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Hart Verity Voting 3.1 Voting System Software Testing Report
Hart Verity Voting 3.1 Voting System
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Hart InterCivic Verity Voting 3.1
Voting System Software Test Report
for
California Secretary of State
HRT-19001-CSTR-01
Vendor Name Hart InterCivic
Vendor System Verity Voting 3.1
Prepared by:
4720 Independence St.
Wheat Ridge, CO 80033
303-422-1566
www.SLICompliance.com
Accredited by the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) for Selected Voting System Test Methods or Services
California Secretary of State
Hart InterCivic Verity Voting 3.1
Software Test Report
Revision History
Date Release Author Revision Summary
October 9, 2019 1.0 M. Santos Initial Release
Disclaimer
The information reported herein must not be used by the client to claim product
certification, approval, or endorsement by NVLAP, NIST, or any agency of the
Federal Government.
Trademarks
SLI is a registered trademark of SLI Compliance.
All products and company names are used for identification purposes only
and may be trademarks of their respective owners.
Copyright 2019 by SLI ComplianceSM, a Division of Gaming Laboratories International, LLC
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................... 4
SCOPE OF THE HART INTERCIVIC VERITY VOTING 3.1 VOTING SYSTEM .......................................................... 4
REVIEW SPECIFICATIONS ......................................................................................................................... 5
SOURCE CODE REVIEW ................................................................................................................................ 5
REVIEW RESULTS....................................................................................................................................... 8
DISCREPANCIES ........................................................................................................................................... 8
VULNERABILITIES ......................................................................................................................................... 9
FINAL REPORT .......................................................................................................................................... 12
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INTRODUCTION
This report outlines the test approach SLI Compliance (SLI) followed when
performing Software Testing on the Hart Verity Voting 3.1 voting system against
the California Voting System Standards (CVSS). The purpose of this document is
to provide an understanding of the work SLI conducted.
Scope of the Hart InterCivic Verity Voting 3.1 Voting
System
This section provides a description of the scope of the following Hart Verity
Voting 3.1 voting system components:
Verity Data application.
Verity Build application.
Verity Count application.
Verity Central application.
Verity Election Management.
Verity Desktop.
Verity User Manager.
Verity Scan firmware/hardware.
Verity Touch Writer with Access firmware/hardware.
Verity Reader firmware/hardware.
Verity Print firmware/hardware.
Verity Data provides the user with controls for entering and proofing data
and audio. Verity Data also performs validation on the exported information
to ensure that it will successfully import into Verity Build.
Verity Build opens the election to proof data, view reports, and print ballots,
and allows for configuring and programming the Verity Scan digital
scanners, and Verity Touch Writer ballot marking devices (BMD), as well
as producing the election definition and auditing reports.
Verity Count is an application that tabulates election results and generates
reports. Verity Count can be used to collect and store all election logs from
every Verity component/device used in the election, allowing for complete
election audit log reviews.
Verity Central is a high-speed, central digital ballot scanning system used
for high-volume processing of ballots (such as vote by mail). The unit is
based on commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) scanning hardware coupled with
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Software Test Report
the custom Hart-developed ballot processing application software which
resides on an attached workstation.
Verity Election Management allows users with the Administrator role to
import and manage election definitions. Imported election definitions are
available through the Elections chevron in Verity Build. Users can also
delete, archive, and manage the election definitions.
Verity Desktop enables users, with the correct roles, to set the
workstations’ date and time, gather Verity application hash codes (in order
to validate the correctness of the installed applications), and access to
Windows desktop.
Verity User Manager enables users with the correct role and permissions
to create and manage user accounts within the Verity Voting system for the
local workstation in a standalone configuration, or for the network in a
networked configuration.
Verity Scan is a digital scan precinct ballot counter (tabulator) that is used
in conjunction with an external ballot box. The unit is designed to scan
marked paper ballots, interpret and record voter marks on the paper ballot,
and deposit the ballots into the secure ballot box.
The Verity Touch Writer is a standalone precinct level BMD which also
includes an Audio Tactile Interface (ATI), which allows voters who cannot
complete a paper ballot to generate a machine-readable and human-
readable paper ballot, based on vote selections made.
Verity Reader is a voting center ballot reading device for marked paper
ballots, that a voter can use to verify how their ballot is being read.
Verity Print is a voting center ballot production device for unmarked paper
ballots.
REVIEW SPECIFICATIONS
The following are the specifications for source code testing conducted on the Hart
Verity Voting 3.1 voting system.
Source Code Review
The Hart Verity Voting 3.1 voting system includes proprietary software and
firmware. The voting system code base was tested to the applicable CVSS
requirements.
Review of the code included:
Adherence to the applicable standards in sections 5 and 7 of the CVSS.
Adherence to other applicable coding format conventions and standards
including best practices for the coding language used.
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Analysis of the program logic and branching structure.
Evaluate whether the system is designed in a way that allows meaningful
analysis, including:
o Whether the architecture and code are amenable to an external review.
o Whether code analysis tools can be usefully applied.
o Whether the code complexity is at a level that obfuscates its logic.
Security considerations reviewed against the code base included:
Search for exposures to commonly exploited vulnerabilities.
Evaluate the use and correct implementation of cryptography and key
management.
Analysis of error and exception handling.
Evaluate the likelihood of security failures being detected.
o Evaluate whether audit mechanisms are reliable and tamper resistant.
o Evaluate whether data that might be subject to tampering is properly
validated and authenticated.
Evaluate the risk that a user can escalate his or her capabilities beyond
those authorized.
Evaluate the design and implementation to ensure that sound, generally
accepted engineering practices are followed, checking to verify that code is
defensively written against:
o Bad data.
o Errors in other modules.
o Changes in environment.
o User errors.
o Other adverse conditions.
Evaluate for embedded, exploitable code (such as “Easter eggs”) that can
be triggered to affect the system.
Evaluate the code for dynamic memory access features which would permit
the replacement of certificated executable code or control data or insertion
of exploitable code or data.
Evaluate the code for use of runtime scripts, instructions, or other control
data that can affect the operation of security relevant functions or the
integrity of the data.
Components and coding languages involved in the voting system applications are
shown in Table 1.
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Table 1 – Hart Verity Voting 3.1 Components
Component Language/s Lines of Code Standard
Verity 3.1
All-In-One Code Framework Coding
Source package# 1,375,382
Standards.pdf
package
Included in
Verity 3.1 All-In-One Code Framework Coding
Verity Data C#
Source package Standards.pdf
count
C# Included in All-In-One Code Framework Coding
Verity 3.1 Standards.pdf
Verity Build
Source package
count
C# Included in All-In-One Code Framework Coding
Verity Count previous line Standards.pdf
count
C# Included in All-In-One Code Framework Coding
Verity Central previous line Standards.pdf
count
Verity C# Included in All-In-One Code Framework Coding
Election previous line Standards.pdf
Management count
C# Included in All-In-One Code Framework Coding
Verity
previous line Standards.pdf
Desktop
count
C# Included in All-In-One Code Framework Coding
Verity User
previous line Standards.pdf
Manager
count
C# Included in All-In-One Code Framework Coding
Verity Scan previous line Standards.pdf
count
Verity Touch C# Included in All-In-One Code Framework Coding
Writer w/ previous line Standards.pdf
Access count
C# Included in All-In-One Code Framework Coding
Verity
previous line Standards.pdf
Reader
count
C# Included in All-In-One Code Framework Coding
Verity Print previous line Standards.pdf
count
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Source Code Review Tools utilized by SLI included:
Module Finder: an SLI proprietary application used to parse module names
from C/C++, Java and VB code and populate the identified module names
into the review documents.
Examdiff Pro 5: a commercial application used to compare source code
deliveries.
Understand: a commercial application used to review code to stated
requirements.
REVIEW RESULTS
Discrepancies
Discrepancies are reported such that the California Secretary of State is provided
with a basis for evaluating the extent to which the source code meets applicable
standards.
Verity Data source code review
No source code requirements were found to be an issue within the Verity Data
source code base reviewed; as a result, no discrepancies were written against the
code base.
Verity Build source code review
No source code requirements were found to be an issue within the Verity Build
source code base reviewed; as a result, no discrepancies were written against the
code base.
Verity Count source code review
No source code requirements were found to be an issue within the Verity Count
source code base reviewed; as a result, no discrepancies were written against the
code base.
Verity Central source code review
No source code requirements were found to be an issue within the Verity Central
source code base reviewed; as a result, no discrepancies were written against the
code base.
Verity Election Management source code review
No source code requirements were found to be an issue within the Verity Election
Management source code base reviewed; as a result, no discrepancies were
written against the code base.
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Verity Desktop source code review
No source code requirements were found to be an issue within the Verity Desktop
source code base reviewed; as a result, no discrepancies were written against the
code base.
Verity User Manager source code review
No source code requirements were found to be an issue within the Verity User
Manager source code base reviewed; as a result, no discrepancies were written
against the code base.
Verity Scan source code review
No source code requirements were found to be an issue within the Verity Scan
source code base reviewed; as a result, no discrepancies were written against the
code base.
Verity Touch Writer source code review
No source code requirements were found to be an issue within the Verity Touch
Writer source code base reviewed; as a result, no discrepancies were written
against the code base.
Verity Reader source code review
No source code requirements were found to be an issue within the Verity Reader
source code base reviewed; as a result, no discrepancies were written against the
code base.
Verity Print source code review
No source code requirements were found to be an issue within the Verity Print
source code base reviewed; as a result, no discrepancies were written against the
code base.
Vulnerabilities
For any vulnerabilities discovered, SLI was tasked with identifying the particular
standards applicable to each vulnerability.
To the extent possible, reported vulnerabilities include an indication of whether the
exploitation of the vulnerability would require access by:
Voter: Usually has low knowledge of the voting machine design and
configuration. Some may have more advanced knowledge. May carry out
attacks designed by others. They have access to the machine(s) for less
than an hour.
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Poll worker: Usually has low knowledge of the voting machine design and
configuration. Some may have more advanced knowledge. May carry out
attacks designed by others. They have access to the machine(s) for up to
one week, but all physical security has been put into place before the
machines are received.
Elections official insider: Wide range of knowledge of the voting machine
design and configuration. May have unrestricted access to the machine for
long periods of time. Their designated activities include:
o Set up and pre-election procedures.
o Election operation.
o Post-election processing of results.
o Archiving and storage operations.
Vendor insider: Great knowledge of the voting machine design and
configuration. They have unlimited access to the machine before it is
delivered to the purchaser and, thereafter, may have unrestricted access
when performing warranty and maintenance service, and when providing
election administration services.
SLI will not verify or demonstrate exploitability of the vulnerability but the report of
the vulnerability will identify factors involved in the exploitation.
Any vulnerability theories developed by the source code review team members
shall, to the extent possible, be referred to the Secretary of State staff.
EMS source code vulnerability review
No vulnerabilities were found within the EMS source code base reviewed; as a
result, no findings were written against the code base.
Verity Data source code vulnerability review
No vulnerabilities were found to be an issue within the Verity Data source code
base reviewed; as a result, no findings were written against the code base.
Verity Build source code vulnerability review
No vulnerabilities were found to be an issue within the Verity Build source code
base reviewed; as a result, no findings were written against the code base.
Verity Count source code vulnerability review
No vulnerabilities were found to be an issue within the Verity Count source code
base reviewed; as a result, no findings were written against the code base.
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Verity Central source code vulnerability review
No vulnerabilities were found to be an issue within the Verity Central source code
base reviewed; as a result, no findings were written against the code base.
Verity Election Management source code vulnerability review
No vulnerabilities were found to be an issue within the Verity Election Management
source code base reviewed; as a result, no findings were written against the code
base.
Verity Desktop source code vulnerability review
No vulnerabilities were found to be an issue within the Verity Desktop source code
base reviewed; as a result, no findings were written against the code base.
Verity User Manager source code vulnerability review
No vulnerabilities were found to be an issue within the Verity User Manager source
code base reviewed; as a result, no findings were written against the code base.
Verity Scan source code vulnerability review
No vulnerabilities were found to be an issue within the Verity Scan source code
base reviewed; as a result, no findings were written against the code base.
Verity Touch Writer source code vulnerability review
No vulnerabilities were found to be an issue within the Verity Touch Writer source
code base reviewed; as a result, no findings were written against the code base.
Verity Reader source code vulnerability review
No vulnerabilities were found to be an issue within the Verity Reader source code
base reviewed; as a result, no findings were written against the code base.
Verity Print source code vulnerability review
No vulnerabilities were found to be an issue within the Verity Print source code
base reviewed; as a result, no findings were written against the code base.
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FINAL REPORT
No discrepancy findings were located within the Hart Verity Voting 3.1 code base.
No potential vulnerabilities were identified within the Hart Verity Voting 3.1 code
base
As directed by the California Secretary of State, this software testing report does
not include any recommendation as to whether or not the system should be
approved.
End of Software Test Report
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