Audit-Report-No.-2101-Fact-Sheet

Amarik K. Singh OIG OFFICE of the Inspector General INSPECTOR GENERAL Neil Robertson Chief Deputy Inspector General Fact Sheet Independent January 11, 2023 Prison Oversight Audit of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s Controlled Substances Contraband Interdiction Efforts (Audit Report № 21–01, January 2023) Introduction Reducing the prevalence of controlled substances implemented, drugs have continued to enter California’s (hereafter, controlled substances or drugs) in California’s prison system. The weaknesses within the department’s prison system is an ongoing challenge for the California drug interdiction program allow drugs to continue to Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (the enter California’s prison system. This situation has department). Our audit analyzed the department’s prevailed despite the department having implemented controlled substances contraband interdiction COVID-19 response efforts and having suspended efforts at four prisons from March 1, 2019, through in-person visiting, beginning March 2020, to mitigate January 7, 2022. This fact sheet presents highlights from potential exposure to COVID-19. As Figure 1 shows, the public version of our report, which we published drugs continued to enter prisons, with a notable increase in January 2023. Despite strategies the department has for uncontrolled drug discoveries. Figure 1. Total Number of Individual Drugs Discovered Before and Results During Suspended Visitation Due to the COVID-19 Pandemic * Chapter 1: Canines 3,500 Despite Recognizing That Canines Are Among the Most Effective Resources to Both Deter and Detect Drugs, the Department Underuses Its Canine Program 3,238 3,000 • Canine teams were not always available to conduct frequent searches at their assigned prisons 2,500 Number of Drugs • The department did not regularly use canines to search Discovered prison property, including mail rooms N = 9,467 Pre-COVID (n = 4,899) 2,000 COVID (n = 4,568) 2,131 2,038 Chapter 2: Electronic Drug Detection Devices 1,500 The Department Acknowledges the Usefulness of Electronic Devices in Detecting Drugs, yet Only Uses Them in Limited 1,249 Circumstances 1,000 • Despite evidence demonstrating the effectiveness of electronic drug detection devices, the department did not 500 use the devices to screen for drugs at most State prisons 358 0 16 26 89 23 72 5 222 Civilian Civilian Staff Incarcerated Uncontrolled Other† Visitor Nonvisitor People Chapter 3: Entrance Searches Pre-COVID restrictions (3-1-19 Through 2-29-20) COVID restrictions (3-1-20 Through 2-28-21) The Department’s Screening Process at Prison Entry * The major drugs discovery log data that the department provided to the Office of the Checkpoints Is Inadequate to Prevent Drugs From Being Inspector General (the OIG) included several errors, and the reliability of the data is Introduced Onto Prison Grounds further discussed in Chapter 7 of our report. For purposes of our audit, we made some adjustments to these data to more accurately reflect drug discoveries. We caution that • The department’s entrance screening process was these numbers may still not be accurate. inadequate for discovering drugs, both in policy and † At Prison B, a manager reported that staff erroneously reported 227 drug items (five during the pre-COVID restrictions period and 222 during the COVID restrictions in practice period) discovered as recovered from staff when the items should have been reported as recovered from an incarcerated person. We did not perform procedures to validate • The absence of effective measures to stop drugs from the source of discovery; however, we reclassified the stated error as Other due to uncertainty. entering the prisons risked the health and safety of Source: Major drugs discovery log data maintained by the department’s Division of Adult departmental staff and incarcerated people Institutions and provided by the department’s Office of Research. The data covered the period from March 2019 to February 2021. Page 1 of 3 10111 Old Placerville Road, Suite 110, Sacramento, California 95827 5 Telephone: (916) 288-4233 5 www.oig.ca.gov Amarik K. Singh OIG OFFICE of the Inspector General INSPECTOR GENERAL Neil Robertson Chief Deputy Inspector General Fact Sheet Independent January 11, 2023 Prison Oversight Table 1. Observations of Staff Searched at Pedestrian Entrances Number Chapter 5: Investigations of People Shift Change/ Processed Duration of Prison Off-Peak Location (approximate) Each Search The Department Does Not Consistently or Adequately Conduct Investigations to Determine the Sources of Drugs Shift Change Main Entrance 160 1–2 seconds Discovered in Prisons Prison A Shift Change Main Entrance 230 2–3 seconds • Prison investigators generally conduct poor-quality Off-Peak Main Entrance 25 8 seconds investigations that rarely identify those suspected of Shift Change Main Entrance 105 2–8 seconds bringing drugs into prisons Shift Change MSF 8 5–10 seconds Prison C • The department has minimal policies and procedures for Shift Change Main Entrance 129 8–10 seconds investigating the source of drug discoveries Off-Peak Main Entrance 10 8–10 seconds • Although the department has specific procedures in place Shift Change SHU Entrance 43 2–3 seconds to investigate drug overdoses in prisons, medical staff rarely Prison D Shift Change GP Entrance 55 < 5 seconds notify prison investigators of drug overdoses to ensure that investigations occur Off-Peak GP Entrance 7 10 seconds Approximate Total Number of People Processed 772 Notes: Shift change, for the purposes of this audit, is a period of approximately 45 minutes before the beginning of the work shifts starting at 6:00 a.m. or 2:00 p.m. Figure 2. Results of 153 Drug Discoveries Reviewed at Four Prisons Off-Peak is anytime outside the shift change period. SHU is Security Housing Unit. MSF is Minimum Support Facility. GP is General Population. Source: The OIG’s observations at pedestrian entrances for Prison A, Prison C, and Prison D. Undetermined The department’s COVID-19 pandemic policies precluded in-person inspections at Prison B. 1 (< 1%) Did Not Investigate (Distribution)  42 Incarcerated Did Not People Investigate Chapter 4: Cell Searches Discoveries 88 (58%) Reviewed O O ffi fte c n e r a s s D D i e d p N ar o t t m C e o n n ta d l u P c o t l C ic e y l l R a e n q d u B ir u e n d k , a A n r d e M a S o e s a t r S c e h a e r s c h as e s Inve (4 s 6 2 ti 4 % g a ) ted N = 153  D 34 is c M o a v i e l ries They Did Conduct Were Unlikely to Discover Any Drugs That Might Have Been Present  8 Uncontrolled Discoveries  4 Other • Officers did not conduct the minimum number of required daily cell and bunk area searches, reducing the likelihood of detecting drugs in housing units Note: Figures may not sum to 100% due to rounding. Source: The OIG’s analysis of the department’s investigations into the source of discovered drugs • Officers did not always conduct thorough searches of between March 2019 and February 2021 at Prison A, Prison B, Prison C, and Prison D. incarcerated people’s cells, often skipping crucial areas where incarcerated people could hide drugs Table 2. Rate of Compliance and Supervisory Reviews on Required Daily Cell Searches Chapter 6: Work Change Compliance With Daily Evidence of Supervisory Prison Staff Did Not Always Thoroughly Search Incarcerated Prison Cell Searches Review Workers Reporting to and Returning From Work Assignments, Prison A 59% 42% Increasing the Risk of These Workers Moving Drugs Prison B 28% 36% Throughout Prisons Prison C 8% No Documentation Provided* • As a result of the department’s unclear policies and procedures, not all prisons require staff to search Prison D 88% 99% incarcerated workers who move to and from locations Overall Sample 38% 40% throughout the prisons * According to management at Prison C, supervisory reviews were not documented on the cell search logs, but in a separate housing unit logbook. The prison did not respond to our request for the housing unit logbooks; therefore, we could not determine whether supervisory reviews had occurred. Source: The OIG’s review of cell search records provided by the prisons. Page 2 of 3 10111 Old Placerville Road, Suite 110, Sacramento, California 95827 5 Telephone: (916) 288-4233 5 www.oig.ca.gov Amarik K. Singh OIG OFFICE of the Inspector General INSPECTOR GENERAL Neil Robertson Chief Deputy Inspector General Fact Sheet Independent January 11, 2023 Prison Oversight Figure 3. Data Validation Results of Four Prisons’ Drug Discovery Data Chapter 7: Data Validation Incidents Not Logged * The Department Could Not Accurately Quantify Its 25 (18%) Discoveries of Drugs Because Its Data Collection and Quality Control Procedures Were Both Inadequate, Resulting in the Inclusion of Inaccurate Data in Its Statutorily Required No Entry Errors Found 77 (55%) Public Reports N = 139 • The data on drug discoveries that the department collects Entry Errors and provides to the general public and to stakeholders are 37 (27%) inaccurate and misleading • Departmental policy does not require staff to record in the No Entry Errors Found Entry Errors Incidents Not Logged* major drugs discovery log several drugs identified as having a high potential for abuse and dependency; this lapse in * We identified three incidents that involved amphetamine, hydrocodone, and methadone gathering data prevents the department from monitoring hydrochloride. These substances do not fall under the major drug categories that the department required its staff to track. controlled substance discovery activity Source: The OIG’s review of sampled incidents at Prison A, Prison B, Prison C, and Prison D compared with data entries from the department’s major drugs discovery log. Recommendations The department should: Canines Work Change • Develop and implement procedures to detect and identify drugs at pedestrian • Clarify when, and what search use canines to search the persons and and vehicle security checkpoints methods custody staff are required to personal property of visitors, and staff use in searching incarcerated people Cell Searches at work change checkpoints and when • Develop and implement procedures to they move into or out of high security ensure that canine teams are available • Ensure that staff consistently complete risk areas to conduct frequent searches at their and document required searches; assigned prisons supervisors document evidence of • Establish a quality control process to monitoring the search process, and the ensure that managers and supervisors • Conduct a cost-benefit analysis to reasons when a search is not performed monitor and verify compliance with the effectively use canines to conduct departmental search policy searches of visitors, staff, incarcerated • Implement routine training to people and their personal property, and provide custody staff with continuous • Use electronic contraband and drug to search prison grounds reinforcement of skills and expectations detection devices to detect contraband for conducting effective cell searches and drugs at work change checkpoints Electronic Drug Detection Equipment Investigations Data Validation • Evaluate the cost-benefit analysis result of implementing electronic detection • Establish clear, comprehensive, • Establish policies and procedures devices that can identify drugs in its statewide policies and procedures for on how to properly enter drug discovery interdiction efforts investigating drug discoveries that incidents into the major drugs include investigating the source discovery log Entrance Searches • Develop a field guide to direct • Incorporate the controlled substances • Develop policies and procedures and guide prison investigations of listed in Schedules I and II of federal that include a daily comprehensive drug discoveries and State laws into its major drugs search process of staff, and their discovery log reporting policy belongings at the entrances to prisons’ • Collaborate with California secured perimeters Correctional Health Care Services to • Implement a data quality control develop privacy protocols that ensure process and establish controls within • Provide regular training on prison investigators are informed of all the SharePoint application to reduce how to conduct comprehensive suspected and confirmed overdoses errors in data entry. Otherwise, utilize searches at entrances to prisons’ a database management system with secured perimeters • Develop and conduct training for prison integrated data controls investigators on how to effectively • Employ the use of canines and drug investigate drug discoveries and detection devices that will assist staff to identify the sources of those discoveries Page 3 of 3 10111 Old Placerville Road, Suite 110, Sacramento, California 95827 5 Telephone: (916) 288-4233 5 www.oig.ca.gov