OIG
Audit of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s Natural Disaster Emergency Preparedness and Mitigation Efforts
See Fact Sheet
Amarik K. Singh, Inspector General Shaun Spillane, Chief Deputy Inspector General
of the
OFFICE
OIG
INSPECTOR GENERAL
Independent Prison Oversight May 2025
Audit of the California
Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation’s Natural Disaster
Emergency Preparedness and
Mitigation Efforts
AUD № 24–01
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are available free in portable document format (PDF) on our website.
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For questions concerning the contents of this report,
please contact Shaun Spillane, Public Information Officer,
at 916-288-4212.
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May 1, 2025
Mr. Jeffrey Macomber
Secretary
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
P.O. Box 942883
Sacramento, CA 94283-001
Dear Mr. Macomber:
Enclosed is the Office of the Inspector General’s (the OIG) report titled Audit of the
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s Natural Disaster Emergency
Preparedness and Mitigation Efforts. California Penal Code section 6126, subdivisions (b)
and (c) authorize the OIG to initiate reviews of the California Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation’s (the department) policies, practices, and procedures. In this audit the
OIG evaluated the department’s preparedness and mitigation efforts for wildfires, floods,
and earthquakes. We reviewed the department’s All-Hazards Emergency Operations Plan,
as well as the 2024 site-specific emergency operations plans for 30 of the department’s
prisons, assessing the department’s ability to evacuate prisons threatened by wildfires,
floods, and earthquakes. We also completed an in-depth review of the preparedness
of three prisons—Valley State Prison, the California Rehabilitation Center, and San
Quentin Rehabilitation Center—located in different parts of the state. We reviewed their
methods for assessing their individual risks for wildfires, floods, and earthquakes, their
documented mitigation plans, and whether they revised and improved their policies in
response to threats posed by natural disasters.
While California’s prisons are vulnerable to wildfires, floods, and earthquakes, we
found they are not adequately prepared to respond to emergencies posed by natural
disasters. Not only are some prisons overcrowded, but the department is unable to
evacuate the incarcerated population and staff at most prisons within the first critical
72 hours of an emergency. In addition, prisons do not have specific plans to externally
evacuate the incarcerated population, and any effort to evacuate a prison is limited by
the department’s transportation fleet, which maintains some high mileage vehicles
and is operated out of three regional hubs. For one prison, the closest regional hub is
approximately 400 miles away.
Furthermore, almost all prisons assess their risks from wildfires, floods, and earthquakes,
but we found they generally use different methods for assessing their risks. Using varied
Gavin Newsom, Governor
10111 Old Placerville Road, Suite 110
Sacramento, California 95827
Telephone: (916) 288-4212
www.oig.ca.gov
Mr. Jeffrey Macomber, Secretary
May 1, 2025
Natural Disaster Emergency Preparedness
Page 2
risk assessment methodologies likely resulted in the inconsistent risk ratings we found
among prisons. By using a standardized process to ensure a consistent and accurate risk
rating, prisons can better develop mitigation strategies for the specific risks to which
they are most susceptible.
We also found that the emergency plans prisons develop in preparation for emergencies
are not substantively reviewed by the department’s headquarters as required by California
regulations and departmental policy. Without a robust review and approval process, the
department cannot meet its obligation to ensure that prisons submit up-to-date and
adequate site-specific emergency plans.
Finally, we found that despite departmental policy requiring prisons maintain mutual aid
agreements, two prisons did not enter into mutual aid agreements and others failed to
include key details of the mutual aid agreements in their site-specific emergency plans.
Without the mutual aid agreements or the key details included in the emergency plans,
the value of maintaining such agreements is diminished.
Following publication, we request that the department provide its status on
implementing our recommendations at intervals of 60 days, six months, and one year
from the date of the audit.
Respectfully submitted,
Amarik K. Singh
Inspector General
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OIG Report AUD № 24–01, Natural Disaster Emergency Preparedness, May 2025 | iii
Contents
Illustrations v
Introduction 1
Background 1
California Statewide Emergency Mitigation and Response 1
The Department’s Emergency Response Plan 3
Incident Command Post and Incident Command System 4
Results 7
Chapter 1. California’s Overcrowded Prisons Are Vulnerable to
Wildfires, Floods, and Earthquakes, and the Department Is Unable
to Evacuate the Incarcerated Population and Staff at Most Prisons
Within 72 Hours of an Emergency 7
The Department Does Not Have Specific Plans to Externally Evacuate
Prisons in Response to Natural Disasters 7
Prison Evacuations, Including the Evacuation of California State Prison,
Corcoran, and the Substance Abuse Treatment Facility Will Likely Take
More Than 72 Hours 8
The Location and High Mileage of Transportation Buses and Other
Fleet Vehicles Likely Limits the Department’s Ability to Evacuate Most
Prisons Within 72 Hours 9
Overcrowding and the Proximity of Neighboring Prisons Roughly
Doubles the Incarcerated Population to Be Evacuated During
an Emergency 11
Effective Plans to Evacuate Prisons in 72 Hours Are Particularly
Important in the Event of Earthquakes 12
The Department May Not Evacuate Prisons in the Event of a Wildfire 13
Recommendations 15
Chapter 2. Although Almost All Prisons Assess Their Risk of
Natural Disasters, They Do Not Do So Consistently 16
Prison Staff Generally Use Multiple Methods to Assess Their Risk of
Wildfires, Floods, and Earthquakes 16
Using Multiple Risk Assessment Methods Likely Results in
Inconsistent Risk Ratings Between Prisons 17
Office of the Inspector General, State of California
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iv | OIG Report AUD № 24–01, Natural Disaster Emergency Preparedness, May 2025
Some Prisons Rate Their Risks of Natural Disasters Differently
Despite Being Located in Close Proximity to Each Other 18
Recommendations 19
Chapter 3. The Emergency Planning Unit Does Not Substantively
Review Prisons’ Site-Specific Emergency Operations Plans
as Required by California Regulations and Departmental Policy 20
The Emergency Planning Unit’s Approval Process Is Flawed 20
The Emergency Planning Unit Does Not Ensure Prisons Submit
Site-Specific Supplements or Review Them for Adequacy 21
Recommendations 22
Chapter 4. At Least Two Prisons Have Not Entered Into
Mutual Aid Agreements, and Not All Site-Specific Emergency
Plans Include Key Details of Mutual Aid Agreements 23
Recommendations 24
Appendix 25
Scope and Methodology 25
Assessment of Data Reliability 28
The OIG’s Comments Concerning the Response
Received From the Department 29
Office of the Inspector General, State of California
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OIG Report AUD № 24–01, Natural Disaster Emergency Preparedness, May 2025 | v
Illustrations
Figures
1. Time Line Outlining the Development of Emergency Services
in California 2
2. Map of California Displaying the Department’s State
Transportation Unit (STU) Hub Locations, Selected Prison Sites,
and the Incarcerated Populations at Each Facility 10
3. Elements of the Department’s Hazard and Risk
Assessment Process 16
Tables
Definitions vi
A–1. Audit Objectives and the Methods Used to Fulfill Them 26
Office of the Inspector General, State of California
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vi | OIG Report AUD № 24–01, Natural Disaster Emergency Preparedness, May 2025
Definitions
Term Definition
All-Hazards Emergency The basis for all departmental emergencies requiring activation of the
Operations Plan Incident Command System (ICS).
The California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services is responsible
for the state’s emergency and disaster response services for natural,
technological, or man-made disasters and emergencies, including
Cal OES
responsibility for activities necessary to prevent, respond to, recover
from, and mitigate the effects of emergencies and disasters to people
and property.
The Department The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
Each prison’s site-specific plan that forms the basis for their emergency
Site-Specific Emergency Plan
response procedures and protocol.
Each prison’s site-specific procedures that supplement their site-specific
Site-Specific Supplements
emergency plans and address each prison’s specific issues or hazards.
The unit within the Office of Correctional Safety responsible for
establishing, revising, and maintaining the California Department of
Emergency Planning and Corrections and Rehabilitation’s emergency, planning, preparedness,
Management Unit response, and recovery documents, and providing oversight to ensure
compliance with existing and emergent state and federal regulations. Its
main responsibility is emergency preparedness.
The location at which the primary command and control functions
Incident Command Post
are executed.
The nationally used, standardized, on-scene emergency management
concept specifically designed to allow its user(s) to adopt an integrated
organizational structure equal to the complexity and demands of single
or multiple incidents without being hindered by jurisdictional boundaries.
Incident Command System The Incident Command System is the combination of facilities, equipment,
personnel, procedures, and communications operating within a common
organizational structure, with responsibility for the management of
resources to effectively accomplish stated objectives pertinent to
an incident.
Written or oral agreement between agencies or jurisdictions to assist one
Mutual Aid Agreement another on request, by furnishing personnel, equipment, or expertise in a
specific manner without compensation.
The Office of Correctional Safety (OCS) supports the mission of the
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. OCS’s mission
Office of Correctional Safety
is to protect the public and serve the department’s investigative and
security interests.
The State of California Emergency Plan, approved by the governor, which
State of California
describes the principles and methods to be applied when carrying out
Emergency Plan
emergency operations or rendering mutual aid during emergencies.
Source: Definitions generated by OIG auditing staff.
Office of the Inspector General, State of California
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OIG Report AUD № 24–01, Natural Disaster Emergency Preparedness, May 2025 | 1
Introduction
California Penal Code section 6126(b) authorizes the Office of the
Inspector General (the OIG) to conduct an audit of the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s (the department)
policies, practices, and procedures. We initiated this audit after receiving
concerns about the department’s disaster response and assessment of the
risks to departmental staff and the incarcerated population from natural
disasters including wildfires, floods, and earthquakes.
During this audit, we reviewed the department’s specific policies,
procedures, and mandated staff training implemented to prepare for
and respond to wildfires, floods, and earthquakes, its coordination with
federal, state, and local entities to respond to those natural disasters,
and its efforts to improve emergency response protocols. In addition,
we specifically assessed the department’s ability to evacuate prisons
threatened by wildfires, floods, and earthquakes.
We also evaluated the 2024 emergency operation plans from 30 prisons
in California to determine compliance with applicable law, departmental
policy, and industry standards.1 We then reviewed three prisons in depth,
based on their assessed vulnerability to natural disasters: Valley State
Prison (Valley State) in Central California; California Rehabilitation
Center (CRC) in Southern California; and San Quentin Rehabilitation
Center (San Quentin) in the San Francisco Bay Area. We reviewed the
prisons’ methods used to assess their individual risks for wildfires,
floods, and earthquakes, their documented mitigation plans, and
whether they revised and improved policies or procedures in response
to the threat of natural disasters. Finally, we reviewed the adequacy
and management of on-site supplies of emergency essentials at the
three prisons.
Background
California Statewide Emergency Mitigation and Response
According to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “natural
disasters . . . have the potential to pose a significant threat to human
health and safety, property, critical infrastructure, and homeland
security.” California is the most disaster-prone state in the nation,
vulnerable to wildfires, floods, and earthquakes across its diverse
geography. As we show in Figure 1 below, multiple state entities have
been established over the years while California evolved its emergency
response planning efforts.
1. We only reviewed 30 site-specific emergency plans because one of California’s 31 prisons
did not submit a plan in 2024.
Office of the Inspector General, State of California
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2 | OIG Report AUD № 24–01, Natural Disaster Emergency Preparedness, May 2025
Figure 1. Time Line Outlining the Development of Emergency Services in California
State War Council formed
1943
(Cal OES’s predecessor).
California developed a State
Emergency Plan for civil 1950s
defense planning.
State War Council officially becomes
1970
Office of Emergency Services (OES).
The California State Legislature merged OES and the
Governor’s Office of Criminal Justice Planning, which
was responsible for providing state and federal grant 2004
funds to local communities to prevent crime and
help crime victims.
California Legislature created the California
2009
Emergency Management Agency (Cal EMA).
Cal EMA was renamed the California Governor’s
Office of Emergency Services (Cal OES) as part of 2013
Governor Brown’s Reorganization Plan #2.
California State Legislature passed new
requirements regarding incorporating
2017 access, functional needs, support, and
cultural competence into
emergency planning.
Cal OES updated the
2023
State of California Emergency Plan.
Source: Cal OES website.
Office of the Inspector General, State of California
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OIG Report AUD № 24–01, Natural Disaster Emergency Preparedness, May 2025 | 3
What is now the Governor’s Office of Emergency Services was
established in 1970 to coordinate statewide emergency preparedness,
post emergency recovery and mitigation efforts, and the development,
review, approval, and integration of emergency plans. Multiple agencies
and offices responsible for emergency preparedness and response were
subsequently established, reorganized, and merged into the renamed
Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (Cal OES) in 2013.
Cal OES serves as the state’s leadership hub during all major
emergencies and disasters and is responsible for responding to,
directing, and coordinating federal resources, state resources including
departmental resources, and mutual aid assets across all regions
during an emergency. Cal OES also supports local jurisdictions and
communities through planning and preparedness activities, training, and
facilitating the immediate response to an emergency through the longer‐
term recovery phase.
In 2017, Cal OES released the State of California Emergency Plan, which
in part describes the methods for conducting emergency operations.
Essential elements of the plan include describing the emergency services
provided by governmental agencies and how resources are mobilized,
outlining the methods for carrying out emergency operations, and
describing the process for rendering mutual aid. State law requires Cal
OES to update the State Emergency Plan every five years. Cal OES last
issued a new edition of the State Emergency Plan in 2023.
In 2023, Cal OES also formally adopted the 2023 California State
Hazard Mitigation Plan. In it, Cal OES included some of California’s
hazard history, which since 1950 has included 365 State-of-emergency
declarations, 337 Federal-disaster declarations, over 900 deaths, and
over $20.7 billion in State-administered costs. Cal OES also noted that
from 2018 through 2023, California experienced some of the largest
and most destructive natural disasters in the State’s recorded history,
and that disasters are becoming more frequent and resulting in greater
impacts—a trend expected to increase with population growth and
climate change.
The Department’s Emergency Response Plan
Beginning in 2012, the department implemented an emergency response
plan in phases which was reportedly consistent with California’s then
statewide plan. The department’s All-Hazards Emergency Operations
Plan (emergency plan) was intended to enhance the department’s ability
to prepare for, respond to, mitigate, and recover from all emergencies and
declared disasters involving prisons and other departmental property.
The emergency plan, which was developed using subject matter experts
and best practices from correctional agencies around the country,
defined procedures, outlined staff roles and responsibilities, and required
Office of the Inspector General, State of California
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4 | OIG Report AUD № 24–01, Natural Disaster Emergency Preparedness, May 2025
each prison to develop site-specific supplements2 that describe site-
specific implementation activities that complied with the emergency
plan. Each prison was responsible for assessing its unique risks from
natural disasters and creating a site-specific emergency plan to mitigate
those risks to recover from natural disasters that could significantly
disrupt the prison.
The Emergency Planning and Management Unit (emergency planning
unit) within the department’s Office of Correctional Safety has oversight
responsibility over the emergency plan and must approve each prison’s
site-specific emergency plan. Prisons submit their site-specific
supplements along with their site-specific emergency plans to the
emergency planning unit. The department’s emergency planning unit is
staffed by five employees: one manager, two instructors, one continuity
of operations analyst, and one emergency services coordinator.
It is important to note that the emergency planning unit does not
conduct an independent risk assessment of natural disaster threats
facing each prison but rather relies on the risk assessments conducted
at each site. Prison wardens are required to review and revise the site-
specific plans and submit them annually to the emergency planning unit
in June for review and approval. The emergency planning unit conducts
training at prisons and makes suggestions on emergency planning during
the training, as well as upon request.
The emergency planning unit is also responsible for facilitating the
department’s coordination with other agencies when responding to
emergencies and ensuring that the department remains in compliance
with state and federal emergency management regulations. Finally, the
emergency planning unit serves as the liaison with Cal OES during both
the activation and the recovery phases of emergencies.
The department began updating its emergency plan in 2023, but the
update has not been finalized as of the publication date of this report.
However, in 2024 the department implemented a single update to its
2012 emergency plan affecting the department’s contracting process for
obtaining supplies during emergencies.
Incident Command Post and Incident Command System
The department’s emergency plan includes and follows nationwide
standard communication processes and procedures to respond to
emergencies. For example, prisons may activate an Incident Command
Post in response to an emergency. The Incident Command Post is a
location staffed by appropriate departmental personnel for the purpose of
responding to emergencies including wildfires, floods, and earthquakes.
2. The department refers to site-specific supplements as restricted supplements,
appendixes, and attachments, but for ease of readership we refer to them in this report as
site-specific supplements.
Office of the Inspector General, State of California
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OIG Report AUD № 24–01, Natural Disaster Emergency Preparedness, May 2025 | 5
In addition, an Incident Command System (ICS) is activated when
an emergency requires additional resources or when the situation is
expected to last for an extended period. The ICS is a standardized
approach to managing incidents that coordinates the efforts of multiple
personnel, organizations, and agencies. It is designed to be flexible, cost-
effective, and scalable, making it suitable for a wide range of incidents,
regardless of size or complexity. The system is structured around five
main functional areas: Command, Operations, Planning, Logistics,
and Finance/Administration. When the department activates the ICS,
the Department Operations Center (DOC) at headquarters supports
the prison’s incident response by coordinating resources, providing
executive-level guidance, and defining policies. While the DOC’s primary
role is coordination and support, command and control of the response
remains with the prison.
In cases where an emergency exceeds a prison’s capabilities due to its
size, scope, or complexity, prison staff may request additional resources,
such as an Incident Command Support Team. Prisons may also enter
into local mutual aid agreements with other entities, either within the
department or with outside organizations. These formal agreements
between agencies—such as the federal government, local governments,
emergency services, or other organizations—help ensure coordinated
cooperation and support during emergencies.
Office of the Inspector General, State of California
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6 | OIG Report AUD № 24–01, Natural Disaster Emergency Preparedness, May 2025
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Office of the Inspector General, State of California
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OIG Report AUD № 24–01, Natural Disaster Emergency Preparedness, May 2025 | 7
Results
Chapter 1. California’s Overcrowded Prisons Are
Vulnerable to Wildfires, Floods, and Earthquakes,
and the Department Is Unable to Evacuate
the Incarcerated Population and Staff at Most
Prisons Within 72 Hours of an Emergency
The Department Does Not Have Specific Plans to Externally
Evacuate Prisons in Response to Natural Disasters
Although the department and individual prisons have plans assessing the
risks from and response to wildfires, floods, and earthquakes, those plans
are general in nature and inadequate if large scale external evacuations
are necessary. With the threat of natural disasters posing significant risks
to life and property, inadequate preparations can lead to prison unrest,
strained resources, and ineffective responses. California regulations
mandate that each prison’s site-specific emergency plan must include
procedures for emergency evacuation, including evacuation types, exit
routes, and personnel assignments to ensure the safety of staff during
emergencies. In addition, regulations require prisons to have plans to
respond to natural disasters, and departmental policy requires prisons to
have external evacuation procedures.
However, while most of the site-specific emergency plans we reviewed
included procedures to move the incarcerated population to and from
locations within the prison, none included detailed plans to evacuate
outside the prison gates. Instead, plans included general language
about coordinating evacuation routes with departmental headquarters
staff who would be responsible for determining where the evacuees
would be transferred based on availability of temporary housing with
appropriate security.
Although we acknowledge that coordination with departmental staff is
critical and that local conditions cannot be predetermined, having no
planned evacuation routes or temporary housing options could cause
unnecessary delays during emergencies requiring quick evacuations.
We found that the department lacks a viable and effective plan to timely
evacuate the incarcerated population of most prisons immediately
following a major natural disaster, particularly within 72 hours of
an emergency.
Although departmental policy does not require prisons to have plans
to fully evacuate prisons within 72 hours, we believe this window is
reasonable when responding to a natural disaster. It is also supported
by both the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, which emphasizes
Office of the Inspector General, State of California
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8 | OIG Report AUD № 24–01, Natural Disaster Emergency Preparedness, May 2025
prompt response and early warnings to save lives during emergencies,
and the departmental evacuation plan we discuss below. The
department’s inability to accomplish evacuations within this critical
window significantly increases the threat to the safety of incarcerated
people and overall prison stability in the event of a natural disaster.
Prison Evacuations, Including the Evacuation of California State
Prison, Corcoran, and the Substance Abuse Treatment Facility
Will Likely Take More Than 72 Hours
The difficulty of planning and timely executing large-scale external
evacuations was evident during the aftermath of above average rainfall in
California during 2022 and 2023. In 2023, California experienced record
breaking high levels of rain and snow that threatened to surge four
rivers—Tule, Kings, Kaweah, and Kern—and breach levees, inundating
the Tulare Basin—at the time, the largest freshwater body west of the
Mississippi. Because California State Prison, Corcoran (Corcoran), and
the Substance Abuse Treatment Facility are located near the Tulare
Basin, they were determined to be at high risk of flooding if the levees
protecting the area were breached. However, neither prison had detailed
site-specific emergency plans that included external evacuations.
In response to the impending flood risk, the department assigned staff
to develop a detailed evacuation plan in coordination with 19 crisis
response teams: the department’s statewide transportation unit, teams
from the counties of Tulare, Kings, Riverside, and San Bernardino,
the California Department of Water Resources, Cal OES, and other
local stakeholders3. The resulting plan, which took weeks to prepare,
was designed to evacuate the approximately 8,000 incarcerated people
housed at Corcoran and the Substance Abuse Treatment Facility to other
state prisons in 11 to 14 days, but the plan acknowledged that it could
take longer.
The joint plan also stated that if the prisons were only given three days,
or 72 hours, to evacuate due to imminent flooding, alternate evacuation
sites would be used. This language suggests that a minimum of 72 hours
is reasonable to evacuate a prison or prisons. While we recognize that
Corcoran and the Substance Abuse Treatment Facility had the benefit
of time to prepare the evacuation plan, it is unlikely the department
was prepared to evacuate 8,000 incarcerated people in response to
an imminent threat, particularly within 72 hours. Without the ability
to quickly evacuate prisons, it is likely that wildfires, floods, and
earthquakes will result in loss of life within the incarcerated population.
We believe 72 hours is a reasonable time frame to respond to
emergencies demanding quick action. We arrived at this time frame
3. Other measures including reinforcing levees and utilizing portable barriers to protect
the two prisons were also used in response to the potential flooding of Corcoran and the
Substance Abuse Treatment Facility.
Office of the Inspector General, State of California
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OIG Report AUD № 24–01, Natural Disaster Emergency Preparedness, May 2025 | 9
after careful consideration of several factors, including the unique
environment of prisons, the logistics involved in evacuating the
incarcerated population—particularly high-security risk individuals—
and the operational requirements for a prison’s external evacuation.
In addition, we considered how rapidly conditions can escalate during
emergencies, especially wildfires. Although it did not directly impact
state prisons, the 2018 Camp Fire in Butte County serves as a stark
example of this rapid escalation. The fire consumed 90,000 acres by the
day after it started, and within three days, the death toll had reached 23.
Given this short timeframe, having a plan to evacuate a prison within
72 hours is not only reasonable, but necessary to ensure safety.
The Location and High Mileage of Transportation Buses and
Other Fleet Vehicles Likely Limits the Department’s Ability to
Evacuate Most Prisons Within 72 Hours
The department planned to use 22 buses from its Statewide
Transportation Unit (transportation unit) to evacuate Corcoran and
the Substance Abuse Treatment Facility, with two additional buses on
standby in case of vehicle failure. The evacuation plan also stated it
would take six days to evacuate wheelchair-bound individuals at a rate of
56 people per day. Furthermore, the plan suggested that it could take up
to 24 hours for the transportation unit to gather and deploy fleet buses
and other vehicles to even begin the evacuation.
As we show in Figure 2 below, the transportation unit operates 30 buses,
each seating 38 people, from three regional hubs located in the cities of
Galt in Northern California, Delano in Central California, and Chino in
Southern California.
Office of the Inspector General, State of California
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10 | OIG Report AUD № 24–01, Natural Disaster Emergency Preparedness, May 2025
Figure 2. Map of California Displaying the Department’s State Transportation Unit (STU) Hub Locations,
Selected Prison Sites, and the Incarcerated Populations at Each Facility
1
1 Pelican Bay State Prison (2,020)
2 High Desert State Prison (2,837)
3 San Quentin State Prison (2,945)
STU Hub 4 Folsom State Prison (2,797)
5 California State Prison, Sacramento (2,248)
6 Central California Women’s Facility (2,022)
7 Valley State Prison (3,216)
2
8 Salinas Valley State Prison (2,492)
9 Correctional Training Facility (4,386)
10 California State Prison, Corcoran (2,685)
11 Substance Abuse Treatment Facility (5,261)
12 North Kern State Prison (2,998)
13 Kern Valley State Prison (3,267)
14 California Institution for Men (2,205)
15 California Institution for Women (1,270)
16 California Rehabilitation Center (2,800)
4 5
17 Ironwood State Prison (2,927)
Galt 18 Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (3,157)
19 Centinela State Prison (2,794)
3
20 Calipatria State Prison (2,390)
6 7
8
9
10
11
Delano
12
13
Chino 14
15 16
17
19 20
Source: The OIG and the department’s Monthly Report of Population
18
as of midnight December 31, 2024.
Office of the Inspector General, State of California
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OIG Report AUD № 24–01, Natural Disaster Emergency Preparedness, May 2025 | 11
In addition to buses, the transportation unit operates sedans, paratransit
vehicles, and transport vans, which can seat from approximately seven
to 19 people. In total, the transportation unit has approximately 93 fleet
vehicles available across the state to evacuate incarcerated people during
emergencies. The department may also have access to buses owned
or operated by other state, local governmental, and private entities
through mutual aid agreements we will discuss in greater detail later in
this report.
While all departmental fleet vehicles throughout the state could
be deployed to assist with an evacuation, the number of vehicles at
each hub, and their proximity to prisons in the region, varies. As of
January 6, 2025, the northern regional hub has 31 vehicles, including
11 buses that seat 38 people each; the central hub has 37 vehicles,
including 12 buses that seat 38 people each; and the southern hub
has 25 vehicles, including seven buses that seat 38 people each.
Consequently, if a natural disaster necessitated evacuating San Quentin
Rehabilitation Center, the closest departmental fleet vehicles not
permanently located at the prison or at a nearby prison are in Galt,
approximately 90 miles away. The closest available departmental fleet
vehicles that could be used to evacuate Pelican Bay State Prison, not
stored at the prison or a nearer prison, are approximately 400 miles away.
While the department has personnel to staff a 24-hour a day evacuation
effort, the distances between hubs and prisons potentially needing
external evacuation can be great, which limits the department’s ability to
quickly evacuate.
Finally, the reliability of some departmental fleet buses is questionable.
While we recognize that the department maintains its vehicles,
some have notably high miles. For example, one of its fleet buses has
been driven almost 533,000 miles. One fleet bus has approximately
676,000 miles logged, and five have between 730,000 and 858,000 miles
logged. According to the U.S. Department of Transportation, the
expected lifespan of large heavy-duty buses similar to those used
by the department with a seating capacity of 39 to 47 passengers, is
500,000 miles. Therefore, it is possible the high mileage logged by these
seven fleet buses could impair the department’s ability to respond to
large-scale evacuations.
Overcrowding and the Proximity of Neighboring Prisons
Roughly Doubles the Incarcerated Population to Be Evacuated
During an Emergency
In addition to the challenges associated with the locations of
transportation unit vehicles and their high mileage, the department’s
ability to timely and effectively respond to large-scale emergencies is
further complicated by prison overcrowding. As of December 31, 2024,
California prisons were operating at 122 percent above designed
capacity, housing an additional 16,263 individuals. Overcrowding not
Office of the Inspector General, State of California
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12 | OIG Report AUD № 24–01, Natural Disaster Emergency Preparedness, May 2025
only complicates the department’s ability to manage emergencies, but
also greatly exacerbates its inability to evacuate incarcerated populations
if necessary.
In addition, the proximity of neighboring prisons increases the
likelihood that multiple facilities would be affected by the same natural
disaster, requiring a coordinated evacuation of their populations and
staff. For example, Corcoran and the Substance Abuse Treatment
Facility are adjacent to one another. Their entrances are located two
miles apart, with a combined incarcerated population of 7,946 as of
December 31, 2024. Both facilities currently operate at 140 percent
of their design capacities, presenting a significant challenge to
coordinating a large-scale evacuation of incarcerated people and staff as
described above.
Other examples of adjacent facilities include Folsom State Prison
(Folsom) and California State Prison, Sacramento (Sacramento), which
have a combined overpopulation of 141 percent, and North Kern State
Prison (North Kern) and Kern Valley State Prison (Kern Valley), located
just 2.3 miles apart, with a combined overpopulation of 129 percent.
Because of overcrowding, 1,472 additional incarcerated people, for a
total of 5,045 individuals, would have to be evacuated from Folsom
and Sacramento if it became necessary. Meanwhile, an additional
1,415 individuals, for a total of 6,265 individuals, would have to be
evacuated from North Kern and Kern Valley. Overcrowding, coupled
with prisons located near each other, are factors that complicate external
evacuations, emphasizing the need to be as prepared as possible to
respond to natural disasters.
Effective Plans to Evacuate Prisons in 72 Hours Are Particularly
Important in the Event of Earthquakes
According to Cal OES’s hazard mitigation plan, California has
experienced 19 earthquakes of a magnitude five or greater from
April 5, 2018, through January 2, 2023. While floods and wildfires
may afford the department some time to prepare evacuation plans,
earthquakes can strike without warning. They can also have a cascading
impact that can trigger other hazardous events such as surface fault
ruptures, wildfires, liquefaction, landslides, tsunami, dam or levee
failures, and power outages. Therefore, it is especially important for the
department to have specific plans to timely evacuate prisons affected
by earthquakes.
The risk that a prison will have to be evacuated because of an earthquake
is not so minor or remote that it can or should be ignored. Of the 30 site-
specific emergency plans for 2024 we reviewed, 21 prisons rated their
risk from earthquakes as high, one prison rated their risk as moderate
to high, and four prisons rated their risk as moderate or medium. Only
one prison rated their risk from earthquakes as low. Because of the
Office of the Inspector General, State of California
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OIG Report AUD № 24–01, Natural Disaster Emergency Preparedness, May 2025 | 13
substantial risk from earthquakes, detailed plans to evacuate prisons
within 72 hours of an earthquake could prevent unnecessary and
avoidable loss of life.
The Department May Not Evacuate Prisons in the Event of
a Wildfire
The frequency and intensity of wildfires in California has increased
significantly over the past two decades due to factors such as climate
change, drought, and population growth in fire-prone areas. Wildfires
are now regular events that require emergency evacuations. From 1980
through most of 2024 (as of November 1, 2024), California experienced
46 confirmed weather and climate disasters, including 19 wildfires,
each causing damages exceeding $1 billion. As previously highlighted
in this report, the 2018 Camp Fire serves as a striking example of how
quickly disasters can escalate. Within a day of its start, the wildfire
had consumed 90,000 acres, and by the time it was fully contained, the
number of fatalities had risen to 85, and more than 18,000 structures
were destroyed.
To help reduce the risk of damage and loss of life, the department
maintains fire engines and employs approximately 130 fire personnel.
There are also approximately 150 incarcerated firefighters at
23 institutional fire houses and 1,011 incarcerated firefighters at 36 fire
camps to protect prisons and fight wildfires statewide. In addition,
departmental staff and incarcerated firefighters may perform controlled
burns or other mitigation measures at prisons to reduce the fire risk to
individual prisons. Despite these measures, wildfires have come close
to at least four prisons in the last seven years. In 2018, the Nelson Fire
threatened the California Medical Facility in Vacaville, and by one
report, came within one mile of the prison’s minimum-security yard.
Smoke from the wildfire required incarcerated people to be moved from
the minimum-security yard to another part of the prison, but the prison
did not evacuate the incarcerated population off prison grounds.
Likewise, in 2021 the Dixie Fire burned near Susanville and impacted
both the California Correctional Center and High Desert State Prison
(High Desert). High Desert’s then warden stated that the prison was
“prepared to shelter in place with food stock on hand and up to date
contingency plans for staffing shortages and/or fire evacuation (all-
hazards).” Although High Desert was forced to run on generator power
from July 21, 2021, to at least August 18, 2021, the fire did not come close
enough to force an evacuation. Because the California Correctional
Center was deactivated in 2023 and a report of the incident was not
prepared, we have no records of its response to the emergency.
Finally, in 2023 the Smith River Complex Fire came close to Pelican Bay
State Prison (Pelican Bay) in Crescent City. Pacific Power de-energized
all power lines resulting in a major power outage for Pelican Bay.
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14 | OIG Report AUD № 24–01, Natural Disaster Emergency Preparedness, May 2025
Unlike High Desert and the California Medical Facility, Pelican Bay
prepared a plan to evacuate staff and the incarcerated population totaling
1,550 after significant impact from wildfire, smoke, and the possibility
of a prolonged power outage caused the prison to activate an incident
command post. However, the evacuation plan was not completed until
seven days after the incident command post was activated. Therefore,
it is unlikely that Pelican Bay could have evacuated its incarcerated
population within 72 hours.
While wildfires have not forced evacuations of any California prisons,
other states have not been so fortunate. In 2013, the Colorado
Department of Corrections (Colorado) was forced to undertake the
difficult task of evacuating one prison with inadequate ventilation
primarily in response to fears that smoke from a wildfire would
adversely impact the older incarcerated population. The evacuation took
approximately 27 hours and relocated approximately 900 incarcerated
people to a facility less than seven miles away. However, the evacuation
took place under favorable conditions including having a vacant prison
close by, 12 hours advance notice, an abundance of resources because
civilian evacuations were unnecessary, and the availability of nearby
buses and vans from Colorado’s transportation unit. Notably, Colorado
at times maintains depopulated facilities in case they need to repopulate
or reactivate them, but those prisons can also be used as temporary
evacuation sites during emergencies. The prison evacuees were
transferred to such a facility with the assistance of local law enforcement
entities that provided security during the transfer. Colorado’s successful
evacuation of one relatively small prison under favorable conditions
further emphasizes California’s need to better plan for emergency
evacuations of its prisons.
While a wildfire prompted Pelican Bay to prepare a plan to evacuate
its incarcerated population, California prisons may be less likely to
evacuate in response to wildfires than it would in response to other
natural disasters. According to the department’s fire chief, departmental
resources, as well as resources from outside entities through mutual
aid, would likely be channeled into stopping the wildfire rather than
to evacuations. In fact, calls from outside entities to prisons to discuss
evacuations—which are not always possible and would take longer
to organize—tend to create panic, especially in nonfire personnel,
according to the department’s fire chief. Consequently, he believes
sheltering in place is generally the best option because evacuations
are likely to be logistically impossible, and because the incarcerated
population would be subjected to potential harm from heat, dehydration,
and smoke during an evacuation.
According to the fire chief, because smoke is the greatest threat during
a wildfire, it is important that all prisons maintain an adequate supply
of N95 respirator masks for both staff and the incarcerated population.
Each prison is responsible for stocking and rotating its supply of
N95 masks because the masks typically have a five-year shelf life.
Office of the Inspector General, State of California
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OIG Report AUD № 24–01, Natural Disaster Emergency Preparedness, May 2025 | 15
Based on our review of departmental processes and procedures, the
department is ill-prepared to timely and effectively respond to wildfires,
floods, and earthquakes. We recognize that no amount of planning
will be effective or prevent loss of life and destruction of property in
all emergencies. However, given the increasing likelihood of natural
disasters in California due to climate change, it is increasingly urgent
that the department develop a comprehensive strategy for planning
and implementing large-scale prison evacuations to save lives during
emergencies. Furthermore, it is imperative that the department develop
and require training for prison staff, to ensure prisons can effectively
implement their site-specific emergency response plans, including large-
scale prison evacuations.
Recommendations
• The department should update its All-Hazards Emergency
Operations Plan.
• The department should require prisons to develop and implement
site-specific emergency evacuation plans that include detailed
procedures and evacuation routes to externally evacuate staff and
the incarcerated population within 72 hours.
• The department should identify and designate alternative
temporary relocation sites near each prison to use during
emergency evacuations, including deactivated prisons
when applicable.
• The department should consider relocating current transportation
hubs or adding additional transportation hubs to place fleet
vehicles closer to more prisons to facilitate deployment in
emergency evacuations.
• The department should develop training to prepare prison staff
to plan and timely execute large-scale external evacuations
of prisons.
• The department should require prisons to create and maintain
defensible space around prison buildings to mitigate fire risk.
• The department should consider requiring prisons at moderate
to high risk of wildfires to have fire retardant available to help
reduce the probability of housing units catching on fire.
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16 | OIG Report AUD № 24–01, Natural Disaster Emergency Preparedness, May 2025
Chapter 2. Although Almost All Prisons Assess
Their Risk of Natural Disasters, They Do Not Do
So Consistently
Prison Staff Generally Use Multiple Methods to Assess Their
Risk of Wildfires, Floods, and Earthquakes
To ensure prisons are prepared for natural disasters, departmental policy
implemented in 2012 requires wardens to determine their prison’s level
of risk relative to potential hazards and vulnerabilities by assessing
multiple considerations, including the probability and magnitude of
the threats. Figure 3 below shows all elements of the department’s risk
assessment process.
Figure 3. Elements of the Department’s Hazard and Risk Assessment Process
Duration of Frequency
Event of
Occurrence
Speed of
Magnitude
Onset
of Event
Hazard and
Risk Assessment
Considerations
Potential
Intensity/
Size of
Severity
Affected Area
Including
Impact
Time
Location
Available
of Event
to Warn
Source: The department’s All-Hazards Emergency Operations Plan.
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OIG Report AUD № 24–01, Natural Disaster Emergency Preparedness, May 2025 | 17
With knowledge of the specific risks to which prisons are most
susceptible, prison staff can develop strategies to reduce those risks and
ensure they are properly prepared to prevent and respond to natural
disaster emergencies.
We reviewed the 2024 site-specific emergency plans from 30 prisons
and found that all stated that staff conducted or planned to conduct an
all-hazard assessment, but prisons used different methods to conduct the
analyses. For example, 18 prisons stated they used the Automated Critical
Asset Management System or other assessment tool, six prisons used an
Emergency Planning Unit Hazard Vulnerability Assessment Tool, one
prison used the United San Diego Emergency Services Organization
assessment process, and five prisons did not specify which assessment
tools they used. However, because the department does not require
prisons to attach the assessment analysis to their site-specific emergency
plans, the department cannot easily review the prisons’ risk assessments
to ensure compliance with departmental policy.
Using Multiple Risk Assessment Methods Likely Results in
Inconsistent Risk Ratings Between Prisons
To better understand how prisons rated their risks from natural
disasters in 2024, we requested copies of the risk assessment process
used to determine specific risk assessment ratings for the three prisons
we reviewed in depth: Valley State, CRC, and San Quentin. From the
documents we received, we found that each prison conducted their risk-
assessments differently.
San Quentin conducted a comprehensive assessment using the Hazard
and Vulnerability Assessment Tool which evaluates the probability of
natural disasters, the impact of natural disasters on humans, property,
and business, the prison’s preparedness for natural disasters, and
internal and external response to natural disasters. For example, the
analysis rated the probability and impact of an earthquake on property
and business as high. These high ratings were compounded by low
ratings for preparedness and internal and external response, as assessed
by the prison. San Quentin rated floods and wildfires at a lower risk
of probability but with high property, and business impacts, as well
as low preparedness and internal and external response. According to
a departmental manager, prisons are not required to use the Hazard
and Vulnerability Assessment Tool even though it is likely more
comprehensive than other methods.
Valley State’s emergency plan stated that it conducted a site-specific
all-hazard assessment using the Hazard and Vulnerability Assessment
Tool, the same tool used by San Quentin. However, the prison provided
a printout of Cal OES’s online hazard assessment tool in response to our
request to review its risk assessment analysis. To use that assessment
method, prison staff enter the prison’s address into an online mapping
Office of the Inspector General, State of California
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18 | OIG Report AUD № 24–01, Natural Disaster Emergency Preparedness, May 2025
tool available on the Cal OES website. The Cal OES tool then generates
a risk rating for various natural disasters. Even though it is expressly
authorized under departmental policy, the Cal OES tool seemingly rates
only the probability of the risks.4 The Cal OES tool, without additional
analysis, does not comply with other departmental policy requiring
prisons to analyze their preparedness and the potential impact of
natural disasters, among other factors, beyond simply determining the
probability of occurrence.
Like Valley State, CRC provided a printout of the Cal OES hazard
assessment tool in response to our request for a copy of its risk
assessment process. However, unlike Valley State, CRC’s emergency
plan did not specify which assessment process it used. Instead, CRC’s
emergency plan simply stated that it conducted a site-specific all-hazard
assessment via the Automated Critical Asset Management System,
or other assessment process, to determine its risk. CRC’s emergency
plan did not include a copy of its assessment, and as we stated earlier,
departmental policy does not require its inclusion.
With prisons using different tools to assess and rate their risk of
wildfires, floods, and earthquakes, the department cannot ensure prisons
are thoroughly and accurately examining and assessing their risks.
Moreover, without a robust standardized risk assessment process, the
department cannot ensure suitable control measures are put in place
to minimize the risks—especially high risks—to acceptable levels.
This is particularly important because 15 prisons rated their flood
risk as either high or moderate, 22 rated their wildfire risk as high or
moderate, and 26 rated their earthquake risk as high, moderate to high,
or moderate. Finally, the use of multiple methods to assess risk and
the lack of departmental oversight may lead to incomplete analyses
and inconsistencies when compared with assessments performed by
neighboring prisons as we discuss below.
Some Prisons Rate Their Risks of Natural Disasters Differently
Despite Being Located in Close Proximity to Each Other
We reviewed risk assessments for prisons located near each other to
determine whether their risk assessments were consistent with each
other and found that they were not. For example, Folsom rated its
wildfire risk as moderate, its flood risk as high, and its earthquake risk as
low, while California State Prison, Sacramento, which is adjacent, rated
its risks from wildfires, floods, and earthquakes, as high. In another
example, Kern Valley rated its flood risk as high while North Kern,
2.3 miles away, rated its flood risk as low.
4. Departmental policy authorizes prisons to reference risk assessment maps generated
by Cal OES’s predecessor. However, these maps are outdated, therefore, prisons use the
updated mapping and risk assessment tool available on Cal OES’s website.
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Finally, Corcoran and the Substance Abuse Treatment Facility, located
approximately two miles from each other, rate their flood vulnerability
differently, with Corcoran rating it as low and the Substance Abuse
Treatment Facility rating it as high. For neighboring prisons described
above, we expected similar risk assessments. Without consistent
risk assessments, prisons are not effectively laying the groundwork
for comprehensive emergency preparedness strategies or tailoring
emergency plans and resources to address identified threats.
Even more concerning, Corcoran continued to rate its flood risk as low
in 2024 despite having been seriously threatened by flooding in 2023,
as stated earlier in this report. Because departmental policy requires
prisons to review and revise their site-specific emergency plans annually,
we expected Corcoran, after just having been forced to prepare a detailed
evacuation plan due to the threat of flooding, to have increased its flood
risk rating from its low assessment in 2022 and 2023, to a moderate or
high assessment.
Without a standardized process, neighboring prisons will likely continue
to rate their risks of wildfires, floods, and earthquakes differently, and
will not be able to identify opportunities to work together to mitigate
shared risks as they would have to do in a real emergency. Consequently,
to ensure prisons are prepared for future natural disasters, the
department should develop a standardized risk assessment process to
help prisons accurately assess their risk, to work cooperatively, and if
feasible, to mitigate identified risks.
Recommendations
• The department should standardize risk assessment
methodologies to ensure consistent and accurate risk ratings
across prisons.
• The department should require adjacent prisons to work together
to assess risks and develop mitigation strategies targeting those
risks as part of their site-specific emergency plans.
• The department should enforce the inclusion of detailed, site-
specific mitigation strategies in all emergency plans, particularly
for identified high-risk areas.
• The department should develop a standardized process to ensure
specific mitigation strategies are directly linked to wildfire, flood,
and earthquake vulnerabilities at each prison.
Office of the Inspector General, State of California
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Chapter 3. The Emergency Planning Unit Does
Not Substantively Review Prisons’ Site-Specific
Emergency Operations Plans as Required by
California Regulations and Departmental Policy
The Emergency Planning Unit’s Approval Process Is Flawed
As previously discussed, California regulations require prisons to have
site-specific plans approved by the emergency planning unit to prepare
for and respond to natural disasters that could significantly disrupt
operations. In addition, departmental policy requires wardens to ensure
that their prison’s site-specific plans are submitted annually to the
emergency planning unit for review and approval.
While the emergency planning unit performs some review activities, such
as verifying that each prison submits a site-specific plan and ensuring
that certain documents are included with it, we found that the unit lacks
formal guidelines or specific criteria to assess the content of the plans.
Therefore, the emergency planning unit’s review and approval process
consists only of collecting site-specific plans and verifying that the plans
contain the documents listed in the plans. It does not substantively
review the content of the plans for completeness or accuracy.
According to the manager of the emergency planning unit, the unit does
not substantively review site-specific plans because it does not have the
authority or staff resources to do so. However, current regulations and
departmental policy require the emergency planning unit to approve
site-specific emergency plans. Consequently, the emergency planning
unit seemingly has the necessary authority to establish a formal review
process that includes specific criteria and requirements that prisons
must meet to earn approval.
We acknowledge that the emergency planning unit only has five staff
members and therefore may lack the resources necessary to substantively
review site-specific plans as part of the approval process. However,
because the emergency planning unit has not established a formal review
process with specific criteria for approval, prisons’ emergency plans and
risk assessments are never reviewed for accuracy or completeness. In
short, the department has no way of knowing if prisons have accurately
identified the risks threatening the prisons and taken adequate steps to
mitigate those risks. In addition, the department’s lack of oversight has
resulted in neighboring prisons submitting the inconsistent risk ratings
we described above, further compromising the department’s ability to
prepare for and respond to natural disasters.
Office of the Inspector General, State of California
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The Emergency Planning Unit Does Not Ensure Prisons Submit
Site-Specific Supplements or Review Them for Adequacy
In addition to site-specific emergency plans, departmental policy
requires prisons to develop site-specific supplements that address
site-specific hazards not covered by the department’s emergency plan.
Departmental policy further requires prisons to review and revise the
policy supplements annually or as needed based on specific incidents
including disasters or disturbances. Although the emergency planning
unit requires prisons to submit the site-specific supplements, it does not
review them to assess their adequacy. As a result, prisons, like Corcoran
as we described earlier, may fail to update their supplements regularly,
even after significant events such as wildfires or floods, lowering their
preparedness for future emergencies.
California regulations mandate that each prison’s emergency plan must
include procedures for emergency evacuation and specify evacuation
types and exit route assignments to ensure the safety of staff during
emergencies. In addition, departmental policy requires prisons to include
response procedures in site-specific supplements that outline external
evacuations. We found that the evacuation plans outlined in prisons’
site-specific emergency plans and supplements, particularly Corcoran
and the Substance Abuse Treatment Facility, showed significant gaps
in detail and were missing critical information. In 2023, both Corcoran
and the Substance Abuse Treatment Facility faced a flood threat due
to record-breaking rainfall and snowfall. In response, they developed a
joint external evacuation plan that included essential details such as the
number of individuals to evacuate, the order and priority of evacuation,
extraction modifications5 and transportation resources.
We recognize that some essential details, such as the number of
individuals to evacuate, may vary from year to year and may not be
included in an annual update to the site-specific supplements. Other
details, such as extraction modifications during an emergency, once
developed are something we would expect Corcoran and the Substance
Abuse Treatment Facility to incorporate into their site-specific plans.
However, neither Corcoran’s nor the Substance Abuse Treatment
Facility’s 2024 emergency plans incorporated this level of detail in their
external evacuation procedures, leaving their plans inadequate to address
similar emergencies in the future.
We reached a similar conclusion after reviewing Pelican Bay’s site-
specific emergency plan and supplements. Although Pelican Bay
developed an external evacuation plan in response to the 2023 Smith
River Complex Fire—an event that led to the evacuation of the town
of Gasquet (18.9 miles from Pelican Bay) and surrounding areas—its
2024 site-specific emergency plan and supplements were not updated
5. Extraction modifications are changes made to the department’s procedures for the
involuntary removal of an incarcerated person from an area.
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22 | OIG Report AUD № 24–01, Natural Disaster Emergency Preparedness, May 2025
to include details developed for the 2023 external evacuation plan. As
a result, Pelican Bay’s emergency plan still lacks sufficient detail to
effectively evacuate staff and the incarcerated population in response to
natural disasters.
Because the emergency planning unit has not established a formal
process to substantively review and approve site-specific emergency
plans and supplements, prisons may not be fully prepared for
emergencies. Without formal guidelines and clear criteria for assessing
the adequacy of these plans, prisons may submit outdated or incomplete
site-specific emergency plans that do not completely or accurately
identify the current risks unique to each prison. Furthermore, because
site-specific emergency plans and supplements do not contain detailed
external evacuation plans, prisons may be unable to timely and effectively
evacuate staff and the incarcerated population in response to wildfires,
floods, or earthquakes.
Recommendations
• The emergency planning unit should establish clear criteria,
including external evacuation procedures, and implement a
formal approval process for approving site-specific emergency
plans and supplements, to ensure compliance with California
regulations and best practices.
• The department should require the emergency planning unit
to formally review all site-specific emergency plans using
established criteria and approve only the site-specific plans and
supplements that meet the established criteria.
• The department should require the emergency planning unit
to visit prisons on a rotating basis to review the prison’s risk
assessments, to ensure the assessments are thorough and
accurate, and to ensure that mitigation measures are in place.
Office of the Inspector General, State of California
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Chapter 4. At Least Two Prisons Have Not
Entered Into Mutual Aid Agreements, and Not
All Site-Specific Emergency Plans Include Key
Details of Mutual Aid Agreements
Mutual aid agreements are written or oral agreements between and
among public agencies, community organizations, and private businesses
committing to assist one another during emergencies. The specific aid
outlined in the agreements is rendered upon request, and those providing
emergency aid are not compensated for their services. Because parties
to mutual aid agreements agree to furnish personnel, equipment, and
expertise during emergencies, they provide a pre-established mechanism
to obtain quick assistance in responding to natural disasters. For
this reason, the department requires prisons to enter into mutual aid
agreements to increase their ability to timely and effectively respond
to emergencies.6
To further facilitate rapid response to emergencies, departmental policy
requires that mutual aid agreements include key details including
which entities are covered by the agreement, what goods or services are
covered, and what limitations, if any, apply to the agreement. However,
we found that at least two of the 30 prisons which submitted site-specific
emergency plans in 2024 did not maintain any mutual aid agreements,
and it was unclear from the plans of two others whether they had entered
into mutual aid agreements.
The site-specific emergency plan of one of the prisons that did not
maintain mutual aid agreements stated that, “meetings are held
periodically with representatives from [the city] Police Department
and local hospitals to ensure continuity of services and to address any
problems that may be encountered.” However, the plan did not identify
which local hospitals participated in the meetings or what was discussed
in the meetings. Therefore, the department’s ability to coordinate an
emergency response would be compromised because headquarters’ staff
would be unable to quickly determine which hospitals the prison met
with to ensure continuity and address problems.
Moreover, some prisons that maintain mutual aid agreements failed
to attach them to their site-specific plans and failed to include key
information about the mutual aid agreements in these plans. While
departmental policy does not require mutual aid agreements be attached
or key information be included in each prison’s site-specific emergency
plan, we expected key components of the mutual aid agreements to be
documented to expedite the mutual aid during an emergency. If key
components of mutual aid agreements are missing or unavailable to
departmental staff, their value during emergencies is diminished.
6. Prisons may alternatively enter in memorandums of understanding for the same purpose,
but for ease of readership, we will refer only to mutual aid agreements in this report.
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24 | OIG Report AUD № 24–01, Natural Disaster Emergency Preparedness, May 2025
For example, one prison stated that it had entered into mutual aid
agreements with local hospitals and a medical doctor, but did not identify
specifically which local hospitals, or which medical doctor. Another
prison stated in its emergency plan that mutual aid agreements were
established with all local hospitals and local law enforcement agencies,
but did not provide any additional information about the agreements.
Without specifically naming or identifying the parties involved, what aid
is being provided, or what limitations apply, mutual aid agreements, even
if they have been formalized in writing, do not comply with departmental
policy and their effectiveness during an emergency is greatly diminished.
To ensure that both prison and departmental headquarters staff
can identify key details of mutual aid agreements, such as contact
information for all parties, prisons should either include that
information in their site-specific emergency plans or attach the mutual
aid agreements to their plans. In addition, requiring a formalized and
standardized process for establishing mutual aid agreements will better
prepare prisons and departments to respond to natural disasters.
Recommendations
• Formalize all mutual aid agreements into written contracts
that clearly define the terms, roles, responsibilities, contact
information, authority, and scope of assistance to be provided by
each party.
• Standardize the process for documenting and reviewing
mutual aid agreements to ensure that agreements are clear,
enforceable, and effectively address the needs of each prison
during emergencies.
• Require mutual aid agreements to be attached to site-specific
emergency plans or require details of the mutual aid agreements,
such as contact information, be included in site-specific
emergency plans.
Office of the Inspector General, State of California
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OIG Report AUD № 24–01, Natural Disaster Emergency Preparedness, May 2025 | 25
Appendix
Scope and Methodology
California Penal Code section 6126(b) and (c) authorizes the Office of
the Inspector General (the OIG) to initiate audits of the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s (the department’s)
policies, practices, and procedures. This audit focuses on concerns
about the department’s disaster response and assessment of the risks to
department staff and the incarcerated population from wildfires, floods,
and earthquakes. The table below presents the objectives of our audit and
the methods we used to address them.
We conducted this performance audit in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that
we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence
to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions according
to our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides
a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions according to our
audit objectives.
Office of the Inspector General, State of California
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26 | OIG Report AUD № 24–01, Natural Disaster Emergency Preparedness, May 2025
A–1. Audit Objectives and Methods Used to Fulfill Them
Audit Objectives Method
1. Review the department’s • Reviewed relevant laws, rules, regulations, policies, and
preparedness for wildfire, flood, and procedures related to the department’s emergency response
earthquake emergencies at prisons. plans for wildfires, floods, and earthquakes.
• Reviewed reports issued by the department in its State
a) Review and evaluate the
Leadership Accountability Act report.
department’s plans, policies,
and procedures to prepare for
• Reviewed reports issued by federal and state agencies related
wildfires, floods, and earthquakes.
to emergency preparedness and response.
b) Review and evaluate the • Interviewed departmental headquarters staff and reviewed
department’s coordination with relevant materials, including the State Administrative
local, state, and federal agencies Manual, the Department’s Operations Manual, the Restricted
to prepare for and respond to Operations Manual, Correctional Safety Manual, training
wildfires, floods, and earthquakes. materials, and Climate and Disaster reports from news articles,
academic research, and incidents.
c) Review and evaluate the
• After reviewing the department’s emergency operations
department’s wildfire, flood, and
plans, we selected three prisons for fieldwork: California
earthquake response training and
Rehabilitation Center, San Quentin Rehabilitation Center, and
preparedness programs for staff
Valley State Prison.
and the incarcerated population.
• Interviewed staff at California Rehabilitation Center, San
d) Review and evaluate the Quentin Rehabilitation Center, and Valley State Prison and
department’s natural disaster/ reviewed relevant local operating procedures and duty
emergency response protocols, statements at each prison regarding their emergency response
including communication preparedness and plans.
systems, evacuation plans, and
emergency supplies.
e) Review and evaluate whether
the department identifies and
improves its emergency response
plans based on after action
reports, annual emergency plan
reviews, and other post emergency
evaluations by timely revising
policies and procedures.
(Continued on next page.)
Office of the Inspector General, State of California
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OIG Report AUD № 24–01, Natural Disaster Emergency Preparedness, May 2025 | 27
A–1. Audit Objectives and the Methods Used to Fulfill Them (continued)
Audit Objectives Method
2. Review the department’s efforts to • Interviewed departmental headquarters staff and reviewed
mitigate the impacts of wildfire, flood, relevant materials, including the State Administrative Manual,
and earthquake emergencies on staff the Department’s Operations Manual, the Restricted Operations
and the incarcerated population. Manual, Correctional Safety Manual, training materials, and
climate and disaster reports from news articles, academic
a) Review and evaluate research, and incidents.
prisons’ site-specific plans,
• Interviewed staff at each selected prison and examined relevant
policies, and procedures to
local operating procedures and staff training to assess their
prepare for wildfires, floods,
emergency preparedness.
and earthquakes.
• Reviewed and analyzed supporting documentation, including
b) Review and evaluate whether wildfire, flood, and earthquake risk assessments, emergency
prisons’ site-specific plans supplies, and mutual aid agreements with local agencies and
identify and improve their emergency responders at the three selected prisons.
emergency response plans
based on after action reports,
annual emergency plan reviews,
and other post emergency
evaluations by timely revising
policies and procedures
Source: Compiled by OIG auditing staff.
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28 | OIG Report AUD № 24–01, Natural Disaster Emergency Preparedness, May 2025
Assessment of Data Reliability
The U.S. Government Accountability Office, whose standards our
office adheres to for conducting and preparing audits, mandates
an assessment of the sufficiency and appropriateness of computer-
processed information used to support our findings, conclusions,
or recommendations.
Throughout this audit, we relied on data provided by the department
regarding emergencies at its prisons caused by wildfires, floods, and
earthquakes, training schedules, emergency supplies inventory, and
data published on the department’s website regarding the incarcerated
population. While we did not perform testing procedures to verify the
accuracy of the data, we determined that it was reliable for the purposes
of this audit.
Office of the Inspector General, State of California
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OIG Report AUD № 24–01, Natural Disaster Emergency Preparedness, May 2025 | 29
The OIG’s Comments Concerning
the Response Received From the
Department
The department received a draft of this report prior to publication
and was given the opportunity to comment. Although we received the
department’s response, we did not publish it with our report because
the comments were primarily editorial in nature. Moreover, nothing in
the response addressed our findings, conclusions, or recommendations;
nor did the response provide any planned corrective actions. We did,
however, consider the editorial changes the department requested and
made edits where appropriate to provide clarity.
Office of the Inspector General, State of California
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30 | OIG Report AUD № 24–01, Natural Disaster Emergency Preparedness, May 2025
(This page left blank for reproduction purposes.)
Office of the Inspector General, State of California
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Audit of the California Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation’s Natural Disaster Emergency
Preparedness and Mitigation Efforts
Audit Report № 24–01
OFFICE of the
INSPECTOR GENERAL
Amarik K. Singh
Inspector General
Shaun Spillane
Chief Deputy Inspector General
STATE of CALIFORNIA
May 2025
OIG