Hart Verity Voting 3.1 Voting System Security and Telecommunications Testing Report

Hart InterCivic Verity Voting 3.1 Security and Telecommunications Test Report for California Secretary of State CHI-19044-STR-01 Vendor Name Hart InterCivic Vendor System Verity Voting 3.1 Prepared by: 4720 Independence St. Wheat Ridge, CO 80033 303-422-1566 www.SLICompliance.com Accredited by the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) for Selected Voting System Test Methods or Services California Secretary of State Hart InterCivic Verity Voting 3.1 Security and Telecomm Test Report Copyright 2019 by SLI ComplianceSM, a Division of Gaming Laboratories International, LLC Revision History Date Release Author Revision Summary November 5th, 2019 1.0 J. Peterson Initial Release Disclaimer The information reported herein must not be used by the client to claim product certification, approval, or endorsement by NVLAP, NIST, or any agency of the Federal Government. Trademarks SLI is a registered trademark of SLI Compliance. All products and company names are used for identification purposes only and may be trademarks of their respective owners. California Certification Page 2 of 32 Security and Telecomm Test Report v1.0 Report Number CHI-19044-STR-01 California Secretary of State Hart InterCivic Verity Voting 3.1 Security and Telecomm Test Report TABLE OF CONTENTS OVERVIEW ................................................................................................................................................... 4 PHASE I – DOCUMENTATION REVIEW ..................................................................................................... 5 2.1 SECURITY .............................................................................................................................................. 5 6.2 DESIGN, CONSTRUCTION, AND MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS ................................................................. 6 7.2.2 ACCESS CONTROL IDENTIFICATION ...................................................................................................... 6 7.3.1 POLLING PLACE SECURITY .................................................................................................................. 6 7.3.2 CENTRAL COUNT LOCATION SECURITY ................................................................................................. 7 7.4.1 SOFTWARE AND FIRMWARE INSTALLATION ............................................................................................ 7 7.4.2 PROTECTION AGAINST MALICIOUS SOFTWARE ...................................................................................... 8 7.4.3 SOFTWARE DISTRIBUTION AND SETUP VALIDATION ............................................................................... 8 7.4.4 SOFTWARE DISTRIBUTION.................................................................................................................... 9 7.4.5 SOFTWARE REFERENCE INFORMATION ................................................................................................. 9 7.4.6 SOFTWARE SETUP VALIDATION .......................................................................................................... 10 7.8.1 ACCESS CONTROL ............................................................................................................................ 10 PHASE II – FUNCTIONAL SECURITY TESTING ...................................................................................... 10 5.4.3 IN-PROCESS AUDIT RECORDS ............................................................................................................ 12 7.2.1 GENERAL ACCESS CONTROL ............................................................................................................. 13 7.2.2 ACCESS CONTROL IDENTIFICATION .................................................................................................... 14 7.2.3 ACCESS CONTROL AUTHENTICATION .................................................................................................. 15 7.2.4 ACCESS CONTROL AUTHORIZATION ................................................................................................... 16 7.3 PHYSICAL SECURITY MEASURES ........................................................................................................... 17 7.3.1 POLLING PLACE SECURITY ................................................................................................................ 18 7.3.2 CENTRAL COUNT LOCATION SECURITY ............................................................................................... 19 7.4.1 SOFTWARE AND FIRMWARE INSTALLATION .......................................................................................... 19 7.4.2 PROTECTION AGAINST MALICIOUS SOFTWARE .................................................................................... 21 7.4.3 SOFTWARE DISTRIBUTION AND SETUP VALIDATION ............................................................................. 21 7.4.5 SOFTWARE REFERENCE INFORMATION ............................................................................................... 22 7.4.6 SOFTWARE SETUP VALIDATION .......................................................................................................... 23 7.6 TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND DATA TRANSMISSION ................................................................................. 27 7.6.1 MAINTAINING DATA INTEGRITY ........................................................................................................... 27 7.6.2 ELECTION RETURNS .......................................................................................................................... 28 7.8.1 ACCESS CONTROL ............................................................................................................................ 28 7.8.2 DATA INTERCEPTION AND DISRUPTION ............................................................................................... 29 PHASE III – TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND DATA TRANSMISSION TESTING.................................... 30 6.1.2 DATA TRANSMISSION ......................................................................................................................... 30 6.2.1 CONFIRMATION ................................................................................................................................. 31 FINAL REPORT .......................................................................................................................................... 32 California Certification Page 3 of 32 Security and Telecomm Test Report v1.0 Report Number CHI-19044-STR-01 California Secretary of State Hart InterCivic Verity Voting 3.1 Security and Telecomm Test Report Overview This test report provides results for the security and telecommunications testing of the Hart InterCivic Verity Voting 3.1 Voting System (Hart Verity Voting 3.1). Security and telecommunications testing covered: Top-level system design and architecture. System documentation and procedures. Testing of relevant software and operating system configuration for pertinent vulnerabilities. Testing of hardware, including examination of unused hardware ports and security measures applied to those ports. Testing of system communications, including encryption of data as well as protocols and procedures for access authorization. Testing was implemented without any prior knowledge of the source code. The testing was divided into three phases: Phase I included review of all pertinent documents for appropriate processes and procedures for implementing a secure system. This included review of the system design and architecture. Phase II included testing of relevant software, operating systems, and hardware configurations. Phase III included testing of all telecommunications aspects of the system. California Certification Page 4 of 32 Security and Telecomm Test Report v1.0 Report Number CHI-19044-STR-01 California Secretary of State Hart InterCivic Verity Voting 3.1 Security and Telecomm Test Report Phase I – Documentation Review During Phase I testing, documentation was reviewed to verify and validate the following requirements: Top-level system design and architecture. System documentation and procedures. During Phase I testing, documentation was reviewed to verify and validate the following California Voting System Standards (CVSS) requirements: 2.1.1 Security. 6.2 Design, Construction, and Maintenance Requirements. 7.2.2 Access control identification. 7.3.1 Polling place security. 7.3.2 Central count location security. 7.4.1 Software and firmware installation. 7.4.2 Protections against malicious software. 7.4.3 Software distribution and setup validation. 7.4.4 Software Distribution. 7.4.5 Software Reference Information. 7.4.6 Software Setup Validation. 7.8.1 Access control. See the applicable section below for more details on these requirements and the review results. During Phase I testing, an issue log of any errors and omissions found in the documentation or anomalies encountered was maintained. 2.1 Security System security is achieved through a combination of technical capabilities and sound administrative practices. To ensure security, all systems shall: a. Provide documentation of mandatory administrative procedures for effective system security. Results: Review of the Technical Data Package (TDP) validated that the requirement was satisfactorily covered. California Certification Page 5 of 32 Security and Telecomm Test Report v1.0 Report Number CHI-19044-STR-01 California Secretary of State Hart InterCivic Verity Voting 3.1 Security and Telecomm Test Report 6.2 Design, Construction, and Maintenance Requirements Design, construction, and maintenance requirements for telecommunications represent the operational capability of both system hardware and software. These capabilities shall be considered basic to all data transmissions. Results: Review of the Technical Data Package (TDP) validated that the requirement was satisfactorily covered. 7.2.2 Access Control Identification a. The voting system shall identify users and processes to which access is granted and the specific functions and data to which each entity holds authorized access. b. Voting system equipment that implements role-based access control shall support the recommendations for Core RBAC in the ANSI INCITS 359-2004 American National Standard for Information Technology Role Based Access Control document. c. Voting system equipment shall allow the administrator, group, or role to configure the permissions and functionality for each identity, group, or role to include account and group/role creation, modification, and deletion. Results: Review of the Technical Data Package (TDP) validated that the requirement was satisfactorily covered. 7.3.1 Polling Place Security For polling place operations, manufacturers shall develop and provide detailed documentation of measures to enable poll workers to physically protect and perform orderly shutdown of voting equipment to counteract vandalism, civil disobedience, and similar occurrences. The measures shall allow the immediate detection of tampering with vote casting devices and precinct ballot counters. Results: Review of the TDP validated that the requirement was satisfactorily covered. California Certification Page 6 of 32 Security and Telecomm Test Report v1.0 Report Number CHI-19044-STR-01 California Secretary of State Hart InterCivic Verity Voting 3.1 Security and Telecomm Test Report 7.3.2 Central Count Location Security Manufacturers shall develop and document in detail the measures to be taken in a central counting environment. These measures shall include physical and procedural controls related to the handling of ballot boxes, preparing of ballots for counting, counting operations, and reporting data. Results: Review of the TDP validated that the requirement was satisfactorily covered. 7.4.1 Software and Firmware Installation The system shall meet the following requirements for installation of software, including hardware with embedded firmware: a. Air Gap Architecture i. Every voting system shall be capable of being deployed in a segregated dual-installation architecture to protect against propagation of viruses. The architecture shall allow elections officials to use one or more, permanent server(s) and set of central-office voting devices, known to be running unaltered, certified software and firmware to create memory cards before each election and to use another, physically separate “sacrificial” server and set of voting devices after the election to tabulate results and generate reports. The architecture shall allow transfer of the election definition and tally database from the permanent server(s) to the sacrificial server using a write-once medium, such as a CD-R. The voting system architecture shall allow each installation to use its own Ethernet network, port server, and central-office vote-recording units, including any DRE and optical scan units, permitting the two installations to be segregated and air-gapped to ensure that there are no cross connections. An air gap is established by keeping two installations/networks physically separate and seeing that no device attached to the sacrificial installation/network is connected (directly or indirectly) to the first network, ensuring that data cannot flow from one installation/network to the other. ii. The TDP for the voting system shall provide full procedures and instructions, to be incorporated into the official use procedures for the voting system, to implement the segregated dual-installation architecture. b. Voting and Tabulating Units i. If software is resident in the system as firmware, the manufacturer shall require and state in the system documentation that every device is to be retested to validate each ROM prior to the start of elections operations. California Certification Page 7 of 32 Security and Telecomm Test Report v1.0 Report Number CHI-19044-STR-01 California Secretary of State Hart InterCivic Verity Voting 3.1 Security and Telecomm Test Report ii. To prevent alteration of executable code, no software shall be permanently installed or resident in the voting system unless the system documentation states that the jurisdiction must provide a secure physical and procedural environment for the storage, handling, preparation, and transportation of the system hardware. iii. The voting system bootstrap, monitor, and device-controller software may be resident permanently as firmware, provided that this firmware has been shown to be inaccessible to activation or control by any means other than by the authorized initiation and execution of the vote counting program, and its associated exception handlers. iv. The election-specific programming may be installed and resident as firmware, provided that such firmware is installed on a component (such as a computer chip) other than the component on which the operating system resides. v. After initiation of Election Day testing, no source code or compilers or assemblers shall be resident or accessible. Results: Review of the TDP validated that the requirement was satisfactorily covered. 7.4.2 Protection against Malicious Software Voting systems shall deploy commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) protection against the many forms of threats to which they may be exposed such as file and macro viruses, worms, Trojan horses, and logic bombs. Manufacturers shall develop and document the procedures to be followed to ensure that such protection is maintained in a current status. Virus and malware protection software and updates shall be installed using transportable portable media only and shall not be installed by download from the Internet. Results: Review of the TDP validated that the requirement was satisfactorily covered. 7.4.3 Software Distribution and Setup Validation Subsections 7.4.4, 7.4.5 and 7.4.6 specify requirements for the distribution of voting system software and the setup validation performed on voting system equipment. These requirements are applicable to voting systems that have completed certification testing. Results: Review of the TDP validated that the requirement was satisfactorily covered. California Certification Page 8 of 32 Security and Telecomm Test Report v1.0 Report Number CHI-19044-STR-01 California Secretary of State Hart InterCivic Verity Voting 3.1 Security and Telecomm Test Report 7.4.4 Software Distribution The manufacturer shall document all software including voting system software, third party software (such as operating systems and drivers) to be installed on the certified voting system, and installation programs. a. The documentation shall have a unique identifier (such as a serial number or part number) for the following set of information: documentation, software manufacturer name, product name, version, the certification application number of the voting system, file names and paths or other location information (such as storage addresses) of the software. b. The documentation shall designate all software files as static, semi-static or dynamic. Results: Review of the TDP validated that the requirement was satisfactorily covered. 7.4.5 Software Reference Information (Pertinent excerpt being addressed from CVSS requirement 7.4.5) a. The manufacturer shall provide the NSRL, any California certified escrow facility, pursuant to Title 2, Division 7, Chapter 6 of the California Code of Regulation, and the Office of the Secretary of State with a copy of the software installation disk, including the executable binary images of all third party software. Further, the manufacturer shall deposit the source code, tools, and documentation, to allow the complete and successful compilation of a system in its production/operation environment. i. The manufacturer shall document that the process used to verify the software distributed on unalterable storage media is the certified software by using the reference information provided by the NSRL or other designated repository before installing the software. b. The manufacturers shall document to whom they provide voting system software. Results: Review of the TDP validated that the requirement was satisfactorily covered. California Certification Page 9 of 32 Security and Telecomm Test Report v1.0 Report Number CHI-19044-STR-01 California Secretary of State Hart InterCivic Verity Voting 3.1 Security and Telecomm Test Report 7.4.6 Software Setup Validation a. Setup validation methods shall verify the contents of all system storage locations (e.g., system registers, variables, files, etc.) containing election specific information (e.g., ballot style, candidate registers, measure registers, etc.). i. The manufacturer shall document the default values of all system storage locations that hold election specific information. Results: Review of the TDP validated that the requirement was satisfactorily covered. 7.8.1 Access Control The accredited testing laboratory shall conduct tests of system capabilities and review the access control policies and procedures submitted by the manufacturer to identify and verify the access control features implemented as a function of the system. Specific activities to be conducted by the S-ATA shall include: a. A review of the manufacturer’s access control policies, procedures and system capabilities to confirm that all requirements have been addressed completely. Results: Review of the TDP validated that the requirement was satisfactorily covered. Phase II – Functional Security Testing Phase II testing included: Testing of relevant software and operating system configuration for pertinent vulnerabilities. Testing of hardware, including examination of unused hardware ports and the security measures applied to those ports. During Phase II, functional tests were exercised in order to verify and validate the following CVSS requirements: 2.1.1 Security. 5.4.3 In-process Audit Records. 7.2.1 General access control. 7.2.2 Access control identification. 7.2.3 Access control authentication. California Certification Page 10 of 32 Security and Telecomm Test Report v1.0 Report Number CHI-19044-STR-01 California Secretary of State Hart InterCivic Verity Voting 3.1 Security and Telecomm Test Report 7.2.4 Access control authorization. 7.3 Physical security measures. 7.3.1 Polling place security. 7.3.2 Central count location security. 7.4.1 Software and firmware installation. 7.4.2 Protection against malicious software. 7.4.3 Software distribution and setup validation. 7.4.5 Software Reference Information. 7.4.6 Software Setup Validation. 7.6 Telecommunications and data transmission. 7.6.1 Maintaining Data Integrity. 7.6.2 Election Returns. 7.8.1 Access Control. 7.8.2 Data Interception and Disruption. See the applicable section below for more details on these requirements and the test results. An issue log of any errors, omissions, or anomalies found in the documentation was maintained. 2.1.1 Security System security is achieved through a combination of technical capabilities and sound administrative practices. To ensure security, all systems shall: a. Provide security access controls that limit or detect access to critical system components to guard against loss of system integrity, availability, confidentiality, and accountability. b. Provide system functions that are executable only in the intended manner and order, and only under the intended conditions. c. Use the system's control logic to prevent a system function from executing if any preconditions to the function have not been met. d. Provide safeguards in response to system failure to protect against tampering during system repair or interventions in system operations. e. Provide security provisions that are compatible with the procedures and administrative tasks involved in equipment preparation, testing, and operation. f. Incorporate a means of implementing a capability if access to a system function is to be restricted or controlled. California Certification Page 11 of 32 Security and Telecomm Test Report v1.0 Report Number CHI-19044-STR-01 California Secretary of State Hart InterCivic Verity Voting 3.1 Security and Telecomm Test Report Testing performed: The overall functionality of the system was assessed based upon these seven overreaching functional security requirements: All access control mechanisms will be examined to determine if they are adequate to guard against system integrity, availability, confidentiality, and accountability. The system functions will be examined to determine that the system functions in only the intended manner. All system control logic will be examined to determine if system functions can be executed without preconditions to the functions being met. Examination of the systems safeguards in response to system failures to determine if there is protection against tampering during a system repair or interventions. Confirm that the security provisions are compatible with procedures, administrative tasks during equipment preparation, and election system testing and operation. Determine if system capabilities can be implemented during system functions while the system is restricted or controlled. Applicable to: Verity Data/Build, Verity Central, Verity Count, Verity Touch Writer, Verity Reader, Verity Scan, and Verity Print. Results: Testing validated that the requirement was satisfactorily covered. 5.4.3 In-process Audit Records a. Notification of system login or access errors, file access errors, and physical violations of security as they occur, and a summary record of these events after processing. Testing performed: As all other requirements were being tested, the Audit log was reviewed to verify that appropriate records were recorded for the events occurring. The examination also included: Attempts to modify or corrupt audit logs / records. Attempts to disable or turn off audit logging capabilities. Attempts to falsify audit logs located on removable election media. Applicable to: Verity Data/Build, Verity Central, Verity Count, Verity Touch Writer, Verity Reader, Verity Scan, and Verity Print. California Certification Page 12 of 32 Security and Telecomm Test Report v1.0 Report Number CHI-19044-STR-01 California Secretary of State Hart InterCivic Verity Voting 3.1 Security and Telecomm Test Report Results: All attempts to circumvent, modify, or disable in-process audit logs or capabilities were unsuccessful. Testing showed that the Verity polling place devices do not provide electronic monitoring of physical security. With the exception of the tablet being unlocked and removed from the case. This is considered a low severity vulnerability and has been mitigated by physical security controls, such as locks and tamper evident seals. 7.2.1 General Access Control a. Voting system equipment shall provide access control mechanisms designed to permit authorized access to the voting system and to prevent unauthorized access to the voting system. i. Access control mechanisms on the Election Management System (EMS) shall be capable of identifying and authenticating individuals permitted to perform operations on the EMS. b. Voting system equipment shall provide controls that permit or deny access to the device’s software and files. c. The default access control permissions shall implement the minimum permissions needed for each role or group identified by a device. d. The voting device shall prevent a lower-privileged process from modifying a higher-privileged process. e. An administrator of voting system equipment shall authorize privileged operations. f. Voting system equipment shall prevent modification to or tampering with software or firmware through any means other than the documented procedure for software upgrades. Testing performed: System wide authentication checks, including both positive and negative testing. To verify that the systems under examination allowed authorized users the ability to complete tasks while preventing all unauthorized users from accessing critical controls or processes. Attempts to access systems files or software via an unauthorized method or process. System wide permission checks to determine if user accounts and passcodes only allowed the appropriate levels of permission/roles to perform the task at hand. California Certification Page 13 of 32 Security and Telecomm Test Report v1.0 Report Number CHI-19044-STR-01 California Secretary of State Hart InterCivic Verity Voting 3.1 Security and Telecomm Test Report Examined solution specific users and roles to confirm permissions and task/actions. Attempts to escalate privileges from a lower privileged account in an attempt to perform or access roles or tasks not specifically assigned to users. Examined the system to determine if the software or firmware could be tampered with or modified through other means besides the documented procedure. Enumerated each system as able, pulling audit logs, firewall rules, running processes, network configurations, user lists, and security settings. Applicable to: Verity Data/Build, Verity Central, Verity Count, Verity Scan, Verity Touch Writer, Verity Print, and Verity Reader. Results: Review of the requirement validated that the requirement was partially covered. During the examination of the system, the ability to change the administrator password for the desktop environment was observed. While this didn’t allow an unauthorized user to access sensitive system components, the ability to change the systems administrative password from blank to an arbitrary value could cause a denial of service attack on the system, whether this change was unintentional or malicious. Mitigations would include setting the password on the system during deployment, and controlling physical access to the server with procedural controls at the jurisdiction. 7.2.2 Access Control Identification a. The voting system shall identify users and processes to which access is granted and the specific functions and data to which each entity holds authorized access. b. Voting system equipment that implements role-based access control shall support the recommendations for Core RBAC in the ANSI INCITS 359-2004 American National Standard for Information Technology Role Based Access Control document. c. Voting system equipment shall allow the administrator, group, or role to configure the permissions and functionality for each identity, group, or role to include account and group/role creation, modification, and deletion. Testing performed: Confirmed that the documented users and roles are the same as those documented in the TDP. Confirmed all solution roles and responsibilities. California Certification Page 14 of 32 Security and Telecomm Test Report v1.0 Report Number CHI-19044-STR-01 California Secretary of State Hart InterCivic Verity Voting 3.1 Security and Telecomm Test Report Confirmed administrative group’s roles and permissions. Applicable to: Verity Data/Build, Verity Central, Verity Count, Verity Scan, Verity Touch Writer, Verity Print, and Verity Reader. Results: Testing validated that the requirement was satisfactorily covered. 7.2.3 Access Control Authentication The following authentication requirements apply to all voting system equipment. a. Voting system equipment shall authenticate users prior to granting them access to system functions or data. b. When private or secret authentication data is stored in voting system equipment, the data shall be protected to ensure that the confidentiality and integrity of the data is not violated. c. Voting system equipment shall allow the administrator group or role to set and change passwords, pass phrases, and keys. d. Voting system equipment shall allow privileged groups or roles to be disabled and allow new individual privileged groups or roles to be created. e. Voting system equipment shall lock out groups, roles, or individuals after a specified number of consecutive failed authentication attempts within a predefined time period. f. Voting systems shall allow the administrator group or role to configure the account lock out policy, including the time period within which failed attempts must occur, the number of consecutive failed access attempts allowed before lock out, and the length of time the account is locked out. g. If the voting system uses a user name and password authentication method, the voting system shall allow the administrator to enforce password strength, histories, and expiration. h. The voting system shall allow the administrator group or role to specify password strength for all accounts, including minimum password length, use of capitalized letters, use of numeric characters, and use of non- alphanumeric characters. i. The voting system shall enforce password histories, and allow the administrator to configure the history length. j. Voting system equipment shall ensure that the username is not used in the password. k. Voting systems shall provide a means to automatically expire passwords in accordance with the voting jurisdiction’s policies. California Certification Page 15 of 32 Security and Telecomm Test Report v1.0 Report Number CHI-19044-STR-01 California Secretary of State Hart InterCivic Verity Voting 3.1 Security and Telecomm Test Report Testing performed: Attempts to access system functions and resources without successful authentication to the operating system or Verity 3.1 system. Attempts to find extra authentication data from system storage, including compact flash cards, hard drives, USB sticks, and Cfast storage. Verified the system equipment allows the administrator to change all passwords, pass phrases, and keys, if applicable. Verified that the system(s) have the ability to lockout accounts after a specified number of failed authentication attempts. Confirmed and tested the system’s password complexity, strength, lockout, history, length, and expiration requirements. Applicable to: Verity Data/Build, Verity Central, Verity Count, Verity Scan, Verity Touch Writer, Verity Print, and Verity Reader. Results: Review of the requirement validated that the requirement was partially covered. The Windows desktop operating system administrative user had a blank password. While the examiner was not able to circumvent the built-in access controls to access the system in an unauthorized manner, the operating system administrative password was able to be changed prior to the Verity shell being fully established. 7.2.4 Access Control Authorization a. Voting systems shall ensure that only authorized roles, groups, or individuals have access to election data. b. Voting systems shall explicitly authorize subject’s access based on access control lists or policies. c. Voting systems shall explicitly deny subject’s access based on access control lists or policies. During the examination, the access control authorization capabilities of all the systems were examined to determine if the systems sufficiently provided controls for authorization. Testing performed: Verified that the system only allows authorized roles, groups, and individuals access to election data. Verified that the system has access levels based on roles, control lists, or policies. California Certification Page 16 of 32 Security and Telecomm Test Report v1.0 Report Number CHI-19044-STR-01 California Secretary of State Hart InterCivic Verity Voting 3.1 Security and Telecomm Test Report Verified that the system successfully denies access to the system based on roles, lists, or policies. All the systems successfully protected the system BIOS settings from tampering which prevented all attempts to boot from unauthorized devices and system configuration settings from being changed at a BIOS level. Applicable to: Verity Data/Build, Verity Central, Verity Count, Verity Scan, Verity Touch Writer, Verity Print, and Verity Reader. Results: Testing validated that the requirement was satisfactorily covered. 7.3 Physical Security Measures a. Any unauthorized physical access shall leave physical evidence that an unauthorized event has taken place. b. Voting systems shall only have physical ports and access points that are essential to voting operations and to voting system testing and auditing. c. An event log entry that identifies the name of the affected device shall be generated if a component connected to a piece of voting system equipment is disconnected while polls are open. d. Ports disabled while polls are open shall only be re-enabled by authorized administrators. e. Access points, such as covers and panels, shall be secured by locks or tamper evident seals or tamper resistant countermeasures shall be implemented so that system owners can monitor access to voting system components through these points. f. Ballot boxes shall be designed such that any unauthorized physical access results in physical evidence that an unauthorized event has taken place. During the examination of the physical security measures, all the systems were physically secured as they normally would be during a live election. Testing performed: Attempts to circumvent all physical security features, including picking of locks and attempts to circumvent or bypass security seals and security screws. Examined and tested all ports and connectors. Disconnected devices and examined audit logs, as applicable, to determine if auditing of device disconnection was present. Identified and examined every cover, panel, and access compartment. Attempts to circumvent all ballot boxes in an attempt to add, remove, or destroy paper ballots. California Certification Page 17 of 32 Security and Telecomm Test Report v1.0 Report Number CHI-19044-STR-01 California Secretary of State Hart InterCivic Verity Voting 3.1 Security and Telecomm Test Report Applicable to: Verity Data/Build, Verity Central, Verity Count, Verity Scan, Verity Touch Writer, Verity Print, and Verity Reader. Results: Testing validated that the requirement was partially covered. Security seals, locks, and security screws can be circumvented. For this reason, it is recommended that the jurisdictions have a procedure in place to efficiently manage and monitor security seals and locking devices. Review of the requirement 7.3.d, showed that for all systems, all ports are enabled on the system; the ability to plug devices into the device ports requires specially made USB plugs or are physically secured behind locking compartments. Desktop equipment has sufficient physical security measures; however, all ports are available and enabled. The ballot printers all have default on board admin credentials enabled. This is considered a low level vulnerability. The severity was considered low as the impact of a directly connected printer is low. 7.3.1 Polling Place Security For polling place operations, manufacturers shall develop and provide detailed documentation of measures to enable poll workers to physically protect and perform orderly shutdown of voting equipment to counteract vandalism, civil disobedience, and similar occurrences. The measures shall allow the immediate detection of tampering with vote casting devices and precinct ballot counters. Testing performed: Tests were performed to verify that the documented measures provide adequate polling place security, including: Physical examination of ballot box security. Tested orderly shutdowns. Examined physical privacy screens that allow privacy during a voting session. Confirmed physical characteristics of device protection including locks, security seals, and cases. Examined ballot printers for the ability to manipulate printer settings. For Verity Print: o QR code/barcode scanner was tested to determine what action will be carried out when scanning a properly encoded code. o Malicious QR codes/bar codes were tested to see if the scanner will perform an unexpected action or read an incorrectly encoded code. Examples are SQL queries, reset barcode scanner settings to default, etc. California Certification Page 18 of 32 Security and Telecomm Test Report v1.0 Report Number CHI-19044-STR-01 California Secretary of State Hart InterCivic Verity Voting 3.1 Security and Telecomm Test Report o Physical attempts to modify or alter the QR Code/bar code were tested. o Confirmed that the action completed by the QR Code/bar code matches the intended outcome. (Provides the correct ballot, tabulates the correct selection, points to the correct position on the ballot for marking, brings up the appropriate ballot style, voter name, etc.) o Decoded/encoded codes to read the data contained in the code. (In many cases it’s encrypted data) as well as to see if the system will read any type of QR code/barcode or if it only reads specific encoding. Applicable to: Verity Scan, Verity Touch Writer, Verity Print, and Verity Reader. Results: Review of the requirement validated that the requirement was satisfactorily covered. With a caveat: The ballot printer’s administrative menu has default credentials; this is considered a low severity vulnerability. 7.3.2 Central Count Location Security Manufacturers shall develop and document in detail the measures to be taken in a central counting environment. These measures shall include physical and procedural controls related to the handling of ballot boxes, preparing of ballots for counting, counting operations and reporting data. Testing performed: Tests were performed to verify that the documented measures provide adequate central count location security, including: Confirmed physical characteristics of device protection including locks, security seals, and cases. Examined Verity desktop configurations to verify that the desktops provided secured network communications between devices. Examined Verity desktop configurations to verify that unauthorized users were not able to access operating system components. Verified that the Verity desktop configurations were not able to be manipulated through the ability to boot to unauthorized devices or circumvent in-place access controls. Verified all COTS equipment such as scanners and printers. Applicable to: Verity Central and Verity Count. Results: Testing validated that the requirement was satisfactorily covered. 7.4.1 Software and Firmware Installation (Pertinent excerpt being addressed from CVSS requirement 7.4.1) California Certification Page 19 of 32 Security and Telecomm Test Report v1.0 Report Number CHI-19044-STR-01 California Secretary of State Hart InterCivic Verity Voting 3.1 Security and Telecomm Test Report The system shall meet the following requirements for installation of software, including hardware with embedded firmware: a. Voting and Tabulating Units: i. To prevent alteration of executable code, no software shall be permanently installed or resident in the voting system unless the system documentation states that the jurisdiction must provide a secure physical and procedural environment for the storage, handling, preparation, and transportation of the system hardware. ii. The voting system bootstrap, monitor, and device-controller software may be resident permanently as firmware, provided that this firmware has been shown to be inaccessible to activation or control by any means other than by the authorized initiation and execution of the vote counting program, and its associated exception handlers. iii. The election-specific programming may be installed and resident as firmware, provided that such firmware is installed on a component (such as a computer chip) other than the component on which the operating system resides. iv. After initiation of Election Day testing, no source code or compilers or assemblers shall be resident or accessible. Testing performed: Confirmed solutions air gap architecture including, but not limited to, private ethernet networking configurations and protections and the ability to protect the system against foreign software being introduced to the system. Confirmed that the Verity Voting 3.1 system contained no source code, compilers, or assemblers. Confirmed that all boot operations were password protected and that the Verity Voting 3.1 system’s monitoring and device controller software is inaccessible to activation or control. Confirmed that none of the software is permanently installed or resident in the Verity Voting 3.1 system. Applicable to: Verity Data/Build, Verity Central, Verity Count, Verity Scan, Verity Touch Writer, Verity Print, and Verity Reader. Results: Testing of the requirement validated that the requirement was satisfactorily covered. With a caveat that the systems redundant array of independent drives (RAID) controller software is accessible during the boot function and could potentially be used to delete or reconfigure the onboard RAID. California Certification Page 20 of 32 Security and Telecomm Test Report v1.0 Report Number CHI-19044-STR-01 California Secretary of State Hart InterCivic Verity Voting 3.1 Security and Telecomm Test Report Deletion of the RAID volume only removes the system mirrored redundancy and doesn’t affect the machines functionality. 7.4.2 Protection against Malicious Software Voting systems shall deploy commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) protection against the many forms of threats to which they may be exposed such as file and macro viruses, worms, Trojan horses, and logic bombs. Manufacturers shall develop and document the procedures to be followed to ensure that such protection is maintained in a current status. Virus and malware protection software and updates shall be installed using transportable portable media only and shall not be installed by download from the Internet. Testing performed: Tests were performed to verify that COTS products are implemented to protect against malicious software, as described in voting system manufacturer documentation, including: Verifying protection against malicious software and files. Ability to run unauthorized software. Ability to run unauthorized scripts (PowerShell, Python, and batch). Attempts to circumvent whitelisting technology. Applicable to: Verity Data/Build, Verity Central, Verity Count, Verity Scan, Verity Touch Writer, Verity Print, and Verity Reader. Results: Testing of the requirement demonstrated that the requirement was satisfactorily covered. It was noted that the EICAR test files were not prevented from being introduced to the desktop machines; however, all attempts to execute malicious software or unauthorized executables and scripts was prevented. 7.4.3 Software Distribution and Setup Validation Subsections 7.4.4, 7.4.5, and 7.4.6 specify requirements for the distribution of voting system software and the setup validation performed on voting system equipment. These requirements are applicable to voting systems that have completed certification testing. Testing performed: This requirement is met by successful validation of 7.4.5 and 7.4.6. Applicable to: Verity Data/Build, Verity Central, Verity Count, Verity Scan, Verity Touch Writer, Verity Print, and Verity Reader. Results: Testing determined that the requirement was satisfactorily covered. 7.4.4 Software Distribution and Setup Validation California Certification Page 21 of 32 Security and Telecomm Test Report v1.0 Report Number CHI-19044-STR-01 California Secretary of State Hart InterCivic Verity Voting 3.1 Security and Telecomm Test Report The manufacturer shall document all software including voting system software, third party software (such as operating systems and drivers) to be installed on the certified voting system, and installation programs. a. The documentation shall have a unique identifier (such as a serial number or part number) for the following set of information: documentation, software manufacturer name, product name, version, the certification application number of the voting system, file names and paths or other location information (such as storage addresses) of the software. b. The documentation shall designate all software files as static, semi-static or dynamic. Testing performed: During the examination of the Verity Voting 3.1 solution, the systems were reviewed to confirm: Verification and examination of third-party software for vulnerabilities. Verification and examination of all software and file paths. Confirmation of unique identifiers of software. Examination of static, semi-static, and dynamic content of the systems. Applicable to: Verity Data/Build, Verity Central, Verity Count, Verity Scan, Verity Touch Writer, and Verity Reader. Results: Testing determined that the requirement was satisfactorily covered. 7.4.5 Software Reference Information a. The voting system equipment shall be designed to allow the voting system administrator to verify that the software is the certified software by comparing it to reference information produced by the NSRL or other designated repository. Testing performed: Tests were performed to verify that the software can be verified to meet the National Software Reference Library (NSRL) reference information, including: Verification of trusted build process. Verification and examination of system verification process for integrity checking the certified software. Verified the process for certifying system software. Applicable to: Verity Data/Build, Verity Central, Verity Count, Verity Scan, Verity Touch Writer, and Verity Reader. Results: Testing validated that the requirement was satisfactorily covered. California Certification Page 22 of 32 Security and Telecomm Test Report v1.0 Report Number CHI-19044-STR-01 California Secretary of State Hart InterCivic Verity Voting 3.1 Security and Telecomm Test Report 7.4.6 Software Setup Validation a. Setup validation methods shall verify that only authorized software is present on the voting equipment. Authorized software is COTS software components needed to run the voting system and voting software components identified by the manufacturer as authorized. b. The manufacturer shall provide a method to comprehensively list all software files that are installed on voting systems. i. This method shall list version names and numbers for all application software on the voting system. ii. This method should list of the date of installation for all application software on the voting system. c. Setup validation methods shall include a software verification method that ensures that the voting system software has not been modified illegitimately. i. The voting systems shall include any supporting software and hardware necessary to conduct the software verification method. ii. The manufacturer shall document the process used to conduct the software verification method. iii. The software verification method shall not modify the voting system software on the voting system. d. Voting systems shall include a software verification method that either verifies software prior to installation or a method that verifies software using an external interface. Voting systems may include both software verification methods. Voting systems may provide ancillary setup validation methods, including methods for verifying or identifying installed software, other than those described in this section. There are no specific requirements for ancillary setup validation methods. However, any method intended to serve as the voting system software verification method must meet the requirements outlined in this section. e. Voting systems which implement a software verification method that verifies software prior to installation shall meet the following requirements. i. The voting system shall contain no more than one method for installing, updating, or removing software on a system. o Voting system equipment shall prevent processes from installing software except for the one specific software installation process identified by the manufacturer. California Certification Page 23 of 32 Security and Telecomm Test Report v1.0 Report Number CHI-19044-STR-01 California Secretary of State Hart InterCivic Verity Voting 3.1 Security and Telecomm Test Report o The voting system manufacturer shall document the procedures for installing, updating, and removing voting system software, configuration files, and data files. o Voting system equipment shall prevent processes from installing, updating or removing software while the polls are open. o Voting system equipment shall prevent the execution of software not installed using the specified software installation process. ii. The voting system shall only allow authenticated administrators to install software on voting equipment. The voting system shall present the administrator with a description of the software change being performed, including: o A list of all applications and/or file names being updated. o The type of action performed on each application and/or file (e.g., new application/file, deletion or overwriting of existing file). iii. Voting system equipment shall store the current version identification of all software installed on the voting system equipment. o The current version identification shall be included as part of reports created by the voting system equipment. o The current version identification shall be displayed as part of the voting system equipment start up process. iv. The process for installing, updating and removing software shall make software changes based on information contained in software update packages. Software update packages shall minimally contain the following information: o A unique identifier for the software update package. o Names of the applications or files modified during the update process. o Version numbers of the applications or files modified during the update process. o Any software prerequisites or dependencies for the software involved in the update. o A description of the type of action performed on each application and/or file (e.g., new application/file, deletion or overwriting of existing file). o The binary data of any new or updated files involved in the update process. California Certification Page 24 of 32 Security and Telecomm Test Report v1.0 Report Number CHI-19044-STR-01 California Secretary of State Hart InterCivic Verity Voting 3.1 Security and Telecomm Test Report v. The software update package shall be formatted in a non-restrictive, publicly-available format. Manufacturers shall provide a specification describing how they have implemented the format with respect to the manufacturer’s specific voting devices and data, including such items as descriptions of elements, attributes, constraints, extensions, syntax and semantics of the format, and definitions for data fields and schemas. vi. Software update packages shall be digitally signed by using a NIST approved algorithm with a security strength of at least 112 bits. vii. The software installation process shall verify digital signatures, software version identification, software prerequisites and dependencies, and manufacturer specific authorization information associated with the software before the software is installed. The software installation process shall not install software with invalid digital signatures, version numbers, or manufacturer specific authorization information, and shall not install software on systems that do not meet the update requisites. viii. The voting system shall have the capability to prevent the installation of previous versions of applications or files. ix. The software installation process shall result in information being stored in the voting system equipment’s log such that altering or deleting log entries or the log was detected. x. The minimum information to be included in the voting system equipment log shall be: o Success or failure of the software installation process. o Cause of a failed software installation (such as invalid version identification, digital signature, etc.) o Application or file name(s), and version number(s). o A description of the type of action performed on each application and/or file (e.g., new application/file, deletion or overwriting of existing file.) o A cryptographic hash of the software update package using FIPS 1402 level 1 or higher validated cryptographic module. f. If software is verified after being installed on the voting system equipment, the voting system equipment shall provide an external interface to the location of the voting system software for software verification purposes. i. The external interface: o Shall be protected using tamper evident techniques. California Certification Page 25 of 32 Security and Telecomm Test Report v1.0 Report Number CHI-19044-STR-01 California Secretary of State Hart InterCivic Verity Voting 3.1 Security and Telecomm Test Report o Shall have a physical indicator showing when the interface is enabled and disabled. o Shall be disabled during voting. o Should provide a direct read-only access to the location of the voting system software without the use of installed software. The verification process should be able to be performed using COTS software and hardware available from sources other than the voting system manufacturer. o If the process uses hashes or digital signatures, then the verification software shall use a FIPS 140-2 level 1 or higher validated cryptographic module. o The verification process shall either (a) use reference information on unalterable storage media received from the repository or (b) verify the digital signature of the reference information on any other media. g. Setup validation methods shall verify the contents of all system storage locations (e.g., system registers, variables, files, etc.) containing election specific information (e.g., ballot style, candidate registers, measure registers, etc.). i. The manufacturer should provide a method to query the voting system to determine the value contained in all system storage locations containing election specific information. Testing performed: Tests were performed to verify that the installation process for each system component is robust and maintains the integrity of the voting system. These tests included: Attempts to modify or change Verity Desktop executable software. Attempts to modify or change Verity device executable software. Confirmed process for verification of Verity Desktop and device software. Verified that Verity utilizes FIPS 140-2 validated hashing algorithms. Verified system installation process and procedure. Verified system trusted build procedures. Examined the desktop environment to confirm that there is no unauthorized software on the device. Applicable to: Verity Data/Build, Verity Central, Verity Count, Verity Scan, Verity Touch Writer, Verity Print, and Verity Reader. Results: Review of the requirement validated that the requirement was satisfactorily covered. California Certification Page 26 of 32 Security and Telecomm Test Report v1.0 Report Number CHI-19044-STR-01 California Secretary of State Hart InterCivic Verity Voting 3.1 Security and Telecomm Test Report 7.6 Telecommunications and Data Transmission There are four areas that must be addressed by telecommunications and data transmission security capabilities: access control, data integrity, detection and prevention of data interception, and protection against external threats. 7.6.1 Maintaining Data Integrity Voting systems that use telecommunications to communicate between system components and locations are subject to the same security requirements governing access to any other system hardware, software, and data function. a. Voting systems that use electrical or optical transmission of data shall ensure the receipt of valid vote records is verified at the receiving station. This should include standard transmission error detection and correction methods such as checksums or message digest hashes. Verification of correct transmission shall occur at the voting system application level and ensure that the correct data is recorded on all relevant components consolidated within the polling place prior to the voter completing casting of his or her ballot. i. Cryptography used to verify the receipt of vote records shall use NIST approved algorithms with security strength of at least 112 bits. Message Authentication Code (MAC) keys shall have a security strength of at least 112 bits. Testing performed: Tests were performed to verify that data is properly encrypted, and that receipt is verified, including: Security testing captured and examined all network traffic between each of the separate networked devices and determined that all traffic between the server and clients utilize encrypted traffic. Determining that all results files and election relevant data that is transmitted or contained in removable media are encrypted or digitally signed. Examination of the desktop isolated networks determined that all communications between devices require authentication and that any unauthorized devices accidentally or maliciously added to the secured networking environments would not be able to interact with the Verity Desktop server/client systems. Vulnerability scans of desktop systems were conducted both as a trusted and untrusted machine in the network. Applicable to: Verity Data/Build, Verity Central, and Verity Count. Results: Review of the requirement validated that the requirement was satisfactorily covered. California Certification Page 27 of 32 Security and Telecomm Test Report v1.0 Report Number CHI-19044-STR-01 California Secretary of State Hart InterCivic Verity Voting 3.1 Security and Telecomm Test Report 7.6.2 Election Returns If the voting system provides access to election returns or interactive inquiries, the system shall: a. Allow authorized administrators the ability to disable or restrict access to election returns (for equipment that operates in a central counting environment). This requirement applies as well to polling place equipment that contains a removable memory module or that may be removed in its entirety to a central place for the consolidation of polling place returns. b. Design voting system software and its security environment such that data accessible to interactive queries resides in an external file or database created and maintained by the elections software under the restrictions applying to any other output report: i. The output file or database has no provision for write access back to the system. ii. Persons whose only authorized access is to the file or database are denied write access, both to the file or database, and to the system. Testing performed: Tests were performed to determine that if the system provides access to election returns or interactive queries, then the authorized administrators can disable or restrict access, and that the data resides in an external file or database governed by the voting system. Tests included: Attempts to compromise database components to modify or alter results. Attempts to modify or change results files on removable media. Attempts to change results in transmission between count server and client. Attempts to physically compromise device and desktop systems in an attempt to compromise storage media. Applicable to: Verity Central and Verity Count. Results: Testing validated that the requirement was satisfactorily covered. 7.8.1 Access Control For those access control features built in as components of the voting system, the S-ATA shall design tests to confirm that these security elements work as specified. Specific activities to be conducted by the S-ATA shall include: a. Specific tests designed by the S-ATA to verify the correct operation of all documented access control procedures and capabilities, including tests designed to circumvent controls provided by the manufacturer. These tests shall include: California Certification Page 28 of 32 Security and Telecomm Test Report v1.0 Report Number CHI-19044-STR-01 California Secretary of State Hart InterCivic Verity Voting 3.1 Security and Telecomm Test Report i. Performing the activities that the jurisdiction will perform in specific accordance with the manufacturer’s access control policy and procedures to create a secure system, including procedures for software and firmware installation. ii. Performing tests intended to bypass or otherwise defeat the resulting security environment. These tests shall include simulation of attempts to physically destroy components of the voting system in order to validate the correct operation of system redundancy and backup capabilities. This review applies to the full scope of system functionality. It includes functionality for defining the ballot and other pre-voting functions, as well as functions for casting and storing votes, vote canvassing, vote reporting, and maintenance of the system’s audit trail. Testing performed: Tests were performed to verify the documented procedures as well as attempts to defeat the implemented access control security on each system component, including: Physical examination of all networking connections and equipment. Vulnerability assessment of networked devices. Username and password bypass attempts for networked devices. Applicable to: Verity Data/Build, Verity Central, Verity Count, Verity Scan, Verity Touch Writer, Verity Print, and Verity Reader. Results: Testing validated that the requirement was satisfactorily covered. 7.8.2 Data Interception and Disruption For systems that use telecommunications, as provided for in section 6 of the Standards and consistent with California law, to transmit official voting data, the S- ATA shall review, and conduct tests of, the data interception and prevention safeguards specified by the manufacturer in its TDP. The S-ATA shall evaluate safeguards provided by the manufacturer to ensure their proper operation, including the proper response to the detection of efforts to monitor data or otherwise compromise the system. Individual, public-facing voting components are not networked, nor do they transmit individual voting results. This includes the Verity Print, Verity Reader, Verity Scan, and Verity Touch. The only telecommunications in use is an isolated closed network to link the EMS systems together at a central count location. Operating system level transmissions provided appropriate encryption, receipt validation, and data integrity. Testing performed: Testing was performed to verify operating system level transmissions provided appropriate encryption, receipt validation, and data integrity, including: California Certification Page 29 of 32 Security and Telecomm Test Report v1.0 Report Number CHI-19044-STR-01 California Secretary of State Hart InterCivic Verity Voting 3.1 Security and Telecomm Test Report Security testing captured and examined all network traffic between each of the separate networked devices and determined that all traffic between the server and clients utilize encrypted traffic. The examination determined that all results files and election relevant data that is transmitted or contained in removable media are encrypted or digitally signed. Examination of the desktop isolated networks determined that all communications between devices require authentication and that any unauthorized devices accidentally or maliciously added to the secured networking environments would not be able to interact with the Verity Desktop server/client systems. Vulnerability scans of desktop systems were conducted both as a trusted and untrusted machine in the network. Applicable to: Verity Data/Build, Verity Central, and Verity Count. Results: Testing validated that the requirement was satisfactorily covered. Phase III – Telecommunications and Data Transmission Testing During Phase III, tests were exercised in order to verify and validate the following requirements: Testing of system communications, including encryption of data, as well as protocols and procedures for access authorization. In this phase, tests were exercised in order to verify and validate the following CVSS requirements: 6.1.2 Data Transmission. 6.2.1 Confirmation. See the applicable section below for more details on these requirements and the test results. An issue log of any errors, omissions, or anomalies found in the documentation was maintained. 6.1.2 Data Transmission These requirements apply to the use of telecommunications to transmit data for the preparation of the system for an election, the execution of an election, and the preservation of the system data and audit trails during and following an election. While this section does not assume a specific model of voting system operations and does not assume a specific model for the use of telecommunications to California Certification Page 30 of 32 Security and Telecomm Test Report v1.0 Report Number CHI-19044-STR-01 California Secretary of State Hart InterCivic Verity Voting 3.1 Security and Telecomm Test Report support such operations, it does address the following types of data, where applicable: Voter Authentication: Coded information that confirms the identity of a voter for security purposes for a system that transmits votes individually. Ballot Definition: Information that describes to a voting machine the content and appearance of the ballots to be used in an election. Vote Count: Information representing the tabulation of votes at any level within the control of the jurisdiction, such as the polling place, precinct or central count. List of Voters: A listing of the individual voters who have cast ballots in a specific election. Additional data transmissions used to operate a voting system in the conduct of an election, but not explicitly listed above, are also subject to the requirements of this section. Testing performed: All networked devices were scrutinized to determine if networked systems and the data transmissions between the networked systems were vulnerable to compromise, and if the data transmissions were encrypted. Testing included: Nessus vulnerability scans were conducted on all equipment that were connected to the private Verity Voting 3.1 isolated networks as an external untrusted entity. Testing to confirm that the operating system level transmissions provided appropriate encryption, receipt validation, and data integrity. Testing to confirm that the ability to export Root certificates didn’t include the private key. Network Packet capture and analysis, to determine transmission encryption, and to determine if authentication was performed in the clear. Applicable to: Verity Data/Build, Verity Central, and Verity Count. Results: Testing demonstrated that the requirement was satisfactorily covered in the tested configuration. 6.2.1 Confirmation Confirmation occurs when the system notifies the user of the successful or unsuccessful completion of the data transmission, where successful completion is defined as accurate receipt of the transmitted data. To provide confirmation, the telecommunications components of a voting system shall notify the user of the successful or unsuccessful completion of the data transmission. In the event of unsuccessful transmission, the user shall be notified of the action to be taken. California Certification Page 31 of 32 Security and Telecomm Test Report v1.0 Report Number CHI-19044-STR-01 California Secretary of State Hart InterCivic Verity Voting 3.1 Security and Telecomm Test Report Testing performed: Testing was performed to verify appropriate confirmation of data transmission to the user and actions to be taken, if any, including: Nessus vulnerability scans were conducted on all equipment connected to the private Verity Voting 3.1 system networks. Operating system level transmissions provide confirmation. In the case of transmissions between server and client for the Verity systems, confirmation was displayed or provided in audit logging. Applicable to: Verity Data/Build, Verity Central, and Verity Count. Results: Testing validated that the requirement was satisfactorily covered. This requirement was determined to be not applicable for polling place devices. Nessus vulnerability scans were conducted on all equipment that was connected to the private EMS network. These included the Verity Data/Build Server/Client, Verity Central Server/Client, Verity Count Server/Client. Operating system level transmissions provided confirmation of transmission. Testing validated that the requirement was satisfactorily covered. Final Report During the CVSS requirements examination and the Open-Ended Vulnerability Testing (OEVT) portion of the testing, issues were noted related to access control for desktop devices, passwords, ballot printer configuration and standalone desktop configurations. It should be noted that these issues do not directly affect the overall function of the voting system and are alleviated with manual processes and procedures. In many cases, the issues discovered were not related to public- facing voting system components and required elevated system permissions for access or manipulation. It should also be noted that proper secure utilization of the voting system solution is reliant upon properly trained personnel, as well as following all processes and procedures set forth by the voting vendor to ensure properly configured and secured equipment for use in a live election environment. As directed by the California Secretary of State, this report does not include any recommendation as to whether or not the system should be approved. End of Security and Telecommunications Test Report California Certification Page 32 of 32 Security and Telecomm Test Report v1.0 Report Number CHI-19044-STR-01