Audit of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s Natural Disaster Emergency Preparedness and Mitigation Efforts-Fact Sheet

Amarik K. Singh OIG OFFICE of the Inspector General INSPECTOR GENERAL Shaun Spillane Chief Deputy Inspector General Summary Fact Sheet Independent May 1, 2025 Prison Oversight Audit of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s Natural Disaster and Emergency Preparedness and Mitigation Efforts (Audit Report № 24–01, May 2025) Introduction and personnel assignments to ensure the safety of staff during emergencies. In addition, regulations require California is the most disaster-prone State in the prisons to have plans to respond to natural disasters, nation, vulnerable to wildfires, floods, and earthquakes and departmental policy requires prisons to have across its diverse geography. In our audit, we reviewed external evacuation procedures. the department’s specific policies, procedures, and mandated staff training implemented to prepare for However, while most of the site-specific emergency and respond to wildfires, floods, and earthquakes, plans we reviewed included procedures to move the its coordination with Federal, State, and local incarcerated population to and from locations within entities. We also assessed the departments’ ability the prison, none included detailed plans to evacuate to evacuate prisons threatened by wildfires, floods, outside the prison gates. Instead, plans included and earthquakes. general language about coordinating evacuation routes with departmental headquarters staff who would be In addition, we evaluated the 2024 emergency responsible for determining where the evacuees would operations plans from 30 prisons to determine their be transferred based on availability of temporary compliance with law, policy, and industry standards. housing with appropriate security. We reviewed three prisons in depth: Valley State Prison, California Rehabilitation Center, and San Prison Evacuations, Including the Evacuation of Quentin Rehabilitation Center. We reviewed the California State Prison, Corcoran, and the Substance prisons methods to assess their risks of natural Abuse Treatment Facility Will Likely Take More Than disasters and their documented mitigation plans. 72 Hours Finally, we reviewed the adequacy and management of In 2023, California experienced record breaking high on-site supplies and emergency essentials. levels of rain and snow that threatened to inundate the Tulare Basin. Because California State Prison, Results Corcoran (Corcoran), and the Substance Abuse Treatment Facility are located near the Tulare Basin, California’s Overcrowded Prisons Are Vulnerable to they were determined to be at high risk of flooding Wildfires, Floods, and Earthquakes if the levees protecting the area were breached. However, neither prison had detailed site-specific The Department Does Not Have Specific Plans emergency plans that included external evacuations. to Externally Evacuate Prisons in Response to The prisons developed an evacuation plan to Natural Disasters evacuate approximately 8000 incarcerated people in Although the department and individual prisons 11 to 14 days. However, we found that 72 hours is a have plans assessing the risks from and response to reasonable time frame to respond to emergencies wildfires, floods, and earthquakes, those plans are demanding quick action. We arrived at this time frame general in nature and inadequate if large scale external after careful consideration of several factors, including evacuations are necessary. California regulations the unique environment of prisons, the logistics mandate that each prison’s site-specific emergency involved in evacuating the incarcerated population— plan must include procedures for emergency particularly high-security risk individuals—and the evacuation, including evacuation types, exit routes, operational requirements for a prison’s external Page 1 of 4 10111 Old Placerville Road, Suite 110, Sacramento, California 95827 5 Telephone: (916) 288-4212 5 www.oig.ca.gov Amarik K. Singh OIG OFFICE of the Inspector General INSPECTOR GENERAL Shaun Spillane Chief Deputy Inspector General Summary Fact Sheet Independent May 1, 2025 Prison Oversight evacuation. In addition, we considered how rapidly only complicates the department’s ability to manage conditions can escalate during emergencies, especially emergencies, but also greatly exacerbates its inability wildfires and earthquakes. The department’s inability to evacuate incarcerated populations if necessary. to evacuate prisons within 72 hours significantly In addition, the proximity of neighboring prisons increases the threat to the safety of incarcerated increases the likelihood that multiple facilities would people, and overall prison stability in the event of a be affected by the same natural disaster, requiring a natural disaster. coordinated evacuation of their populations and staff. The Location and High Mileage of Transportation Although Almost All Prisons Assess Their Risk of Buses and Other Fleet Vehicles Likely Limits the Natural Disasters, They Do Not Do So Consistently Department’s Ability to Evacuate Most Prisons Within 72 Hours Prison Staff Generally Use Multiple Methods to Assess Their Risk of Wildfires, Floods, and Earthquakes While all departmental fleet vehicles throughout the State could be deployed to assist with an We reviewed the 2024 site-specific emergency evacuation, the number of vehicles at each of the three plans from 30 prisons and found that all stated staff departmental transportation hubs, and their proximity conducted or planned to conduct an all-hazard to prisons in the region, varies. Consequently, if a assessment, but prisons used different methods to natural disaster necessitated evacuating San Quentin conduct the analyses. For example, 18 prisons stated Rehabilitation Center, the closest departmental fleet they used the Automated Critical Asset Management vehicles not permanently located at the prison or at a System or other assessment tool, six prisons used nearby prison are in Galt, approximately 90 miles away. an Emergency Planning Unit Hazard Vulnerability The distances between hubs and prisons potentially Assessment Tool, one prison used the United San needing external evacuations can be great, further Diego Emergency Services Organization assessment limiting the department’s ability to quickly evacuate. process, and five prisons did not specify which assessment tools they used. However, because the Finally, the reliability of some departmental fleet department does not require prisons to attach the buses is questionable. For example, one of its fleet assessment analysis to their site-specific emergency buses has been driven almost 533,000 miles. One plans, the department cannot easily review the fleet bus has approximately 676,000 miles logged, and prisons’ risk assessments to ensure compliance with five have between 730,000 and 858,000 miles logged. departmental policy. According to the U.S. Department of Transportation, the expected lifespan of large heavy-duty buses similar Using Multiple Risk Assessment Methods Likely Results to those used by the department is 500,000 miles. in Inconsistent Risk Ratings Between Prisons Therefore, it is possible the high mileage logged by these seven fleet buses could impair the department’s We found that Valley State Prison, California ability to respond to large-scale evacuations. Rehabilitation Center, and San Quentin Rehabilitation each conducted their risk-assessments differently and Overcrowding and the Proximity of Neighboring may not have assessed the same factors when assessing Prisons Roughly Doubles the Incarcerated Population to their risks. Because prisons use different tools when Be Evacuated During an Emergency assessing and rating their risk of wildfires, floods, and earthquakes, the department cannot ensure prisons The department’s ability to timely and effectively are thoroughly and accurately examining and assessing respond to large-scale emergencies is further their risks. Moreover, without a robust standardized complicated by prison overcrowding. As of risk assessment process, the department cannot ensure December 31, 2024, California prisons were operating suitable control measures are put in place to minimize at 122 percent above designed capacity, housing an the risks—especially high risks—to acceptable levels. additional 16,263 individuals. Overcrowding not Page 2 of 4 10111 Old Placerville Road, Suite 110, Sacramento, California 95827 5 Telephone: (916) 288-4212 5 www.oig.ca.gov Amarik K. Singh OIG OFFICE of the Inspector General INSPECTOR GENERAL Shaun Spillane Chief Deputy Inspector General Summary Fact Sheet Independent May 1, 2025 Prison Oversight Some Prisons Rate Their Risks of Natural Disasters California regulations mandate that each prison’s Differently Despite Being Located in Close Proximity to emergency plan must include procedures for Each Other emergency evacuation and specify evacuation types and exit route assignments to ensure the safety of We reviewed risk assessments for prisons located staff during emergencies. In addition, departmental near each other to determine whether their risk policy requires prisons to include response procedures assessments were consistent with each other and in site-specific supplements that outline external found that they were not. For example, Folsom State evacuations. We found that the evacuation plans Prison rated its wildfire risk as moderate, its flood outlined in prisons’ site-specific emergency plans and risk as high, and its earthquake risk as low, while supplements, particularly Corcoran and the Substance California State Prison, Sacramento, which is adjacent, Abuse Treatment Facility, showed significant gaps in rated its risks from wildfires, floods, and earthquakes, detail and were missing critical information. as high. In another example, Kern Valley State Prison rated its flood risk as high while North Kern State At Least Two Prisons Have Not Entered Into Prison, 2.3 miles away, rated its flood risk as low. Mutual Aid Agreements, and Not All Site-Specific Emergency Plans Include Key Details of Mutual The Emergency Planning Unit Does Not Aid Agreements Substantively Review Prisons’ Site-Specific Emergency Operations Plans as Required by To further facilitate rapid response to emergencies, California Regulations and Departmental Policy departmental policy requires prisons to enter into mutual aid agreements that include key details The Emergency Planning Unit’s Approval Process including which entities are covered by the agreement, Is Flawed what goods or services are covered, and what limitations, if any, apply to the agreement. However, While the emergency planning unit performs some we found that at least two of the 30 prisons which review activities, such as verifying that each prison submitted site-specific emergency plans in 2024 did submits a site-specific plan and ensuring that certain not maintain any mutual aid agreements, and it was documents are included with it, we found that the unclear from the plans of two others whether they had emergency planning unit lacks formal guidelines or entered into mutual aid agreements. specific criteria to assess the content of the plans. Moreover, some prisons that maintain mutual aid The Emergency Planning Unit Does Not Ensure Prisons agreements failed to attach them to their site- Submit Site-Specific Supplements or Review Them specific plans and failed to include key information for Adequacy about the mutual aid agreements in these plans. In addition to site-specific emergency plans, While departmental policy does not require mutual departmental policy requires prisons to develop aid agreements be attached or key information be site-specific supplements that address site-specific included in each prison’s site-specific emergency hazards not covered by the department’s emergency plan, we expected key components of the mutual plan. Departmental policy further requires prisons aid agreements to be documented to expedite the to review and revise the policy supplements annually mutual aid during an emergency. If key components or as needed based on specific incidents including of mutual aid agreements are missing or unavailable disasters or disturbances. Although the emergency to departmental staff, their value during emergencies planning unit requires prisons to submit the site- is diminished. specific supplements, it does not review them to assess their adequacy. Page 3 of 4 10111 Old Placerville Road, Suite 110, Sacramento, California 95827 5 Telephone: (916) 288-4212 5 www.oig.ca.gov Amarik K. Singh OIG OFFICE of the Inspector General INSPECTOR GENERAL Shaun Spillane Chief Deputy Inspector General Summary Fact Sheet Independent May 1, 2025 Prison Oversight Recommendations California’s Overcrowded Prisons wildfires to have fire retardant • The department should Are Vulnerable to Wildfires, available to help reduce the require the emergency probability of housing units planning unit to formally Floods, and Earthquakes, and the catching on fire. review all site-specific Department Is Unable to Evacuate emergency plans using the Incarcerated Population and Although Almost All Prisons Assess established criteria and Staff at Most Prisons Within Their Risk of Natural Disasters, approve only the site-specific 72 Hours of an Emergency They Do Not Do So Consistently plans and supplements that meet the established criteria. • The department should • The department should • The department should update its All-Hazards standardize risk assessment require the emergency Emergency Operations Plan. methodologies to ensure planning unit to visit prisons consistent and accurate risk • The department should ratings across prisons. on a rotating basis to review require prisons to develop the prison’s risk assessments, and implement site-specific • The department should to ensure the assessments emergency evacuation require adjacent prisons are thorough and accurate, plans that include detailed to work together to assess and to ensure that mitigation procedures and evacuation risks and develop mitigation measures are in place. routes to externally evacuate strategies targeting those staff and the incarcerated risks as part of their site- At Least Two Prisons Have population within 72 hours. specific emergency plans. Not Entered Into Mutual Aid Agreements, and Not All Site- • The department should • The department should Specific Emergency Plans identify and designate enforce the inclusion of alternative temporary detailed, site-specific Include Key Details of Mutual relocation sites near mitigation strategies in all Aid Agreements each prison to use during emergency plans, particularly emergency evacuations, for identified high-risk areas. • Formalize all mutual aid including deactivated prisons agreements into written when applicable. • The department should contracts that clearly develop a standardized define the terms, roles, • The department should process to ensure specific responsibilities, contact consider relocating current mitigation strategies are information, authority, and transportation hubs or adding directly linked to wildfire, scope of assistance to be additional transportation flood, and earthquake provided by each party. hubs to place fleet vehicles vulnerabilities at each prison. closer to more prisons to • Standardize the process for facilitate deployment in The Emergency Planning Unit documenting and reviewing emergency evacuations. mutual aid agreements to Does Not Substantively Review ensure that agreements • The department should Prisons’ Site-Specific Emergency are clear, enforceable, develop training to prepare Operations Plans as Required and effectively address prison staff to plan and timely by California Regulations and the needs of each prison execute large-scale external during emergencies. Departmental Policy evacuations of prisons. • Require mutual aid • The emergency planning • The department should agreements to be attached unit should establish clear require prisons to create and to site-specific emergency criteria, including external maintain defensible space plans or require details of evacuation procedures, and around prison buildings to the mutual aid agreements, implement a formal approval mitigate fire risk. such as contact information, process for approving site- be included in site-specific specific emergency plans • The department should emergency plans. and supplements, to ensure consider requiring prisons compliance with California at moderate to high risk of regulations and best practices. Page 4 of 4 10111 Old Placerville Road, Suite 110, Sacramento, California 95827 5 Telephone: (916) 288-4212 5 www.oig.ca.gov