involved a continuous course of conduct. The Office of
Internal Affairs further divided complaints when they included allegations that
the department deemed less serious, and when the department determined that
a complaint included allegations that were not related. In addition, the Office
of Internal Affairs routinely created separate cases involving both health care
staff and custody staff. In one example, an incarcerated person submitted a
single complaint alleging a sergeant had directed a nurse to falsify a medical
evaluation of the complainant after having used unreasonable force against him.
The Office of Internal Affairs not only created a case for the allegation involving
the sergeant but also created a separate case for the allegation against the nurse.
All the information obtained during the investigation involving the nurse was
relevant to the investigation involving the sergeant. Because the allegations were
directly related, the Office of Internal Affairs should not have divided them into
two separate cases.
To address these concerns, the OIG recommends that the department
develop and implement a process to identify allegations that have already
been investigated, are currently being investigated, or are related to an open
investigation, and then combine all related allegations into a single investigation.
Because all duplicative allegations may not always be identified during the
screening process, the OIG also recommends that the department develop
and implement a policy to combine related investigations and close out
superfluous case numbers once the department identifies them. The OIG further
recommends that only one investigator investigate all related allegations in
one investigation and that the department discontinue the practice of dividing
complaints. Doing so would ensure consistency in investigations, ensure that
investigators are familiar with all relevant evidence, and ensure the department
uses resources efficiently.
Office of the Inspector General, State of California
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10 | Monitoring the Staff Misconduct Investigation and Review Process, 2024 Annual Report
Department Attorneys Performed Poorly in Most Staff
Misconduct Cases Monitored by the OIG
During the 2024 reporting period, the OIG monitored and closed 162 staff
misconduct investigative cases and the employee disciplinary process for
those cases. Of the 162 OIG-monitored staff misconduct cases, the department
assigned an attorney to 83 of them, which included one case where the
department assigned an attorney solely to consult with an employee relations
officer who drafted the disciplinary action and represented the department
during disciplinary proceedings. The OIG assessed how well department
attorneys provided legal advice to investigators and to wardens. The OIG also
evaluated the performance of the department attorney in litigating employee
disciplinary actions. The OIG found department attorneys performed poorly
in 59 of the 83 cases, or 71 percent of investigations in which the department
assigned an attorney to the case. The OIG found in 24 or 83 of the cases, or 29
percent, department attorneys performed satisfactorily. Department attorneys
did not perform in a superior manner in any cases.
Department Attorneys Drafted Few Disciplinary Actions and Did Not
Litigate Any Evidentiary Hearings Before the State Personnel Board
in 2024 on OIG-Monitored Cases
In 2024, the OIG monitored and closed 162 staff misconduct cases. The
department assigned an attorney to 83 of the 162 cases. Of these 83 cases,
hiring authorities sustained an allegation of misconduct in only 22 of the cases,
or 27 percent. In one case, a lieutenant retired before the department could
serve him with disciplinary action. In another case, the department assigned
an attorney to consult with the employee relations officer who represented
the department during the disciplinary proceedings. In five of the remaining
20 cases, the hiring authority sustained an allegation, but issued only corrective
action, and did not impose disciplinary action. Of the 15 cases in which the
department attorney drafted a disciplinary action, officers filed an appeal in
seven of the cases, including one case in which an officer withdrew his appeal.
Department attorneys advised the hiring authority to settle the remaining six
cases for a lesser penalty. In one case, the hiring authority reduced the penalty
from disciplinary action to corrective action. In two cases, the hiring authority
reduced a previously imposed salary reduction and agreed to the early removal
of the disciplinary action from the officer’s personnel file. In three other cases in
which employees filed appeals, hiring authorities withdrew previously imposed
penalties of dismissal, including in one case in which the hiring authority
withdrew disciplinary actions against three officers in their entirety. Because
the department entered settlements on all the appeals, department attorneys did
not present an evidentiary hearing before the State Personnel Board on OIG-
monitored cases. In contrast, the OIG monitored one case in which an employee
relations officer litigated an evidentiary hearing before the State Personnel Board
in 2024.
Office of the Inspector General, State of California
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Monitoring the Staff Misconduct Investigation and Review Process, 2024 Annual Report | 11
Department Attorneys Provided Incorrect or Poor Advice to Either
the Investigator or the Hiring Authority in Almost Two-Thirds of All
OIG-Monitored Cases
Department attorneys are assigned to provide legal consultation to investigators
and to hiring authorities, including wardens. The OIG found department
attorneys provided poor advice to investigators about investigations in
41 of 83 cases, or 49 percent. The OIG found department attorneys gave
poor advice to hiring authorities regarding investigations or disciplinary
findings in 39 of 83 cases, or 47 percent, or to both investigators and hiring
authorities, in 27 of 83 cases, or 33 percent. In 53 cases, or 64 percent, department
attorneys provided poor advice to either the investigator or the hiring authority.
In 41 of 83 monitored cases, department attorneys failed to provide appropriate
advice to an investigator concerning an investigation. Department attorneys
failed to advise investigators to include all relevant allegations, interview
percipient witnesses, and collect necessary evidence such as medical records
for investigations.
For example, in one case, a sergeant allegedly slammed an incarcerated person’s
face onto a concrete floor, causing the incarcerated person to suffer a fractured
eye socket and spinal injuries. The department attorney failed to advise the
investigator to interview the incarcerated person who filed the complaint and
failed to advise the investigator to obtain medical records to evaluate the injuries
the incarcerated person may or may not have received due to the incident. The
department attorney failed to advise the investigator to include information
about the extent of the injuries in the investigative report. The department
attorney later inappropriately advised the hiring authority—a warden—to find
the investigation to be sufficient even though the Office of Internal Affairs
investigator failed to interview the incarcerated person who filed the complaint
and did not include important information about the extent of the incarcerated
person’s injuries in the investigative report. The department attorney further
advised the warden to find that the sergeant’s use of force was justified, lawful,
and proper, even though the Office of Internal Affairs had not thoroughly
investigated the allegation.
In 39 of 83 monitored cases, the department attorney advised hiring authorities,
including wardens, to make incorrect investigation and disciplinary findings.
Incorrect investigation and disciplinary findings included finding an
investigation to be sufficient when incomplete; selecting an inappropriate
finding for an allegation of sustained, not sustained, unfounded, exonerated, or
no finding; and selecting an insufficient penalty.
In one case, one officer allegedly disclosed an incarcerated person’s confidential
records to a second incarcerated person, causing another incarcerated person
to assault the first incarcerated person, and then lied during her Office of
Internal Affairs’ interview. A second officer allegedly filed a false report that
the incarcerated person instigated a fight with a third incarcerated person.
The hiring authority found insufficient evidence to sustain the allegations, but
Office of the Inspector General, State of California
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12 | Monitoring the Staff Misconduct Investigation and Review Process, 2024 Annual Report
after the OIG sought a higher level of review, the hiring authority’s supervisor
sustained allegations that the first officer disclosed confidential records and lied
during her Office of Internal Affairs’ interview and dismissed the first officer.
The department did not assign an attorney until the case went through the higher
level of review. The department attorney advised the hiring authority to withdraw
the allegation that the officer disclosed the incarcerated person’s confidential
records, which was the conduct that provided the motivation for the officer to lie
during her interview. The department attorney then advised the hiring authority
to settle the case with the officer, a process that reinstated her to the position of
officer and amended the disciplinary action to remove the dishonesty allegation
and which, instead, would reflect the allegation of unauthorized access to
confidential information. The department attorney advised the hiring authority
to agree to modify the officer’s penalty from a dismissal to a waiver of six months
and one day of back pay because there was insufficient evidence to prove the
officer’s motive to lie even though there was evidence to support the allegations
and the penalty.
Employee Relations Officers Often Performed Poorly While
Representing the Department in Employee Disciplinary Cases
An employee relations officer is a department employee responsible for
coordinating the administrative process for employee discipline cases. Employee
relations officers also represent the department during the employee disciplinary
process and at any administrative hearings in cases without an assigned
department attorney. These are called nondesignated cases. The department’s
operations manual provides a similar definition and notes that the employee
relations officer is an employee designated by a hiring authority to coordinate
disciplinary actions. The employee relations officer has many duties, but some
of the most significant duties are drafting disciplinary actions and representing
the department in all nondesignated cases before the State Personnel Board.
A nondesignated case is one in which the department has not assigned a
department attorney to represent the department.
Of the cases monitored by the OIG in 2024, there were 10 instances in which
the employee relations officer drafted the disciplinary action, represented the
department in settlement discussions, represented the department in State
Personnel Board proceedings, or a combination of the above. It is noteworthy
that of the cases monitored by the OIG in 2024, department attorneys
represented the department in the roles noted above on 15 occasions. Thus, in the
25 cases monitored by OIG requiring an individual to represent the department
in the disciplinary process, an employee relations officer—not an attorney—
represented the department in 40 percent of the cases.
In more than half of monitored cases for which an employee relations officer
represented the department during the disciplinary process, the OIG negatively
assessed the employee relations officer’s performance. In many of these
instances, the performance of the employee relations officer led to poor outcomes
for the department, or could have, if not for OIG recommendations. Specifically,
the department settled cases in which it otherwise should not have but for the
Office of the Inspector General, State of California
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Monitoring the Staff Misconduct Investigation and Review Process, 2024 Annual Report | 13
performance of the employee relations officer. In other cases, if not for OIG
monitoring, substantial errors would likely have been made by the employee
relations officer.
The first noteworthy example encompasses two separate cases monitored by
the OIG. In both cases, a hiring authority sustained allegations of misconduct
against a sergeant. However, despite originating from the same prison, each case
had a different employee relations officer from different prisons representing the
department. Moreover, there were two additional cases with sustained allegations
against the sergeant that the OIG did not monitor with still two other employee
relations officers involved in the cases. These four cases gave rise to four separate
disciplinary actions, including one in which a hiring authority dismissed the
sergeant, which was one of the cases monitored by the OIG. Despite all four
disciplinary actions concerning the same sergeant, the four employee relations
officers did not coordinate among themselves to draft the disciplinary actions or
to represent the department until right before entering into a global settlement
agreement. This lack of coordination led to many errors, the first of which was
that the department served two of the disciplinary actions on the sergeant after
the department had already dismissed him from employment, negating their
use in supporting the sergeant’s dismissal. Had there been proper coordination
among the employee relations officers, or a single employee relations officer
handling all matters related to the sergeant, the department could have drafted a
single disciplinary action, which would have provided substantial support to the
department’s decision to dismiss the sergeant.
Moreover, during a settlement conference before the State Personnel Board,
the employee relations officer representing the department for the dismissal
action entered into a global settlement agreement for all four disciplinary actions
related to the sergeant, reducing the dismissal to a demotion, and withdrawing
the other three disciplinary actions outright. While the three other employee
relations officers were brought into the settlement conference, it was clear
that they were not fully informed of the details of the settlement. In the other
associated case monitored by the OIG, communication with the employee
relations officer revealed she was not even fully aware that the terms of the
global settlement withdrew the disciplinary action in her case. In addition, the
hiring authority for the same disciplinary action failed to even respond to an
inquiry from the OIG questioning whether he had provided settlement authority.
Finally, it should also be noted that the final settlement report drafted by the
department reflected that four separate hiring authorities were consulted during
the settlement discussions. However, one of those listed hiring authorities did
not even work for the department at the time of the settlement discussion, which
draws into question who the employee relations officer consulted before the
single employee relations officer attempted to settle four cases at once.
In another example of poor performance by a departmental employee relations
officer, an employee relations officer failed to consult with departmental staff
prior to listing the staff member as an expert witness in a prehearing witness
list filed with the State Personnel Board. The employee relations officer was not
aware of the content of the expected testimony of those witnesses during a State
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14 | Monitoring the Staff Misconduct Investigation and Review Process, 2024 Annual Report
Personal Board hearing and only consulted with the individuals after submitting
the witness list to the State Personnel Board. After consulting with the witnesses,
the employee relations officer realized that the witnesses would not support the
department’s position regarding the staff misconduct the department alleged
in the disciplinary action. This failure to properly identify supporting expert
witnesses and consult with witnesses before listing them in support of the
disciplinary action led to the department settling the case for a lesser penalty
than was warranted for the misconduct.
In still additional cases, the OIG attorney made recommendations to an employee
relations officer concerning significant flaws in disciplinary documents. On
one occasion, an employee relations officer drafted a disciplinary action that
contained an incorrect penalty, an incorrect incident date, an inaccurate
description of who authored the investigative report, and failed to include
multiple exhibits from the investigative report. Even after the OIG attorney
recommended that the employee relations officer correct the inaccuracies,
the employee relations officer failed to include relevant prior discipline in the
disciplinary action, requiring an amended disciplinary action. The employee
relations officer then needed to draft a second amended disciplinary action based
on OIG recommendations after the OIG attorney pointed out that the employee
relations officer had not corrected the incident date in the disciplinary action.
In another case, the OIG attorney made substantial recommendations to an
employee relations officer concerning a disciplinary action.
Given the identified deficiencies in the performance of employee relations
officers in representing the department in the employee discipline process,
the OIG recommends that the department provide more robust training to
employee relations officers concerning the employee disciplinary process and
how to represent the department during that process. In addition, the OIG
recommends that the department, at a minimum, assign an attorney to represent
the department in any employee discipline that has the potential to result in an
evidentiary hearing before the State Personnel Board.
Office of the Inspector General, State of California
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Monitoring the Staff Misconduct Investigation and Review Process, 2024 Annual Report | 15
In Most OIG-Monitored Cases Involving Alleged Staff
Misconduct, Hiring Authorities Performed Poorly in
Making Decisions and Processing Cases
The OIG monitored the performance of hiring authorities from the time a
hiring authority, such as a warden, received a completed investigation from the
Office of Internal Affairs through the cessation of any employee discipline-
related proceedings. In a majority of cases monitored by the OIG, the sole
hiring authority was a warden. However, a health care executive served as a
hiring authority in a few OIG-monitored employee discipline case. In 2024, the
OIG monitored 162 staff misconduct cases. The OIG found the hiring authority
performed poorly in 103 of those cases and satisfactorily in 59 of the cases.
The OIG did not rate any hiring authority’s performance as superior in 2024.
Therefore, hiring authorities performed poorly in 64 percent of cases monitored
by the OIG. This is a marked increase in poor performance from last year, in
which we found hiring authorities performed poorly in 50 percent of the cases
we monitored.
Similar to the OIG’s findings for the 2023 reporting period, a great deal of poor
ratings during the 2024 reporting period resulted from hiring authority delays
in conducting the investigative and disciplinary findings conferences. In 81 of
162 cases the OIG monitored, or 50 percent, the hiring authority failed to timely
conduct the investigative and disciplinary findings conference. This reflects a
lack of notable improvement from our report last year, in which we documented
similar delays in 52 percent of cases monitored by our staff. In fact, in 2024, the
average time from when a hiring authority received a report to the date a hiring
authority held an investigative and disciplinary findings conference was 52 days.
Moreover, in 21 instances, it took 100 days or more for the hiring authority to
hold the conference.
Hiring authorities also made poor findings. For cases the OIG monitored and
closed in 2023, hiring authorities made poor findings in 19 percent. In 2024,
the OIG found hiring authorities made poor findings in 39 of 162 cases, or
24 percent, which reflects hiring authorities were making inappropriate findings
in a substantial number of cases and did so at a rate even greater than that
found during the prior year. Poor findings include making an inappropriate
determination concerning the sufficiency of an investigation as well as failing to
appropriately determine the findings for each allegation. On eight occasions in
2024, the hiring authority’s findings were so egregious the OIG sought a higher
level of review by the hiring authority’s supervisor.
Finally, the hiring authority settled cases or modified the penalty in 20 cases
monitored by the OIG. In 17 of those cases, or 85 percent, the OIG found the
settlement or modification failed to comply with policy. Inappropriately settling
cases or modifying penalties at such a high rate is suggestive of a concerning
trend. The department has clear policy that a hiring authority must follow when
determining whether settlement or modification is appropriate. Despite repeated
OIG recommendations to adhere to the policy, hiring authorities frequently
defied the policy.
Office of the Inspector General, State of California
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16 | Monitoring the Staff Misconduct Investigation and Review Process, 2024 Annual Report
The Department Did Not Have a Current Policy Regarding Officers’
Use of Physical Holds
In recent years, law enforcement agencies have shown a heightened awareness
regarding officers’ use of neck restraints. On May 25, 2020, four Minneapolis
Police Department officers detained a man named George Floyd. One of the
officers, Derek Chauvin, applied one of his knees to the side of Floyd’s neck for
an extended period, which resulted in the death of Floyd. Authorities arrested
and charged the four officers for their involvement in Floyd’s death, after which
they were convicted and sentenced to prison. At the time of the incident, the
Minneapolis Police Department allowed officers to use neck restraints. Prior
to the incident, only two states, Tennessee and Illinois, had enacted bans on
physical holds that restricted either air or blood flow. In the year following
Floyd’s death, 24 states, including California, enacted bans, or restrictions on
officers’ use of neck restraints.
On September 20, 2020, less than four months after the incident involving Floyd,
California Governor Gavin Newsom signed Government Code section 7286.5
into law, which became effective January 1, 2021. The law banned officers in
law enforcement agencies throughout California from using “chokeholds”
and carotid restraints. However, under Government Code section 7286(a)(5),
the definition of a “law enforcement agency” did not include the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation even though it employs more than
20,000 officers.
In contrast to the governor’s prompt response, the department delayed
updating its use-of-force regulation of its officers’ physical holds on the neck
until November 16, 2022, nearly two and a half years after Floyd’s death. The
department not only delayed instituting this important regulatory change, but
even now, more than four years after Floyd’s death, the department still has not
updated its policy manual (the Department Operations Manual, also known as
the DOM), specifically Section 51020.5, to match the regulatory change.
The department’s omission in its policy manual is significant. Former Officer
Chauvin applied pressure to the side of Floyd’s neck, cutting off blood flow to
the brain. The department now prohibits this type of neck restraint under the
California Code of Regulations (CCR), section 3268(c)(2), which bans any neck
restraint that restricts blood flow to the brain. However, the current 2024 DOM,
specifically section 51020.5, continues to only ban neck restraints which
restrict air flow alone and makes no mention of neck restraints that restrict
blood flow to the brain. The department amended CCR section 3268(c)(2) on
November 16, 2022, and the department updated its DOM in 2023 and again
in 2024. However, the department still has not updated DOM Section 51020.5
to match the amended regulation during either of these annual revisions. The
department’s delay to amend its regulation on neck restraints and its subsequent
continued failure to update its policy manual on improper neck restraints
shows a lack of urgency by the department that is inconsistent with the urgent
responses by the State of California, and the nation, following the public outcry
over officers using physical restraints on an individual’s neck.
Office of the Inspector General, State of California
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Monitoring the Staff Misconduct Investigation and Review Process, 2024 Annual Report | 17
To remedy this problem, the OIG recommends that the department delay no
longer and immediately update DOM Section 51020.5 to prohibit officers from
using any neck restraints limiting blood flow to the brain.
In Multiple Cases, Hiring Authorities Failed to Enforce the
Department’s Use-of-Force Regulation Related to Improper
Physical Holds
The OIG found a lack of consistency between the department regulation and
departmental policy regarding neck restraints. The OIG also noticed a lack of
enforcement of the department’s use-of-force regulation related to physical holds
on the neck, even in the face of video evidence.
Case Example 1
In one case, an officer allegedly grabbed an incarcerated person by the throat
and threw him to the ground in the presence of three other officers while the
incarcerated person was handcuffed with his hands behind his back. The hiring
authority originally found the officer used an improper neck restraint and
imposed a salary reduction. However, the hiring authority later changed his
mind and determined the officer’s use of force was not a “chokehold” and chose
to withdraw the disciplinary action. To justify his position, the hiring authority
stated the officer’s hold around the incarcerated person’s neck was only for three
seconds, and the officer did not appear to be squeezing very hard. The OIG did
not agree with the hiring authority’s assessment and asked the hiring authority
if he would at least train the officer to not use this type of hold in the future.
The hiring authority said he would not train the officer, nor any other officers,
unless his supervisor specifically told him the hold was improper. The OIG
elevated the matter to the hiring authority’s supervisor, and the hiring authority’s
supervisor acknowledged the officer violated the department’s use-of-force
policy and imposed the original salary reduction. However, the hiring authority’s
supervisor entered into a settlement agreement with the officer whereby he
reduced the length of time for the salary reduction by half and agreed to remove
the disciplinary action from the officer’s personnel file after only one year instead
of the standard three years required by policy. The OIG did not concur with
the settlement.
Case Example 2
In another case, a hiring authority found insufficient evidence to sustain an
allegation that an officer used an improper physical hold on an incarcerated
person’s neck. The hiring authority and the department attorney argued
they could not see from the body-worn-camera video evidence whether the
officer’s arm was placed over the incarcerated person’s neck or on his upper
back. However, the video footage was clear, certainly enough to establish
by a preponderance of the evidence, that the officer’s arm was on top of the
incarcerated person’s neck. Furthermore, the incarcerated person described
the incident as a “normal takedown including forearms to the neck.” The
incarcerated person did not file a complaint, but a member of the hiring
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18 | Monitoring the Staff Misconduct Investigation and Review Process, 2024 Annual Report
authority’s executive staff saw the video, was concerned it showed the officer’s
arm on the incarcerated person’s neck and recommended an investigation
take place. Despite all the above, the hiring authority and department attorney
insisted they could not see the officer’s arm on the incarcerated person’s neck.
Case Example 3
The OIG has observed an additional example of departmental stakeholders
who did not accept video evidence as sufficient proof of an officer using an
improper neck restraint despite it being depicted on a video recording. In this
instance, the officer used a headlock to take control of the incarcerated person
and ultimately took the incarcerated person to the ground while still holding
him around the neck. Despite what can be seen in the surveillance video, the
department attorney, and the hiring authority, refused to accept that the video
recording showed beyond a preponderance of the evidence that the officer had
used an improper physical hold on the incarcerated person’s neck, even when the
incarcerated person told an investigator he could not breathe during the incident.
The OIG elevated the matter to the hiring authority’s supervisor who also did not
find the video evidence compelling enough to establish proof by a preponderance
of the evidence that the officer used an improper restraint of the incarcerated
person’s neck.
Case Example 4
In yet another case, a hiring authority initially found an officer did not commit
misconduct when he used a neck restraint on an incarcerated person. However,
the OIG attorney recommended that the hiring authority find the officer
had used improper force. The hiring authority agreed and found the officer
violated the regulation on neck restraints and imposed a salary reduction on
the officer. The officer appealed to the State Personnel Board, and the hiring
authority entered into a settlement agreement with the officer, inappropriately
reducing the length of time for the salary reduction when there was no change in
circumstances. The OIG did not concur with the settlement.
To alleviate these concerns, the OIG recommends that in-depth training
pertaining to officers using physical holds on the neck be provided to all
departmental officers, staff who review uses of force, and staff who represent the
department in use-of-force cases, and that the department consistently enforce
its regulation banning any neck restraint that restricts air or blood flow.
Hiring Authorities, Including Wardens, Did Not Make Consistent
Notifications to Complainants After the Conclusion of Staff
Misconduct Investigations
After the department completed an investigation, the hiring authority, most
often a warden, was required to provide written notice about the outcome of the
complaint to the person who initiated the complaint, which may have been an
incarcerated person, a citizen, or a departmental employee.
Office of the Inspector General, State of California
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Monitoring the Staff Misconduct Investigation and Review Process, 2024 Annual Report | 19
Even though the notification requirement is stated in the department’s
operations manual (DOM) and is also codified in CCR, the language of these
requirements is vague regarding the specific information that must be included
in the written notices to the complainants.10 As such, the OIG observed a lack of
consistency on the part of hiring authorities in providing written complainant
notifications. The department’s practice for notifying complainants appeared
to vary—not only among prisons, but also within prisons. The OIG reviewed
complainant notifications from various hiring authorities at different prisons and
observed the following varying levels of specificity:
• Some prisons listed each allegation and included the category of
the allegation, the names of departmental staff members who were
subjects of the investigation, and brief facts about the allegations.
• Some prisons listed the allegations and included the category
and the name of the staff member who was a subject of the
investigation, but no facts about the allegation itself.
• Some prisons listed the allegation and included brief facts but did
not provide the category of the allegation.
In another other example, we noted the hiring authority at one prison provided
inconsistent information to be included in the complainant notification. In some
instances, the hiring authority provided allegations with some facts, but did not
provide the category of the allegation. In another instance, the hiring authority
included the category of the allegation, but did not provide any facts about the
allegation itself or provide the name of the staff member who was a subject of
the investigation.
In one example of our monitoring activity, our office learned that on
June 19, 2024, the department’s Division of Adult Institutions office emailed the
employee relations officers at each of the institutions instructing the institutions
to provide written notice to the complainant only for the allegations spelled
out in the original complaint. In that email, the department noted that some
institutions sent response letters to complainants that included more information
than the findings on the initial allegations submitted by complainants. The email
provided examples illustrating that any allegations not included in the initial
allegations submitted by the complainant should be excluded from the written
notifications. The email also noted that when allegations were added by the
hiring authority, the employee relations officers should note in the department’s
staff misconduct database that the hiring authority was the complainant
for those additional allegations. While the email provided some guidance to
the institutions on what information should be included in the complainant
notifications, it failed to address situations whereby the complainant added
allegations after having submitted a grievance or clarified details that
subsequently were formed into additional allegations after the initial complaint
or grievance was submitted. The email also failed to address situations in which
the hiring authority initiated an investigation after review of an incident.
10. DOM, Section 31140.4.10, and the California Code of Regulations, Title 15, section 3486.3.
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20 | Monitoring the Staff Misconduct Investigation and Review Process, 2024 Annual Report
The OIG is concerned that such an instruction limiting the information provided
in the complainant notification could be construed to limit the search for
information and might discourage investigators from seeking out all possible
allegations to add to the original complaint as the investigation progresses.
Similarly, if a complainant makes additional allegations during the investigation,
that person may be inclined to initiate a new complaint rather than amend a
standing one, which could lead to a strain on resources. Ultimately, the current
process presents a risk that a complainant would have no notice about critical
findings or closure for allegations not clearly articulated in the initial staff
misconduct complaint form.
Furthermore, an email providing guidance on what should be included in the
written notification is not formal policy. As a result, hiring authorities are not
bound to comply, and the type of information included in the complainant
notifications will continue to be inconsistent.
Therefore, the OIG recommends that the department update its Department
Operations Manual to clarify the specific information that hiring authorities
need to include in the written complainant notification. The OIG recommends
that the written notice to the complainant include all allegations the complainant
made, including the allegations in the initial complaint form, any additional
allegations the complainant made after submitting the initial staff misconduct
complaint, and any allegations the hiring authority added regarding the
same incident.
Office of the Inspector General, State of California
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Monitoring the Staff Misconduct Investigation and Review Process, 2024 Annual Report | 21
OIG Recommendations to the California Department
of Corrections and Rehabilitation Regarding Its Staff
Misconduct Complaint Investigation and Employee
Disciplinary Process
1. The OIG recommends that Office of Internal Affairs investigators
conduct the initial interview in staff misconduct investigations and
request all video recordings within one month of case assignment.
2. The OIG recommends that the department implement a process
to identify allegations that have already been investigated, are
currently being investigated, or are related to an open investigation,
and combine all related allegations into a single investigation. The
OIG recommends that the department develop and implement
a policy to combine related investigations and close out
superfluous case numbers once the department identifies them.
The OIG recommends that only one investigator investigate all
related allegations in one investigation and that the department
discontinue the practice of dividing complaints.
3. The OIG recommends that the department provide more robust
training to employee relations officers concerning the employee
disciplinary process and how to represent the department in that
process. In addition, the OIG recommends that the department, at
a minimum, assign an attorney to represent the department in any
employee discipline that has the potential to result in an evidentiary
hearing before the State Personnel Board.
4. The OIG recommends that the department update its Department
Operations Manual, Section 51020.5, to prohibit officers from using
any neck restraints limiting blood flow to the brain.
5. The OIG recommends that in-depth training pertaining to officers
using physical holds on the neck be provided to all departmental
officers, staff who review uses of force, and staff who represent
the department in use-of-force cases, and that the department
consistently enforce its regulation banning any neck restraint that
restricts air or blood flow.
6. The OIG recommends that the department update its Department
Operations Manual to clarify the specific information that hiring
authorities need to include in the written complainant notification.
The OIG recommends that the written notice to the complainant
include all allegations the complainant made, including the
allegations in the initial complaint form, any additional allegations
the complainant made after submitting the initial staff misconduct
complaint, and any allegation the hiring authority added regarding
the same incident.
Office of the Inspector General, State of California
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22 | Monitoring the Staff Misconduct Investigation and Review Process, 2024 Annual Report
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Monitoring the Staff Misconduct Investigation and Review Process, 2024 Annual Report | 23
The Department’s Response to Our Staff Misconduct
Monitoring Report
Docusign Envelope ID: EFC21BAF-7CD5-49F9-A1D5-87ECCC63D742
STATE OF CALIFORNIA — DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION GAVIN NEWSOM, GOVERNOR
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
PO Box 942883
Sacramento, CA 94283-0001
February 20, 2025
Ms. Amarik Singh
Office of the Inspector General
10111 Old Placerville Road, Suite 110
Sacramento, CA 95827
Dear Ms. Singh:
The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) has reviewed the draft
report entitled The Office of the Inspector General’s Monitoring in 2024 of the Staff Misconduct
Complaint Investigations and the Employee Disciplinary Process of the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation, and acknowledges the concerns outlined regarding staff
misconduct investigations and the employee disciplinary process. We recognize that many of
the challenges highlighted stem from the overwhelming number of cases processed within our
system. The volume of investigations continues to outpace the capacity of the Allegation
Investigation Unit (AIU) to complete them within the desired timeframes. While delays have
occurred, they are not due to a lack of commitment but rather the operational realities of
managing an extraordinarily high caseload.
Over the past eight months, CDCR has been working diligently with external stakeholders,
including the Office of the Inspector General (OIG), to identify and engage in meaningful steps
to continue reforming its investigative and disciplinary processes. These efforts include, but are
not limited to, filing an emergency Staff Misconduct regulations package with the Office of
Administrative Law, simplifying the staff misconduct process by eliminating the Local
Designated Inquiry Process, revising the Allegation Decision Index to provide greater clarity,
consolidating Information Technology systems to improve case tracking and management, and
developing Peace Officer Standards and Training certified training to enhance investigator
preparedness. In addition, the department is currently seeking to hire an outside consultant to
review and make meaningful recommendations on the Department’s Use of Force regulations,
policy and training. Lastly, the Department recently completed a series of trainings for staff
hired into the newly established Centralized Allegation Resolution Unit, which will review, as
part of a centralized and independent unit, completed investigations which involved or
originated from incarcerated persons residing within six specific Armstrong designated
institutions.
CDCR has implemented case prioritization strategies to focus on meeting statutory deadlines,
addressing cases based on their age and complexity, and ensuring compliance with legal
obligations. While we recognize that some cases have exceeded the prescribed timelines, AIU
is continuously refining its processes to improve efficiency without compromising the integrity
of investigations. To further address timeframe related challenges, CDCR is actively recruiting
Office of the Inspector General, State of California
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24 | Monitoring the Staff Misconduct Investigation and Review Process, 2024 Annual Report
Docusign Envelope ID: EFC21BAF-7CD5-49F9-A1D5-87ECCC63D742
Amarik Singh, Office of the Inspector General
Page 2
all vacant investigator positions within AIU and has repositioned several internal vacancies to
hire additional investigative staff. CDCR also continues to refine its intake process to better
identify overlapping or duplicative complaints at the outset, reducing redundant investigative
efforts while maintaining a complete review of all allegations. By streamlining the case review
and assignment process CDCR has improved efficiency and made better use of investigative
resources. CDCR is consistently improving its case management system used to manage
investigations, to ensure effective tracking and streamlining of information related to casework
for all stakeholders. Furthermore, CDCR is working toward additional improvements to its case
management system that will enhance communication, efficiencies and ensure compliance
with policies and regulations.
I am troubled by the robust discussion in the report of the May 2020 death of George Floyd and
the force used by members of the Minneapolis Police Department, which appears to be an
attempt to provoke readers into undeserved ill-will towards CDCR. To be clear, CDCR does not
authorize chokeholds or any other physical restraints, which prevents the person from
swallowing or breathing or restricts blood flow to the brain. CDCR provides regular and
consistent annual training to staff related to the use of force, which includes discussion and
training on chokeholds and positional asphyxia to ensure the safety awareness of the
incarcerated population.
CDCR is dedicated to working with OIG and other stakeholders to ensure success across all
mission areas. Through ongoing communication and collaboration, we strive to enhance
accountability, improve operations and achieve our shared goals. If you have any questions,
contact me at (916) 323-6001.
Sincerely,
for
JEFF MACOMBER
Secretary
Office of the Inspector General, State of California
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The Office of the Inspector General’s
Monitoring in 2024 of the Staff Misconduct
Complaint Investigations and the Employee
Disciplinary Process of the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
2024 Annual Report
OFFICE of the INSPECTOR GENERAL
Amarik K. Singh
Inspector General
Shaun Spillane
Chief Deputy Inspector General
STATE of CALIFORNIA
March 2025
OIG